Peacekeeping by attrition: The United Nations in Angola

Journal of Modern African Studies

Volumn 36, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 399-422

  MacQueen, Norrie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 11544259811     PISSN: 0022278X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022278X98002845     Document Type: Article

References (67)

1. MONUA was established by the Security Council on the recommendation of the secretarygeneral. UN Document S/RES/118, 30 June 1997.
2. On the Angola-Namibia agreement see G. R. Berridge, 'Diplomacy and the Angola/Namibia Accords', International Affairs 65, 3 (1989), pp. 463-79. For a wider historical sweep but with a closer focus on Angola see Anthony G. Pazzanita. 'The conflict resolution process in Angola'. Journal of Modern African Studies 29, 1 (1991), pp. 83-114.
3. On the Angola-Namibia agreement see G. R. Berridge, 'Diplomacy and the Angola/Namibia Accords', International Affairs 65, 3 (1989), pp. 463-79. For a wider historical sweep but with a closer focus on Angola see Anthony G. Pazzanita. 'The conflict resolution process in Angola'. Journal of Modern African Studies 29, 1 (1991), pp. 83-114.
4. Anthony Parsons, From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN interventions 1947-95 (Penguin, 1996), P. 141.
5. James Hamill, 'Angola's road from under the rubble', The World Today 50, 1 (January 1994), P. 9.
6. On the role of Lisbon see Moses Venancio, 'Portuguese mediation in the Angolan conflict in 1990-1' in S. Chan and V. Jabri (eds.), Mediation in Southern Africa (London, 1993), pp. 100-15.
7. The ethnic and social bases of Angolan nationalism at the time of independence are explored by Franz-Wilhelm Heimer in The Decolonization Conflict in Angola: An Essay in Political Sociology (Geneva, 1979).
8. See Norrie MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire (London, 1997), pp. 34-5.
9. For a comprehensive and detailed accounts of the civil war of 1975-6 see Colin Legum, 'Foreign intervention in Angola' and Tony Hodges, 'How the MPLA won in Angola' in their study, The War over Southern Africa (London, 1976), pp. 9-43 and 47-64 respectively.
10. For a comprehensive and detailed accounts of the civil war of 1975-6 see Colin Legum, 'Foreign intervention in Angola' and Tony Hodges, 'How the MPLA won in Angola' in their study, The War over Southern Africa (London, 1976), pp. 9-43 and 47-64 respectively.
11. The Alvor agreement was published in English as Angola: the Independence Agreement (Lisbon, 1975).
12. Former Portuguese foreign minister, Ernesto Melo Antunes, a key architect of the Alvor agreement in 1975, was one who pointed up the similarities with Bicesse. 'The history of the Alvor Agreement showed that each (of the liberation movements) ...looked on the agreement as a base for the conquest of power... (the) Bicesse agreement has succumbed to the same disease.' Interview in Maria João Avillez, Do Fundo da Revolução (Lisbon, 1994), pp. 26-7.
13. The electoral process and its break-down are analysed by Anthony W. Pereira, 'The neglected tragedy: the return to war in Angola, 1992-3', Journal of Modem African Studies 32, 1 (1994), PP. 1-28.
14. About 5 million voters were registered for the elections which were held on 29-30 September 1992. On a turn-out of 91 per cent the MPLA won 129 and UNITA 70 of the 220 seats in the national assembly. In the presidential contest dos Santos took 49·57 per cent of the vote against Savimbi's 40·07 per cent.
15. By far the most comprehensive and detailed account of the UN's efforts in Angola at this time is that of the special representative of the secretary-general, Dame Margaret Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angola Peace Process, 1992-93 (London, 1996). Anstee has also provided a more concise enumeration of the problems and failings of UNAVEM II in 'Angola: a tragedy not to be forgotten', The World Today 52, 7 (July 1996), pp. 190-1.
16. By far the most comprehensive and detailed account of the UN's efforts in Angola at this time is that of the special representative of the secretary-general, Dame Margaret Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angola Peace Process, 1992-93 (London, 1996). Anstee has also provided a more concise enumeration of the problems and failings of UNAVEM II in 'Angola: a tragedy not to be forgotten', The World Today 52, 7 (July 1996), pp. 190-1.
17. Anstee, 'Angola: a tragedy not to be forgotten', p. 190.
18. Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War, p. 533.
19. See review of Anstee's Orphan of the Cold War by Elaine Windrich in the Journal of Modern African Studies 35, 2 (1997), p. 359.
20. George Wright, The Destruction of a Nation: United States' Policy towards Angola since 1945 (London, 1997), pp. 178-79.
21. All states were now required to refrain from the supply of arms and oil to Angola ' other than through named points of entry on a list to be supplied by the Government of Angola', UN Document SC/RES/864, 15 September 1993.
22. In December 1993 the Security Council agreed to stay the application of further measures - including the prevention of foreign travel by the UNITA leadership - for as long as UNITA continued to negotiate in good faith at Lusaka. UN Document SC/RES/890, 15 December 1993. This was reaffirmed - though with warnings to UNITA-in mid-1994: UN Document SC/RES/922, 31 May 1994.
23. UN Document SC/RES/945, 29 September 1994.
24. Wright, The Destruction of a Nation, p. 188. Mandela emphasised that he was adding his support to the reinvigoration of the Bicesse process rather than launching a new initiative. Some reports misleadingly described the Lusaka agreement as having been 'brokered' by him-see, for example, The Times, 16 November 1994.
25. Wright, The Destruction of a Nation, p. 188. Mandela emphasised that he was adding his support to the reinvigoration of the Bicesse process rather than launching a new initiative. Some reports misleadingly described the Lusaka agreement as having been 'brokered' by him-see, for example, The Times, 16 November 1994.
26. So elusive was Savimbi at this time that widely credited-though ultimately unfoundedrumours began to spread of his having been severely wounded in the fighting.
27. The text of the Lusaka Protocol was issued as UN Document S/1994/1441, annex, 22 December 1994.
28. UNITA's four full ministries were to be: Geology and Mines; Trade; Health; Tourism. Its seven deputy ministerial posts were in Defence, Interior, Finance, Agriculture, Public Works, Social Re-integration and Mass Communication. Its three governorships were of Uíge, Lunda Sul and Cuando-Cubango with deputy governorships in Huambo, Luanda, Bengo, Kwanza Sul, Benguela, Bié and Huila. In addition, UNITA was to have five ambassadorial posts to Canada, Mexico, India, Cabo Verde and UNESCO.
29. The Economist, 18-24 February 1995.
30. Financial Times, 13 February 1995.
31. UN Document S/RES/976, 8 February 1995.
32. UN Document S/1995/177, 5 March 1995.
33. Letter from the secretary-general to president of the Security Council. UN Document S/1995/230, 28 March 1995.
34. Blondin Beye's efforts to this end had been supplemented by a statement from the president of the Security Council linking the full deployment of UNAVEM to the holding of the meeting -UN Document S/PRST/1995/18, 13 April 1995. The UN had also orchestrated a campaign of persuasion by those few African states still regarded as broadly sympathetic to UNITA, most notably Zaire and Ivory Coast-UN Document S/1995/350, 3 May 1995.
35. The Economist, 15-21 July 1995.
36. In addition to the ground troops there were at this time 339 military observers, 89 staff officers and 210 civilian police. In all, 34 states were involved in this early stage of the operation. UN Document S/1995/458, annex, 4 June 1995.
37. Financial Times, 24 January 1995.
38. UN Document SC/RES/1008, 7 August 1995.
39. The process of quartering was to be 'step three' of 'phase two' of Annex 3 of the Protocol. This was to begin on D-Day+45-that is to say, forty-five days after 31 October 1994, the date of the initialling of the Lusaka agreement. The process should, therefore, have been underway by mid-December 1994.
40. UN Document S/1995/1012, 7 December 1995.
41. Ibid. By 1 December 1995 only 363 UNITA 'fighters' had registered at quartering centres.
42. Financial Times, 6 December 1995.
43. UN Document S/1996/75, 31 January 1996.
44. UN Document S/1996/175, annex, 7 March 1996.
45. UN Documents S/RES/1055, 8 May 1996 and S/RES/1075, October 1996.
46. O Pensador (Embassy of Angola, Washington DC), September 1996.
47. UN Document S/RES/1075, 11 October 1996.
48. UN Document 8/1996/1000, 2 December 1996.
49. Annex 7 of the Lusaka Protocol was devoted to the completion of the electoral process but it was never a prominent issue in the wrangles over the settlement.
50. The Economist, 18-24 June 1994.
51. The Economist, 14-20 September 1996. The official Angolan news agency initially reported Savimbi's acceptance of the post either in good faith or as part of a government attempt to control the 'spin' on developments-see the Financial Times, 12 August 1995.
52. The Economist, 14-20 September 1996. The official Angolan news agency initially reported Savimbi's acceptance of the post either in good faith or as part of a government attempt to control the 'spin' on developments-see the Financial Times, 12 August 1995.
53. UN Document S/1997/115, 7 February 1997.
54. UN Document S/1997/304, 14 April 1997.
55. Statement by the president of the Security Council, UN Document S/PRST/1997/3, 30 January 1997.
56. UN Document S/1997/115, 7 February 1997.
57. UN Document S/1997/248, 25 March 1997.
58. The prime minister remained the MPLA's José da Franca van Dunem, but with UNITA nominees occupying the four portfolios agreed at Lusaka. There was also a UNITA nominee in the new post of vice-president originally created for Savimbi.
59. UN Document S/1997/438, 5 June 1997.
60. UN Documents S/1997/438, 5 June 1997; S/RES/118, 30 June 1997.
61. The sanctions were outlined in UN Document S/RES/1127 on 28 August 1997. Their application was delayed pending some sign of UNITA changing its ways. It did not do so and the sanctions were implemented from 30 October following a further Security Council resolution (S/RES/1135, 29 October 1997).
62. Report of the secretary-general on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola, UN Document S/1997/959, 4 December 1997.
63. Sassou-Nguesso's victory was, in fact, clinched by support from Angolan government forces which crossed into Congo from the Cabinda enclave.
64. Anstee, 'Angola: a tragedy not to be forgotten', p. 190.
65. The thirty-two contributing states at this time included eleven Africans and a wide range of West and East Europeans and Asians. There were three Lusophone contributors: Portugal, Guinea-Bissau and Brazil.
66. The Times, 10 February 1995.
67. On the UN operation in Mozambique see Chris Alden, 'The UN and the resolution of conflict in Mozambique', Journal of Modem African Studies 33, 1 (1995), pp. 103-28.