-
1
-
-
11644252395
-
-
[1993] A.C. 442
-
[1993] A.C. 442.
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
11644270008
-
-
[1972] A.C. 626
-
[1972] A.C. 626.
-
-
-
-
3
-
-
11644327942
-
-
[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 518
-
[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 518.
-
-
-
-
4
-
-
11644292545
-
-
[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 524
-
[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 524.
-
-
-
-
5
-
-
11644278944
-
-
[1996] Crim.L.R. 435 and [1997] Crim.L.R. 359 respectively
-
[1996] Crim.L.R. 435 and [1997] Crim.L.R. 359 respectively.
-
-
-
-
6
-
-
11644284716
-
-
[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 518 at 520F, 521A
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[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 518 at 520F, 521A.
-
-
-
-
7
-
-
11644287921
-
-
ibid. at 523G-524A
-
ibid. at 523G-524A.
-
-
-
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8
-
-
11644281178
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-
[1978] 1 W.L.R. 770
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[1978] 1 W.L.R. 770.
-
-
-
-
9
-
-
11644249111
-
-
See Lloyds Bank v. Bundy [1975] Q.B. 326 at 339, per Lord Denning M.R.; Ayres v. Hazelgrove (1984), unreported
-
See Lloyds Bank v. Bundy [1975] Q.B. 326 at 339, per Lord Denning M.R.; Ayres v. Hazelgrove (1984), unreported.
-
-
-
-
10
-
-
11644316793
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-
[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 524 at 531A
-
[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 524 at 531A.
-
-
-
-
11
-
-
11644290367
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-
[1993] A.C. 442
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[1993] A.C. 442.
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-
-
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12
-
-
11644327645
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-
[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 524 at 535A
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[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 524 at 535A.
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-
-
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13
-
-
11644307531
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[1997] Crim.L.R. 359 at 361
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[1997] Crim.L.R. 359 at 361.
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-
-
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14
-
-
11644305757
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[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 524 at 534G-535A
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[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 524 at 534G-535A.
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-
-
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15
-
-
11644252393
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-
[1993] A.C. 442
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[1993] A.C. 442.
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-
-
-
16
-
-
11644272268
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-
[1993] A.C. 442
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[1993] A.C. 442.
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-
-
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17
-
-
11644283340
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[1993] A.C. 442
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[1993] A.C. 442.
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-
-
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18
-
-
11644309665
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[1993] A.C. 442
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[1993] A.C. 442.
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-
-
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19
-
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11644313506
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[1993] A.C. 442
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[1993] A.C. 442.
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-
-
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20
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11644266527
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[1993] A.C. 442 at 464D
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[1993] A.C. 442 at 464D.
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-
-
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21
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11644312656
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[1972] A.C. 626
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[1972] A.C. 626.
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-
-
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22
-
-
11644274591
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[1993] A.C. 442 at 460D-E
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[1993] A.C. 442 at 460D-E.
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-
-
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23
-
-
11644284714
-
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[1972] A.C. 626 at 632A; quoted by Lord Keith, [1993] A.C. 442 at 455H
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[1972] A.C. 626 at 632A; quoted by Lord Keith, [1993] A.C. 442 at 455H.
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-
-
-
24
-
-
11644315242
-
-
note
-
Reference to the civil law for concepts such as "permission" is in fact not quite inevitable. (Compare "consent" in rape, which has a distinctive meaning quite internal to the criminal law: see Olugboja [1982] Q.B. 320, discussed (1996) 16 L.S. 275.) But the concepts under discussion here are those of a transfer being void, voidable, or perfect, for which it is clear that reference is being made to the civil law.
-
-
-
-
25
-
-
11644305758
-
-
note
-
An appellate attempt to engage with such rules can be seen in the judgment of Lord Lane C.J. in Kaur (Dip) v. Chief Constable of Hampshire [1981] 1 W.L.R. 578 at 582-583, but such attempts were characterised as inadvisable by Lord Roskill in Morris [1984] A.C. 320 at 334D. (See too Whittaker v. Campbell [1984] Q.B. 318, and in adifferent context Att. Gen.'s Reference (No. 3 of 1994) [1997] 3 W.L.R. 421 at 444H-445A.) In Dobson v. General Accident Fire and Life Insurance Corp. plc [1990] 1 Q.B. 274 at 289F, Bingham L.J. points out that the question whether the subject-matter of the appropriation is "property belonging to another" must be governed by civil law principles. There is, however, no suggestion that this is other than an exception from Lord Roskill's enjoinder. Reflection upon its implications may illuminate the wisdom of Lord Roskill's view, in fact. Few of the personnel of a criminal trial would feel comfortable, for example, in applying the law enunciated in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington LBC [1996] A.C. 669, so as to discover whether property was held under a trust and thus counted as "belonging to another". The difficulty will become profounder still if English law accepts remedial constructive trusts, which, although on at least some views they may date from the relevant facts, are imposed in an exercise of (civil) judicial discretion.
-
-
-
-
26
-
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11644253251
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[1993] A.C. 442
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[1993] A.C. 442.
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-
-
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27
-
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11644249110
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[1982] Q.B. 1053 at 1074D-E
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[1982] Q.B. 1053 at 1074D-E.
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-
-
-
29
-
-
11644326798
-
-
note
-
In his commentary on Kendrick and Hopkins, [1997] Crim.L.R. 359 at 360-361, Professor Smith argues that the requirement that the accused should have acted "dishonestly" demands an inquiry purely as to his or her state of mind, but in view of element (i) this seems doubtful.
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
11644250914
-
-
note
-
Professor Smith raises the possibility of quite a wide gap: [1996] Crim.L.R. 436 at 437. But he appears to do so on the footing that element (i) of dishonesty is defined by "what a man of scrupulous morality or nice honour would do in the circumstances" (Smith v. Hughes (1871) L.R. 6 Q.B. 597 at 603, per Cockburn C.J.). This, however, seems significantly more exigent that the reference to the "ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people". In particular, the latter formulation may allow for a higher degree of individualism than the former. This may make a difference in certain examples discussed by Professor Smith ([1996] Crim.L.R. 436 at 437, [1997] Crim.L.R. 359 at 360).
-
-
-
-
31
-
-
11644300787
-
-
[1972] A.C. 626
-
[1972] A.C. 626.
-
-
-
-
32
-
-
11644268838
-
-
[1993] A.C. 442
-
[1993] A.C. 442.
-
-
-
-
33
-
-
11644326629
-
-
[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 524 at 534E
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[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 524 at 534E.
-
-
-
-
34
-
-
11644323249
-
-
note
-
The omitted words are "which was said of Lady S.", i.e. Lady Marjorie Stirling inMazo. The court is thus hinting that Mazo may have been correctly decided on its facts, i.e. that Ms Mazo was not guilty of theft, in that Lady Marjorie's capabilities were not so impaired that reasonable and honest people would have regarded Ms Mazo's acceptance of gifts from her as dishonest. More generally, it is noticeable that the Court of Appeal in Mazo presents Ms Mazo's conduct in a rather sympathetic light, while the court's portrayal of the events in Kendrick and Hopkins is much more damning.
-
-
-
-
35
-
-
11644298790
-
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[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 524 at 538A
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[1997] 2 Cr.App.R. 524 at 538A.
-
-
-
-
36
-
-
11644312657
-
-
[1997] Crim.L.R. 359
-
[1997] Crim.L.R. 359.
-
-
-
-
37
-
-
11644306659
-
-
[1972] A.C. 626
-
[1972] A.C. 626.
-
-
-
-
38
-
-
11644275436
-
-
[1993] A.C. 442. See n.25 above
-
[1993] A.C. 442. See n.25 above.
-
-
-
-
39
-
-
11644296646
-
-
[1996] Crim.L.R. 435 at 437
-
[1996] Crim.L.R. 435 at 437.
-
-
-
-
40
-
-
11644313508
-
Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eight Report
-
cf. the dictum by O'Connor J. in the High Court of Australia in Black v. S. Freedman & Co. (1910) 12 C.L.R. 105 at 110, "Where money has been stolen, it is trust money in the hands of the thief." In terms of the analysis advanced by Professor Birks and others, this might be a case either of unconscientious receipt or perhaps of restitution for a wrong. Before the Theft Act 1968, it may have been the law that the thief's conviction revested title to the property in question in its original owner (see the Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eight Report, Theft and Related Offences (1966), para. 160 et seq.). Any such rule was, however, abolished by s.31 (2) of that Act, and replaced by a procedure for restoring stolen property to one who is "entitled to recover" it (s.28(1)).
-
(1966)
Theft and Related Offences
-
-
-
41
-
-
11644284715
-
-
note
-
See especially Hague v. Deputy Governor of Parkhursi Prison, Weldon v. Home Office [1992] 1 A.C. 58; X. and others (minors) v. Bedfordshire C.C., M. (a minor) v. Newham LBC, E. (a minor) v. Dorset C.C. [1995] 2 A.C. 633.
-
-
-
-
42
-
-
11644321915
-
-
note
-
Money Laundering Regulations, S.I. 1993 No. 1933, introduced in implementation of E.C. Directive 91/308.
-
-
-
-
43
-
-
11644278139
-
-
note
-
Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378; Brinks Ltd v. Abu-Saleh, The Times, October 23, 1995.
-
-
-
-
44
-
-
11644314380
-
-
note
-
See, e.g. Bateman (1925) 19 Cr.App.R. 8 at 11-12; Andreas v. DPP [1937] A.C. 576 at 582-583.
-
-
-
-
45
-
-
11644271416
-
-
note
-
A concern which manifests itself, for example, in Bowmakers Ltd v. Barnet Instruments Ltd [1945] K.B. 65, Sajan Singh v. Sardara Ali [1960] A.C. 167, and Tinsley v. Milligan [1994] 1 A.C. 340; and in the institution of acquisition by prescription.
-
-
-
-
46
-
-
11644282322
-
-
note
-
That concern is partially met if the right is merely voidable, not void, thus safeguarding the bona fide purchaser for value without notice. But the safeguard may not be extensive enough: it does not, for example, cover a bona fide volunteer donee, nor a bona fide purchaser who acquires the property after avoidance (cf. Car and Universal Finance Co. Ltd v. Caldwell [1965] 1 Q.B. 525). Moreover, the very doctrine of bona fide purchase introduces transaction costs, inimically to the public interest.
-
-
-
-
47
-
-
11644253252
-
-
note
-
The effect of Kendrick and Hopkins is also that a person may be guilty of handling stolen property notwithstanding that the property may be the thief's to keep. Again, there may be no conflict in this. One might say that the criminal law, in the offence of handling, penalises the unsatisfactory behaviour of those who participate in the process of capitalising on the theft. One could without self-contradiction regard it as right for the civil law to preserve the stability of titles acquired in that process.
-
-
-
-
48
-
-
11644251460
-
-
note
-
[1997] Crim.L.R. 359 at 360. He makes the point only briefly, however, and the argument as constructed in the text may therefore not be his.
-
-
-
-
49
-
-
11644287691
-
-
[1993] A.C. 442
-
[1993] A.C. 442.
-
-
-
-
50
-
-
11644313508
-
The Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eight Report
-
The frame of the Theft Act 1968 itself appears to reflect an acceptance that liability for theft may not be coterminous with the original owner's entitlement to the return of the property stolen. The simple post-conviction procedure for restoring stolen property, established in s.28(1), is expressed to be usable in favour only of one who is "entitled to recover" the property. The Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eight Report, Theft and Related Offences (1966), para. 164, suggests that this procedure should be used only in clear cases, so recognising that there might be less clear cases in which distinct proceedings would be required.
-
(1966)
Theft and Related Offences
-
-
|