Group contracts for voluntary nonpoint source pollution reductions: Evidence from experimental auctions

American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 86, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 1196-1202

  Taylor, Michael A ^a   Sohngen, Brent ^b   Randall, Alan ^b   Pushkarskaya, Helen ^c  

^a SETON HALL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ABATEMENT COST; AGRICULTURAL EMISSION; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION; POLLUTION CONTROL;

EID: 10944232031     PISSN: 00029092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0002-9092.2004.00664.x     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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