Generalizing Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn 2, Issue , 2003, Pages 1014-1015

  Hudson, Benoît ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Computer Science Department ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Electronic auctions; Preference elicitation

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPTIMIZATION; PERFORMANCE; PROBLEM SOLVING; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; ELECTRONIC AUCTIONS; PREFERENCE ELICITATION;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 1142304632     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/860575.860772     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (7)

1. Wolfram Conen and Tuomas Sandholm. Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions: Extended abstract. ACM-EC, pp. 256-259, 2001. A more detailed version appeared in the UCAI-2001 Workshop on Economic Agents, Models, and Mechanisms, pp. 71-80.
2. Wolfram Conen and Tuomas Sandholm. Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions: Extended abstract. ACM-EC, pp. 256-259, 2001. A more detailed version appeared in the UCAI-2001 Workshop on Economic Agents, Models, and Mechanisms, pp. 71-80.
3. Wolfram Conen and Tuomas Sandholm. Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions. AAAI, pp. 367-372, 2002.
4. Theodore Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617-631, 1973.
5. Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm. Costly valuation computation in auctions. TARK, pp. 169-182, 2001.
6. Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal. The communication complexity of efficient allocation problems. Draft. Second version March 5th, 2002.
7. David C Parkes. Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems. AMEC Workshop, IJCAI, 1999.