The Iranian nuclear challenge

International Affairs

Volumn 80, Issue 2, 2004, Pages

  Bowen, Wyn Q ^a   Kidd, Joanna ^b  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 11144353745     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00382.x     Document Type: Article

References (123)

1. The IAEA is responsible for safeguarding that states live up to their commitments not to use nuclear programmes for weapons purposes. Safeguards agreements cover nuclear materials and activities and serve as 'a confidence-building measure, an early warning mechanism, and the trigger that sets in motion other responses by the international community if and when the need arises'. Safeguards in the 19905 were strengthened because of failures to detect clandestine activity in Iraq and North Korea. The additional protocol or AP is an important element of the strengthened system. It is a legal document signed by individual states and the IAEA granting the Agency 'complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements'. A principal aim is to enable the IAEA to provide assurances about declared and possible undeclared activities. It gives the IAEA 'expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process'. See International Atomic Energy Agency, 'IAEA safeguards overview: comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols', http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/ sg_overview.shtml, last accessed 28 Jan. 2004.
2. The shah once planned the construction of up to twenty nuclear power plants and, to this end, established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in 1974.
3. Ambassador of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 'Memorandum on the peaceful nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran policy', 14 June 2003, submitted to the inquiry on the 'Foreign policy aspects of the war against terrorism', House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, roth Report, Session 2002-3, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200203/ cmselect/cmfaff/405/405we18.htm, last accessed 12 Feb. 2004.
4. M.Ghannadi-Maragheh, Vice President for Nuclear Fuel Production, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 'Iranian nuclear fuel cycle experience', paper presented to World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, London, 3-5 Sept. 2003, p. 1, http://www.world-nuclear.org/sym/subindex.htm, last accessed 12 Feb. 2004.
5. Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement of the Islamic Republic of Iran', 10 Nov. 2003, p. 9. For an overview of several elements of Iran's civil nuclear energy programme, see the website of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, http://www.aeoi.org. ir.
6. Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement of the Islamic Republic of Iran', 10 Nov. 2003, p. 9. For an overview of several elements of Iran's civil nuclear energy programme, see the website of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, http://www.aeoi.org. ir.
7. Cited in Jim Heintz, 'Iran accepts extra inspections of nuclear sites', Independent, 11 Nov. 2003, p. 12.
8. 7 Ambassador of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 'Memorandum on the peaceful nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran policy'.
9. 'The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', INFCIRC/214, 13 Dec. 1974, International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/intcires/others/intcirc214. pdf, last accessed 12 Feb. 2004.
10. Office of the Secretary of Defense, US Department of Defense, Proliferation: threat and response, Jan. 2001, pp. 34-8, http://www.defenselink. mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf, last accessed 12 Feb. 2004.
11. Iran has also admitted to working on laser enrichment since the early 1990s. A pilot plant was established in 2000 at Lashkar Ab'ad, where Iranian technicians have conducted enrichment experiments using imported uranium metal. See Director General, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 10 Nov. 2003, p. 8; Marshall Breit, 'Iran's programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 Dec. 2003, http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ Factsheets/iransnuclearprogram.htm, last accessed 30 Jan. 2004.
12. Iran has also admitted to working on laser enrichment since the early 1990s. A pilot plant was established in 2000 at Lashkar Ab'ad, where Iranian technicians have conducted enrichment experiments using imported uranium metal. See Director General, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 10 Nov. 2003, p. 8; Marshall Breit, 'Iran's programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 Dec. 2003, http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ Factsheets/iransnuclearprogram.htm, last accessed 30 Jan. 2004.
13. Uranium hexafluoride is the chemical form of uranium used during the enrichment process.
14. See Director General, IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 10 Nov. 2003, pp. 6-7; Breit, 'Iran's programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium'.
15. See Director General, IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 10 Nov. 2003, pp. 6-7; Breit, 'Iran's programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium'.
16. David Albright and Corey Hinderstain, 'Iran, player or rogue?', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59: 5, Sept.-Oct. 2003, pp. 52-8, http://www. thebulletin.org/issues/2003/s003/s003albright.html, last accessed 20 Jan. 2004.
17. Director General, IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 6 June 2003, p. 6.
18. Albright and Hinderstain, 'Iran, player or rogue?', pp. 52-8.
19. Director General, IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 26 Aug. 2003, p. 6.
20. Ibid., 10 Nov. 2003, p. 7. Iran's Esfahan conversion facility is reported to be capable of converting uranium yellow cake into uranium hexafluoride, which will presumably be sent to Natanz for enrichment. Moreover, the previously undeclared Jabr Ibn Hayan Laboratory is known to have converted uranium tetrafluoride into uranium metal. See Breit, 'Iran's programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium'.
21. Ibid., 10 Nov. 2003, p. 7. Iran's Esfahan conversion facility is reported to be capable of converting uranium yellow cake into uranium hexafluoride, which will presumably be sent to Natanz for enrichment. Moreover, the previously undeclared Jabr Ibn Hayan Laboratory is known to have converted uranium tetrafluoride into uranium metal. See Breit, 'Iran's programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium'.
22. See Director General, IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 10 Nov. 2003, pp. 6, 16; Breit, 'Iran's programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium'.
23. See Director General, IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 10 Nov. 2003, pp. 6, 16; Breit, 'Iran's programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium'.
24. Albright and Hinderstain, 'Iran, player or rogue?', pp. 52-8.
25. Director General, IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 6 June 2003, p. 2.
26. Ibid., p. 3; ibid., 26 Aug. 2003, p. 8.
27. Ibid., p. 3; ibid., 26 Aug. 2003, p. 8.
28. Breit, 'Iran's programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium'.
29. Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfstahl and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly arsenals (Washington DC: Brookings Institution/Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), pp. 257-60.
30. Mark Hibbs, 'Bonn will decline Teheran bid to resuscitate Bushehr project', Nucleonics Week, 2 May 1991.
31. US Department of Defense, Proliferation: threat and response, Jan. 2001, pp. 34-8.
32. Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 257-60.
33. See Irina Rybalchenko, 'Iran will share its nuclear waste with Russia', Moscow Kommersant, 25 June 2002, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 26 June 2002 (CEP20020626000430). Iran appears to have plans eventually to produce its own fuel for Bushehr and other planned power reactors. See Breit, 'Iran's programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium'.
34. See Irina Rybalchenko, 'Iran will share its nuclear waste with Russia', Moscow Kommersant, 25 June 2002, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 26 June 2002 (CEP20020626000430). Iran appears to have plans eventually to produce its own fuel for Bushehr and other planned power reactors. See Breit, 'Iran's programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium'.
35. Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 257-60.
36. Director General, IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 6 June 2003, p. 5. Uranium comes in many chemical forms. Uranium tetrafluoride is generally an intermediate in the conversion of uranium hexafluoride to uranium oxide or metal. Uranium dioxide is the form in which uranium is most commonly used as a nuclear reactor fuel. See 'Chemical forms of uranium', Environmental Assessment Division, Argonne National Laboratory, http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/guide/uncompound/forms/index.ofm, accessed 12 Feb. 2004.
37. Director General, IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 6 June 2003, p. 5. Uranium comes in many chemical forms. Uranium tetrafluoride is generally an intermediate in the conversion of uranium hexafluoride to uranium oxide or metal. Uranium dioxide is the form in which uranium is most commonly used as a nuclear reactor fuel. See 'Chemical forms of uranium', Environmental Assessment Division, Argonne National Laboratory, http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/guide/uncompound/forms/index.ofm, accessed 12 Feb. 2004.
38. US Department of Defense, Proliferation: threat and response, 1990, p. 14, cited in Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 260-2.
39. US Department of Defense, Proliferation: threat and response, 1990, p. 14, cited in Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 260-2.
40. 'Iran', Research Reactors Database, International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb, accessed 30 Jan. 2004; 'Iran', Handbook of nuclear countries, 4th edn (Berlin: Lexiko-graphisches Institut, 1998), p. 139; Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 257-60.
41. 'Iran', Research Reactors Database, International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb, accessed 30 Jan. 2004; 'Iran', Handbook of nuclear countries, 4th edn (Berlin: Lexiko-graphisches Institut, 1998), p. 139; Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 257-60.
42. 'Iran', Research Reactors Database, International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb, accessed 30 Jan. 2004; 'Iran', Handbook of nuclear countries, 4th edn (Berlin: Lexiko-graphisches Institut, 1998), p. 139; Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 257-60.
43. Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 260-2.
44. US Department of Defense, Proliferation: threat and response, 1996, p. 14, cited ibid.
45. US Department of Defense, Proliferation: threat and response, 1996, p. 14, cited ibid.
46. Ahmed Rashid and Robin Gedye, 'Pardon for scientist who sold atom bomb secrets', Daily Telegraph, 4 Feb. 2004, p. 13.
47. Massoud Ansari, 'Nuclear scientists from Pakistan admit helping Iran with bomb-making', Sunday Telegraph, 25 Jan. 2004, p. 27.
48. Associated Press, 'Pakistani revelations strengthen probe into Iran's nuclear program', USA Today, 26 Dec. 2003, http://www.usatoday.com.
49. Anthony Barnett, 'Revealed: how Pakistan fuels nuclear arms race', Observer, 18 Jan. 2004, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0, 6903,1125614,00.html, accessed 19 Jan. 2004
50. Rashid and Gedye, 'Pardon for scientist who sold atom bomb secrets', p. 13.
51. Barnett, 'Revealed'.
52. 40 Associated Press, 'Pakistani revelations strengthen probe into Iran's nuclear program'.
53. Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 257-60.
54. The shah's regime also reportedly initiated a nuclear weapons programme which continued until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Brenda Shaffer, 'Iran at the nuclear threshold', Arms Control Today, Nov. 2003, p. 7.
55. 'Iran', Country Analysis Briefs, Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html, accessed 2 Feb. 2004.
56. See e.g. Steve Coll, '"Nuclear sales" to Iran blocked', Guardian, 17 Nov. 1992, p. 12.
57. US National Intelligence Council, 'Foreign missile developments and the ballistic missile threat through 2015: unclassified summary of a national intelligence estimate', Dec. 2001 (released 9 Jan. 2002).
58. Steven Everts, The EU and Iran: how to make conditional engagement work, policy brief, Centre for European Reform, p. 2, http://www.cer.org.uk, accessed 30 Jan. 2004.
59. Albright and Hinderstain, 'Iran, player or rogue?', pp. 52-8.
60. Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 256-7.
61. Tehran Domestic Service, 'Hashemi-Rafsanjani speaks on the future of the IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps', 6 Oct. 1988, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-NES), 7 Oct. 1988, p. 52, cited in Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 256-7.
62. Tehran Domestic Service, 'Hashemi-Rafsanjani speaks on the future of the IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps', 6 Oct. 1988, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-NES), 7 Oct. 1988, p. 52, cited in Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 256-7.
63. D. Sanger, 'Three enemy targets require three different strategies', New York Times, 15 Dec. 2002, http://www.nyt.com.
64. Economist Intelligence Unit, Iran: country profile 2002 (London: EIU, 2002), pp. 10-11.
65. Ibid., p. 2.
66. Ray Takeyh, 'Iran's nuclear calculations', World Policy Journal 20: 2, Summer 2003, p. 23, http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/, accessed 1 Dec. 2003.
67. Judith S. Yaphe, 'US-Iran relations: normalization in the future?', Strategic Forum, no. 188, Jan. 2002, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/ sf188.htm, accessed 1 Dec. 2003.
68. S. Kile, 'Nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and ballistic missile defence', in SIPRI yearbook 2003: armaments, disarmament and international security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 595-6.
69. In 1981 Israeli aircraft destroyed Iraq's Osiraq nuclear research reactor. The aim was to retard the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme, thereby averting a detrimental shift in the regional military balance to Israel's disadvantage.
70. See Takeyh, 'Iran's nuclear calculations', p. 22.
71. Kori N. Schake and Judith S. Yaphe, The strategic implications of a nuclear-armed Iran, McNair paper 64 (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, May 2001), http://www.ndu.edu/ inss/McNair/McNair64/McN64cont.htm, accessed 1 Dec. 2003.
72. In October 2001 Khatami signed a military technical cooperation agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin for Iran's acquisition of Russian arms. It is assessed that this agreement could lead to Iranian purchases of Russian weaponry totalling up to US$300 million per year, See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The military balance 2002-2003 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 278-9.
73. Michael Eisenstadt, 'The armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran: an assessment', Middle East Review of International Affairs 5: 1, March 2001, p. 15.
74. Schake and Yaphe, The strategic implications of a nuclear-armed Iran.
75. See Takeyh, 'Iran's nuclear calculations', pp. 21, 23-4; Shaffer, 'Iran at the nuclear threshold', pp. 7, 10.
76. See Takeyh, 'Iran's nuclear calculations', pp. 21, 23-4; Shaffer, 'Iran at the nuclear threshold', pp. 7, 10.
77. See Takeyh, 'Iran's nuclear calculations', p. 21.
78. See ibid., p. 25.
79. 'IRGC', Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ iran/agency/irgc.htm, accessed 1 Dec. 2003.
80. Cirincione et al., Deadly arsenals, pp. 256-7.
81. The ambassador made this comment on 10 November 2003. See Roula Khalaf and Judy Dempsey, 'US consults over Iran's nuclear programme', Financial Times, 12 Nov. 2003, p. 15.
82. Shaffer, 'Iran at the nuclear threshold', p. 10.
83. See Albright and Hinderstain, 'Iran, player or rogue?', pp. 52-8; Miriam Rajkumar, Iran's nuclear challenge (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 Oct. 2003), http://www.ceip.org, accessed 1 Dec. 2003. Andrew Jack and Judy Dempsey, 'Iran's nuclear start-up delayed', Financial Times, 14 Oct. 2003, p. 13.
84. See Albright and Hinderstain, 'Iran, player or rogue?', pp. 52-8; Miriam Rajkumar, Iran's nuclear challenge (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 Oct. 2003), http://www.ceip.org, accessed 1 Dec. 2003. Andrew Jack and Judy Dempsey, 'Iran's nuclear start-up delayed', Financial Times, 14 Oct. 2003, p. 13.
85. See Albright and Hinderstain, 'Iran, player or rogue?', pp. 52-8; Miriam Rajkumar, Iran's nuclear challenge (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 Oct. 2003), http://www.ceip.org, accessed 1 Dec. 2003. Andrew Jack and Judy Dempsey, 'Iran's nuclear start-up delayed', Financial Times, 14 Oct. 2003, p. 13.
86. Everts, The EU and Iran, p. 2.
87. Statement by Kenneth C. Brill, US ambassador, IAEA Board of Governors' Meeting, Vienna, 8 Sept. 2003.
88. David R. Sands, 'EU issues warning to Tehran on nukes', Washington Times, 30 Sept. 2003, http://www.washingtontimes.com.
89. See 'Iran', Country Profiles, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk.
90. Albright and Hinderstain, 'Iran, player or rogue?', pp. 52-8.
91. See 'Basic principles for an EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction' (Doc.10352/03 PESC 315 CONOP 18 CODUN 13 COTER. 24); 'Action plan for the implementation of the basic principles for an EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction' (Doc.10354/03 PESC 316 CONOP 19 CODUN 14 COTER 25). The Council of Europe, Brussels, http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76328.pdf, accessed 30 Jan. 2004.
92. See 'Basic principles for an EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction' (Doc.10352/03 PESC 315 CONOP 18 CODUN 13 COTER. 24); 'Action plan for the implementation of the basic principles for an EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction' (Doc.10354/03 PESC 316 CONOP 19 CODUN 14 COTER 25). The Council of Europe, Brussels, http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76328.pdf, accessed 30 Jan. 2004.
93. See 'Basic principles for an EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction' (Doc.10352/03 PESC 315 CONOP 18 CODUN 13 COTER. 24); 'Action plan for the implementation of the basic principles for an EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction' (Doc.10354/03 PESC 316 CONOP 19 CODUN 14 COTER 25). The Council of Europe, Brussels, http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76328.pdf, accessed 30 Jan. 2004.
94. 'Basic principles for an EU strategy', pp. 1-2.
95. Board of Governors, IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', resolution adopted by the board on 26 Nov. 2003, GOV/2003/81, 26 Nov. 2003, pp. 1-2, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf, accessed 15 Dec. 2003.
96. I b i d.
97. 'Agreed statement at the end of a visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran by the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany', Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 Oct. 2003, http://www.mfa.gov.ir/News/english/documents/ doc3256.htm, accessed 1 Dec. 2003.
98. Ex-President Rafsanjani rejects "bullying" over signing NPT', Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, Tehran, in Persian, 12 Sept. 2003, in BBC Monitoring, Middle East, 12 Sept. 2003. The Expediency Council is an advisory body for the Supreme Leader and is described as the ultimate adjudicating power in disputes over legislation between the Majlis and the Guardian Council. Members are appointed by the Supreme Leader. Rafsanjani has developed the Council into an influential strategic planning and policy-making body. See BBC News Online, 'Iran: who holds the power?'.
99. The Guardian Council is regarded as the most influential political body in Iran. It is currently controlled by conservatives and consists of six theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists nominated by the judiciary and approved by the Majlis (parliament). The council approves all bills passed by the Majlis and ensures they conform to the constitution and Islamic law. The Council also has the power to vet all candidates in elections to parliament, the presidency and the Assembly of Experts. See BBC news online, 'Iran: who holds the power?', http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/ 03/iran_power/html/assembly.stm, accessed 1 Dec. 2003.
100. 'Senior cleric says Iran should pull out of nuclear treaty', Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran, in Persian, 19 Sept. 2003, in BBC Monitoring, Middle East, 19 Sept. 2003.
101. Jim Muir, 'Nuclear deal splits Iran hardliners', BBC News Online, 22 Oct. 2003, http://www.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3204125.stm, accessed 23 Oct. 2003.
102. I b i d.
103. Everts, The EU and Iran, p. 3.
104. Muir, 'Nuclear deal splits Iran hardliners'.
105. Statement by Kenneth C. Brill, US ambassador, IAEA Board of Governors' Meeting, Vienna, 8 Sept. 2003.
106. Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, 'US policy and Iran', Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 28 Oct. 2003, US State Department, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/25682pf.htm, accessed 30 Jan. 2004.
107. Director General, IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 10 Nov. 2003, p. 9.
108. Ibid., p. 10.
109. Joe Fiorill, 'IAEA governors accept Iran's additional protocol; talks on resolution delayed', Global Security Newswire, 21 Nov. 2003, http://www.nti.org.
110. 'US disbelief at Iran nuclear findings', Financial Times, 13 Nov. 2003, p. 13.
111. Board of Governors, IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', 26 Nov. 2003.
112. I b i d.
113. I b i d.
114. 'Iran signs additional protocol on nuclear safeguards: signing ceremony takes place at IAEA', IAEA, 18 Dec. 2003, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/ 2003/iranap20031218.html, accessed 18 Dec. 2003.
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116. Julian Borger and Ian Traynor, 'Bush urges tougher curbs on nuclear trade', The Guardian, 12 Feb. 2003, p. 2.
117. Full text: Bush speech on WMD, The Australian, 12 Feb. 2004, http:www.theaustralian.news.com.au/, accessed 12 Feb. 2004.
118. Carol Giacomo, 'US mulling stronger international nuclear curbs', Reuters, 25 Jan. 2004, http://www.reuters.com,accessed 25 Jan. 2004.
119. 'Basic principles for an EU strategy', pp. 1-2.
120. Caren Bohan, 'US mulls dialogue with Iran', Reuters, 30 Dec. 2003, http://www.reuters.com, accessed 30 Dec. 2003.
121. Armitage, 'US policy and Iran'.
122. See Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan, Engaging problem countries, policy brief no.61 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2000), pp. 1-8.
123. John R. Bolton, Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, 'Nuclear weapons and rogue states: challenge and response', remarks to the conference of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Fletcher School's International Security Studies Program, Washington DC, 2 Dec. 2003, US State Department, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/26786.htm, accessed 5 Dec. 2003.