Bayesian inference in repeated english auctions

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Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 193-211

  Albano, Gian Luigi ^a   Jouneau Sion, Frédéric ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIV LILLE   (France)

Author keywords

Bayesian inference; English auctions; Game theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 11144302152     PISSN: 11330686     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02603006     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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12. PESENDORFER, M. (1995). A study of collusion in first-price auctions: Part I and II. Preprint, Northwestern University.
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