Human rights as subjectivity: The age of rights and the politics of culture

Millenium

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 97-118

  Chesterman, Simon ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 11544268310     PISSN: 03058298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/03058298980270011201     Document Type: Article

References (123)

1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217A, 3 UN GA Official Records 135, UN Doc. A/810 (1948), Art. 1.
2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. G.D.H. Cole (London: Dent, 1968 [1762]) Book 1, Chapter 1, p.49.
3. Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 32, referring to Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', The National Interest (No. 16, Summer, 1989), p. 4.
4. Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 32, referring to Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', The National Interest (No. 16, Summer, 1989), p. 4.
5. In so far as it provides a better basis for states, NGOs, etc., to deal with accusations of cultural relativism, it is practical as opposed to the philosophical argument that precedes it.
6. Norberto Bobbio, Liberalism and Democracy, trans. M. Ryle and K. Soper (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 6-7.
7. Norberto Bobbio, 'On the Fundamental Principles of Human Rights', in Norberto Bobbio, The Age of Rights, trans. A. Cameron (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), p. 3. This paper was originally published as Noberto Bobbio, 'L'Illusion du fondament absolu', in Norberto Bobbio, Le Fondament des droits de l'homme (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1966).
8. Norberto Bobbio, 'On the Fundamental Principles of Human Rights', in Norberto Bobbio, The Age of Rights, trans. A. Cameron (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), p. 3. This paper was originally published as Noberto Bobbio, 'L'Illusion du fondament absolu', in Norberto Bobbio, Le Fondament des droits de l'homme (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1966).
9. Ibid., pp. 3 and 10.
10. See, for example, Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origins and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 146-49.
11. Bobbio, op. cit., in note 6, pp. 4-5, emphasis in original.
12. Ibid., p. 10.
13. Ibid., p. 11, emphasis in original.
14. See, for example, Richard Rorty, 'Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality', in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (eds.), On Human Rights (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1993).
15. Norberto Bobbio, 'Human Rights Now and in the Future', in Bobbio, The Age of Rights, op. cit., in note 6, p. 13. This paper was first published as Norberto Bobbio, 'Presente e avvenire dei diritti dell'uomo', in La comunità internazionale (Vol. 23, 1968).
16. Norberto Bobbio, 'Human Rights Now and in the Future', in Bobbio, The Age of Rights, op. cit., in note 6, p. 13. This paper was first published as Norberto Bobbio, 'Presente e avvenire dei diritti dell'uomo', in La comunità internazionale (Vol. 23, 1968).
17. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
18. Norberto Bobbio, 'The Age of Rights', in Bobbio, The Age of Rights, op. cit., in note 6, p. 35.
19. Alexander Hamilton, 1787, quoted in James A. Joyce, The New Politics of Human Rights (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 7.
20. Bobbio, op. cit., in note 13, p. 13.
21. See, for example, Raimundo Panikkar, 'Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?', Diogenes (No, 120, 1982), pp. 76-77.
22. See, for example, Jeremy Waldron (ed.), 'Nonsense upon Stilts': Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London: Methuen, 1987), especially pp. 7-21.
23. Jeremy Bentham, 'Anarchical Fallacies', in ibid., p. 53. See also Morion Winston (ed.), The Philosophy of Human Rights (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1989), p. 5.
24. Jeremy Bentham, 'Anarchical Fallacies', in ibid., p. 53. See also Morion Winston (ed.), The Philosophy of Human Rights (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1989), p. 5.
25. See Waldron (ed.), op. cit., in note 19, p. 13.
26. See, for example, ibid., pp. 17-18, and Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York, NY: Knopf, 1969), Volume 2, p. 458. This was in part foreseen by Locke himself, who wrote in 1689: 'He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind, and look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with indifferency survey their actions, will be able to satisfy himself that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named-which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others': John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: Everyman, 1965 [1689]) Book 1, Chapter 3, §§10, pp. 31-32.
27. See, for example, ibid., pp. 17-18, and Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York, NY: Knopf, 1969), Volume 2, p. 458. This was in part foreseen by Locke himself, who wrote in 1689: 'He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind, and look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with indifferency survey their actions, will be able to satisfy himself that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named-which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others': John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: Everyman, 1965 [1689]) Book 1, Chapter 3, §§10, pp. 31-32.
28. See, for example, ibid., pp. 17-18, and Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York, NY: Knopf, 1969), Volume 2, p. 458. This was in part foreseen by Locke himself, who wrote in 1689: 'He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind, and look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with indifferency survey their actions, will be able to satisfy himself that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named-which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others': John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: Everyman, 1965 [1689]) Book 1, Chapter 3, §§10, pp. 31-32.
29. See Rhoda Howard, Human Rights and the Search for Community (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), pp. 67-71. She discusses the anachronistic pictures that are often painted of'pre-modern' societies and the opposition of 'cultural absolutists' to allowing such peoples to shatter their romanticised vision of 'tradition'.
30. See, for example, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics, Second Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), pp. 8-9, and cited references therein. See also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, 'Human Rights in the Muslim World', Harvard Human Rights Journal (Vol. 3, No. 1, 1990), p. 13.
31. See, for example, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics, Second Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), pp. 8-9, and cited references therein. See also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, 'Human Rights in the Muslim World', Harvard Human Rights Journal (Vol. 3, No. 1, 1990), p. 13.
32. See, for example, Fernando Tesón, 'International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism', Virginia Journal of International Law (Vol. 25, No. 4, 1985), pp. 894-95.
33. See, for example, Tom Campbell, The Left and Rights: A Conceptual Analysis of the Idea of Socialist Rights (London: Routledge, 1982).
34. See, for example, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, 'Feminist Approaches to International Law', American Journal of International Law (Vol. 85, No. 4, 1991), p. 613; Catharine MacKinnon, 'On Torture: A Feminist Perspective on Human Rights', in Kathleen Mahoney and Paul Mahoney (eds.), Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century (London: M. Nijhoff, 1993), p. 21; and Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, 'Making Women Visible: Setting an Agenda for the Twenty-First Century', St John's Law Review (Vol. 69, Nos. 1-2, 1995), p. 231. Useful collections include Dorinda Dallmeyer (ed.), Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law (Washington, DC: American Society of International Law, 1993), and Rebecca J. Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).
35. See, for example, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, 'Feminist Approaches to International Law', American Journal of International Law (Vol. 85, No. 4, 1991), p. 613; Catharine MacKinnon, 'On Torture: A Feminist Perspective on Human Rights', in Kathleen Mahoney and Paul Mahoney (eds.), Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century (London: M. Nijhoff, 1993), p. 21; and Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, 'Making Women Visible: Setting an Agenda for the Twenty-First Century', St John's Law Review (Vol. 69, Nos. 1-2, 1995), p. 231. Useful collections include Dorinda Dallmeyer (ed.), Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law (Washington, DC: American Society of International Law, 1993), and Rebecca J. Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).
36. See, for example, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, 'Feminist Approaches to International Law', American Journal of International Law (Vol. 85, No. 4, 1991), p. 613; Catharine MacKinnon, 'On Torture: A Feminist Perspective on Human Rights', in Kathleen Mahoney and Paul Mahoney (eds.), Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century (London: M. Nijhoff, 1993), p. 21; and Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, 'Making Women Visible: Setting an Agenda for the Twenty-First Century', St John's Law Review (Vol. 69, Nos. 1-2, 1995), p. 231. Useful collections include Dorinda Dallmeyer (ed.), Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law (Washington, DC: American Society of International Law, 1993), and Rebecca J. Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).
37. See, for example, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, 'Feminist Approaches to International Law', American Journal of International Law (Vol. 85, No. 4, 1991), p. 613; Catharine MacKinnon, 'On Torture: A Feminist Perspective on Human Rights', in Kathleen Mahoney and Paul Mahoney (eds.), Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century (London: M. Nijhoff, 1993), p. 21; and Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, 'Making Women Visible: Setting an Agenda for the Twenty-First Century', St John's Law Review (Vol. 69, Nos. 1-2, 1995), p. 231. Useful collections include Dorinda Dallmeyer (ed.), Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law (Washington, DC: American Society of International Law, 1993), and Rebecca J. Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).
38. See, for example, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, 'Feminist Approaches to International Law', American Journal of International Law (Vol. 85, No. 4, 1991), p. 613; Catharine MacKinnon, 'On Torture: A Feminist Perspective on Human Rights', in Kathleen Mahoney and Paul Mahoney (eds.), Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century (London: M. Nijhoff, 1993), p. 21; and Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, 'Making Women Visible: Setting an Agenda for the Twenty-First Century', St John's Law Review (Vol. 69, Nos. 1-2, 1995), p. 231. Useful collections include Dorinda Dallmeyer (ed.), Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law (Washington, DC: American Society of International Law, 1993), and Rebecca J. Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).
39. Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), p. 69.
40. Paul F. Schmidt, 'Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism', Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 52, No. 25, 1955), p. 782.
41. Renteln, op. cit., in note 28, p. 86.
42. Ibid., p. 88. See also Panikkar, op. cit., in note 18, pp. 77-79.
43. Ibid., p. 88. See also Panikkar, op. cit., in note 18, pp. 77-79.
44. See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties. Human Rights, and International Law (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990).
45. See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, 'Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment', in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im (ed.), Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), pp. 35-36.
46. An-Na'im, op. cit., in note 32, pp. 162-63. See also The Holy Bible, Matthew 7:12.
47. An-Na'im, op. cit., in note 32, pp. 162-63. See also The Holy Bible, Matthew 7:12.
48. Reza Afshari, 'An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human Rights', Human Rights Quarterly (Vol. 16, No. 2, 1994), p. 247.
49. Richard Falk, 'Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights', in An-Na'im (ed.), op. cit., in note 33, p. 54.
50. Ibid., p. 57.
51. See, for example, Yash Ghai, 'Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate', Australian Year Book of International Law (Vol. 15, 1994), p. 6.
52. Bentham, op. cit., in note 20, p. 49, emphasis in original.
53. This is true of the International Bill of Rights. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, Organisation of African Unity Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, Art. 14 (entered into force 1986), 21 International Legal Materials (e.g., Vol. 21, 1981, p. 58) 58; American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San Jose), opened for signature 22 November 1969, OAS Treaty Series 36, OAS Off Rec OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, Doc.21, Rev.6, Art. 21 (entered into force 1978), 9 ILM 673; Protocol No 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 20 March 1952, European Treaty Series 9, Art 1 (entered into force 1954), reprinted in Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 1200. The right is qualified by reference to 'public need', 'public utility', and 'public interest', respectively.
54. Bobbio, op. cit., in note 13, pp. 13-14.
55. For example, John Finnis argues that the principles of natural law have no history. '[T]here could be a history of the popularity of the various theories offered to explain the place of those principles in the whole scheme of things. But of natural law itself there could, strictly speaking. be no history'. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 24, emphasis added. See also Ian Duncanson, 'Finnis and the Politics of Natural Law', Western Australia Law Review (Vol. 19, No. 2, 1989), p. 239.
56. For example, John Finnis argues that the principles of natural law have no history. '[T]here could be a history of the popularity of the various theories offered to explain the place of those principles in the whole scheme of things. But of natural law itself there could, strictly speaking. be no history'. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 24, emphasis added. See also Ian Duncanson, 'Finnis and the Politics of Natural Law', Western Australia Law Review (Vol. 19, No. 2, 1989), p. 239.
57. In other words, the presumption that the law merely describes the world, representing facts, as opposed to producing facts. See Rolando Gaete, Human Rights and the Limits of Critical Reason (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth 1993), pp. 25-27.
58. See Michel Foucault, 'The Discourse on Language', in Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M.S. Smith (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1972), pp. 216-19.
59. These ideas are pursued further in Simon Chesterman, 'Law, Subject and Subjectivity in International Relations: International Law and the Postcolony', Melbourne University Law Review (Vol. 20, No. 4, 1996), p. 979.
60. See Susan Sim, 'Human Rights-Bridging the Gulf', Straits Times (Singapore), 21 October 1995 (Reuters on-line service), and Kenneth Christie, 'Regime Security and Human Rights in Southeast Asia', Political Studies (Vol. 43, Special Issue: Politics and Human Rights, 1995), p. 204. See also Bilhari Kausikan, 'Asia's Different Standard', Foreign Policy (Vol. 92, Fall 1993), p. 24.
61. See Susan Sim, 'Human Rights-Bridging the Gulf', Straits Times (Singapore), 21 October 1995 (Reuters on-line service), and Kenneth Christie, 'Regime Security and Human Rights in Southeast Asia', Political Studies (Vol. 43, Special Issue: Politics and Human Rights, 1995), p. 204. See also Bilhari Kausikan, 'Asia's Different Standard', Foreign Policy (Vol. 92, Fall 1993), p. 24.
62. See Susan Sim, 'Human Rights-Bridging the Gulf', Straits Times (Singapore), 21 October 1995 (Reuters on-line service), and Kenneth Christie, 'Regime Security and Human Rights in Southeast Asia', Political Studies (Vol. 43, Special Issue: Politics and Human Rights, 1995), p. 204. See also Bilhari Kausikan, 'Asia's Different Standard', Foreign Policy (Vol. 92, Fall 1993), p. 24.
63. See, for example, Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 182-95, and Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (London: Vintage, 1992), pp. 37-42.
64. See, for example, Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 182-95, and Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (London: Vintage, 1992), pp. 37-42.
65. Broadly, ontogeny denotes the study of the development of the individual being (Oxford English Dictionary). Ontogenesis is thus the development of that individual. In each case, the meaning here is ontological rather than biological.
66. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, op. cit., in note 1, Preamble, Para. 1, emphasis added.
67. The Universal Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly in 1948 with 48 states voting in favour and eight abstaining (Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the Soviet Union together with four East European states, and a Soviet republic whose votes it controlled). Steiner and Alston, op. cit., in note 40, p. 119.
68. See, for example, Jeremy Bentham's comments in Waldron (ed.), op. cit., in note 19, p.53. 'Reasons for wishing there were such things as rights, are not rights-hunger is not bread'.
69. This is nevertheless distinct from the common position that rights are deontic, with a precise meaning only in a normative language. See, for example, Bobbio, The Age of Rights, op. cit., in note 6, p. xiii, and Gaete, op. cit., in note 43, pp. 51-56.
70. This is nevertheless distinct from the common position that rights are deontic, with a precise meaning only in a normative language. See, for example, Bobbio, The Age of Rights, op. cit., in note 6, p. xiii, and Gaete, op. cit., in note 43, pp. 51-56.
71. Bobbio, op. cit., in note 13, p. 14, emphasis added.
72. Bobbio, op. cit., in note 15, p. 35.
73. Immanuel Kant, 'A Renewed Attempt to Answer the Question: "Is the Human Race Continually Improving?"', in Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant: Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 187.
74. Bobbio, op. cit., in note 15, p. 35.
75. Ibid., p. 43.
76. Rousseau, op. cit., in note 2. Book 2, Chapter 7, p. 84, emphasis added.
77. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. A. Sheridan (London: Penguin. 1979), p. 305.
78. See. for example. Michel Foucault, 'The Confession of the Flesh', in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge, trans. C. Gordon (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 98: 'The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike....In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals'.
79. Foucault, op. cit., in note 59, p. 301, emphasis added.
80. See further Chesterman, op. cit., in note 45, discussing Foucault, op. cit., in note 60, p. 301.
81. See further Chesterman, op. cit., in note 45, discussing Foucault, op. cit., in note 60, p. 301.
82. See, for example, Mark Poster, Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of a Context (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 54-61.
83. See Michel Foucault, 'On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress', in Paul Rabinow (ed.),The Foucault Reader (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), pp. 351-52.
84. Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Volume 2, trans. R. Hurley (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 251.
85. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(I)(d). This is one of the four bases of international law to be considered by the Court in making determinations between disputants.
86. Amnesty International in particular has at its heart the very transcendental individual whose 'universality' was questioned in the first section. See also Henry Steiner, Diverse Partners: Non-Government Organizations in the Human Rights Movement (Cambridge, MA : Harvard Law School Human Rights Program, 1991), p. 19. It is important to note that such a critique does not suggest that Amnesty's work is not important, but merely that the motif of the 'prisoner of conscience' adopts a particular conception of the human subject of rights and that this is in some ways limiting. See Philip Alston, 'The Fortieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration', in Jan Bertin (ed.). Human Rights in a Pluralist World: Individuals and Collectivities (London: Meckler, 1989), p. 12.
87. Amnesty International in particular has at its heart the very transcendental individual whose 'universality' was questioned in the first section. See also Henry Steiner, Diverse Partners: Non-Government Organizations in the Human Rights Movement (Cambridge, MA : Harvard Law School Human Rights Program, 1991), p. 19. It is important to note that such a critique does not suggest that Amnesty's work is not important, but merely that the motif of the 'prisoner of conscience' adopts a particular conception of the human subject of rights and that this is in some ways limiting. See Philip Alston, 'The Fortieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration', in Jan Bertin (ed.). Human Rights in a Pluralist World: Individuals and Collectivities (London: Meckler, 1989), p. 12.
88. See, for example, David W. Kennedy, 'A New World Order: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow', Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems (Vol. 4. No. 2, 1994), pp. 329 and 334.
89. Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 213-21.
90. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, op. cit., in note 1, Art 21(3). It further provides that 'this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures'. See Thomas M. Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance', American Journal of International Law (Vol. 86, No. 1, 1992), p. 46.
91. See, for example, W. Michael Reisman, 'Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law', American Journal of International Law (Vol. 84, No. 4, 1990), pp. 872-73, and J.G. Starke, 'Human Rights and International Law', in Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay (eds.), Human Rights (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), pp. 113-31. It would be idle to argue that this necessarily represents a victory for human rights. The values expressed in such public international law doctrine are very much 'those of Liberal individualism transposed to the interstate level'. Martti Koskenniemi, 'The Future of Statehood', Harvard International Law Journal (Vol. 32, No. 2, 1991), p. 404.
92. See, for example, W. Michael Reisman, 'Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law', American Journal of International Law (Vol. 84, No. 4, 1990), pp. 872-73, and J.G. Starke, 'Human Rights and International Law', in Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay (eds.), Human Rights (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), pp. 113-31. It would be idle to argue that this necessarily represents a victory for human rights. The values expressed in such public international law doctrine are very much 'those of Liberal individualism transposed to the interstate level'. Martti Koskenniemi, 'The Future of Statehood', Harvard International Law Journal (Vol. 32, No. 2, 1991), p. 404.
93. See, for example, W. Michael Reisman, 'Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law', American Journal of International Law (Vol. 84, No. 4, 1990), pp. 872-73, and J.G. Starke, 'Human Rights and International Law', in Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay (eds.), Human Rights (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), pp. 113-31. It would be idle to argue that this necessarily represents a victory for human rights. The values expressed in such public international law doctrine are very much 'those of Liberal individualism transposed to the interstate level'. Martti Koskenniemi, 'The Future of Statehood', Harvard International Law Journal (Vol. 32, No. 2, 1991), p. 404.
94. Panikkar, op. cit., in note 18, p. 77.
95. Louis Henkin, speaking in Brian Urquhart, Louis Henkin, and Richard Butler. 'Yesterday's Politics, Tomorrow's Problems: A World Without the United Nations?', Melbourne University Law Review (Vol. 20, No. 1, 1995), pp. 25-26.
96. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', Foreign Affairs (Vol 72, No. 3, 1993), p. 27.
97. Derrida, op. cit., in note 3, p. 10, emphasis in original.
98. Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1991).
99. Ibid., p. 1.
100. Julia Kristeva, 'Open Letter to Harlem Désir', in Julia Kristeva, Nations Without Nationalism, trans. L.S. Roudiez (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 50.
101. Kristeva, op. cit., in note 76, p. 2, emphasis in original.
102. Ibid., p. 195.
103. Ibid., p. 154
104. Ibid., p. 192.
105. Sigmund Freud, 'The "Uncanny"', in Sigmund Freud, The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. J. Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-1975), Volume 17, p. 220.
106. Ibid., p. 241.
107. Ibid., pp. 226-252.
108. Kristeva, op. cit., in note 76, p. 188.
109. Ibid., emphasis in original.
110. Ibid., emphasis in original.
111. Ibid., p. 191, first emphasis added.
112. See Jennifer Balint, 'Towards the Anti-Genocide Community', Australian Journal of Human Rights (Vol. 1, No. 1, 1994), p. 21 note 48, brielly noting Kristeva's work.
113. David Jacobson, Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 8-9.
114. Ibid., p. 126-38.
115. Ibid., p. 126-27.
116. Kristeva, op. cit., in note 76, p. 174, emphasis in original.
117. See, for example, Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. C. Farrington (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1963), pp. 196-98.
118. See the references listed in note 27. This does not normally refer to the 'seizing' of power in the traditional sense, but is often more properly understood as the displacing of hegemony to provide opportunity for other voices to be heard. Haraway, for example, argues that we need to take responsibility 'for what we learn how to see. Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', in Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York, NY: Routledge, 1991), p. 183. See also Rosi Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).
119. See the references listed in note 27. This does not normally refer to the 'seizing' of power in the traditional sense, but is often more properly understood as the displacing of hegemony to provide opportunity for other voices to be heard. Haraway, for example, argues that we need to take responsibility 'for what we learn how to see. Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', in Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York, NY: Routledge, 1991), p. 183. See also Rosi Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).
120. See John Chesterman, Poverty Law and Social Change: The Story of the Fit:roy Legal Service (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1996), pp. 13-16 and 37.
121. Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"', in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (eds.), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), p. 28.
122. Ibid., p. 9.
123. Kristeva, op. cit., in note 76, p. 173.