BORROKA - The legitimation of street violence in the political discourse of radical Basque nationalists

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 714-736

  Van Broek, Hanspeter Den ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b NONE   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 12144269451     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/095465590885141     Document Type: Review

References (75)

1. This denomination, Movimiento para la Liberación National Vasco (MLNV), was adopted by the radical nationalist movement to establish parallels with the national liberation movements in other parts of the world (e.g., Algeria, Vietnam) and to convey the image of a guerrilla army with general and wide support within Basque society. In this conception. ETA is the MLNV's military branch, Herri Batasuna (HB) its political organization, and Jarrai its youth movement. (In recent years, and anticipating judicial attempts to declare organizations belonging to the MLNV illegal, Herri Batasuna changed its name to "Euskal Herritarrok," then to "Batasuna," and, recently, to "Sozialista Abertzaleak," whereas Jarrai became "Haika," and, later, "Segi.")
2. For Basque nationalists, the Basque Country (or Euskal Herria in the Basque language) comprises the Basque Autonomous Community and the Foral Community of Navarre in Spain, and Iparralde, or the French Basque region, on the northern side of the Pyrenees. This is the region where historically the Basque language has been spoken and which both moderate and radical nationalists see as their Basque Fatherland; still, the region has never been a political subject in itself. The Basque Autonomous Community is made up of the provinces Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya, and Álava, and acquired its special status as a result of the Statute of Autonomy of 1979; the level of autonomous rule of the Basque Government and Parliament is generally assumed to be even higher than that of the German Länder. However, and unless stated otherwise, throughout the text I will use the expression "the Basque Country" to refer to the Basque region in Spain, as it is principally on Spanish soil that ETA activists and adherents have carried out their violent actions. (The Basque region in the south of France does not have a special status, but forms part of the Acquitaine department. Despite the fact that in radical nationalist discourse both the Spanish and the French State are qualified as the occupying enemy forces, for "practical" reasons, ETA actions have hardly ever taken place in France. For decades, ETA commandos considered the French Basque region a sanctuary where attacks could be prepared and where activists could find refuge after they had been carried out. Several times, I heard Spanish politicians and journalists complain that there seemed to exist some sort of tacit agreement between the French state and ETA which implied that the latter would not commit any terrorist attacks on French soil, as long as the gendarmerie left ETA undisturbed. However, this situation changed after 11 September 2001; since then, operations of French police forces against ETA members have been more frequent and successful.) For the good order, moderate and radical nationalist parties account for just over 50 percent of the votes in the Basque Autonomous Community, whereas support for Basque nationalism is about 10 percent in the province of Navarre and less than 5 percent in the Basque region in the south of France. Votes for Herri Batasuna have always oscillated around 15 percent in the Basque Autonomous Community.
3. Patricia O'Connor, "Introduction: Discourse of Violence," Discourse & Society 6/3 (1995) p.310.
4. David E. Apter, "Political Violence in Analytical Perspective," In D.E. Apter (ed.), The Legitimation of Violence (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1997) pp.2, 5.
5. Michael Wieviorka, "ETA and Basque Political Violence," in D.E. Apter (ed.), The Legitimation of Violence (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1997).
6. Javier Elzo, Plan de actuación del Gobierno para el desarrollo de los valores democráticos y fomento de actitudes de solidaridad, tolerancia y responsabilidad en los adolescentes y jóvenes vascos (Vitoria-Gasteiz: Eusko Jaurlaritza, 1996; internal document).
7. Apter (note 4) p.11.
8. Alan Bairner, "The battlefield of Ideas: The Legitimation of Political Violence in Northern Ireland." European Journal of Political Research 14 (1986) pp.637-640.
9. a parte (1995; internal document).
10. ETA, "Ponencia general - Karramarro" Zutabe, 12 (1995; internal document); ETA, Karramarro (2. zatia) (1996; internal document).
11. ETA, "Ponencia general - Karramarro" Zutabe, 12 (1995; internal document); ETA, Karramarro (2. zatia) (1996; internal document).
12. Obviously, some of the left-wing nationalists I interviewed had more extremist views than others (Jarrai spokespersons and participants in acts of street violence were generally more radical than the average Herri Batasuna member), and not all respondents managed the same discursive resources (some militant youths, in particular, used rather rudimentary rhetoric). Radical nationalist youth generally distinguished themselves from other young people for their preference for revolutionary symbols (Che Guevara badges, T-shirts with slogans in favour of ETA prisoners) and their deep, often openly professed, respect for ETA.
13. María J. Funes, "Social Responses to Political Violence in the Basque Country: Peace Movements and Their Audience," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42/4 (August 1998), p.495.
14. Ibid, p.507.
15. Fernando Reinares, Patriotas de la muerte. Quiénes han militado en ETA y por qué (Madrid: Grupo Santillana de Ediciones, S.A., 2001).
16. José Manuel Mata López, El Nationalisme Vasco Radical. Discurso, organización y expresiones (Bilbao: Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del Pais Vasco, 1993).
17. Elzo (note 6) p.4.
18. Ibid. Similar depolitization occurs in Douglass and Zulaika's analysis of ETA violence as ritual action (William A. Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, "On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process," Comparative Studies of Society and History 32/2, 1990). Elsewhere, Zulaika affirms that youth participation in kale borroka actions respond to "rituals of manliness" (El Diario Vasco, 29 Sept. 1996).
19. Ibid. Similar depolitization occurs in Douglass and Zulaika's analysis of ETA violence as ritual action (William A. Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, "On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process," Comparative Studies of Society and History 32/2, 1990). Elsewhere, Zulaika affirms that youth participation in kale borroka actions respond to "rituals of manliness" (El Diario Vasco, 29 Sept. 1996).
20. Ibid. Similar depolitization occurs in Douglass and Zulaika's analysis of ETA violence as ritual action (William A. Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, "On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process," Comparative Studies of Society and History 32/2, 1990). Elsewhere, Zulaika affirms that youth participation in kale borroka actions respond to "rituals of manliness" (El Diario Vasco, 29 Sept. 1996).
21. Jeremy MacClancy, "At Play with Identity in the Basque Arena," in S. Macdonald (ed.), Inside European Identities: Ethnography in Western Europe (Oxford: Berg Publishers Ltd., 1993) p.94.
22. Ibid. p.87.
23. Anton Blok, "Het narcisme van kleine verschillen," Amsterdams Sociologist Tijdschrift, 24/2 (1997).
24. For a good analysis of the history and strategies of the peace movements in the Basque Country, see Maria J. Funes, La salida del silencio. Movilizaciones par la paz en Euskadi, 1986-1997 (Akal Ediciones, 1998).
25. Herri Batasuna (note 9) p.61.
26. Jarrai-1, V/99. The respondents are referred to by indicating the organization they belong to or are active in: HB = Herri Batasuna; Jarrai = the MLNV youth organization; KByth = youth who had participated in kale borroka actions; EHA = the movement Euskal Herria Askatu. Respondents are numbered according to the first time they were interviewed; also given are the month and year the interview was done: V/99 = May 1999.
27. Herri Batasuna (note 9); ETA (note 10).
28. ETA, Karamarro (2. Zatia) (note 10) p.16.
29. Ibid. p.19.
30. Ibid. p.18.
31. ETA, Zutabe (see note 10) in: Annex Karramarro Txostenak, KAS alternatibatik Euskal Alternatiba Demokratikora eman beti hitza herriari; emphasis in the original.
32. Egin, 1 Jan. 1996; cited in José Antonio Rekondo, Bietan Jarrai. Guerray Paz en las calles de Euskadi (Bilbao: Aranalde, 1998) p.55.
33. Egin, 1 Jan. 1996; cited in José Antonio Rekondo, Bietan Jarrai. Guerray Paz en las calles de Euskadi (Bilbao: Aranalde, 1998) p.55.
34. Cf. also Rekondo (note 29) p.26.
35. Jarrai, Los movimientos populares y nuestra actuación politica. Usurbilgo Jarraiko ikastaroak, batzar nazionala; Uda ikastaroak (1995, internal document) p.7.
36. Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
37. Ibid. p.8.
38. See note 2.
39. Partido Socialista Obrero Español, the Spanish social-democratic party in government in Madrid from 1982 until 1996, when it was displaced from power by the conservative Partido Popular. Since 14 March 2004, The PSOE has been in government again.
40. Herri Batasuna (note 9) pp.20-22.
41. Ibid. p.22.
42. ETA (note 10).
43. ETA, Karramarro(2. zatia) (note 10) p.8.
44. I-b-i-d.
45. Rekondo (note 29) p.22.
46. Herri Batasuna (note 9) p.29.
47. ETA, Karramarro 2 (note 10) p. 18.
48. HB-6, X/99.
49. I-b-i-d.
50. HB-5, IX/99.
51. Jarrai-3, VI/99.
52. KByth-l, X/98.
53. HB-5, IX/99.
54. HB-4, VIII/99.
55. Elzo (note 6).
56. KByth-1, X/98.
57. KByth-3, IX/99.
58. Jarrai-4, IX/99.
59. KByth-3, IX/99.
60. I-b-i-d.
61. EHA-1, IX/99.
62. HB-5, IX/99.
63. Jarrai-1, V/99.
64. KByth-1, X/98.
65. Jarrai-4, IX/99.
66. I-b-i-d.
67. Jarrai-1, V/99.
68. I-b-i-d.
69. Cited in Rekondo (note 29) p.30.
70. In the late 1980s, one of the ETA leaders had designed this type of part-time juvenile terrorism with different goals in mind: it would compensate for the reduced operativeness of ETA; participants, most of them being minors, would receive relatively low punishments if arrested by the police; these violent acions would be useful training for those who desired to become full-fledged ETA members.
71. As a matter of fact, an MLNV document had already stated in 1997 that Basque youth had to be instructed on how to sustain the kale borroka on their own account in time of truce; see Rekondo (note 29) p.32.
72. J.A. Kotarba, "Labelling Theory and Everyday Deviance," in Jack D. Douglas et al., Introduction to the Sociologies of Everyday Life (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1980) p.90.
73. Cf. P. Arthur, "'Reading' Violence: Ireland," in D.E. Apter (ed.), The Legitimation of Violence (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1997).
74. HB-5, IX/99.
75. HB-7, v/2000.