Mughal nobles, Indian merchants and the beginning of British conquest in Western India: The case of Surat 1756-1759

Modern Asian Studies

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 257-315

  Torri, Michelguglielmo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURIN   (Italy)

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EID: 11744255176     PISSN: 0026749X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0026749X98002728     Document Type: Article

References (242)

1. P. J. Marshall, 'British Expansion in India in the Eighteenth Century: A Historical Revision', History, LX (Feb. 1975), and idem, 'Western Arms in Maritime Asia in the Early Phases of Expansion', MAS, 14, 1 (1980).
2. P. J. Marshall, 'British Expansion in India in the Eighteenth Century: A Historical Revision', History, LX (Feb. 1975), and idem, 'Western Arms in Maritime Asia in the Early Phases of Expansion', MAS, 14, 1 (1980).
3. It is worth stressing that the changed equilibrium in favour of the Europeans was not such as to remain unchallenged. During the remainder of the century, some Indian powers either made use of their military assets in a more creative way, or completely reorganized their armies. This caused a quick escalation in the effectiveness of both English and Indian armies. Until the second Anglo-Maratha war, the outcome of the military contest between the East India Company and some keyIndian potentates was far from being a foregone one. On all this, besides Marshall's articles quoted above, see the important paper by John Pemble, 'Resources and Techniques in the Second Maratha War', The Historical Journal, 19, 2 (1976). A synthesis of the views of the above authors can be found in Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), ch. IV. More generally on the problem of Western military challenge and Asian response see Gayl D. Ness and William Stahl, 'Western Imperialist Armies in Asia', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 19, 1 (1977).
4. It is worth stressing that the changed equilibrium in favour of the Europeans was not such as to remain unchallenged. During the remainder of the century, some Indian powers either made use of their military assets in a more creative way, or completely reorganized their armies. This caused a quick escalation in the effectiveness of both English and Indian armies. Until the second Anglo-Maratha war, the outcome of the military contest between the East India Company and some keyIndian potentates was far from being a foregone one. On all this, besides Marshall's articles quoted above, see the important paper by John Pemble, 'Resources and Techniques in the Second Maratha War', The Historical Journal, 19, 2 (1976). A synthesis of the views of the above authors can be found in Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), ch. IV. More generally on the problem of Western military challenge and Asian response see Gayl D. Ness and William Stahl, 'Western Imperialist Armies in Asia', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 19, 1 (1977).
5. It is worth stressing that the changed equilibrium in favour of the Europeans was not such as to remain unchallenged. During the remainder of the century, some Indian powers either made use of their military assets in a more creative way, or completely reorganized their armies. This caused a quick escalation in the effectiveness of both English and Indian armies. Until the second Anglo-Maratha war, the outcome of the military contest between the East India Company and some keyIndian potentates was far from being a foregone one. On all this, besides Marshall's articles quoted above, see the important paper by John Pemble, 'Resources and Techniques in the Second Maratha War', The Historical Journal, 19, 2 (1976). A synthesis of the views of the above authors can be found in Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), ch. IV. More generally on the problem of Western military challenge and Asian response see Gayl D. Ness and William Stahl, 'Western Imperialist Armies in Asia', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 19, 1 (1977).
6. The first modern scholar to point out the role of Pocock's squadron in the British conquest of the Surat castle has been T. J. Shejwalkar ('The Surat Episode of 1759', Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute, vol. VIII [K. N. Dixit Memorial Volume], 1947). This is a useful study, among other reasons because, although grounded on a somewhat restricted documentary basis (the author did not make use of the unpublished English records), it draws on some Maratha sources and offers some interesting insights on the role played by the Marathas.
7. Lakshmi Subramanian, 'Capital and Crowd in a Declining Asian Port City. The Anglo-Bania Order and the Surat Riots of 1759', MAS, 19, 2 (1985), pp. 210-12; idem, 'The Castle Revolution of 1759 and the Banias of Surat: Changing BritishIndian Relationships in Western India', in Dwijendra Tripathi (ed.), State and Business in India: A Historical Perspective (Ahmedabad: Manohar, 1987); and idem, 'The Eighteenth-Century Social Order in Surat: A Reply and an Excursus on the Riots of 1788 and 1795', MAS, 25, 2 (1991) [hereafter quoted as 'Reply'], pp. 338-42.
8. Lakshmi Subramanian, 'Capital and Crowd in a Declining Asian Port City. The Anglo-Bania Order and the Surat Riots of 1759', MAS, 19, 2 (1985), pp. 210-12; idem, 'The Castle Revolution of 1759 and the Banias of Surat: Changing BritishIndian Relationships in Western India', in Dwijendra Tripathi (ed.), State and Business in India: A Historical Perspective (Ahmedabad: Manohar, 1987); and idem, 'The Eighteenth-Century Social Order in Surat: A Reply and an Excursus on the Riots of 1788 and 1795', MAS, 25, 2 (1991) [hereafter quoted as 'Reply'], pp. 338-42.
9. Lakshmi Subramanian, 'Capital and Crowd in a Declining Asian Port City. The Anglo-Bania Order and the Surat Riots of 1759', MAS, 19, 2 (1985), pp. 210-12; idem, 'The Castle Revolution of 1759 and the Banias of Surat: Changing BritishIndian Relationships in Western India', in Dwijendra Tripathi (ed.), State and Business in India: A Historical Perspective (Ahmedabad: Manohar, 1987); and idem, 'The Eighteenth-Century Social Order in Surat: A Reply and an Excursus on the Riots of 1788 and 1795', MAS, 25, 2 (1991) [hereafter quoted as 'Reply'], pp. 338-42.
10. As far as the merchants of Surat are concerned, this theory was first suggested by the English conquerors themselves and readily accepted and reiterated by Richard Owen Cambridge. See his An Account of the War in India (London: T. Jefferys, 1762, 2nd edn.), pp. 287ff.
11. Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat c. 1700-1750 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1979), particularly the 'Introduction'.
12. In the late 1730s the turnover of the Surat trade could still be considerable. So, in 1739, the English noticed the arrival of two ships from Jiddah and Mocha, one owned by Ibrahim Chellabi and the other by Shaik Mahmud, carrying 'six lacs of rupees treasure, besides merchandize'. See FRS, 25 August 1739. For the insight that Surat, during the 1730s and 1740s, was still a place of considerable trade, see Indrani Ray, 'European Traders in Surat (1730-1750)', The Calcutta Historical Journal, VI, 1 (1981).
13. FRS, 28 Aug. 1746.
14. FRS, 20 Feb. 1747.
15. FRS, 23 Nov. 1747. Besides the FRS for the relevant periods, my reconstruction of the antecedents and initial phases of the Surat civil war is based on DP, pp. cclxxivff, and the unfinished drafts on this topic written by Robert Orme, in Orme OV 147.
16. Das Gupta, Indian Merchants, passim.
17. E.g. FRS, 24 Oct. 1748.
18. E.g. FRS 30 June 1749 (letter to Bombay).
19. FRS 6 Dec. 1748, for the participation of Mulla's men in the fighting. The best source on Fakharuddin's fortunes during the early phase of the civil war is DP, pp. cclxxx, cclxxxv-cclxxxvii.
20. The Surat Banias can be identified with the Hindu and Jain section of the city merchant class, and the term is utilized in this meaning throughout the present paper. The term itself is not without ambiguities, as it was used in the British records both in a functional meaning (as synonymous with broker) and in a castal meaning (a communal group made up of people belonging to the Hindu and Jain trading jatis). A fuller discussion of this problem is given below: see the section entitled The 'head of the banias' and his followers. Of course, when I say that Jagannath belonged to the most illustrious Bania family in Surat, I am making use of the word in its castal meaning.
21. The Rustom-Parak feud up to this point is analyzed in detail in Das Gupta, Indian Merchants, ch. 5. In later decades, the English 'investment', although still eagerly sought because of the prestige that it carried with itself, had become a scarcely profitable economic proposition. But, in the first half of the century, its management, far from being merely a matter of prestige, could procure great wealth. According to Dunjeeshaw Munjeeshaw - a Parsi merchant whose career is discussed below - it was the management of several consecutive investments that was the main cause of Manockjee Nawrojee's great wealth. See FRS, 1 Sept. 1772 (Dunjeeshaw Munjeeshaw's petition).
22. In fact, when the position of representative of the English Company was returned to Jagannath, he officially received the title of 'Marfutteah' (Marfettah, namely Agent). This was intended to underline that Jagannath's position was a lesser one as compared to what it had previously been, when the official title had been Chief Broker and, later, Vakil. On this, see Ashin Das Gupta, 'The Broker at Mughal Surat,c. 1740', in Revista de Cultura (Macau), nos 13/14 (1991), p. 179. Yet, the Surat factory records show that Jagannath went on acting as de facto vakil, namely representative, of the English Company vis-à-vis the Mughal authorities, the Maratha representatives and the other European powers in town. As a consequence, his political influence in the city was enormous and remained such up to his death. The situation did not change when his functions as Vakil were taken by his former assistant, the Parsi merchant Dunjeeshaw Munjeeshaw. Although Dunjeeshaw did not even get the official title of Marfutteah - he had to content himself with that of Assistant Marfutteah - his influence was such that he seems to have acted as a kind of uncrowned king of Surat up to the mid-1770s. After that date, while Dunjeeshaw's economic fortune was on the wane, the English decided to rein in his powers as representative of the 'Hon'ble Company'. In the later period the post of broker became a ceremonial one, without any real power attached to it. For Jagannath and Dunjeeshaw's political role during the concluding phase of the civil war, see below.
23. Mayor's Court, 1761: Muncherjee Bomonjee . . . [contra] Muncherjee Cursetjee (IOR: P/417/17, pp. 2ff).
24. FRS, 11 Sept. 1747. The struggle between Jagannath Laldas and the Rustoms must be followed in FRS and Public for the relevant years. Another important source is represented by James Fraser's letters in IOR: E/4/461.
25. John Splinter Stavorinus, Voyages to the East-Indies (London: G. G. and J. Robinson, 1798), vol. III, pp. 122, 151-4.
26. For references to Muncherjee's ships and trade see, e.g. FRS, 13 April 1757, 12 May 1757, 28 Jan. 1758, 24 March 1758, 18 Nov. 1758, and Public 25 Nov. 1760. Muncherjee's status as one of the most affluent merchants in Surat was sanctioned by the grant of a ma'afi. This was a privilege bestowed by the Mughal Emperor, exempting a merchant from paying customs on goods amounting to a certain value. In the case of Muncherjee it was for Rs 100,000 per year. The ma'afi, was granted only to very few among the biggest merchants, in theory in order to increase the turnover of trade. By reading back a document of a later period, it can be inferred that, in the period under discussion (the 1740s and 1750s) the other Surat merchants - besides Muncherjee - entitled to ma'afis were Salah Chellabi (Rs 100,000) and Mulla Fakharuddin (Rs 200,000). A likely hypothesis is that Salah and Fakharuddin had inherited their ma'afis from their illustrious ancestors. But that was not the case of Muncherjee, who had started his career as a 'menial servant'. For the definition of Muncherjee as a 'menial servant but a few years ago' see Public, 2 April 1758 (letter from Mr. Ellis of 28 March 1758). On the ma'afi-holders in Surat see, e.g. FRS, 13 Feb. 1796.
27. For Sidi Masud's ships trading to Malabar and Mocha, see, e.g. FRS, 7 December 1741, and 16 March and 7 September 1744. He is described as largely engaged in sea trade and shipbuilding in Orme's first unfinished draft on the civil war. See IOR: Orme OV 147, p. no.
28. On the Sidi see Orme's unfinished drafts on the civil war (Orme OV 147), and DP, pp. cclxxviii. See, also, FRS, 22 Oct. 1948.
29. The sources on which my account of the civil war is based have been already quoted in fn. 10. Here it must be added that, unfortunately, there are no good surveys of the Surat civil war. Those available in the Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency. Gujarat: Surat and Broach, vol. II (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1877, pp. 123-7) and in 'Papers Presented to the House of Commons relating to East India Affairs (Paper no. 308)', in Parliamentary Reports, vol. XVII (1806), pp. 57-9 (Jonathan Duncan's minute of 13 August 1799, paras 5-14), are disappointing and confusing. Better, but still insufficient, is the survey available in Cambridge, An Account of the War in India, pp. 287-98. Cambridge's account, based on the English records, is reproduced verbatim in Stavorinus, Voyages to the East Indies, vol. III, pp. 31-49. Stavorinus provides some additional information, drawn from Dutch sources, at pages 50-8. Unfortunately his additions do not enlarge much on what is said by Cambridge.
30. The sources on which my account of the civil war is based have been already quoted in fn. 10. Here it must be added that, unfortunately, there are no good surveys of the Surat civil war. Those available in the Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency. Gujarat: Surat and Broach, vol. II (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1877, pp. 123-7) and in 'Papers Presented to the House of Commons relating to East India Affairs (Paper no. 308)', in Parliamentary Reports, vol. XVII (1806), pp. 57-9 (Jonathan Duncan's minute of 13 August 1799, paras 5-14), are disappointing and confusing. Better, but still insufficient, is the survey available in Cambridge, An Account of the War in India, pp. 287-98. Cambridge's account, based on the English records, is reproduced verbatim in Stavorinus, Voyages to the East Indies, vol. III, pp. 31-49. Stavorinus provides some additional information, drawn from Dutch sources, at pages 50-8. Unfortunately his additions do not enlarge much on what is said by Cambridge.
31. The sources on which my account of the civil war is based have been already quoted in fn. 10. Here it must be added that, unfortunately, there are no good surveys of the Surat civil war. Those available in the Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency. Gujarat: Surat and Broach, vol. II (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1877, pp. 123-7) and in 'Papers Presented to the House of Commons relating to East India Affairs (Paper no. 308)', in Parliamentary Reports, vol. XVII (1806), pp. 57-9 (Jonathan Duncan's minute of 13 August 1799, paras 5-14), are disappointing and confusing. Better, but still insufficient, is the survey available in Cambridge, An Account of the War in India, pp. 287-98. Cambridge's account, based on the English records, is reproduced verbatim in Stavorinus, Voyages to the East Indies, vol. III, pp. 31-49. Stavorinus provides some additional information, drawn from Dutch sources, at pages 50-8. Unfortunately his additions do not enlarge much on what is said by Cambridge.
32. The sources on which my account of the civil war is based have been already quoted in fn. 10. Here it must be added that, unfortunately, there are no good surveys of the Surat civil war. Those available in the Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency. Gujarat: Surat and Broach, vol. II (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1877, pp. 123-7) and in 'Papers Presented to the House of Commons relating to East India Affairs (Paper no. 308)', in Parliamentary Reports, vol. XVII (1806), pp. 57-9 (Jonathan Duncan's minute of 13 August 1799, paras 5-14), are disappointing and confusing. Better, but still insufficient, is the survey available in Cambridge, An Account of the War in India, pp. 287-98. Cambridge's account, based on the English records, is reproduced verbatim in Stavorinus, Voyages to the East Indies, vol. III, pp. 31-49. Stavorinus provides some additional information, drawn from Dutch sources, at pages 50-8. Unfortunately his additions do not enlarge much on what is said by Cambridge.
33. DP, pp. cclxxx, cclxxxv-cclxxxvii.
34. On the business connection between William Wake and Mulla Fakharuddin see FRS, 16 March 1748. By the 1760s the latter was once again considered one of the principal Surat merchants. See, e.g. the closing of the merchants' petition in Public, 18 Sept. 1770.
35. Spencer's 1st report, para. 5.
36. In 1752, the English envoys - who were arranging a meeting with Sidi Masud - were forewarned that 'the Sciddee was a very old man, who could not bear being exposed'. FRS, 23 Feb. 1752. The next day, when they met him, they found him 'weak and out of order'. FRS, 24 Feb. 1752.
37. On 'Mr. Lambe's war' see FRS and Public for the period from 3 June 1751, when the English opened the hostilities against the Sidi by destroying his fleet, to 5 March 1752, when the articles of peace were entered in Public. Moreover, important information on the reasons for the English defeat can be found in the report by Francis Pym, William De La Garde and Titus Scott of 25 May 1752, entered in Public, 29 May 1752.
38. This is what is claimed by George W. Forrest, in his preface to the Selections from the Letters, Dispatches, and Other State Papers Preserved in the Bombay Secretariat, Home Series, vol. I (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1887), p. XXIX. In the English records there is no indication that Lambe committed suicide, only that of his sudden death. On the other hand, the records leave us in no doubt that, during his last days, Henry Lambe was an extremely distressed man.
39. The English could easily blockade Surat from the sea, but that was a two-edged weapon, as even the 'Hon'ble Company's own trade would come to a standstill. Of course, this would not please the Directors in London, and their displeasure could be extremely dangerous for the Company officers in Bombay. On the other hand, an all-out war against the Sidi would be a difficult one, which, even if victorious, would be horrendously costly. Again, the Directors would be far from pleased with it. On his part, Sidi Masud, in spite of his earlier military victory, must have been well aware that total war with the English was a no-win proposition and that some kind of political settlement had to be made.
40. During the initial years of the civil war, the English had become the real power behind Meah Atchund, even if, lately, their relationship with him had turned sour. So much so that, when the Sidi challeged Atchund, the English were late in coming to his help. This, very possibly, was the main cause of the defeat of them both. Now, at the moment of the final peace with the Sidi, the English tried to preserve some political influence for themselves through the 3rd article of the treaty of peace. It stated: 'the two sons of Meah Atchund to have posts of considerable honour and credit under the [Surat] Government and granted at our [the English] desire' (Public, 5 March 1752). A few days after, Sidi Masud and Safder Khan agreed to give to Meah Atchund's two sons 'the post of Lord Mayor [sic]' (FRS, 23 March 1752). Yet the two princes were expelled from the city soon afterwards (DP, p. ccxci). Accordingly, all that the English really got from Sidi Masud was his engagement to pay 2 lakhs of rupees. Yet, such was the delay in the payment of this sum that its last instalment was disbursed only at the end of 1758, namely some two years after Sidi Masud's death. See FRS, 19 Nov. 1758.
41. FRS, 9 Aug. 1753, 22 April and June 1754. Both Faris Khan and Ali Nawaz Khan were to play an important role in the events leading to the English conquest of Surat castle.
42. Here it is worth stressing that this policy of containment against European privileges has been misread by an author as a systematic policy of victimization by the Surat government against the city merchant community (see Lakshmi Subramanian, 'The Castle Revolution of 1759', and idem, 'Reply'). Besides, according to the author just quoted, the East India Company - no doubt out of its goodness of heart - had taken up the defence of the aggrieved merchants. In fact, what happened was that, as part of his policy of reducing European privileges, the Sidi put pressure on the merchants under English protection. One of his favourite methods was that of disregarding the right of extraterritoriality enjoyed by the 'protected' merchants. According to it, the merchants under the protection of one of the four European Factories could be tried by the Surat Government only with the consent of the Chief of the Factory. Sidi Masud's main aim was less 'fleecing' the merchants than reimposing the political authority of the Surat Government on as much of the Surat merchant class as possible. This is a topic of some relevance, which I am planning to discus in a next paper.
43. Here it is worth stressing that this policy of containment against European privileges has been misread by an author as a systematic policy of victimization by the Surat government against the city merchant community (see Lakshmi Subramanian, 'The Castle Revolution of 1759', and idem, 'Reply'). Besides, according to the author just quoted, the East India Company - no doubt out of its goodness of heart - had taken up the defence of the aggrieved merchants. In fact, what happened was that, as part of his policy of reducing European privileges, the Sidi put pressure on the merchants under English protection. One of his favourite methods was that of disregarding the right of extraterritoriality enjoyed by the 'protected' merchants. According to it, the merchants under the protection of one of the four European Factories could be tried by the Surat Government only with the consent of the Chief of the Factory. Sidi Masud's main aim was less 'fleecing' the merchants than reimposing the political authority of the Surat Government on as much of the Surat merchant class as possible. This is a topic of some relevance, which I am planning to discus in a next paper.
44. FRS, same date.
45. This was true even in the case of his military commander, Sidi Hilal, who had been one of the old Sidi's closest associates. See FRS, 23 March 1752, and Spencer's 2nd report, para. 14. Yet, in spite of the little love that he had for his new master, Sidi Hilal was to remain faithful to him up to the bitter end. See below.
46. Secret, 28 Jan. 1757.
47. With the notable exception of the Chellabis. See Spencer's 1st report, para. 5.
48. At least, this was what was claimed by the incumbent English Chief, Brabazon Ellis. See Secret, 28 Jan. 1757 (letter from Brabazon Ellis of 20 Jan. 1757).
49. Secret, 28 Jan. 1757 (letter from Brabazon Ellis).
50. Secret, 28 Jan. 1757.
51. He was one of the few dependants of the 'Hon'ble Company', then serving in the Bombay Presidency, who trod with success the path to great personal affluence thanks to his mercantile acumen (Public, 8 Oct. 1777). He put together his personal fortune while working as supracargo in the Company's ships. Then he became a shipowner and, in the late 1750s, turned one of his ships to privateering against the French (Public, 17 June and 2 Aug. 1757). While his personal fortune grew, so did his position inside the Company. In the 1750s, he became member of the inner circle of the Bombay Government, that Select Committee for Secrecy that was in charge of all the most delicate and important political affairs of the Presidency. In 1755, he was as chosen to man that most difficult and delicate position that the Chiefship of Surat had then become (Secret, 17 Sept. 1755).
52. Secret, 28 Jan. 1757.
53. After that date, a French squadron, in order to attack Bombay, would be forced by the prevailing winds to come up from the South, bordering the coast of India. This would make it easy to detect its advance in time to concentrate all the available British forces in the island, readying Bombay for defence. Ibid.
54. Ibid., 23, 24 Feb. 1757.
55. Secret, 24 Oct. and 14 Nov. 1758.
56. The definition of Muncherjee as 'all powerful' (tout-puissant) is given by Anquetil Duperron (DP, p. ccxciv).
57. Secret, 29 Nov. 1758 [IOR, P/D/50, p. 189].
58. Still in 1772, Ellis remembered, in a letter written to the Bombay Governor, that Ali Nawaz Khan had been 'totally under Muncher's guidance'. Public, 16 Sept. 1772 (Extract of Mr Ellis's letter of 4 Feb. 1772).
59. See fn. 21.
60. For the religious divisions of the Parsis in the 1750s and the fact that Muncherjee was the religious leader of 'presque tous les Parses de l'Inde' [practically all the Parsis in India], see DP, pp. cccxv-cccxvi, cccxxvi-cccxxvii.
61. Secret, Jan. 1758 (Ellis's letter of 22 Jan. 1758) [IOR: P/D/49, pt III, p. 24].
62. Secret, 2 April 1758 (Mr Ellis's letter of 28 March 1758).
63. Secret, 13 Dec. 1757, 12 Jan. 1758.
64. IOR: P/D/49, pt III, p. 24. This was nothing more than a malicious piece of gossip, which does not find confirmation in any other source. Several years later, Mir Hafizuddin Khan, then the ruling Nawab and a deadly personal enemy to Ali Nawaz Khan, when drawing up a list of all the unpleasantness of which his foe had been responsible, did not mention this particular sin. Had Ali Nawaz Khan been guilty of it or, more simply, had he been really suspected of it by people at large, this murder would have had pride of place in Mir Hafizuddin's roll. See Public, 3 Jan. 1771 (letter from the Nabob of Surat).
65. Ellis's letter of 22 Jan. 1758.
66. Secret, 14 Nov. 1757.
67. All quotations are from Ellis's letter of the 22 Jan. 1758. See Subramanian, 'The Castle Revolution', p. 111 for her description of this same episode. In it 'some substantial shroffs' become 'the bankers of the city'.
68. Parts of this private correspondence found their way into the official records when Ellis quarrelled with the Bombay Government. They are in Secret, 15 May 1758 (Ellis's letter of 8 May 1758).
69. Secret, Letter to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 7 Feb. 1758.
70. Secret, 28 Jan. 1758.
71. Secret, Feb. 1758 (Ellis's letter of 11 Feb. 1758).
72. Ellis's letter of 11 Feb. 1758.
73. Secret, Feb. 1758 (Ellis's letter of 15 Feb. 1758).
74. Secret, 21 Feb. 1758; Public, 7 May 1758; Secret, 12 March 1758.
75. Secret, 12 March 1758 (Agreement between Richard Bourchier and Pharus Caun). The same document is available in FRS, 15 Feb. 1759.
76. DP, pp. cclxxiv-cclxxv.
77. FRS, 22 April 1754.
78. Secret, April 1758 (Ellis's letter of 28 March 1758).
79. Public, 23 March 1758 (letter from Surat, 18 inst.). Surat Bar was the stretch of water marked by the sand-banks that crisscrossed the estuary of the river Tapi. Most ocean-going ships were able to go over these sand-banks and navigate up river only when the level of the Tapi was at its highest - which happened during the so called springs. Accordingly, the Bar played the role of a harbour (an admittedly dangerous one) before and after the monsoon.
80. Secret (Ellis's letters of 11 Feb. and 11 March 1757).
81. Secret, 17 March 1758.
82. Secret, Consultation without date, but between the 14 and 18 March 1758, and letter to Ellis of 18 March 1758.
83. Secret, Letter from Mr Ellis of 28 March 1758.
84. According to Subramanian's reconstruction of these same events, it was at this point that, 'while the debate between the two councils continued, the Sidi's clique got the upper hand [sic]. Ali Nawas Khan became nawab [sic] and Sidi Masud the qiladar [sic].' ('The Castle Revolution', p. 112).
85. Ellis's letter of 28 March 1758.
86. Public, 23 Sept. 1758 (letter from Surat, 16 inst.); ibid., 24 Oct. 1758 (letter from Surat, 19 inst.).
87. Secret, 14 Nov. 1758.
88. FRS, 16 Jan. 1755.
89. See fn. 17. For the sake of simplicity, in the following pages the terms 'Brokers', 'Vakil', and 'Marfutteah' have been used as synonyms, even if, in theory, they were not identical.
90. E.g. FRS, 19 and 20 May 1752, and 19 Nov. 1752. On one occasion he is indicated as 'head of the merchants'. See FRS, 4 March, 1748.
91. See Subramanian, 'Reply', pp. 338-41. The definition 'special relationship' is mine. Subramanian writes that 'since 1752 he [Jagannathdas Laldas] was both the head of the Banias and the English representative (Vakil), a notable convergence of roles that has escaped Torri's attention' (ibid., p. 340). Here, Subramanian makes reference to Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Surat during the second half of the Eighteenth Century: What Kind of Scial Order?', MAS, 21, 4 (1987) [hereafter quoted as 'Surat'], pp. 681-8. In fact, this problem had been commented upon, although briefly, in Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Ethnicity and trade in Surat during the dual government era: 1759-1800', The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 27, 4 (1990), p. 379 (published before Subramanian's 'Reply'). It had not been touched upon in Torri, 'Surat', because, for the reasons that shall be detailed in the present paper, it had been judged unimportant. It has already been pointed out (see the section on the beginning of the civil war) that 'the notable convergence of the roles' alluded to by Subramanian did not start - as she claims - in 1752, but well before. In particular, Jagannath became broker of the 'Hon'ble Company' upon the death of his father in 1732. See Das Gupta, Indian merchants, pp. 80, 87-8. In 1737' because of his fall from grace, Jagannath lost the post of broker to Manockjee Nawrojee, but got it back in 1747, when - as noted (see fn. 17) - the official designation of the post became that of 'Marfutteah' (Marfettah), namely 'Agents'. See Das Gupta, 'The Broker at Mughal Surat', pp. 174 ff.
92. See Subramanian, 'Reply', pp. 338-41. The definition 'special relationship' is mine. Subramanian writes that 'since 1752 he [Jagannathdas Laldas] was both the head of the Banias and the English representative (Vakil), a notable convergence of roles that has escaped Torri's attention' (ibid., p. 340). Here, Subramanian makes reference to Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Surat during the second half of the Eighteenth Century: What Kind of Scial Order?', MAS, 21, 4 (1987) [hereafter quoted as 'Surat'], pp. 681-8. In fact, this problem had been commented upon, although briefly, in Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Ethnicity and trade in Surat during the dual government era: 1759-1800', The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 27, 4 (1990), p. 379 (published before Subramanian's 'Reply'). It had not been touched upon in Torri, 'Surat', because, for the reasons that shall be detailed in the present paper, it had been judged unimportant. It has already been pointed out (see the section on the beginning of the civil war) that 'the notable convergence of the roles' alluded to by Subramanian did not start - as she claims - in 1752, but well before. In particular, Jagannath became broker of the 'Hon'ble Company' upon the death of his father in 1732. See Das Gupta, Indian merchants, pp. 80, 87-8. In 1737' because of his fall from grace, Jagannath lost the post of broker to Manockjee Nawrojee, but got it back in 1747, when - as noted (see fn. 17) - the official designation of the post became that of 'Marfutteah' (Marfettah), namely 'Agents'. See Das Gupta, 'The Broker at Mughal Surat', pp. 174 ff.
93. See Subramanian, 'Reply', pp. 338-41. The definition 'special relationship' is mine. Subramanian writes that 'since 1752 he [Jagannathdas Laldas] was both the head of the Banias and the English representative (Vakil), a notable convergence of roles that has escaped Torri's attention' (ibid., p. 340). Here, Subramanian makes reference to Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Surat during the second half of the Eighteenth Century: What Kind of Scial Order?', MAS, 21, 4 (1987) [hereafter quoted as 'Surat'], pp. 681-8. In fact, this problem had been commented upon, although briefly, in Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Ethnicity and trade in Surat during the dual government era: 1759-1800', The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 27, 4 (1990), p. 379 (published before Subramanian's 'Reply'). It had not been touched upon in Torri, 'Surat', because, for the reasons that shall be detailed in the present paper, it had been judged unimportant. It has already been pointed out (see the section on the beginning of the civil war) that 'the notable convergence of the roles' alluded to by Subramanian did not start - as she claims - in 1752, but well before. In particular, Jagannath became broker of the 'Hon'ble Company' upon the death of his father in 1732. See Das Gupta, Indian merchants, pp. 80, 87-8. In 1737' because of his fall from grace, Jagannath lost the post of broker to Manockjee Nawrojee, but got it back in 1747, when - as noted (see fn. 17) - the official designation of the post became that of 'Marfutteah' (Marfettah), namely 'Agents'. See Das Gupta, 'The Broker at Mughal Surat', pp. 174 ff.
94. See Subramanian, 'Reply', pp. 338-41. The definition 'special relationship' is mine. Subramanian writes that 'since 1752 he [Jagannathdas Laldas] was both the head of the Banias and the English representative (Vakil), a notable convergence of roles that has escaped Torri's attention' (ibid., p. 340). Here, Subramanian makes reference to Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Surat during the second half of the Eighteenth Century: What Kind of Scial Order?', MAS, 21, 4 (1987) [hereafter quoted as 'Surat'], pp. 681-8. In fact, this problem had been commented upon, although briefly, in Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Ethnicity and trade in Surat during the dual government era: 1759-1800', The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 27, 4 (1990), p. 379 (published before Subramanian's 'Reply'). It had not been touched upon in Torri, 'Surat', because, for the reasons that shall be detailed in the present paper, it had been judged unimportant. It has already been pointed out (see the section on the beginning of the civil war) that 'the notable convergence of the roles' alluded to by Subramanian did not start - as she claims - in 1752, but well before. In particular, Jagannath became broker of the 'Hon'ble Company' upon the death of his father in 1732. See Das Gupta, Indian merchants, pp. 80, 87-8. In 1737' because of his fall from grace, Jagannath lost the post of broker to Manockjee Nawrojee, but got it back in 1747, when - as noted (see fn. 17) - the official designation of the post became that of 'Marfutteah' (Marfettah), namely 'Agents'. See Das Gupta, 'The Broker at Mughal Surat', pp. 174 ff.
95. See Subramanian, 'Reply', pp. 338-41. The definition 'special relationship' is mine. Subramanian writes that 'since 1752 he [Jagannathdas Laldas] was both the head of the Banias and the English representative (Vakil), a notable convergence of roles that has escaped Torri's attention' (ibid., p. 340). Here, Subramanian makes reference to Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Surat during the second half of the Eighteenth Century: What Kind of Scial Order?', MAS, 21, 4 (1987) [hereafter quoted as 'Surat'], pp. 681-8. In fact, this problem had been commented upon, although briefly, in Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Ethnicity and trade in Surat during the dual government era: 1759-1800', The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 27, 4 (1990), p. 379 (published before Subramanian's 'Reply'). It had not been touched upon in Torri, 'Surat', because, for the reasons that shall be detailed in the present paper, it had been judged unimportant. It has already been pointed out (see the section on the beginning of the civil war) that 'the notable convergence of the roles' alluded to by Subramanian did not start - as she claims - in 1752, but well before. In particular, Jagannath became broker of the 'Hon'ble Company' upon the death of his father in 1732. See Das Gupta, Indian merchants, pp. 80, 87-8. In 1737' because of his fall from grace, Jagannath lost the post of broker to Manockjee Nawrojee, but got it back in 1747, when - as noted (see fn. 17) - the official designation of the post became that of 'Marfutteah' (Marfettah), namely 'Agents'. See Das Gupta, 'The Broker at Mughal Surat', pp. 174 ff.
96. See Subramanian, 'Reply', pp. 338-41. The definition 'special relationship' is mine. Subramanian writes that 'since 1752 he [Jagannathdas Laldas] was both the head of the Banias and the English representative (Vakil), a notable convergence of roles that has escaped Torri's attention' (ibid., p. 340). Here, Subramanian makes reference to Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Surat during the second half of the Eighteenth Century: What Kind of Scial Order?', MAS, 21, 4 (1987) [hereafter quoted as 'Surat'], pp. 681-8. In fact, this problem had been commented upon, although briefly, in Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Ethnicity and trade in Surat during the dual government era: 1759-1800', The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 27, 4 (1990), p. 379 (published before Subramanian's 'Reply'). It had not been touched upon in Torri, 'Surat', because, for the reasons that shall be detailed in the present paper, it had been judged unimportant. It has already been pointed out (see the section on the beginning of the civil war) that 'the notable convergence of the roles' alluded to by Subramanian did not start - as she claims - in 1752, but well before. In particular, Jagannath became broker of the 'Hon'ble Company' upon the death of his father in 1732. See Das Gupta, Indian merchants, pp. 80, 87-8. In 1737' because of his fall from grace, Jagannath lost the post of broker to Manockjee Nawrojee, but got it back in 1747, when - as noted (see fn. 17) - the official designation of the post became that of 'Marfutteah' (Marfettah), namely 'Agents'. See Das Gupta, 'The Broker at Mughal Surat', pp. 174 ff.
97. Even if it might appear to have been put forward to obscure a misstatement relating to the content of an important document. On this see Torri, 'Surat', pp. 683-5,
98. and Subramanian, 'Reply', pp. 338-41.
99. Torri, 'Surat', p. 680.
100. Accordingly even Parsis and Muslims could be labelled by the English as 'banias' in the functional sense. So, for example, Sorabjee Muncherjee, a Parsi and a member of Manockjee Nawrojee's family and business network, acted as 'Banyan Broker or man of business' to William Shaw (an officer of the English Company). See Mayor's Court, 18 April 1782, p. 494. On the Surat Bohra Muslims, classified as banias in the functional sense by Bishop Heber, see Torri, 'Surat', p. 680, fn. 3. The proposition - originally put forward in 'Surat' - that the term 'bania' is a confusing one has been harshly criticized by Subramanian, who thinks it to be 'hilarious' and 'confusing' ('Reply', pp. 322, and 333, fn. 8). Subramanian's abundant discourtesy translates, sometimes, into misrepresentation (see, e.g. her suggestion that Torri implies that the Bohra Muslims belonged to the Bania Mahajan, ibid., p. 323). Yet, discourtesy and misrepresentations apart, if one goes through Subramanian's sixteen-page-long survey of the usage of the term 'bania' ('Reply', Pp. 322-38), the conclusion is inescapable that it fully - if unwittingly - vindicates Torri's original position. In fact, the 'Reply' proves beyond doubt that the term 'bania' is indeed a confusing one, as it is indifferently used in the sources in both the castal and functional meaning.
101. Accordingly even Parsis and Muslims could be labelled by the English as 'banias' in the functional sense. So, for example, Sorabjee Muncherjee, a Parsi and a member of Manockjee Nawrojee's family and business network, acted as 'Banyan Broker or man of business' to William Shaw (an officer of the English Company). See Mayor's Court, 18 April 1782, p. 494. On the Surat Bohra Muslims, classified as banias in the functional sense by Bishop Heber, see Torri, 'Surat', p. 680, fn. 3. The proposition - originally put forward in 'Surat' - that the term 'bania' is a confusing one has been harshly criticized by Subramanian, who thinks it to be 'hilarious' and 'confusing' ('Reply', pp. 322, and 333, fn. 8). Subramanian's abundant discourtesy translates, sometimes, into misrepresentation (see, e.g. her suggestion that Torri implies that the Bohra Muslims belonged to the Bania Mahajan, ibid., p. 323). Yet, discourtesy and misrepresentations apart, if one goes through Subramanian's sixteen-page-long survey of the usage of the term 'bania' ('Reply', Pp. 322-38), the conclusion is inescapable that it fully - if unwittingly - vindicates Torri's original position. In fact, the 'Reply' proves beyond doubt that the term 'bania' is indeed a confusing one, as it is indifferently used in the sources in both the castal and functional meaning.
102. Accordingly even Parsis and Muslims could be labelled by the English as 'banias' in the functional sense. So, for example, Sorabjee Muncherjee, a Parsi and a member of Manockjee Nawrojee's family and business network, acted as 'Banyan Broker or man of business' to William Shaw (an officer of the English Company). See Mayor's Court, 18 April 1782, p. 494. On the Surat Bohra Muslims, classified as banias in the functional sense by Bishop Heber, see Torri, 'Surat', p. 680, fn. 3. The proposition - originally put forward in 'Surat' - that the term 'bania' is a confusing one has been harshly criticized by Subramanian, who thinks it to be 'hilarious' and 'confusing' ('Reply', pp. 322, and 333, fn. 8). Subramanian's abundant discourtesy translates, sometimes, into misrepresentation (see, e.g. her suggestion that Torri implies that the Bohra Muslims belonged to the Bania Mahajan, ibid., p. 323). Yet, discourtesy and misrepresentations apart, if one goes through Subramanian's sixteen-page-long survey of the usage of the term 'bania' ('Reply', Pp. 322-38), the conclusion is inescapable that it fully - if unwittingly - vindicates Torri's original position. In fact, the 'Reply' proves beyond doubt that the term 'bania' is indeed a confusing one, as it is indifferently used in the sources in both the castal and functional meaning.
103. Accordingly even Parsis and Muslims could be labelled by the English as 'banias' in the functional sense. So, for example, Sorabjee Muncherjee, a Parsi and a member of Manockjee Nawrojee's family and business network, acted as 'Banyan Broker or man of business' to William Shaw (an officer of the English Company). See Mayor's Court, 18 April 1782, p. 494. On the Surat Bohra Muslims, classified as banias in the functional sense by Bishop Heber, see Torri, 'Surat', p. 680, fn. 3. The proposition - originally put forward in 'Surat' - that the term 'bania' is a confusing one has been harshly criticized by Subramanian, who thinks it to be 'hilarious' and 'confusing' ('Reply', pp. 322, and 333, fn. 8). Subramanian's abundant discourtesy translates, sometimes, into misrepresentation (see, e.g. her suggestion that Torri implies that the Bohra Muslims belonged to the Bania Mahajan, ibid., p. 323). Yet, discourtesy and misrepresentations apart, if one goes through Subramanian's sixteen-page-long survey of the usage of the term 'bania' ('Reply', Pp. 322-38), the conclusion is inescapable that it fully - if unwittingly - vindicates Torri's original position. In fact, the 'Reply' proves beyond doubt that the term 'bania' is indeed a confusing one, as it is indifferently used in the sources in both the castal and functional meaning.
104. In this way it is labelled 'Saibrow' or 'Sait Row Tuckchung' (Shivrao Teckchand). See Public, 30 June 1772 (petition from Ram Cusson Cuttaree), where Shivrao appears offering security for a man of his jati, who had been imprisoned by the Nawab. Shivrao is the same man who appears among a group of 'principal merchants and shroffs' who approached the English in 1752 to ask for their mediation on a problem of taxes that Sidi Masud intended to levy. It is shown below that, in 1759, Shivrao acted in conjunction with Jagannath Laldas as go-between for the English Chief, John Spencer, and two Mughal nobles: Sir Zafar Yab Khan and Wali Ullah.
105. Accordingly Subramanian is free to label Tarwady Arjunji Nathjee, a 'Bania banker' (e.g. 'Reply', p. 343), as long as she makes clear that Jagannath's title of 'head of the Banias', or, rather 'head of the Banian Caste' (as such is the definition used in the records), did not imply that Tarwady was one of Jagannath's supposed followers. Of course, this is exactly what Subramanian does not do. In fact such is the ambiguity and elasticity of the term 'Bania' as it is used by Subramanian (and on this see the following note too) that, to paraphrase a famous philosopher, it becomes a kind of night in which all cows are black.
106. In 'Capital and Crowd', the Nagar Brahmans are classified by Subramanian as part of the Banias. In her 'Reply', the category becomes wider and, taking perhaps the cue from Torri's 'Surat', Subramanian stretches it to include the Khatris. In fact, at pp. 340-1 of the 'Reply', she appears very near to give in to the temptation to include even the Parsis among the Banias. Certainly, in the 'Reply' she seems convinced that the Parsis as a whole were under English protection (she appears unaware of Muncherjee Cursetjee's political role and economic wealth) and that they made up a sort of political and economic continuum with the Banias.
107. Still, even on this point we proceed on the basis of assumptions built on the impressionistic annotations of some travellers and on the reading back of the first city census (held in 1818).
108. In 1752 a group of 'principal merchants and shroffs' approached the English in order to have their mediation in the dealings between the merchants and Sidi Masud Khan, aimed at raising a considerable sum of money, necessary to buy off the Marathas. This group of 'principal merchants and shroffs' included 13 persons, namely 7 Muslims (among whom Salah and Usman Chellabi), 2 Armenians and 4 Hindus. Among the Hindus, two were Khatris. See FRS, 30 April 1752. No Parsi appeared in this group, as, at the time, most Parsis in Surat were under Muncherjee Cursetjee's influence. Not surprisingly, that die-hard enemy to the English chose not to be part of the group. If we add - as we most certainly should - Muncherjee Cursetjee to the above sample, we have that the Banias made the 14% only of the principal merchants and shroffs in the city. Of course, a group of 14 elements is too small a sample to be accepted as statistically sound. Still, there is no indication in the sources that the situation was radically different from the one that can be inferred from our sample.
109. The claim that, in the period comprising the late 1740s and the 1750s, the bulk of the Bania community became solidly pro-English and acted politically on their behalf is the topic allegedly explored by Subramanian in her The Castle Revolution'. Yet, a close perusal of the tale of the evolving relationship between the Banias and the English that makes up 'The Castle Revolution' soon reveals that, at any turning point (see, in particular, pp. 102-3, 104, 110, 111, 113), almost no sources are quoted. Besides, those quoted are in fact misquoted or quoted out of context. A readily verifiable example of this is the statement (p. 102) that, 'by 1730 the Gujarati banias were offering the most valuable freight for British shipping so much so that in 1731 they complained to the Bengal Nawab that they would be great sufferers from any interference with British shipping'. This is allegedly based on P. J. Marshall, East Indian Fortunes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 79; in fact, Marshall refers to the 'Gujarat silk merchants'. It has been shown that the non-European silk merchants active in the Surat-Bengal silk trade were an ethnically mixed group made up, besides the Hindus, by Armenians - who were hardly less prominent than the Hindus - and Muslims (even if admittedly less prominent than either Hindus or Armenians). See Torri, 'Ethnicity and trade', pp. 387-90, 403.
110. The claim that, in the period comprising the late 1740s and the 1750s, the bulk of the Bania community became solidly pro-English and acted politically on their behalf is the topic allegedly explored by Subramanian in her The Castle Revolution'. Yet, a close perusal of the tale of the evolving relationship between the Banias and the English that makes up 'The Castle Revolution' soon reveals that, at any turning point (see, in particular, pp. 102-3, 104, 110, 111, 113), almost no sources are quoted. Besides, those quoted are in fact misquoted or quoted out of context. A readily verifiable example of this is the statement (p. 102) that, 'by 1730 the Gujarati banias were offering the most valuable freight for British shipping so much so that in 1731 they complained to the Bengal Nawab that they would be great sufferers from any interference with British shipping'. This is allegedly based on P. J. Marshall, East Indian Fortunes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 79; in fact, Marshall refers to the 'Gujarat silk merchants'. It has been shown that the non-European silk merchants active in the Surat-Bengal silk trade were an ethnically mixed group made up, besides the Hindus, by Armenians - who were hardly less prominent than the Hindus - and Muslims (even if admittedly less prominent than either Hindus or Armenians). See Torri, 'Ethnicity and trade', pp. 387-90, 403.
111. Secret, 30 March 1757, and FRS, 23 Oct. 1757 (letter from the Dutch) and 24 Oct. 1757 (answer to the Dutch).
112. FRS, 19 Feb. 1759.
113. Stavorinus, Voyages to the East Indies, vol. III, pp. 122-4.
114. Even Das Gupta's close examination of the first 40 years of the century does not shed much light on this topic. In fact most of what Das Gupta says seems to be inferred from oral sources, which, at best, can be judged relevant only for a much later period. See his Indian Merchants, pp. 79-80, 87-8 and fn. 2. On the other hand, the same Das Gupta, with his usual scholarly aplomb, premises his treatment of this topic with the caveat that the situation was 'most probably' what he makes it out to be. For some information on the role of the 'head of the Banias' - both intriguing and open to different interpretations - see FRS, 30 July 1752. Further material is discussed below.
115. The religious role played by the 'head of the Banias' in later periods can be inferred from the testimony of Dr Nabin Chandra Babubhai Nagarsheth, retold by Ashin Das Gupta in his Indian Merchants, p. 88.
116. E.g. FRS, 29 Sept. 1741 (letter from Bombay of the 18th inst. and letter by Thomas Marsh to the Bombay Govt., same date), and ibid.,16 April 1742 (letter from Bombay of the 7th inst.).
117. On Jagannath's persistently difficult economic position in the 1740s and 1750s and his debts to the English Company see, e.g. FRS, 19 Jan. 1743, 19 Jan., 14 and 23 Dec. 1746; Public, 6 July 1750, 2 Jan. 1751 (list of debts outstanding), and 14 Feb. 1758.
118. Public, 14 Feb. 1758, and FRS, 26 May and 23 June 1759.
119. This comes out quite unambiguously during the discussion in the Bombay Council, in connection with the farming out of the 1758 investment. In fact, in 1758 Jagannath's offer was actually the most convenient among those made by the various bidders. Yet, the Bombay Government preferred to farm out the contract to the previous contractors - namely Nasserwanjee Bomonjee and his partners - on their accepting the same terms made by Jagannath, which they did. The reason explicitly given by the Bombay Government for this unusual procedure was Nasserwanjee and partners' superior economic standing vis-à-vis Jagannath's. See Public, 14 Feb. 1758.
120. The relative importance of Jagannath's two charges is shown by an episode involving the Sidi, the English and Jagannath in 1752. The Sidi was then casting around for the huge sum of money made necessary by his engagements with both the English and the Marathas and, as usual in these cases, he tried to levy it from the merchants. Yet, true to himself, the Sidi tried to arrange things in such a way that the odium for the new levy would fall on the English. In order to do this, he decided to involve Jagannath in the dealings of an ad hoc council of merchants. By taking part in the proceedings of the council and being somehow made to acquiesce in its decisions, Jagannath would automatically make the English Company share responsibility for them, precisely because of his status as representative of the English Company. The problem, for the Sidi, was to entice the English into giving Jagannath licence to take part in the merchant council. This the Sidi obtained by convincing them that Jagannath's presence was necessary because he was the 'head of the Banian caste'. Eventually the English realized the Sidi's ruse and neutralized it just in time. FRS, 19, 20 May, 4 June, 4, 20, 25, 29 Nov. 1752. This seems to be the substance and the correct meaning of this episode, in spite of the radically different interpretation given to it by Subramanian in her 'Reply', pp. 340-1.
121. Secret, 14 Nov. 1757 (Letter from Mr Ellis).
122. William De La Garde. See Mayor's Court, 18 Jan. 1762 (Anne De La Garde's petition) and ibid., 16 Feb. 1762 (Dunjeeshaw Munjeeshaw's answer).
123. DP, pp. cccxv-cccxvi, cccxxvi-cccxxvii. In Duperron's memoir the leader of the minority is indicated as a Darab, and Dunjeeshaw does not even appear. It is only in the 1760s that Dunjeeshaw, by then one of the wealthiest and possibly the most politically influential merchant in Surat, emerges as the head of the minority faction, engaged in a bitter clash with the majority. The majority, although headed by Muncherjee, included numerous and affluent merchants under English protection. On this see Public and FRS for the period from June to November 1768. The gap in the FRS collection for this period (both the IOR and the Maharashtra State Archives collections are incomplete) can be partly filled by reference to Orme OV 131.
124. The fact that Nek Sat Khan was Dunjeeshaw's grandfather surfaces in a letter written by Mir Naseruddin Khan in 1799. See FRS, 12 Aug. 1799 (Roca from Meer Nusseereddeen Khan Behadur to the Chief Daniel Seton) [IOR: G/36/78, p. 550]. On Nek Sat Khan see Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. IX, pt II, Gujarat Papulation: Musalmans and Parsis (Bombay: at the Government Central Press, 1890), p. 197, fn. 197. According to the Gazetteer, Nek Sat Khan had received his title from Muhammad Shah, in 1744, as a token of esteem by the Mughal Emperor for the Parsi's ability as watchmaker. Nek Sat Khan was to head the delegation that the English sent to Delhi, after the takeover of Surat castle, in order to obtain a grant by the Mughal monarch, legitimizing their conquest.
125. The fact that Nek Sat Khan was Dunjeeshaw's grandfather surfaces in a letter written by Mir Naseruddin Khan in 1799. See FRS, 12 Aug. 1799 (Roca from Meer Nusseereddeen Khan Behadur to the Chief Daniel Seton) [IOR: G/36/78, p. 550]. On Nek Sat Khan see Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. IX, pt II, Gujarat Papulation: Musalmans and Parsis (Bombay: at the Government Central Press, 1890), p. 197, fn. 197. According to the Gazetteer, Nek Sat Khan had received his title from Muhammad Shah, in 1744, as a token of esteem by the Mughal Emperor for the Parsi's ability as watchmaker. Nek Sat Khan was to head the delegation that the English sent to Delhi, after the takeover of Surat castle, in order to obtain a grant by the Mughal monarch, legitimizing their conquest.
126. Secret, 14 Nov. 1757 (Ellis's letter of 7 Nov. 1757).
127. Secret, 14 Nov. 1757 (Ellis's letter); Secret, April 1758 (Ellis's letter of 28 March 1758). Besides, Ellis was particularly concerned about his own private broker, who, however, is never indicated by name.
128. FRS, 19 Nov. 1758.
129. Public, 16 Sept. 1772 (extract of Mr Ellis's letter of the 4 Feb. 1772).
130. Public, 29 May 1772 (Dunjeeshaw's memorial); Bombay Revenues Proceedings, 15 June 1781 (Dunjeeshaw's petition); ibid., 20 June 1781 (Dunjeeshaw's [second] petition); FRS, 25 JuIy 1781.
131. In 1781, the Broach Chief, who had personally known both Ellis and Spencer, officially stated that 'he has reason to believe he [Dunjeeshaw] was of service as to the two expeditions [that against Surat and that leading to the conquest of Broach in the early 1770s] and more especially on the first [that against Surat] as he has often heard Mr. Ellis, who was Chief of Surat at the time the expedition against that place was planned, and Mr. Spencer, who was Chief when it was executed, declare that he [Dunjeeshaw] was of material service to them both'. Bombay Revenue Proceedings, 4 Sept. 1781 (answer from Broach).
132. FRS, 3 May 1760, and 24 May 1760 (letter from Bombay of 19 May). For a somewhat inflated account of the role of Dunjeeshaw's grandfather in the takeover of Surat see H. D. Darukhanwala, Parsi: Lustre on Indian Soil (Bombay: Kokil & Co., 1963), 2 vols, vol. II, pp. 371-2 (Sorabji Cawasji Neksatkhan).
133. FRS, 14, 19, 20 Aug. 1759 and Orme OV 131, pp. 45, 46.
134. On the 27 Oct. 1761. See Public, 3 Nov. 1761.
135. Public, 15 Feb. and 7 March 1763.
136. Public, 26 March 1765.
137. Public, 6 May 1766; 19 and 30 May 1767; 4 Oct. 1768; 8 Aug. 1770; 13 Oct. 1772; 24 Aug. 1773; 27 Oct. 1774; 30 April 1776; 17 Feb. 1779.
138. FRS, 21 Nov. 1758.
139. After his defeat Atchund had sojourned for some time in Surat. That was an uncomfortable situation for both him and the Sidi. Accordingly, both of them had asked the English to allow the former Nawab to go and reside in Bombay, which happened at the beginning of 1753. Public, 7 Nov. 1752, and FRS, 7 Feb. 1753.
140. DP, pp. ccxci, ccxciv-ccxcv.
141. When Ellis and the Secret Committee considered the possible candidates for the role of Nawab in Surat, Meah Atchund's name never came up, in spite of the former Nawab's previous connection with the English Company (see Secret: Ellis's letter of 15 Feb. 1758 and Committee of 17 Feb. 1758). This is not as surprising as it could seem at first. Together with the unfortunate Mr Lambe, Atchund must have been saddled by the Bombay Government with the responsibility for the 'Hon'ble Company"s defeat at the hands of Sidi Masud Khan. Of course, true to human nature, the fact that the responsibility for that fiasco was less Atchund's than the Bombay Government's must have made the latter particularly unforgiving towards the former.
142. DP, p. ccxci.
143. Ibid., p. ccxciv.
144. He received 100 sepoys and one Arab Jemadar. After the successful completion of the enterprise, the Nawab of Broach was rewarded with the Vakee Nagaree (wakianigar) of the port of Surat. FRS, 13 Feb. 1795 (Roca from the Nabob). Formerly an office in charge of writing confidential reports to the Mughal Court on what happened in Surat, by Atchund's time the wakianigar was a sinecure which entitled to a (hefty) stipend.
145. FRS, 6 Nov. 1758 (letter to Bombay), for the quotation. For the Peshwa's initial support to Atchund and later change of heart, see Shejwalkar, The Surat Episode, pp. 177-9.
146. Ibid. and Maharashtra State Archives: Selection of the Bombay Government papers, No 87 (1795): Report of the Committee . . . Read [on] 1710 November 1795, pp. 20-1 (Chief's answer). The same document, consisting of the Nawab's justification of his behaviour during the August 1796 riot, is available in FRS 1795. In it the information can be found on Kishen Rao as the main financial support of Meah Atchund's expedition against Surat. Of course, this information must be treated with caution, as it appears in a document of a much later period. Yet, it seems to square with Shejwalkar's account, which, on this point, draws from Maratha sources.
147. FRS, 22 and 23 Nov. 1758.
148. Secret, 29 Nov. 1758. See also DP, pp. ccxciv-ccxcv.
149. FRS, 4 Dec. 1758 and DP, pp. ccxcv-ccxcvi.
150. FRS, 6 Dec. 1758.
151. On Atchund's difficult financial situation see below. The fact that the city was not sacked is recorded in DP, p. cccxci.
152. Secret, 25 Nov. 1758.
153. On this see the classic work by A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983; 1st edn. 1890), pp. 271-4.
154. Secret, 5 Dec. 1758.
155. Once back in Bombay, Ellis had automatically resumed his seat as member of the Select Committee.
156. Secret, 12 Dec. 1758.
157. Secret, 18 Dec. 1758.
158. Spencer 1st report, para. 10.
159. On this see below.
160. Spencer's 1st report, paras 1-2, 4.
161. Secret, Ellis's letter of 28 March 1758.
162. During one of the bitter exchanges that he continued to have with his Bombay colleagues, he once again claimed, no doubt with a trifle of exaggeration, that 'when the expedition was first urged by him, all the trading body of Surat was in our [English] interest, with near half of the sepoys in Ali NOVUS Caun's [Ali Nawaz Khan] pay, whereas at the present juncture we are utterly destitute of that advantage'. Political, 8 Dec. 1758 (Questions answered in writing by Mr Ellis, indisposed).
163. See Torri, 'Surat', pp. 683-6, and Subramanian, 'Reply', pp. 338-9.
164. See Torri, 'Surat', pp. 683-6, and Subramanian, 'Reply', pp. 338-9.
165. Spencer's 1st report, para. 5.
166. Ibid. Of course, the Chellabis were absolutely right in being afraid that the English would make use of any new political power to impose their control on the profitable trade to the Middle East. For an introduction to this problem see Michelguglielmo Torri, 'In the Deep Blue Sea: Surat and its Merchant Class During the Dyarchic Era (1759-1800)', The Indian Economic and Social History Review, XIX, 3 & 4 (1982), pp. 272-5.
167. Or, to quote Mr Mondale's immortal question to Mr Hart, during the 1984 nomination campaign for the democratic candidacy to the White House, 'where is the meat?'. Yet, the fact that, at this crucial point, the shroffs who had taken part in Ellis's conspiracy vanished into thin air is not regarded as in any way significant by Subramanian. Without the benefit of any documental proof, she goes on reiterating that the alliance between the shroffs and the English did in fact continue even after the fiasco of the 1758 expedition, and was crucial to the eventual success of the English takeover of Surat castle ('Reply', p. 342).
168. See below.
169. Spencer's 1st report, paras 6 and 7. The fact that the secret connection between the English Chief and the two Mughal nobles was kept open by both Jagannath and the foremost Khatri merchant in Surat means that, even in this purely mediatory role, the 'Banias' did not enjoy any monopoly.
170. On this particular point see Spencer's 2nd report, para. 4.
171. On the role played by Wali Ullah in the betrayal of Ali Nawaz Khan compare Shejwalkar, The Surat Episode, p. 179, with DP, pp. ccxcv-ccxcvi.
172. Spencer's 1st report, paras 3, 6-7.
173. Of course, if not Wali Ullah, at least Sidi Zafar, as one of the principal 'slaves' in Surat, must have played a role in the coup d'état that, a few years before, had led to Faris Khan's fall from power and expulsion from Surat.
174. Ibid., para. 7.
175. Ibid.
176. Spencer's doubts on Sidi Zafar and Wali Ullah's sincerity surfaced again in his second major report, written some three weeks later. See Spencer's 2nd report, para. 10. Later they seem to have been forgotten.
177. Ibid., passim, and para. 13 for the intelligence on the Dutch.
178. FRS, 2 Feb. 1759.
179. On the harassment of merchants under English protection see FRS, 30 Dec. 1758, 3 and 9 Jan. 1759.
180. FRS, 12 Feb. 1759.
181. Spencer's 2nd report, para. 12.
182. Ibid., paras 5-9.
183. Public, 6 Feb. 1759, 8 Feb. 1759 (letter to Surat); FRS, 12, 14, 15 Feb. 1759; Public, 22 Feb. 1759. See also DP, pp. ccxcviii-ccxcix.
184. Public, 22 Feb. 1759 (letter from Spencer and Council) and DP, pp. ccxcviii-ccxcix. Pockock's two vessels - which, anyway, were too big to navigate the Tapiplayed the crucially important role of checkmating the Dutch ships and a Maratha flotilla then at the Bar (see below and fn. 201). The Maratha squadron, which had originally been sent to support Ali Nawaz Khan, had arrived too late, namely the day after Ali Nawaz Khan's surrender. See Shejwalkar, The Surat Episode, p. 178.
185. Already in the early 1750s, Sidi Hilal had been one of Sidi Musad's principal lieutenants. See FRS, 23 March 1752.
186. According to Erskine, the Sidi's troops amounted to some 2,000 men (FRS, 14 Feb. 1759). Of this force, 150 Rajputs, under the leadership of a Maulji Chaura, had been suborned by the English (Spencer's 2nd report, para. 6) and actually sided with them in the final phase of the campaign (see below). Of course, considering the fact that the Sidi and the Nawab were 'so divided amongst themselves and so very suspicious of the intention of one another' (Spencer's 2nd report, para, 1), part of the Sidi's forces had to be kept as garrison for the castle and could not be deployed in the fight along the Tapi. On their part, English land forces amounted to 800 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys, 'exclusive of His Majesty's detachment of artillery' (FRS, 15 Feb. 1759), which amounted to an additional 200 men (FRS, 4 Dec. 1758). To this must be added that Spencer had suborned some hundreds of people belonging to either the Sidi or the Nawab, who were supposed to intervene after the beginning of the campaign (Spencer 2nd report, paras 6, 8). Yet, only Maulji's 150 Rajputs finally honoured their engagement with the English. Besides, Spencer had recruited 200 Marwaris and Erskine had been put in charge to raise an additional mercenary force of at least 1,000 men (ibid., paras 7, 9). It is not clear from the records if Erskine was successful in his task, but, even if he failed, English land forces added up to 2,700 men, compared with the Sidi's 2,000 (inclusive of Maulji Chaura's 150 Rajputs, who, as recalled, in the final phase switched to the English side). Besides, the English must have had a better train of field artillery. Alongside this, it must be remembered that, according to Spencer, Meah Atchund had some 4,000 sepoys in his pay, 'but except those he brought into town with him they are not esteemed such good sepoys as the Sciddee's' and, besides, could not be fully relied upon because short of pay (Spencer's 1st report, para. 10). As we shall see, Atchund and his forces, strictly inactive during most of the campaign, finally switched to the English side.
187. The position of the French garden can be seen in the sketch of the plan of Surat made by Robert Orme, and preserved among his papers. See Orme OV 336, P-33.
188. On the military operations see the FRS for the period from 18 February onwards, and DP, pp. ccxcixff.
189. Public, 8 Feb. 1759 (letter to Surat).
190. For the bumbling policy followed by the Marathas since Atchund had escaped from the Peshwa's control, see Shejwalkar, The Surat Episode, passim.
191. In the FRS of 1 March 1759, it is written that 'The Chief is advised from good authority [that] these people have Nana's [the Peshwa] orders not to obstruct us in any shape, but that there is no trusting to such fellows, but that at best they are arrant poltroons, so that no harm can happen from them, however they are played off' (emphasis mine). My own impression is that, as far as the emphasized part is concerned, Spencer was boasting in order to keep up the sagging spirit of his followers.
192. FRS, 8 Feb. 1759 (letters from Erskine of the 6, 7, 8 inst.), FRS, 11,14 and 16 Feb. 1759.
193. FRS, 19 Feb. 1759 (letter from Erskine).
194. Secret, 17 Jan. 1759.
195. Spencer's 2nd report, para, 1, and FRS, 18 Feb. 1758 (letter from Erskine).
196. FRS, 15 and 23 Feb. 1759.
197. FRS, 27 Feb. 1759.
198. FRS, 1 March 1759.
199. FRS, March 1759 (between 11 and 12 at night).
200. FRS, 2 March 1759 (late at night).
201. Ibid.
202. On Faris Khan and Meah Atchund's characters see Torri, 'Surat', p. 688, fn. 27.
203. FRS, 11 Feb. 1759.
204. FRS, 14 Feb. 1759.
205. FRS, 19 Feb. 1759 (letter from Erskine of the previous day).
206. Ibid., postscript.
207. This was openly stated by Spencer to a delegation from town which was at the English camp on the funny errand of asking Spencer's permission in order to get hold of the English 'garden' and turn it over to the Sidi's army. FRS, 19 Feb. 1759.
208. Ibid.
209. FRS, 8 and g Feb. 1759.
210. FRS, 13 Feb. 1759. On that date Chellabi was supposed to resume his negotiation with Spencer, but he never showed up.
211. Neither did the Sayyids. FRS, 27 Feb. 1759.
212. FRS, 22 Feb. 1759.
213. FRS, 27 Feb. 1759.
214. FRS, 2 and 27 Feb. 1759. The letters were aimed at those influential men or social groups which occupied a middle ground between the English and the Sidi. This section of the population, by shifting its weight behind either party could play a decisive role in the outcome of the war. The letters were addressed to the 'house of the Chellabys', to Sayyid Abdul Idruss, to 'the principal officers and inhabitants of Surat', to Meah Atchund, and to 'Appajee and Mandrow, the Maratta agents'. Of course, there were no letters addressed to Sidi Zafar, Wali Ullah and the Head Sayyid, as they were already part of the pro-English party.
215. Secret, 18 Dec. 1758 (instructions to John Spencer).
216. DP, p. ccxcii.
217. FRS, g Feb. 1759 (letter from Erskine).
218. For the Peshwa's Surat plolicy see Shejwalkar, The Surat Episode, passim. Some additional information can be gathered from W. S. Desai, Bombay and the Marathas up to 1774 (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970), pp. 157-61. Unfortunately, both works, although useful (particularly the former), are far from being fully satisfactory.
219. For the Peshwa's Surat plolicy see Shejwalkar, The Surat Episode, passim. Some additional information can be gathered from W. S. Desai, Bombay and the Marathas up to 1774 (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970), pp. 157-61. Unfortunately, both works, although useful (particularly the former), are far from being fully satisfactory.
220. FRS, 12 Feb. 1759.
221. FRS, 27 Feb. 1759.
222. FRS, 19 Feb. 1759 (letter from Erskine).
223. Some twenty years after these facts, while relating them to the Dutch Rear Admiral Stavorinus, then visiting Surat, Muncherjee and the other Dutch broker, Govindram, claimed that the incumbent Directore, Taillefert, had been bought by the English. See Stavorinus, Voyages to the East Indies, vol. III, pp. 121-4. This charge, although convincing enough to be believed by Stavorinus, was totally groundless. The Dutch Directore never appears in the English records among those that the English tried to suborn. The real reason for Dutch inaction was the presence of Pocock's two ships of the line at the Surat Bar, which could easily have sunk or seized the Dutch vessels there. See Secret, 15 April 1759 (letter from Pocock of 29 March 1759 and letter of Spencer of 8 April 1759).
224. Subramanian, 'Reply', p. 341 fn. 56.
225. It is exactly this statement, quoted by Subramanian out of context, which in her opinion shows that Torri 'is quite incorrect' (ibid.) in claiming that the merchants were far from being enthusiastically pro-English.
226. FRS, 3 March 1759.
227. FRS, 2 March 1759.
228. FRS, 4 March 1759.
229. Ibid.
230. DP, pp. cccii-cciii.
231. DP, pp. ccci, cccii.
232. V. G. Hatalkar (ed.), French Records relating to the History of the Marathas, vols I & II (Bombay: State Board for Literature and Culture, 1978), particularly, vol. I, pp. 66ff.
233. Yehoshafat Harkabi, 'Choosing Between Bad and Worse', Journal of Palestine Studies, XVI, 3 (Spring 1987).
234. Torri, 'Surat', p. 691.
235. FRS, 5 Dec. 1759.
236. FRS, 10 and 28 April 1759.
237. Letter from the Court of Directors to Bombay of 25 April 1760, para. 96 [IOR, E/4/996, p. 873], and Public, 24 Feb. 1761. The hypothesis can be made that Ellis, by then back in England, played a role in making the Directors aware of Jagannath's 'great use'. This supposition is strengthened by the fact that, still in 1772, Ellis intervened with a personal letter addressed to the incumbent Bombay Governor on behalf of Jagannath's business associate and political heir, Dunjeeshaw Munjeeshaw.
238. Because of their connections with some powerful English officers, both Dadabhoy Manockjee, the last heir of Manockjee Nawrojee's fortune, and Mulla Fakharuddin were able to go back to Surat and, up to the early 1770s, greatly prospered under English patronage.
239. Here, it is unnecessary to dwell once again on the claim made in Subramanian, 'Capital and Crowd', p. 213, that the 1% war tax was 'volunteered' by the 'Banias'. On this see Torri, 'Surat', pp. 688-go.
240. Here, it is unnecessary to dwell once again on the claim made in Subramanian, 'Capital and Crowd', p. 213, that the 1% war tax was 'volunteered' by the 'Banias'. On this see Torri, 'Surat', pp. 688-go.
241. This happened in 1742, when a 0.25% custom was raised for the maintenance of the Mughal fleet (FRS, 27 June 1742); in 1744, when Tegh Beg Khan levied a 1% custom in order to finance the military expenditure made necessary by the defence of the city against another Mughal pretender (FRS, 2 Aug. 1744); and in 1752, when Sidi Masud and Safder Khan were casting around for the money necessary to pay both the English and the Marathas (see FRS, 19, 20 May 4 June, 4, 20, 25, 29 Nov. 1752; the episode is summed up in fn. 101). In the latter case, Safder Khan, after much dithering by the merchants, actually detained the most eminent among them in the durbar, intimating that they would not be releaed before deciding on the kind and amount of new taxes (FRS, 30 July 1752).
242. FRS, 4, 5, 27 Aug. and 28 Nov. 1759. See also Public, 9 Dec. 1759.