Chapter 56 Values of games with infinitely many players

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Volumn 3, Issue , 2002, Pages 2121-2167

  Neyman, Abraham ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

coalitional form; continuum of players; cooperative; games; non atomic; transferable utility; value

Indexed keywords

EID: 11244284404     PISSN: 15740005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03019-9     Document Type: Review

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