How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats

Psychological Review

Volumn 102, Issue 4, 1995, Pages 684-704

  Gigerenzer, Gerd ^a,b   Hoffrage, Ulrich ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN COGNITIVE AND BRAIN SCIENCES   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 11944267218     PISSN: 0033295X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0033-295X.102.4.684     Document Type: Article

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