Lobbying strategies, venue selection, and organized interest involvement at the U.S. Supreme court

American Politics Research

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 170-197

  Hansford, Thomas G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Amicus curiae; Lobbying strategies tactics; Organized interests; Supreme Court

Indexed keywords

EID: 1142266325     PISSN: 1532673X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X03259192     Document Type: Review

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