The compliant ally? Turkey and the west in the Middle East 1954-58

Middle Eastern Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 73-90

  Sever, Ayşegül ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 11744308988     PISSN: 00263206     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00263209808701223     Document Type: Review

References (89)

1. There are no substantial Turkish official records available for this period.
2. For the Soviet demands see Necmettin Sadak, 'Turkey faces the Soviets', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27 (1949), pp. 458-61; Feridun Cernai Erkin, Türk-Sovyet Iliskileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Basnur Yayinevi, 1968), pp. 246-318; Suat Bilge, Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliǧi İlişkileri 1920-64 - Güç Komşuluk (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankasi Kültür Yayinlari, 1992), pp.265-80; Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp.355-82; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1975), Vol.IV, pp.206-10.
3. For the Soviet demands see Necmettin Sadak, 'Turkey faces the Soviets', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27 (1949), pp. 458-61; Feridun Cernai Erkin, Türk-Sovyet Iliskileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Basnur Yayinevi, 1968), pp. 246-318; Suat Bilge, Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliǧi İlişkileri 1920-64 - Güç Komşuluk (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankasi Kültür Yayinlari, 1992), pp.265-80; Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp.355-82; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1975), Vol.IV, pp.206-10.
4. For the Soviet demands see Necmettin Sadak, 'Turkey faces the Soviets', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27 (1949), pp. 458-61; Feridun Cernai Erkin, Türk-Sovyet Iliskileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Basnur Yayinevi, 1968), pp. 246-318; Suat Bilge, Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliǧi İlişkileri 1920-64 - Güç Komşuluk (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankasi Kültür Yayinlari, 1992), pp.265-80; Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp.355-82; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1975), Vol.IV, pp.206-10.
5. For the Soviet demands see Necmettin Sadak, 'Turkey faces the Soviets', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27 (1949), pp. 458-61; Feridun Cernai Erkin, Türk-Sovyet Iliskileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Basnur Yayinevi, 1968), pp. 246-318; Suat Bilge, Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliǧi İlişkileri 1920-64 - Güç Komşuluk (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankasi Kültür Yayinlari, 1992), pp.265-80; Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp.355-82; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1975), Vol.IV, pp.206-10.
6. For the Soviet demands see Necmettin Sadak, 'Turkey faces the Soviets', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27 (1949), pp. 458-61; Feridun Cernai Erkin, Türk-Sovyet Iliskileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi (Ankara: Basnur Yayinevi, 1968), pp. 246-318; Suat Bilge, Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliǧi İlişkileri 1920-64 - Güç Komşuluk (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankasi Kültür Yayinlari, 1992), pp.265-80; Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp.355-82; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1975), Vol.IV, pp.206-10.
7. Ömer Kürkçüoǧlu, Türkiye'nin Arab Ortadoǧusuna Karşi Politikasi 1945-1970 (Ankara: A.Ü. SBF Yayinlari, 1972), p.32; Mahmut Bali Aykan, 'The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy From the 1950s to the 1990s', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.25 (1993), p.92.
8. Ömer Kürkçüoǧlu, Türkiye'nin Arab Ortadoǧusuna Karşi Politikasi 1945-1970 (Ankara: A.Ü. SBF Yayinlari, 1972), p.32; Mahmut Bali Aykan, 'The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy From the 1950s to the 1990s', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.25 (1993), p.92.
9. 'Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 1950-54', Dönem, IX, 11 Dec. 1950, col.138; Feridun Cemal Erkin, Dişişlerinde 34 Yil - Washington Büÿkelçiliǧi, II. Cilt, I.Kisim (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1987), George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp.72-91; Metin Toker, Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşali Yillari - DP'nin Altin Yillari 1950-54 (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1990), pp.82-7. The election of May 1950 was a turning point in Turkey's political life. The Republican People's Party (the RPP) which had ruled the country since the establishment of the Republic in 1923 as the single party, lost the election. The electorate voted for the Democrat Party (the DP) in huge numbers in order to protest about economic hardship under the RPP rule, especially during the war, and to bring the dominance of single party elite in governmental offices to an end. This was the beginning of a decade-long Democrat rule in the country. Although the DP's seizure of power signalled radical changes in Turkey's domestic policy, it was not to indicate the same sort of change in the country's foreign policy. The Democrats' election campaign had been based on domestic issues in general. They had campaigned for change in economic management by proposing to take steps in the direction of liberalization of the economy and of political life. The only foreign policy matter they made an issue during the election was Turkey's accession to NATO. When the Democrats came to office they pointed out there would be no radical changes in Turkey's foreign policy. It was soon understood that the difference between the Democrats and their predecessors would be more in the execution of the policies rather than in the policies themselves. As far as Turkey's admission to NATO was concerned, this meant increasing pressure on the West to accept Turkey at almost any cost. In the month following the Democrat Party's victory, the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June, 1950 created circumstances under which the new government found the opportunity to pursue its campaign for NATO membership with more conviction. Consequently, in the expectation of an easy accession to NATO, the Democrat leadership decided to send 4,500 men to Korea on 18 July 1950.
10. 'Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 1950-54', Dönem, IX, 11 Dec. 1950, col.138; Feridun Cemal Erkin, Dişişlerinde 34 Yil - Washington Büÿkelçiliǧi, II. Cilt, I.Kisim (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1987), George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp.72-91; Metin Toker, Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşali Yillari - DP'nin Altin Yillari 1950-54 (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1990), pp.82-7. The election of May 1950 was a turning point in Turkey's political life. The Republican People's Party (the RPP) which had ruled the country since the establishment of the Republic in 1923 as the single party, lost the election. The electorate voted for the Democrat Party (the DP) in huge numbers in order to protest about economic hardship under the RPP rule, especially during the war, and to bring the dominance of single party elite in governmental offices to an end. This was the beginning of a decade-long Democrat rule in the country. Although the DP's seizure of power signalled radical changes in Turkey's domestic policy, it was not to indicate the same sort of change in the country's foreign policy. The Democrats' election campaign had been based on domestic issues in general. They had campaigned for change in economic management by proposing to take steps in the direction of liberalization of the economy and of political life. The only foreign policy matter they made an issue during the election was Turkey's accession to NATO. When the Democrats came to office they pointed out there would be no radical changes in Turkey's foreign policy. It was soon understood that the difference between the Democrats and their predecessors would be more in the execution of the policies rather than in the policies themselves. As far as Turkey's admission to NATO was concerned, this meant increasing pressure on the West to accept Turkey at almost any cost. In the month following the Democrat Party's victory, the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June, 1950 created circumstances under which the new government found the opportunity to pursue its campaign for NATO membership with more conviction. Consequently, in the expectation of an easy accession to NATO, the Democrat leadership decided to send 4,500 men to Korea on 18 July 1950.
11. 'Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 1950-54', Dönem, IX, 11 Dec. 1950, col.138; Feridun Cemal Erkin, Dişişlerinde 34 Yil - Washington Büÿkelçiliǧi, II. Cilt, I.Kisim (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1987), George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp.72-91; Metin Toker, Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşali Yillari - DP'nin Altin Yillari 1950-54 (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1990), pp.82-7. The election of May 1950 was a turning point in Turkey's political life. The Republican People's Party (the RPP) which had ruled the country since the establishment of the Republic in 1923 as the single party, lost the election. The electorate voted for the Democrat Party (the DP) in huge numbers in order to protest about economic hardship under the RPP rule, especially during the war, and to bring the dominance of single party elite in governmental offices to an end. This was the beginning of a decade-long Democrat rule in the country. Although the DP's seizure of power signalled radical changes in Turkey's domestic policy, it was not to indicate the same sort of change in the country's foreign policy. The Democrats' election campaign had been based on domestic issues in general. They had campaigned for change in economic management by proposing to take steps in the direction of liberalization of the economy and of political life. The only foreign policy matter they made an issue during the election was Turkey's accession to NATO. When the Democrats came to office they pointed out there would be no radical changes in Turkey's foreign policy. It was soon understood that the difference between the Democrats and their predecessors would be more in the execution of the policies rather than in the policies themselves. As far as Turkey's admission to NATO was concerned, this meant increasing pressure on the West to accept Turkey at almost any cost. In the month following the Democrat Party's victory, the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June, 1950 created circumstances under which the new government found the opportunity to pursue its campaign for NATO membership with more conviction. Consequently, in the expectation of an easy accession to NATO, the Democrat leadership decided to send 4,500 men to Korea on 18 July 1950.
12. 'Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 1950-54', Dönem, IX, 11 Dec. 1950, col.138; Feridun Cemal Erkin, Dişişlerinde 34 Yil - Washington Büÿkelçiliǧi, II. Cilt, I.Kisim (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1987), George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp.72-91; Metin Toker, Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşali Yillari - DP'nin Altin Yillari 1950-54 (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1990), pp.82-7. The election of May 1950 was a turning point in Turkey's political life. The Republican People's Party (the RPP) which had ruled the country since the establishment of the Republic in 1923 as the single party, lost the election. The electorate voted for the Democrat Party (the DP) in huge numbers in order to protest about economic hardship under the RPP rule, especially during the war, and to bring the dominance of single party elite in governmental offices to an end. This was the beginning of a decade-long Democrat rule in the country. Although the DP's seizure of power signalled radical changes in Turkey's domestic policy, it was not to indicate the same sort of change in the country's foreign policy. The Democrats' election campaign had been based on domestic issues in general. They had campaigned for change in economic management by proposing to take steps in the direction of liberalization of the economy and of political life. The only foreign policy matter they made an issue during the election was Turkey's accession to NATO. When the Democrats came to office they pointed out there would be no radical changes in Turkey's foreign policy. It was soon understood that the difference between the Democrats and their predecessors would be more in the execution of the policies rather than in the policies themselves. As far as Turkey's admission to NATO was concerned, this meant increasing pressure on the West to accept Turkey at almost any cost. In the month following the Democrat Party's victory, the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June, 1950 created circumstances under which the new government found the opportunity to pursue its campaign for NATO membership with more conviction. Consequently, in the expectation of an easy accession to NATO, the Democrat leadership decided to send 4,500 men to Korea on 18 July 1950.
13. FO to Charles, Annex D, Part II; Turkish assurances that they will play their part in the Middle East Defence, 4 Oct. 1951, FO195/2667, PRO, Kew.
14. For the detailed account of the Pentagon talks see Foreign Relations of the United States (henceforth FRUS), 1947, Vol.V, The Near East and Africa (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1971), pp.488-620.
15. Peter Hahn, 'Containment and Egyptian Nationalism: The Unsuccessful Effort to Establish the Middle East Command, 1950-52', Diplomatic History, Vol.11 (1987), p.27; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation - My Years in the State Department (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), pp.562-3; John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, The Soviet Union and the United States (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1990), p.189.
16. Peter Hahn, 'Containment and Egyptian Nationalism: The Unsuccessful Effort to Establish the Middle East Command, 1950-52', Diplomatic History, Vol.11 (1987), p.27; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation - My Years in the State Department (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), pp.562-3; John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, The Soviet Union and the United States (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1990), p.189.
17. Peter Hahn, 'Containment and Egyptian Nationalism: The Unsuccessful Effort to Establish the Middle East Command, 1950-52', Diplomatic History, Vol.11 (1987), p.27; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation - My Years in the State Department (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), pp.562-3; John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, The Soviet Union and the United States (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1990), p.189.
18. FRUS, 1952-54, Vol.IX, The Near East and Middle East (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986), p.251.
19. Ibid., pp. 139-40.
20. Some works that emphasize Turkey's role in the pact include Brian Holden Reid, 'The Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact', in John Young (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Churchill Peacetime Administration 1951-55 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), pp.160-79; Keith Kyle, Suez (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), pp.89-90; McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO-Middle East Connection, pp.156-60.
21. Some works that emphasize Turkey's role in the pact include Brian Holden Reid, 'The Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact', in John Young (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Churchill Peacetime Administration 1951-55 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), pp.160-79; Keith Kyle, Suez (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), pp.89-90; McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO-Middle East Connection, pp.156-60.
22. Some works that emphasize Turkey's role in the pact include Brian Holden Reid, 'The Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact', in John Young (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Churchill Peacetime Administration 1951-55 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), pp.160-79; Keith Kyle, Suez (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), pp.89-90; McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO-Middle East Connection, pp.156-60.
23. Metin Tamkoç, Warrior Diplomats (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976), pp.230, 237-8.
24. FO to Bowker, 19 Feb. 1955, FO371/115492, PRO.
25. Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), p.119; FO Minute, Levant Department, 3 March 1955, FO371/115496, PRO; Warren to Secretary of State, 18 Jan. 1955, 6 82.86B/3-958, National Archives, Washington, DC (henceforth NA).
26. Gardener to FO, 8 March 1955, FO371/115496, PRO.
27. FO Minute, J.F. Brewis, 30 March 1955, FO371/115502, PRO.
28. Moose to Secretary of State, NA, 17 March 1955, 6 74.83/ 1-855.
29. Gardener to FO, 23 March 1955, FO371/115501, PRO; Moose to Secretary of State, 24 March 1955, NA, 6 82.00/2-2855.
30. Even today the Hatay dispute is a stumbling block in the two countries' relations. For further information on the Hatay problem see Aptülahat Akşin, Atatürk'ün Dis Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991); Abdurrahman Melek, Hatay Nasil Kurtuldu? (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991); Avedis K. Sanjian, 'The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish-Syrian Relations (1939-56)', Middle East Journal, Vol.10 (1956), pp.379-84.
31. Even today the Hatay dispute is a stumbling block in the two countries' relations. For further information on the Hatay problem see Aptülahat Akşin, Atatürk'ün Dis Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991); Abdurrahman Melek, Hatay Nasil Kurtuldu? (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991); Avedis K. Sanjian, 'The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish-Syrian Relations (1939-56)', Middle East Journal, Vol.10 (1956), pp.379-84.
32. Even today the Hatay dispute is a stumbling block in the two countries' relations. For further information on the Hatay problem see Aptülahat Akşin, Atatürk'ün Dis Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991); Abdurrahman Melek, Hatay Nasil Kurtuldu? (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991); Avedis K. Sanjian, 'The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish-Syrian Relations (1939-56)', Middle East Journal, Vol.10 (1956), pp.379-84.
33. Byroade, Egypt to Secretary of State, 25 March 1955, NA, 6 82.87/3-155.
34. Gallman to State Department, 21 March 1955, NA, 6 82.00/2858.
35. Dulles to Warren, 26 March 1955, NA, 6 82. 87/ 3-155.
36. For Operation Alpha see FRUS, 1955-57, Arab-Israeli Dispute, Vol.XIV (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989).
37. After Nasser came to power in 1954, Turkish leaders had virtually no success in developing a mutual understanding with him. When the free officers (Nasser was one of them), under the leadership of General Neguib seized power in Egypt in 1952, Turkey regarded this as a new beginning in Turkey's relations with Egypt. In the early months of the new Egyptian administration, both countries exchanged friendly messages. Both Neguib and Nasser paid tribute to Atatürk and his country in their public statements. However, this did not last long. After Nasser replaced Neguib in April 1954, Turkey once again hoped for close relations with Egypt after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of July 1954, and even appointed the foreign minister's brother as ambassador to Cairo as a gesture of goodwill. Nasser refused even to meet Menderes as long as the Turkish government still sought to organize a defence pact in co-ordination with the West. Later on some goodwill initiatives were retaken but no success prevailed. See G.E.K., 'The Turco-Egyptian Flirtation of Autumn 1954', The World Today, Vol.12 (1956); Mahmut Dikerdem, Ortadoguda Devrim Yillari (Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 1990); Baruch Gilead, 'Turkish-Egyptian Relations 1952-57', Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol.10 (1959); Ismail Soysal, 'Political Relations Between Turkey and Egypt in the Last Six Decades', Turkish Review of Quarterly Digest, Vol.4 (1990); Zeki Kuneralp, Sadece Diplomat (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaasi, 1981), pp.107-13.
38. After Nasser came to power in 1954, Turkish leaders had virtually no success in developing a mutual understanding with him. When the free officers (Nasser was one of them), under the leadership of General Neguib seized power in Egypt in 1952, Turkey regarded this as a new beginning in Turkey's relations with Egypt. In the early months of the new Egyptian administration, both countries exchanged friendly messages. Both Neguib and Nasser paid tribute to Atatürk and his country in their public statements. However, this did not last long. After Nasser replaced Neguib in April 1954, Turkey once again hoped for close relations with Egypt after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of July 1954, and even appointed the foreign minister's brother as ambassador to Cairo as a gesture of goodwill. Nasser refused even to meet Menderes as long as the Turkish government still sought to organize a defence pact in co-ordination with the West. Later on some goodwill initiatives were retaken but no success prevailed. See G.E.K., 'The Turco-Egyptian Flirtation of Autumn 1954', The World Today, Vol.12 (1956); Mahmut Dikerdem, Ortadoguda Devrim Yillari (Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 1990); Baruch Gilead, 'Turkish-Egyptian Relations 1952-57', Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol.10 (1959); Ismail Soysal, 'Political Relations Between Turkey and Egypt in the Last Six Decades', Turkish Review of Quarterly Digest, Vol.4 (1990); Zeki Kuneralp, Sadece Diplomat (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaasi, 1981), pp.107-13.
39. After Nasser came to power in 1954, Turkish leaders had virtually no success in developing a mutual understanding with him. When the free officers (Nasser was one of them), under the leadership of General Neguib seized power in Egypt in 1952, Turkey regarded this as a new beginning in Turkey's relations with Egypt. In the early months of the new Egyptian administration, both countries exchanged friendly messages. Both Neguib and Nasser paid tribute to Atatürk and his country in their public statements. However, this did not last long. After Nasser replaced Neguib in April 1954, Turkey once again hoped for close relations with Egypt after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of July 1954, and even appointed the foreign minister's brother as ambassador to Cairo as a gesture of goodwill. Nasser refused even to meet Menderes as long as the Turkish government still sought to organize a defence pact in co-ordination with the West. Later on some goodwill initiatives were retaken but no success prevailed. See G.E.K., 'The Turco-Egyptian Flirtation of Autumn 1954', The World Today, Vol.12 (1956); Mahmut Dikerdem, Ortadoguda Devrim Yillari (Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 1990); Baruch Gilead, 'Turkish-Egyptian Relations 1952-57', Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol.10 (1959); Ismail Soysal, 'Political Relations Between Turkey and Egypt in the Last Six Decades', Turkish Review of Quarterly Digest, Vol.4 (1990); Zeki Kuneralp, Sadece Diplomat (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaasi, 1981), pp.107-13.
40. After Nasser came to power in 1954, Turkish leaders had virtually no success in developing a mutual understanding with him. When the free officers (Nasser was one of them), under the leadership of General Neguib seized power in Egypt in 1952, Turkey regarded this as a new beginning in Turkey's relations with Egypt. In the early months of the new Egyptian administration, both countries exchanged friendly messages. Both Neguib and Nasser paid tribute to Atatürk and his country in their public statements. However, this did not last long. After Nasser replaced Neguib in April 1954, Turkey once again hoped for close relations with Egypt after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of July 1954, and even appointed the foreign minister's brother as ambassador to Cairo as a gesture of goodwill. Nasser refused even to meet Menderes as long as the Turkish government still sought to organize a defence pact in co-ordination with the West. Later on some goodwill initiatives were retaken but no success prevailed. See G.E.K., 'The Turco-Egyptian Flirtation of Autumn 1954', The World Today, Vol.12 (1956); Mahmut Dikerdem, Ortadoguda Devrim Yillari (Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 1990); Baruch Gilead, 'Turkish-Egyptian Relations 1952-57', Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol.10 (1959); Ismail Soysal, 'Political Relations Between Turkey and Egypt in the Last Six Decades', Turkish Review of Quarterly Digest, Vol.4 (1990); Zeki Kuneralp, Sadece Diplomat (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaasi, 1981), pp.107-13.
41. After Nasser came to power in 1954, Turkish leaders had virtually no success in developing a mutual understanding with him. When the free officers (Nasser was one of them), under the leadership of General Neguib seized power in Egypt in 1952, Turkey regarded this as a new beginning in Turkey's relations with Egypt. In the early months of the new Egyptian administration, both countries exchanged friendly messages. Both Neguib and Nasser paid tribute to Atatürk and his country in their public statements. However, this did not last long. After Nasser replaced Neguib in April 1954, Turkey once again hoped for close relations with Egypt after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of July 1954, and even appointed the foreign minister's brother as ambassador to Cairo as a gesture of goodwill. Nasser refused even to meet Menderes as long as the Turkish government still sought to organize a defence pact in co-ordination with the West. Later on some goodwill initiatives were retaken but no success prevailed. See G.E.K., 'The Turco-Egyptian Flirtation of Autumn 1954', The World Today, Vol.12 (1956); Mahmut Dikerdem, Ortadoguda Devrim Yillari (Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 1990); Baruch Gilead, 'Turkish-Egyptian Relations 1952-57', Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol.10 (1959); Ismail Soysal, 'Political Relations Between Turkey and Egypt in the Last Six Decades', Turkish Review of Quarterly Digest, Vol.4 (1990); Zeki Kuneralp, Sadece Diplomat (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaasi, 1981), pp.107-13.
42. Warren to Secretary of State, 29 March 1955, NA, 6 82.87/3-155.
43. Ibid.
44. Memorandum of Conversation between H. Görk and G.V. Allen, 24 Oct. 1955, NA, 6 82.87/4-155.
45. Ibid., Ankara to FO, 14 Oct. 1955, FO371/115525, PRO.
46. FO to Ankara, 20 Oct. 1955, FO371/115524, PRO.
47. Stewart to Wright, 19 March 1956, FO 371/121272, PRO.
48. 21 Feb. 1956, NA, Lot 58 D 610.
49. FRUS, 1955-57, Vol.XII, Near East Region; Iran-Iraq (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 196.
50. 19 June 1955, 782.00(W)/1-555; National Security Council (NSC) -NSC 5708/1 US Policy Towards Turkey, 6 May 1957. Athough the first three years of Democrat Party government had witnessed a remarkable economic boom in Turkey, the Menderes administration had then begun to face acute economic hardship, not least as a result of mismanagement.
51. Mallory to Secretary of State, 4 Nov. 1955, NA, 782.11/1-2655.
52. Bowker to FO, 2 Nov. 1955, FO371/115526, PRO; FRUS, 1955-57, Vol.XII, pp.176-82.
53. Duke to Macmillan, 16 Nov. 1955, FO371/115649, PRO.
54. FO Minute, E.M. Rose, 21 Oct. 1955, FO371/115524, PRO; Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune 1945-55 (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.654;
55. Elisabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-71 (London: Chatto &Windus, 1981), p.188.
56. Michael B. Oren, 'A Winter of Discontent: Britain's Crisis in Jordan, Dec. 1955-March 1956', International Journal of Middle East Studies', Vol.22 (1990), pp. 175-81; Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: RIIA and Pinter, 1991), p.26.
57. Michael B. Oren, 'A Winter of Discontent: Britain's Crisis in Jordan, Dec. 1955-March 1956', International Journal of Middle East Studies', Vol.22 (1990), pp. 175-81; Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: RIIA and Pinter, 1991), p.26.
58. Bowker to Shuckburgh, 29 June 1955, FO371/115515, PRO.
59. FRUS 1955-57, Vol.XIII, Near East: Jordan - Yemen (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), p.692.
60. Ibid.
61. Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace - The White House Years 1956-1961 (London: Heineman, 1966), p.198.
62. Warren to Secretary of State, 15 Nov. 1956, DOS003448, Declassified Document Reference System (henceforth DDRS) (Washington, DC: Carrolton Press, 1989).
63. Karpat, Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, p.120; Hüseyin Baǧci, Demokrat Parti Dönemi Diş Politikasi (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1990), p.90-1; Peter Mangold, Superpower Intervention in the Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 101.
64. Karpat, Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, p.120; Hüseyin Baǧci, Demokrat Parti Dönemi Diş Politikasi (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1990), p.90-1; Peter Mangold, Superpower Intervention in the Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 101.
65. Karpat, Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, p.120; Hüseyin Baǧci, Demokrat Parti Dönemi Diş Politikasi (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1990), p.90-1; Peter Mangold, Superpower Intervention in the Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 101.
66. Memorandum on the Turkish Forces on the Syrian border, 17 Oct. 1957, NA, Lot 58 D610.
67. Herter to Secretary of State, 14 Oct. 1957, DOS000357, DDRS (Washington, DC: Carrolton Press, 1985).
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. FRUS 1955-57, Vol.XIII, pp.692-3.
71. Baskin Oran, 'Turkiye'nin Büyük Komşu Sorunu Nedir?', Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol.25 (1970), pp.77-9; Oral Sander, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayinevi, 1973), p. 163; Kürkçüoǧlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Orta Doǧu'suna Karşi Politikasi, p. 122.
72. Baskin Oran, 'Turkiye'nin Büyük Komşu Sorunu Nedir?', Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol.25 (1970), pp.77-9; Oral Sander, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayinevi, 1973), p. 163; Kürkçüoǧlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Orta Doǧu'suna Karşi Politikasi, p. 122.
73. Baskin Oran, 'Turkiye'nin Büyük Komşu Sorunu Nedir?', Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol.25 (1970), pp.77-9; Oral Sander, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayinevi, 1973), p. 163; Kürkçüoǧlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Orta Doǧu'suna Karşi Politikasi, p. 122.
74. Stewart to FO, 13 Sept. 1957, FO371/128241, PRO.
75. Ibid.
76. Stewart to FO, 12 Oct. 1957, FO371/128242, PRO.
77. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971), p.285.
78. Bowker to FO, 16 July 1958, FO371/133791, PRO. On 14 Feb. 1956 Jordan and Iraq formed a federation in order to counterbalance the union between Syria and Egypt, the so-called United Arab Republic. The Menderes government recognized both inter-Arab groupings but its real support laid with the Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan. On the day following the Iraqi coup of 14 July the Americans sent some 15,000 troops to Lebanon to secure pro-Western regime of Camille Chamoun in Lebanon.
79. FRUS, 1958-60, Vol.XI, Lebanon and Jordan (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992), p.307.
80. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.277; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p.522.
81. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.277; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p.522.
82. Reilly, Moscow to FO, 20 July 1958, FO371/133795, PRO.
83. Record of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and Dulles, 18 July 1958, FO371/133823, PRO.
84. Ibid.
85. Lord Hood, Washington to FO, 19 July 1958, FO371/134212, PRO.
86. Conversation between the Secretary of State and Dulles, 18 July 1958, NA, FO371/133823.
87. Oran, '"Türkiye" nin Büyük Komşu Sorunu Nedir?', pp.77-9; Sander, Türk-Amerikan Iliskileri, p.163.
88. Oran, '"Türkiye" nin Büyük Komşu Sorunu Nedir?', pp.77-9; Sander, Türk-Amerikan Iliskileri, p.163.
89. NSC5708/2, US Policy Towards Turkey, Operations Coordinating Board Report, 10 Dec. 1958; Zafer (Pro-government newspaper), 21 Aug. 1958. In spite of increased aid given to Turkey in 1958, the amount was insufficient to deal with Turkey's economic problems. In April 1960, just before his overthrow, Menderes decided to visit the Soviet Union to secure financial support from an alternative source. The visit never took place since the military seized power in Turkey on 27 May 1960.