Fundamental dimensions of U.S. trade policy

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 65, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 93-125

  Bohara, Alok K ^a   Camargo, Alejandro Islas ^b   Grijalva, Therese ^c   Gawande, Kishore ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO   (United States)

^b INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO   (Mexico)

^c WEBER STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dimensionality; Ideology; Interest; Omnibus Trade Act; Roll call voting

Indexed keywords

COMPETITIVENESS; POLICY ANALYSIS; TRADE POLICY; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES; WESTERN HEMISPHERE; WORLD;

EID: 10944254089     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2003.10.002     Document Type: Article

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