'What is is always becoming what ought to be.' How Political Action Generates a Participation Norm

European Sociological Review

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 13-29

  Opp, Karl Dieter ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG   (Germany)

^b NONE   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1142278573     PISSN: 02667215     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/esr/20.1.13     Document Type: Review

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