-
3
-
-
84936068266
-
-
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Ronald A. Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982).
-
(1986)
Law's Empire
-
-
Dworkin, R.1
-
4
-
-
11244277850
-
Natural Law Revisited
-
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Ronald A. Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982).
-
(1982)
U. Fla. L. Rev.
, vol.34
, pp. 165
-
-
Dworkin, R.A.1
-
6
-
-
11244345834
-
-
hereinafter NATURAL LAW
-
See NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC POLICY (David F. Forte ed., 1998) [hereinafter NATURAL LAW] . Some of this Article is taken directly from that commentary. I also draw upon a book review, see Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 10 POL. THEORY 130, 133-36 (1987) (book review), and a Pope John XXIII Lecture at Catholic University, see Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political Choice: The General Justification Defense, Criteria for Political Action, and the Duty to Obey the Law, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political Choice].
-
(1998)
Natural Law and Contemporary Public Policy
-
-
Forte, D.F.1
-
7
-
-
11244348721
-
Natural Law and Natural Rights
-
book review
-
See NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC POLICY (David F. Forte ed., 1998) [hereinafter NATURAL LAW] . Some of this Article is taken directly from that commentary. I also draw upon a book review, see Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 10 POL. THEORY 130, 133-36 (1987) (book review), and a Pope John XXIII Lecture at Catholic University, see Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political Choice: The General Justification Defense, Criteria for Political Action, and the Duty to Obey the Law, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political Choice].
-
(1987)
Pol. Theory
, vol.10
, pp. 130
-
-
Greenawalt, K.1
-
8
-
-
11244335203
-
Natural Law and Political Choice: The General Justification Defense, Criteria for Political Action, and the Duty to Obey the Law
-
See NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC POLICY (David F. Forte ed., 1998) [hereinafter NATURAL LAW] . Some of this Article is taken directly from that commentary. I also draw upon a book review, see Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 10 POL. THEORY 130, 133-36 (1987) (book review), and a Pope John XXIII Lecture at Catholic University, see Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political Choice: The General Justification Defense, Criteria for Political Action, and the Duty to Obey the Law, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political Choice].
-
(1986)
Cath. U. L. Rev.
, vol.36
, pp. 1
-
-
Greenawalt, K.1
-
9
-
-
11244332451
-
-
See NATURAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC POLICY (David F. Forte ed., 1998) [hereinafter NATURAL LAW] . Some of this Article is taken directly from that commentary. I also draw upon a book review, see Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 10 POL. THEORY 130, 133-36 (1987) (book review), and a Pope John XXIII Lecture at Catholic University, see Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political Choice: The General Justification Defense, Criteria for Political Action, and the Duty to Obey the Law, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political Choice].
-
Natural Law and Political Choice
-
-
Greenawalt1
-
10
-
-
11244302163
-
-
See FINNIS, supra note 1, at vii
-
See FINNIS, supra note 1, at vii.
-
-
-
-
11
-
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11244315976
-
-
See id. at 30-36
-
See id. at 30-36.
-
-
-
-
12
-
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11244269164
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-
note
-
However, there may well be differences in the implications of the two positions that I fail to recognize.
-
-
-
-
13
-
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11244320250
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The Natural Law Moment
-
supra note 5
-
See David F. Forte, The Natural Law Moment, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 5, at 3, 3-9.
-
Natural Law
, pp. 3
-
-
Forte, D.F.1
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14
-
-
11244273734
-
-
See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 245-342
-
See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 245-342.
-
-
-
-
15
-
-
11244357569
-
-
See id. at 365
-
See id. at 365.
-
-
-
-
16
-
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11244253440
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-
I discuss these differences in GREENAWALT, supra note 4
-
I discuss these differences in GREENAWALT, supra note 4.
-
-
-
-
17
-
-
11244319049
-
-
note
-
There is an important conceptual divide between natural lawyers and many legal positivists. To oversimplify, the division is over whether it is appropriate, or even possible, to provide a value-free analysis of law. Many positivists say it is possible and a worthwhile enterprise. Natural lawyers believe a value approach to the nature of law is more worthwhile, and that a value-free approach may be impossible. I do not address this issue in this Article. Finnis has an illuminating discussion in FINNIS, supra note 1, at 3-22.
-
-
-
-
18
-
-
11244303996
-
-
note
-
Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and Hans Kelsen are striking examples. Bentham and Austin were both utilitarians about moral theory (though Austin's ruleutilitarianism differed from Bentham's act-utilitarianism); in many respects utilitarianism is sharply opposed to natural law claims. Kelsen was a relativist about morality.
-
-
-
-
19
-
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11244350598
-
-
note
-
Finnis accepts natural rights, understood in a certain way, but his foundations are at variance with common natural rights theory. He examines moral duties to determine what rights people have. He says, "[W] hen we come to explain the requirements of justice,. . . we find that there is reason for treating the concept of duty, obligation, or requirement as having a more strategic explanatory role than the concept of rights." FINNIS, supra note 1, at 210.
-
-
-
-
20
-
-
11244280595
-
-
note
-
The foundations of natural rights are a perplexing problem for claims of universal human rights.
-
-
-
-
21
-
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11244251558
-
Judicial Review
-
supra note 5
-
I put the "otherwise" here because a determination to follow other authorities is itself a moral decision of a kind. And if what the authorities clearly demand is immoral enough, judges should refuse to comply. For one argument by a natural lawyer that judicial reliance on natural law should be very limited, see Christopher Wolfe, Judicial Review, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 5, at 157.
-
Natural Law
, pp. 157
-
-
Wolfe, C.1
-
22
-
-
11244267970
-
-
note
-
This comment applies to both strict textualism and strict intentionalism.
-
-
-
-
23
-
-
11244338774
-
-
note
-
A plausible claim about the United States Constitution is that it largely reflects a natural rights philosophy.
-
-
-
-
24
-
-
11244259803
-
-
note
-
A subtle treatment of these matters might require distinctions between legislative responsibilities and administrative responsibilities, even when administrators have broad discretion; and it might require distinctions among kinds of administrative responsibilities. These distinctions would not affect my basic point here.
-
-
-
-
25
-
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11244295873
-
Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspective
-
See Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13 (1984); see also Terry Hall, Legislation, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 5, at 135.
-
(1984)
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y
, vol.1
, pp. 13
-
-
Cuomo, M.M.1
-
26
-
-
11244327375
-
Legislation
-
supra note 5
-
See Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13 (1984); see also Terry Hall, Legislation, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 5, at 135.
-
Natural Law
, pp. 135
-
-
Hall, T.1
-
27
-
-
11244357313
-
-
note
-
Of course, if someone thinks abortion is tantamount morally to murder of a full human being, he may reasonably think this is not a subject about which legislators should acquiesce in a permissive morality among the populace.
-
-
-
-
28
-
-
11244342005
-
-
note
-
It might matter how recently the death penalty has been endorsed by the legislature and its degree of public support.
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
11244307801
-
Welfare
-
supra note 5
-
See R. George Wright, Welfare, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 5, at 280.
-
Natural Law
, pp. 280
-
-
Wright, R.G.1
-
32
-
-
84937301649
-
A Natural Law of Human Labor
-
See JAMES BERNARD MURPHY, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF LABOR: ARISTOTELIAN THEMES IN ECONOMIC THEORY 4 (1993); James Bernard Murphy, A Natural Law of Human Labor, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 71 (1994).
-
(1994)
Am. J. Juris.
, vol.39
, pp. 71
-
-
Murphy, J.B.1
-
33
-
-
84895712096
-
The Natural Law Banner
-
supra note 5
-
See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Natural Law Banner, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 5, at 380.
-
Natural Law
, pp. 380
-
-
Noonan Jr., J.T.1
-
34
-
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11244301604
-
-
See id. at 380-81
-
See id. at 380-81.
-
-
-
-
35
-
-
0004001507
-
-
Alburey Castell ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc.
-
By a liberal perfectionist, I mean broadly a liberal whose moral philosophy is built on some idea of human fulfillment, not on ideas of "right" that are detached from specific conclusions about good. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Alburey Castell ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1947) (1859); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
-
(1859)
On Liberty
-
-
Mill, J.S.1
-
36
-
-
0003956640
-
-
By a liberal perfectionist, I mean broadly a liberal whose moral philosophy is built on some idea of human fulfillment, not on ideas of "right" that are detached from specific conclusions about good. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Alburey Castell ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1947) (1859); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
-
(1986)
The Morality of Freedom
-
-
Raz, J.1
-
37
-
-
0004273805
-
-
I am lumping together in this category both those who think that morality overall is about respecting rights and those who think that much about individual morality starts from human fulfillment but that government and law should limit themselves to protecting rights. I am also lumping together those who emphasize rights against interference, see, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974), and those who think substantial government involvement is necessary to assure rights to welfare, or to a fair share of the goods of society, see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
-
(1974)
Anarchy, State and Utopia
-
-
Nozick, R.1
-
38
-
-
0004048289
-
-
rev. ed.
-
I am lumping together in this category both those who think that morality overall is about respecting rights and those who think that much about individual morality starts from human fulfillment but that government and law should limit themselves to protecting rights. I am also lumping together those who emphasize rights against interference, see, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974), and those who think substantial government involvement is necessary to assure rights to welfare, or to a fair share of the goods of society, see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
-
(1999)
A Theory of Justice
-
-
Rawls, J.1
-
39
-
-
11244357570
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-
note
-
Finnis challenges Rawls's reliance on a "thin theory of the good" to build political rights. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 105-06, 108-09.
-
-
-
-
41
-
-
11244291735
-
-
note
-
Finnis has said, "A genuine requirement of practical reasonableness is not the less a part of natural law (to use the classical phrase) just because it is not universally recognized or is actively disputed." FINNIS, supra note 1, at 31.
-
-
-
-
42
-
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11244268344
-
-
note
-
As I have noted earlier, it is also true that what measures should be embodied in law will depend on the moral views of the broad population, as well as on informed opinion about what is morally right.
-
-
-
-
43
-
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11244346362
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Property, the Common Law, and John Locke
-
supra note 5
-
See James R. Stoner, Jr., Property, the Common Law, and John Locke, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 5, at 193, 193-218.
-
Natural Law
, pp. 193
-
-
Stoner Jr., J.R.1
-
44
-
-
11244356448
-
-
note
-
Finnis says cautiously, "The good of personal autonomy in community . . . suggests that the opportunity of exercising some form of private ownership, including of means of production, is in most times and places a requirement of justice." FINNIS, supra note 1, at 169.
-
-
-
-
45
-
-
11244350600
-
-
note
-
I mean not only that they will think that citizens are morally entitled to receive what the law gives them a right to, but also that they will see the law as reflecting antecedent moral rights and duties.
-
-
-
-
46
-
-
11244295514
-
-
FINNIS, supra note 1, at 30 (footnote omitted)
-
FINNIS, supra note 1, at 30 (footnote omitted).
-
-
-
-
47
-
-
11244323640
-
-
note
-
Of course, if one became persuaded that monogamy was "non-fundamental," one might accommodate it in the manner that one might accommodate various views about the range of property rights.
-
-
-
-
48
-
-
11244273735
-
-
note
-
I am aware that at various stages of history, some natural lawyers defended slavery as natural. Our judgment now that natural law approaches, like all other approaches, have led to serious moral errors may be some ground for skepticism not only about particular modern conclusions but also about the process of reasoning used to reach them.
-
-
-
-
49
-
-
11244332451
-
-
supra note 5
-
I consider the positions of a number of Roman Catholic scholars in Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political Choice, supra note 5, at 6-12.
-
Natural Law and Political Choice
, pp. 6-12
-
-
Greenawalt1
-
50
-
-
11244332850
-
-
See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 85
-
See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 85.
-
-
-
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51
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11244290830
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See id. at 86-90
-
See id. at 86-90.
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-
-
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52
-
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11244350599
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See id. at 106-07
-
See id. at 106-07.
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-
-
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53
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11244357315
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See id. at 112
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See id. at 112.
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54
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11244355658
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Id. at 118
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Id. at 118.
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55
-
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11244340315
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See; FINNIS, supra note 32, at 87-92
-
See; FINNIS, supra note 32, at 87-92.
-
-
-
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56
-
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11244285764
-
-
note
-
I include this fact, so that one cannot say the visitors' enjoyment of this aesthetic experience is only postponed.
-
-
-
-
57
-
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11244357316
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-
note
-
Finnis does say that in one instantiation slight damage to a particular value is better than great damage to the same value. See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 111. One might build on that comment to suggest that slight damage to one value can be justified in order to prevent great damage to another value. Finnis also suggests that a convenient test of respect for good is whether the person doing the harm would think the act reasonable had he been the one harmed. See id. at 123. If almost everyone thinks it would be reasonable to be put out of a museum to save a life, even when the saving occurs because of a threat, that might affect how one would characterize the act.
-
-
-
-
58
-
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0347338652
-
Against Consequentialism
-
See, e.g., Germain Grisez, Against Consequentialism, 23 AM. J. JURIS. 21, 51 (1978).
-
(1978)
Am. J. Juris.
, vol.23
, pp. 21
-
-
Grisez, G.1
-
59
-
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11244291736
-
-
note
-
According to the so-called principle of "double effect," an act that predictably causes the loss of innocent life may be warranted if the actor's intention is good, and there are proportionately grave reasons for allowing the evil to occur. Thus, an engineer may divert a flood to save a town although she knows that the inhabitants of a farm will be killed. Similarly, fliers may bomb military targets, if their aim is to attack those targets, though it is certain some civilians will die. (For these purposes, enemy soldiers do not count as innocents.)
-
-
-
-
60
-
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11244332451
-
-
supra note 5
-
For some situations, there is an argument that one should not yield to extortion. See Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political Choice, supra note 5, at 21-22. That argument may bear on the museum hypothetical because the enraged gunman is extorting behavior from the manager, but it hardly bears on Lief's dilemma since the captain is quite content to destroy the entire town, and is only hesitating in order to do Lief a favor. Another argument is that, if one participates in wrong, one compromises one's identity and dirties one's hands, but this hardly seems decisive if many lives are at stake.
-
Natural Law and Political Choice
, pp. 21-22
-
-
Greenawalt1
-
61
-
-
0344126668
-
-
See GERMAIN GRISEZ, ABORTION: THE MYTH, THE REALITIES, AND THE ARGUMENTS 319 (1970). Finnis refers to the saying that "the end does not justify the means" and to Kant's principle to treat humanity "always as an end and never as a means only." FINNIS, supra note 1, at 122 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis W. Beck trans., 1963)).
-
(1970)
Abortion: The Myth, the Realities, and the Arguments
, pp. 319
-
-
Grisez, G.1
-
62
-
-
0004011977
-
-
Lewis W. Beck trans.
-
See GERMAIN GRISEZ, ABORTION: THE MYTH, THE REALITIES, AND THE ARGUMENTS 319 (1970). Finnis refers to the saying that "the end does not justify the means" and to Kant's principle to treat humanity "always as an end and never as a means only." FINNIS, supra note 1, at 122 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis W. Beck trans., 1963)).
-
(1963)
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals
-
-
Kant, I.1
-
63
-
-
0002186185
-
Intention and Side-Effects
-
R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds.
-
One might resist this conclusion in various ways, and Finnis acknowledges the complexities in how one decides what counts as a single act and how to describe the act. See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 122-23; John Finnis, Intention and Side-Effects, in LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 32, 56-61 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991). I suspect the methods of avoidance that might work for the museum manager would also cover Lief's situation.
-
(1991)
Liability and Responsibility
, pp. 32
-
-
Finnis, J.1
-
65
-
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11244272509
-
-
note
-
See Finnis, supra note 54, at 54-61, for a discussion that bears on whether that claim about intent would be reasonable.
-
-
-
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66
-
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0006605415
-
A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia
-
J. Kaewn ed.
-
Even if one cannot act to hasten the death of someone suffering a painful terminal illness, some people believe one can refuse extraordinary measures of care for a similar motive. Finnis rejects this position. See John Finnis, A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 23, 28 (J. Kaewn ed., 1995). The widely discussed variations on "the trolley problem" raise issues about action and inaction. See 2 FRANCES M. KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND STATUS 144-267 (1996); see also Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985).
-
(1995)
Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives
, pp. 23
-
-
Finnis, J.1
-
67
-
-
0007190517
-
-
2
-
Even if one cannot act to hasten the death of someone suffering a painful terminal illness, some people believe one can refuse extraordinary measures of care for a similar motive. Finnis rejects this position. See John Finnis, A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 23, 28 (J. Kaewn ed., 1995). The widely discussed variations on "the trolley problem" raise issues about action and inaction. See 2 FRANCES M. KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND STATUS 144-267 (1996); see also Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985).
-
(1996)
Morality, Mortality: Rights, Duties, and Status
, pp. 144-267
-
-
Kamm, F.M.1
-
68
-
-
84928221607
-
The Trolley Problem
-
Even if one cannot act to hasten the death of someone suffering a painful terminal illness, some people believe one can refuse extraordinary measures of care for a similar motive. Finnis rejects this position. See John Finnis, A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 23, 28 (J. Kaewn ed., 1995). The widely discussed variations on "the trolley problem" raise issues about action and inaction. See 2 FRANCES M. KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND STATUS 144-267 (1996); see also Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985).
-
(1985)
Yale L.J.
, vol.94
, pp. 1395
-
-
Thompson, J.J.1
-
69
-
-
11244330259
-
-
note
-
Finnis expresses some caution about the "doctrine" of double effect developed by causists, which is not itself a principle of practical reasonableness. See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 123. He is sensitive to the difficulties of characterizing acts. See id. at 122-23. But he gives no hint he would approve killing to save lives.
-
-
-
-
70
-
-
11244259802
-
A Propos of Professor Perry: A Plea for Philosophy in Sexual Ethics
-
See Paul J. Weithman, A Propos of Professor Perry: A Plea for Philosophy in Sexual Ethics, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 75, 78-79 (1995).
-
(1995)
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y
, vol.9
, pp. 75
-
-
Weithman, P.J.1
-
71
-
-
0345558386
-
Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation,"
-
Finnis says that he does not mean to "seek to infer normative conclusions or theses from non-normative (natural-fact) premises." John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1068 (1990).
-
(1990)
Notre Dame L. Rev.
, vol.69
, pp. 1049
-
-
Finnis, J.M.1
-
72
-
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11244332452
-
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Id. at 1066
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Id. at 1066.
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-
-
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73
-
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11244301605
-
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Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
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74
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11244252639
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Id.
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Id.
-
-
-
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75
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11244257964
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Id. at 1067
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Id. at 1067.
-
-
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76
-
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11244308765
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Id. at 1065
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Id. at 1065.
-
-
-
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77
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11244336237
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-
note
-
Given the degree of reliability of many contraceptives, couples relying on them will often perceive the chances of procreation as being higher than couples who are aware that some physical impairment will prevent pregnancy.
-
-
-
-
78
-
-
61149719039
-
Living a Christian Life
-
See Finnis, supra note 60, at 1067 n.47 (referring readers to Germain Grisez, Living a Christian Life, in 2 WAY OF THE LORD JESUS 634-39, 648-54, 662-64 (1993)).
-
(1993)
Way of the Lord Jesus
, vol.2
, pp. 634-639
-
-
Grisez, G.1
-
79
-
-
11244339411
-
-
See Weithman, supra note 59, at 89-92
-
See Weithman, supra note 59, at 89-92.
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80
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11244262059
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note
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Of course, if one were confident that an argument about the inherent differences between acts were correct, one might also be confident that qualities of lived experience would differ.
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81
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11244251559
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note
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A defender of this general approach might answer that we need not be locked into just the categorization Finnis has provided; perhaps use of artificial contraception under the right conditions falls on the "good" side of the line.
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82
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11244295874
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note
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I am aware that many people with dominantly homosexual inclinations have married and engaged in heterosexual intercourse, and that many people with dominantly heterosexual inclinations have at some time or other engaged in homosexual acts. But if one is looking for an account of what experiences are possible, one might suspect descriptions by people who have acted against their dominant inclinations. People who are fully bi-sexual in their inclinations may make comparisons that are more highly relevant.
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83
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note
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This last category includes not only physical impairments of various sorts, but also intercourse at certain points in the menstrual cycle and at times when the woman is already pregnant.
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84
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11244323641
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The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A Response to John Finnis
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Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A Response to John Finnis, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 41, 59 (1995).
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(1995)
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y
, vol.9
, pp. 41
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Perry, M.J.1
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85
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11244266815
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See id. at 59-61
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See id. at 59-61.
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86
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11244314770
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Natural Law, Morality and Sexual Complementarity
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David M. Estlund & M. Nussbaum eds.
-
See Weithman, supra note 59, at 75. Weithman considers Finnis's arguments more fully in his contribution to Sex, Preference, and Family. See Paul J. Weithman, Natural Law, Morality and Sexual Complementarity, in SEX, PREFERENCE AND FAMILY 227 (David M. Estlund & M. Nussbaum eds., 1997).
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(1997)
Sex, Preference and Family
, pp. 227
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Weithman, P.J.1
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87
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11244280596
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See Weithman, supra note 59, at 80-82
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See Weithman, supra note 59, at 80-82.
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88
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11244311334
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See id. at 88
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See id. at 88.
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89
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11244277847
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See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 101
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See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 101.
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90
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11244322619
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note
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See id. One may doubt whether any coherent theory that does not rely on religious premises can draw the lines just as Finnis does, but I here assume that such a theory may be available.
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91
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11244335202
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See Perry, supra note 73, at 51-52
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See Perry, supra note 73, at 51-52.
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92
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11244338771
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Finnis, supra note 60, at 1064
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Finnis, supra note 60, at 1064.
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93
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11244301603
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Nature, Morality, and Homosexuality
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supra note 5
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See Robert P. George, Nature, Morality, and Homosexuality, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 5, at 29, 38.
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Natural Law
, pp. 29
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George, R.P.1
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94
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11244346361
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Id. at 36
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Id. at 36.
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95
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11244277846
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Id.
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Id.
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96
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11244267969
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See id. at 29
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See id. at 29.
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97
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11244293210
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See id. at 38
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See id. at 38.
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98
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11244294409
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410 U.S. 113 (1973)
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410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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99
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11244331007
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note
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Part of what is troubling is what exactly counts as suicide and assistance, as contrasted with refusing life support, letting die, and assuaging pain.
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-
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100
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11244352974
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note
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Finnis makes a catergorical argument against suicide and assisted suicide, but that argument does not include the particular formulation on which I focus. See Finnis, supra note 57.
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-
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101
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11244319048
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Privacy
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supra note 5
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See David Novak, Privacy, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 5, at 13, 24. I agree with Professor Novak that fear of lack of control has much to do with the wish of many people to "die with dignity." Id. at 24. Indeed, I think that graceful acceptance of dependence is a lesson that many who are dying teach us all.
-
Natural Law
, pp. 13
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Novak, D.1
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102
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11244312581
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Id at 24
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Id at 24.
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103
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11244276383
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note
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Perhaps a legal right to help in dying will create pressures, internal and external, for people to die to save money; perhaps a limited right of the terminally ill might evolve into a broader right of people to receive help in dying. These are valid worries about creating any legal right to assistance, but they do not resolve the underlying moral question.
-
-
-
-
104
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0003509730
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In relation to the widely cited and widely attacked thesis that women, in general, and men, in general, adopt different approaches to moral problems, see generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: POTCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982), we can easily place traditional natural law theorizing far on the male side of the spectrum.
-
(1982)
In a Different Voice: Potchological Theory and Women's Development
-
-
Gilligan, C.1
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105
-
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11244265625
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Finnis, supra note 60, at 1067
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Finnis, supra note 60, at 1067.
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-
-
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106
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11244330258
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note
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I am putting this very simplistically. It is not as if one approach generally disregards altogether the aspects emphasized by its competitors. What differentiates serious approaches is typically more subtle nuances and matters of degree.
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107
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11244297557
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note
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Given the changes in moral judgment over time, even among those falling squarely within the natural law tradition, it would be naive not to suppose that many particular moral judgments that are now dominant will seem to be erroneous in the future.
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108
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11244345832
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note
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This particular version of the idea of moral progress may be able to explain the increasing rejection of slavery without being refuted by horrors like the Holocaust.
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-
-
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109
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11244314767
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-
note
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Scientific reasoning may be different from moral and social evaluation in this respect. Scientific successes may give some approaches a very strong appeal across cultures.
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110
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11244293208
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note
-
I mean "self-evident" in the sense that Finnis uses about intrinsic good. See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 70. A truth is self-evident if it does not derive from some other proposition; it can be self-evident without being obvious or undisputed.
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-
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111
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11244339410
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note
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I put the point in this way to avoid the question of what exactly is the relation between God and moral standards. Two possibilities are that God establishes moral standards and that moral standards exist independent of God, but God perfectly perceives those standards and encourages human beings to live by them.
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-
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112
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11244321278
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See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 48-49
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See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 48-49.
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113
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11244342769
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note
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See Novak, supra note 90, at 21-22 (arguing forcefully that ideas of natural law are much more deeply rooted in religion than has commonly been recognized).
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114
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11244352973
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note
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Analogously, one might compare within a single culture the differences between family morality and the morality that governs relations among strangers.
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-
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115
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0001758519
-
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Insofar as religious conviction plays a direct role in our moral evaluations, further questions arise about its appropriate place in the political decisions of liberal democracies. I have developed my views on these complex questions in other works. See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCE AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
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(1995)
Private Conscience and Public Reasons
-
-
Greenawalt, K.1
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116
-
-
0003547455
-
-
Insofar as religious conviction plays a direct role in our moral evaluations, further questions arise about its appropriate place in the political decisions of liberal democracies. I have developed my views on these complex questions in other works. See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCE AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
-
(1988)
Religious Convictions and Political Choice
-
-
Greenawalt, K.1
|