The Optimal Software Licensing Policy under Quality Uncertainty

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 5, Issue , 2003, Pages 276-286

  Zhang, Jie ^a   Seidmann, Abraham ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Network externality; Price discrimination; Risk; Software licensing; Upgrade compatibility

Indexed keywords

NETWORK EXTERNALITY; PRICE DISCRIMINATION; SOFTWARE LICENSING; UPGRADE COMPATIBILITY;

COMPUTER OPERATING SYSTEMS; COMPUTER SOFTWARE; COSTS; CUSTOMER SATISFACTION; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY; PUBLIC POLICY; QUALITY CONTROL; RISKS;

WORLD WIDE WEB;

EID: 1142304571     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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