The incredible shrinking war: The Second World War, not (just) the origins of the Cold War. So what the hell were we fighting for, such a long, long time ago?

Diplomatic History

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 347-365

  Kimball, Warren F ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 10944226124     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0145-2096.00271     Document Type: Article

References (116)

1. Mark A. Stoler, "A Half Century of Conflict: Interpretations of U.S. World War II Diplomacy," Diplomatic History 18 (Summer 1994): 375-403, esp. 401-3.
2. This is less so in Great Britain, at least for the present. The U.K. is, after all, a place where "the last war" means World War II, not Korea or Vietnam. But change is in the wind, particularly as the British infatuation with Europe continues to grow. Some British scholars and pundits have recently begun to dismiss the "special" Anglo-American relationship as mythology grossly exaggerated by the brief Second World War alliance and, particularly, by the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship. Can dismissal of the unique, intense World War II experience itself be far behind? There is some irony in this, since the agonizing European experience in the two world wars prompted, almost mandated, something like the European Union. The ongoing energy for that institution may have come from economic self-interest and the search for a way to "tame" Germany, but the initial impetus was the compulsion to find a way to avoid another world, or at least Europeanwide, war.
3. Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Cold War: What Do 'We Now Know'?" American Historical Review 114 (April 1999): 523.
4. Arnold A. Offner, "'Another Such Victory': President Truman, American Foreign Policy, and the Cold War," Diplomatic History 23 (Spring 1999): 153.
5. James Field, "American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book," American Historical Review 83 (June 1978): 644-83.
6. I began to make a chart of American textbook/survey treatments of the Second World War, but however revealing that proved, I found it too boring to write about - so I shall leave the page counts to others, letting this one random example suffice. The text is James T. Patterson, America in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1976). This is but one of many similar treatments.
7. See the reports submitted annually to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) by Michael Hogan and George Herring, the present and immediate past editor of Diplomatic History. Out of 148 presentations scheduled for the 1999 SHAFR annual meeting, nearly half were specifically about the Cold War, and a number of others seemed to touch on Cold War issues. A word about political scientists seems in order here. My impression is that, while some are not bound temporally to the Cold War, most have long ago been colonized by that event. But that makes sense in their case since, by definition, political science, and particularly international relations study, looks to uncover the nature and sources of current international conduct in order to understand and prescribe public policy.
8. "The American Century: A Roundtable (Part I)," Diplomatic History 23 (Spring 1999): 157-370, and "The American Century: A Roundtable (Part II)," ibid. (Summer 1999): 391-537. I find deep irony in the fact that the most analytical comments about the World War II era are the necessarily brief comments by Gerald Horne, whose "Race From Power" essay (pp. 437-61) dealt with issues of foreign policy and "white supremacy." Luce's original editorial, printed on pp. 159-71, was also published with additional material in book form (New York, 1941).
9. "The American Century: A Roundtable (Part I)," Diplomatic History 23 (Spring 1999): 157-370, and "The American Century: A Roundtable (Part II)," ibid. (Summer 1999): 391-537. I find deep irony in the fact that the most analytical comments about the World War II era are the necessarily brief comments by Gerald Horne, whose "Race From Power" essay (pp. 437-61) dealt with issues of foreign policy and "white supremacy." Luce's original editorial, printed on pp. 159-71, was also published with additional material in book form (New York, 1941).
10. "The American Century: A Roundtable (Part I)," Diplomatic History 23 (Spring 1999): 157-370, and "The American Century: A Roundtable (Part II)," ibid. (Summer 1999): 391-537. I find deep irony in the fact that the most analytical comments about the World War II era are the necessarily brief comments by Gerald Horne, whose "Race From Power" essay (pp. 437-61) dealt with issues of foreign policy and "white supremacy." Luce's original editorial, printed on pp. 159-71, was also published with additional material in book form (New York, 1941).
11. Frank Ninkovich, "The United States, NATO, and the Lessons of History" (unpublished paper delivered at the Baker Peace Conference - The European Union, Ohio University, 13 February 1999), p. 5.
12. The Cold War International History Project, sponsored by the Wilson Center in Washington, DC, has done yeoman work in this regard, but its efforts have not brought about systematic full access to Soviet-era records.
13. See Donald G. Schilling, "Re-presenting the Holocaust in the General Histories of World War II" (presented at the conference Lessons and Legacies V: Law Evidence and Context, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida, November 1998).
14. Two studies of American GIs in Europe are David Reynolds, Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945 (New York, 1995), and Peter Schrijvers, The Crash of Ruin: American Combat Soldiers in Europe during World War II (New York, 1998). Michael Sherry is quoted from personal correspondence to the author, 9 December 1998.
15. Two studies of American GIs in Europe are David Reynolds, Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945 (New York, 1995), and Peter Schrijvers, The Crash of Ruin: American Combat Soldiers in Europe during World War II (New York, 1998). Michael Sherry is quoted from personal correspondence to the author, 9 December 1998.
16. Warren F. Kimball, Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill and the Second World War (New York, 1997), 209.
17. Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War (New York, 1968); Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 1957); Arthur S. Schlesinger, Jr., "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," in Yalta: Un Mito che Resiste, ed. Paola Brundu Olla (Roma, n.d. [1987]), 137-58; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945: With a New Afterword (New York, 1995).
18. Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War (New York, 1968); Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 1957); Arthur S. Schlesinger, Jr., "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," in Yalta: Un Mito che Resiste, ed. Paola Brundu Olla (Roma, n.d. [1987]), 137-58; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945: With a New Afterword (New York, 1995).
19. Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War (New York, 1968); Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 1957); Arthur S. Schlesinger, Jr., "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," in Yalta: Un Mito che Resiste, ed. Paola Brundu Olla (Roma, n.d. [1987]), 137-58; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945: With a New Afterword (New York, 1995).
20. Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War (New York, 1968); Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 1957); Arthur S. Schlesinger, Jr., "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," in Yalta: Un Mito che Resiste, ed. Paola Brundu Olla (Roma, n.d. [1987]), 137-58; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945: With a New Afterword (New York, 1995).
21. The most strident of the new perfectionists is R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford, 1995). Other examples are Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (Westport, 1990); Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos 96 (Summer 1993): 65-85; and the essay by Norman Davies, New York Review of Books; 25 May 1995. Schlesinger used the phrase "perfectionist clamor" to describe critics of FDR's Yalta negotiations in "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," 146, 152. For my strong disagreement with the claim that FDR became a Cold Warrior before his death see The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, 1991), chaps. 8-9. See also idem, "Churchill, Roosevelt and Post-war Europe," in Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R. A. C. Parker (London, 1995), 135-49. For a curious "perfectionist" attack on Churchill's policies in 1940 see Bernd Martin, "Churchill and Hitler, 1940: Peace or War?" in ibid., 83-96. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (1953; New York & London, 1970); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948-53). On the influence of that memoir see W. F. Kimball, "Wheel Within a Wheel: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship," in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford, 1993), 291-307. The impact of Churchill's wartime memoir on history and historians cries out for full and careful analysis.
22. The most strident of the new perfectionists is R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford, 1995). Other examples are Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (Westport, 1990); Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos 96 (Summer 1993): 65-85; and the essay by Norman Davies, New York Review of Books; 25 May 1995. Schlesinger used the phrase "perfectionist clamor" to describe critics of FDR's Yalta negotiations in "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," 146, 152. For my strong disagreement with the claim that FDR became a Cold Warrior before his death see The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, 1991), chaps. 8-9. See also idem, "Churchill, Roosevelt and Post-war Europe," in Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R. A. C. Parker (London, 1995), 135-49. For a curious "perfectionist" attack on Churchill's policies in 1940 see Bernd Martin, "Churchill and Hitler, 1940: Peace or War?" in ibid., 83-96. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (1953; New York & London, 1970); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948-53). On the influence of that memoir see W. F. Kimball, "Wheel Within a Wheel: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship," in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford, 1993), 291-307. The impact of Churchill's wartime memoir on history and historians cries out for full and careful analysis.
23. The most strident of the new perfectionists is R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford, 1995). Other examples are Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (Westport, 1990); Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos 96 (Summer 1993): 65-85; and the essay by Norman Davies, New York Review of Books; 25 May 1995. Schlesinger used the phrase "perfectionist clamor" to describe critics of FDR's Yalta negotiations in "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," 146, 152. For my strong disagreement with the claim that FDR became a Cold Warrior before his death see The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, 1991), chaps. 8-9. See also idem, "Churchill, Roosevelt and Post-war Europe," in Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R. A. C. Parker (London, 1995), 135-49. For a curious "perfectionist" attack on Churchill's policies in 1940 see Bernd Martin, "Churchill and Hitler, 1940: Peace or War?" in ibid., 83-96. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (1953; New York & London, 1970); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948-53). On the influence of that memoir see W. F. Kimball, "Wheel Within a Wheel: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship," in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford, 1993), 291-307. The impact of Churchill's wartime memoir on history and historians cries out for full and careful analysis.
24. The most strident of the new perfectionists is R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford, 1995). Other examples are Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (Westport, 1990); Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos 96 (Summer 1993): 65-85; and the essay by Norman Davies, New York Review of Books; 25 May 1995. Schlesinger used the phrase "perfectionist clamor" to describe critics of FDR's Yalta negotiations in "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," 146, 152. For my strong disagreement with the claim that FDR became a Cold Warrior before his death see The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, 1991), chaps. 8-9. See also idem, "Churchill, Roosevelt and Post-war Europe," in Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R. A. C. Parker (London, 1995), 135-49. For a curious "perfectionist" attack on Churchill's policies in 1940 see Bernd Martin, "Churchill and Hitler, 1940: Peace or War?" in ibid., 83-96. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (1953; New York & London, 1970); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948-53). On the influence of that memoir see W. F. Kimball, "Wheel Within a Wheel: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship," in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford, 1993), 291-307. The impact of Churchill's wartime memoir on history and historians cries out for full and careful analysis.
25. The most strident of the new perfectionists is R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford, 1995). Other examples are Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (Westport, 1990); Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos 96 (Summer 1993): 65-85; and the essay by Norman Davies, New York Review of Books; 25 May 1995. Schlesinger used the phrase "perfectionist clamor" to describe critics of FDR's Yalta negotiations in "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," 146, 152. For my strong disagreement with the claim that FDR became a Cold Warrior before his death see The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, 1991), chaps. 8-9. See also idem, "Churchill, Roosevelt and Post-war Europe," in Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R. A. C. Parker (London, 1995), 135-49. For a curious "perfectionist" attack on Churchill's policies in 1940 see Bernd Martin, "Churchill and Hitler, 1940: Peace or War?" in ibid., 83-96. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (1953; New York & London, 1970); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948-53). On the influence of that memoir see W. F. Kimball, "Wheel Within a Wheel: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship," in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford, 1993), 291-307. The impact of Churchill's wartime memoir on history and historians cries out for full and careful analysis.
26. The most strident of the new perfectionists is R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford, 1995). Other examples are Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (Westport, 1990); Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos 96 (Summer 1993): 65-85; and the essay by Norman Davies, New York Review of Books; 25 May 1995. Schlesinger used the phrase "perfectionist clamor" to describe critics of FDR's Yalta negotiations in "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," 146, 152. For my strong disagreement with the claim that FDR became a Cold Warrior before his death see The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, 1991), chaps. 8-9. See also idem, "Churchill, Roosevelt and Post-war Europe," in Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R. A. C. Parker (London, 1995), 135-49. For a curious "perfectionist" attack on Churchill's policies in 1940 see Bernd Martin, "Churchill and Hitler, 1940: Peace or War?" in ibid., 83-96. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (1953; New York & London, 1970); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948-53). On the influence of that memoir see W. F. Kimball, "Wheel Within a Wheel: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship," in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford, 1993), 291-307. The impact of Churchill's wartime memoir on history and historians cries out for full and careful analysis.
27. The most strident of the new perfectionists is R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford, 1995). Other examples are Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (Westport, 1990); Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos 96 (Summer 1993): 65-85; and the essay by Norman Davies, New York Review of Books; 25 May 1995. Schlesinger used the phrase "perfectionist clamor" to describe critics of FDR's Yalta negotiations in "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," 146, 152. For my strong disagreement with the claim that FDR became a Cold Warrior before his death see The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, 1991), chaps. 8-9. See also idem, "Churchill, Roosevelt and Post-war Europe," in Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R. A. C. Parker (London, 1995), 135-49. For a curious "perfectionist" attack on Churchill's policies in 1940 see Bernd Martin, "Churchill and Hitler, 1940: Peace or War?" in ibid., 83-96. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (1953; New York & London, 1970); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948-53). On the influence of that memoir see W. F. Kimball, "Wheel Within a Wheel: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship," in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford, 1993), 291-307. The impact of Churchill's wartime memoir on history and historians cries out for full and careful analysis.
28. The most strident of the new perfectionists is R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford, 1995). Other examples are Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (Westport, 1990); Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos 96 (Summer 1993): 65-85; and the essay by Norman Davies, New York Review of Books; 25 May 1995. Schlesinger used the phrase "perfectionist clamor" to describe critics of FDR's Yalta negotiations in "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," 146, 152. For my strong disagreement with the claim that FDR became a Cold Warrior before his death see The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, 1991), chaps. 8-9. See also idem, "Churchill, Roosevelt and Post-war Europe," in Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R. A. C. Parker (London, 1995), 135-49. For a curious "perfectionist" attack on Churchill's policies in 1940 see Bernd Martin, "Churchill and Hitler, 1940: Peace or War?" in ibid., 83-96. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (1953; New York & London, 1970); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948-53). On the influence of that memoir see W. F. Kimball, "Wheel Within a Wheel: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship," in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford, 1993), 291-307. The impact of Churchill's wartime memoir on history and historians cries out for full and careful analysis.
29. The most strident of the new perfectionists is R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford, 1995). Other examples are Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (Westport, 1990); Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos 96 (Summer 1993): 65-85; and the essay by Norman Davies, New York Review of Books; 25 May 1995. Schlesinger used the phrase "perfectionist clamor" to describe critics of FDR's Yalta negotiations in "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," 146, 152. For my strong disagreement with the claim that FDR became a Cold Warrior before his death see The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, 1991), chaps. 8-9. See also idem, "Churchill, Roosevelt and Post-war Europe," in Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R. A. C. Parker (London, 1995), 135-49. For a curious "perfectionist" attack on Churchill's policies in 1940 see Bernd Martin, "Churchill and Hitler, 1940: Peace or War?" in ibid., 83-96. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (1953; New York & London, 1970); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948-53). On the influence of that memoir see W. F. Kimball, "Wheel Within a Wheel: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship," in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford, 1993), 291-307. The impact of Churchill's wartime memoir on history and historians cries out for full and careful analysis.
30. The most strident of the new perfectionists is R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford, 1995). Other examples are Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (Westport, 1990); Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos 96 (Summer 1993): 65-85; and the essay by Norman Davies, New York Review of Books; 25 May 1995. Schlesinger used the phrase "perfectionist clamor" to describe critics of FDR's Yalta negotiations in "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," 146, 152. For my strong disagreement with the claim that FDR became a Cold Warrior before his death see The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, 1991), chaps. 8-9. See also idem, "Churchill, Roosevelt and Post-war Europe," in Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R. A. C. Parker (London, 1995), 135-49. For a curious "perfectionist" attack on Churchill's policies in 1940 see Bernd Martin, "Churchill and Hitler, 1940: Peace or War?" in ibid., 83-96. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (1953; New York & London, 1970); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948-53). On the influence of that memoir see W. F. Kimball, "Wheel Within a Wheel: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship," in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford, 1993), 291-307. The impact of Churchill's wartime memoir on history and historians cries out for full and careful analysis.
31. The most strident of the new perfectionists is R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford, 1995). Other examples are Remi Nadeau, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe (Westport, 1990); Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos 96 (Summer 1993): 65-85; and the essay by Norman Davies, New York Review of Books; 25 May 1995. Schlesinger used the phrase "perfectionist clamor" to describe critics of FDR's Yalta negotiations in "Roosevelt's Diplomacy at Yalta," 146, 152. For my strong disagreement with the claim that FDR became a Cold Warrior before his death see The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, 1991), chaps. 8-9. See also idem, "Churchill, Roosevelt and Post-war Europe," in Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R. A. C. Parker (London, 1995), 135-49. For a curious "perfectionist" attack on Churchill's policies in 1940 see Bernd Martin, "Churchill and Hitler, 1940: Peace or War?" in ibid., 83-96. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (1953; New York & London, 1970); Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948-53). On the influence of that memoir see W. F. Kimball, "Wheel Within a Wheel: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship," in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford, 1993), 291-307. The impact of Churchill's wartime memoir on history and historians cries out for full and careful analysis.
32. See, for example, Dennis Dunn, Caught between Roosevelt and Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow (Lexington, KY, 1998), which epitomizes the passion, contempt, and ahistorical anger of the "new perfectionists."
33. For a neat summary of Churchill's ambivalent views of the Soviet Union (Russia) see David Carlton, Churchill and the Soviet Union (Manchester, England, 2000).
34. For those with doubts about Wilson's abiding hostility to Bolshevik rule in Russia see David S. Foglesong, America's Secret War against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 (Chapel Hill, 1995).
35. I can only allude to much of the history that can be understood only within the experience of the Second World War. I also confess to the sin of parochialism, for I am here concerned about the proper historical place of World War II for the history of the United States, not for the entire world - though the British creep into most everything I do. Moreover, the Second World War means very different things to different societies. For the Russians it truly was and remains "The Great Patriotic War"; for the French issues of occupation and collaboration make it a different war; and so on. That global task is one Gerhard Weinberg has begun with both his massive work, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge, England, 1994), and his useful essay, "The Place of World War II in History," Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, number
36. (U.S. Air Force Academy, CO, 1995), but that is only a start. Because the United States finally embraced (perhaps too tightly for some) the world during the war, my Americentric perspective is international, but it still limits my view.
37. For what is only the latest in Steiner's musings on these matters see his Errata (New Haven, 1997), esp. 115-35. The quotations are from p. 118.
38. For examples of Holocaust studies that include but go beyond either a Cold War or a limited WWII connection see the works of Omer Bartov, particularly Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity (New York, forthcoming). Holocaust studies since the 1980s has pried open a substantial body of new archival material and generated a number of analytical studies. See, for example, William Slany, U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II: Preliminary Study (Washington, 1997); idem, U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotiations with Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey on Looted Gold and German External Assets and U.S. Concerns about the Fate of the Wartime Utasha Treasury (Washington, 1998); and Richard Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew (New York, 1998). See also Weinberg, A World at Arms. The recent study by Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment (Chapel Hill, 1998), treats war crimes largely in isolation. Then there is the danger of too much success. Studying the Holocaust as a specific historical event may have blinded politicians and the public to other, Holocaust-as-metaphor, issues. The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 (better called the Holtzman Act, after its most persistent advocate, Elizabeth Holtzman) has generated a debate as to whether or not the law even allows commission members to investigate Japanese war crimes (for example, medical experimentation, which the Japanese conducted on a larger scale than the Germans).
39. For examples of Holocaust studies that include but go beyond either a Cold War or a limited WWII connection see the works of Omer Bartov, particularly Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity (New York, forthcoming). Holocaust studies since the 1980s has pried open a substantial body of new archival material and generated a number of analytical studies. See, for example, William Slany, U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II: Preliminary Study (Washington, 1997); idem, U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotiations with Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey on Looted Gold and German External Assets and U.S. Concerns about the Fate of the Wartime Utasha Treasury (Washington, 1998); and Richard Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew (New York, 1998). See also Weinberg, A World at Arms. The recent study by Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment (Chapel Hill, 1998), treats war crimes largely in isolation. Then there is the danger of too much success. Studying the Holocaust as a specific historical event may have blinded politicians and the public to other, Holocaust-as-metaphor, issues. The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 (better called the Holtzman Act, after its most persistent advocate, Elizabeth Holtzman) has generated a debate as to whether or not the law even allows commission members to investigate Japanese war crimes (for example, medical experimentation, which the Japanese conducted on a larger scale than the Germans).
40. For examples of Holocaust studies that include but go beyond either a Cold War or a limited WWII connection see the works of Omer Bartov, particularly Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity (New York, forthcoming). Holocaust studies since the 1980s has pried open a substantial body of new archival material and generated a number of analytical studies. See, for example, William Slany, U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II: Preliminary Study (Washington, 1997); idem, U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotiations with Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey on Looted Gold and German External Assets and U.S. Concerns about the Fate of the Wartime Utasha Treasury (Washington, 1998); and Richard Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew (New York, 1998). See also Weinberg, A World at Arms. The recent study by Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment (Chapel Hill, 1998), treats war crimes largely in isolation. Then there is the danger of too much success. Studying the Holocaust as a specific historical event may have blinded politicians and the public to other, Holocaust-as-metaphor, issues. The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 (better called the Holtzman Act, after its most persistent advocate, Elizabeth Holtzman) has generated a debate as to whether or not the law even allows commission members to investigate Japanese war crimes (for example, medical experimentation, which the Japanese conducted on a larger scale than the Germans).
41. For examples of Holocaust studies that include but go beyond either a Cold War or a limited WWII connection see the works of Omer Bartov, particularly Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity (New York, forthcoming). Holocaust studies since the 1980s has pried open a substantial body of new archival material and generated a number of analytical studies. See, for example, William Slany, U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II: Preliminary Study (Washington, 1997); idem, U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotiations with Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey on Looted Gold and German External Assets and U.S. Concerns about the Fate of the Wartime Utasha Treasury (Washington, 1998); and Richard Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew (New York, 1998). See also Weinberg, A World at Arms. The recent study by Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment (Chapel Hill, 1998), treats war crimes largely in isolation. Then there is the danger of too much success. Studying the Holocaust as a specific historical event may have blinded politicians and the public to other, Holocaust-as-metaphor, issues. The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 (better called the Holtzman Act, after its most persistent advocate, Elizabeth Holtzman) has generated a debate as to whether or not the law even allows commission members to investigate Japanese war crimes (for example, medical experimentation, which the Japanese conducted on a larger scale than the Germans).
42. For examples of Holocaust studies that include but go beyond either a Cold War or a limited WWII connection see the works of Omer Bartov, particularly Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity (New York, forthcoming). Holocaust studies since the 1980s has pried open a substantial body of new archival material and generated a number of analytical studies. See, for example, William Slany, U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II: Preliminary Study (Washington, 1997); idem, U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotiations with Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey on Looted Gold and German External Assets and U.S. Concerns about the Fate of the Wartime Utasha Treasury (Washington, 1998); and Richard Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew (New York, 1998). See also Weinberg, A World at Arms. The recent study by Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment (Chapel Hill, 1998), treats war crimes largely in isolation. Then there is the danger of too much success. Studying the Holocaust as a specific historical event may have blinded politicians and the public to other, Holocaust-as-metaphor, issues. The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 (better called the Holtzman Act, after its most persistent advocate, Elizabeth Holtzman) has generated a debate as to whether or not the law even allows commission members to investigate Japanese war crimes (for example, medical experimentation, which the Japanese conducted on a larger scale than the Germans).
43. For examples of Holocaust studies that include but go beyond either a Cold War or a limited WWII connection see the works of Omer Bartov, particularly Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity (New York, forthcoming). Holocaust studies since the 1980s has pried open a substantial body of new archival material and generated a number of analytical studies. See, for example, William Slany, U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II: Preliminary Study (Washington, 1997); idem, U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotiations with Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey on Looted Gold and German External Assets and U.S. Concerns about the Fate of the Wartime Utasha Treasury (Washington, 1998); and Richard Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew (New York, 1998). See also Weinberg, A World at Arms. The recent study by Arieh J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment (Chapel Hill, 1998), treats war crimes largely in isolation. Then there is the danger of too much success. Studying the Holocaust as a specific historical event may have blinded politicians and the public to other, Holocaust-as-metaphor, issues. The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 (better called the Holtzman Act, after its most persistent advocate, Elizabeth Holtzman) has generated a debate as to whether or not the law even allows commission members to investigate Japanese war crimes (for example, medical experimentation, which the Japanese conducted on a larger scale than the Germans).
44. Gar Alperowitz's career-long preoccupation with atomic "diplomacy" tends to obscure the connection between the bomb and the Second World War; The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1995).
45. For overviews see the essays on "the home front" in Allies at War: The American, British, and Soviet Experience in the Second World War, ed. D. Reynolds, W. F. Kimball, A. O. Chubarian (New York, 1994).
46. See Michael Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven, 1995).
47. OSS engaged in both clandestine intelligence collection and special operations (guerrilla, sabotage, and subversion activities). U.S. special operations in the Second World War await their historian, even though all but some eight hundred of eight thousand cubic feet of OSS records are declassified and available in the National Archives. According to an archivist there, the material withheld pertains either to intelligence sources and methods, travel vouchers and records useful for servicing veterans inquiries, and records that "derive from a foreign source or involve third agency equity"; see Lawrence McDonald, "OSS Textual Records at the National Archives: An Outline for Researchers," Newsletter, World War Two Studies Association 61 (Spring 1999): 4-10. Why such records must remain classified over fifty years later may be explained by foreign country sensitivities about spies and collaborators, but "third agency equity" (that is, some agency other than CIA) is puzzling. Moreover, discussions within the Nazi War Crimes Commission reveal that the CIA has not declassified estimates of Red Army strength and tactics that frequently were written by accused and even convicted Nazi war criminals. Eduard Mark has, in various articles, begun to make use of OSS records, but primarily to explore the origins of the Cold War; for example, "The OSS in Romania, 1944-1945: An Intelligence Operation of the Early Cold War," Intelligence and National Security 9 (April 1994): 320-44. Jay Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence and Special Operations, 1940-1945 (New York, 1999), studies administrative relationships, but in the process offers a road-map to many of the operational records. On British clandestine activities in the United States see Susan Brewer, To Win the Peace: British Propaganda in the United States during World War II (Ithaca, 1997); Nicholas J. Cull, Selling the War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American "Neutrality" in World War Two (New York, 1995); and the exaggerated, ahistorical picture drawn by Thomas E. Mahl, Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-1944 (Washington, 1998).
48. OSS engaged in both clandestine intelligence collection and special operations (guerrilla, sabotage, and subversion activities). U.S. special operations in the Second World War await their historian, even though all but some eight hundred of eight thousand cubic feet of OSS records are declassified and available in the National Archives. According to an archivist there, the material withheld pertains either to intelligence sources and methods, travel vouchers and records useful for servicing veterans inquiries, and records that "derive from a foreign source or involve third agency equity"; see Lawrence McDonald, "OSS Textual Records at the National Archives: An Outline for Researchers," Newsletter, World War Two Studies Association 61 (Spring 1999): 4-10. Why such records must remain classified over fifty years later may be explained by foreign country sensitivities about spies and collaborators, but "third agency equity" (that is, some agency other than CIA) is puzzling. Moreover, discussions within the Nazi War Crimes Commission reveal that the CIA has not declassified estimates of Red Army strength and tactics that frequently were written by accused and even convicted Nazi war criminals. Eduard Mark has, in various articles, begun to make use of OSS records, but primarily to explore the origins of the Cold War; for example, "The OSS in Romania, 1944-1945: An Intelligence Operation of the Early Cold War," Intelligence and National Security 9 (April 1994): 320-44. Jay Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence and Special Operations, 1940-1945 (New York, 1999), studies administrative relationships, but in the process offers a road-map to many of the operational records. On British clandestine activities in the United States see Susan Brewer, To Win the Peace: British Propaganda in the United States during World War II (Ithaca, 1997); Nicholas J. Cull, Selling the War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American "Neutrality" in World War Two (New York, 1995); and the exaggerated, ahistorical picture drawn by Thomas E. Mahl, Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-1944 (Washington, 1998).
49. OSS engaged in both clandestine intelligence collection and special operations (guerrilla, sabotage, and subversion activities). U.S. special operations in the Second World War await their historian, even though all but some eight hundred of eight thousand cubic feet of OSS records are declassified and available in the National Archives. According to an archivist there, the material withheld pertains either to intelligence sources and methods, travel vouchers and records useful for servicing veterans inquiries, and records that "derive from a foreign source or involve third agency equity"; see Lawrence McDonald, "OSS Textual Records at the National Archives: An Outline for Researchers," Newsletter, World War Two Studies Association 61 (Spring 1999): 4-10. Why such records must remain classified over fifty years later may be explained by foreign country sensitivities about spies and collaborators, but "third agency equity" (that is, some agency other than CIA) is puzzling. Moreover, discussions within the Nazi War Crimes Commission reveal that the CIA has not declassified estimates of Red Army strength and tactics that frequently were written by accused and even convicted Nazi war criminals. Eduard Mark has, in various articles, begun to make use of OSS records, but primarily to explore the origins of the Cold War; for example, "The OSS in Romania, 1944-1945: An Intelligence Operation of the Early Cold War," Intelligence and National Security 9 (April 1994): 320-44. Jay Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence and Special Operations, 1940-1945 (New York, 1999), studies administrative relationships, but in the process offers a road-map to many of the operational records. On British clandestine activities in the United States see Susan Brewer, To Win the Peace: British Propaganda in the United States during World War II (Ithaca, 1997); Nicholas J. Cull, Selling the War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American "Neutrality" in World War Two (New York, 1995); and the exaggerated, ahistorical picture drawn by Thomas E. Mahl, Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-1944 (Washington, 1998).
50. OSS engaged in both clandestine intelligence collection and special operations (guerrilla, sabotage, and subversion activities). U.S. special operations in the Second World War await their historian, even though all but some eight hundred of eight thousand cubic feet of OSS records are declassified and available in the National Archives. According to an archivist there, the material withheld pertains either to intelligence sources and methods, travel vouchers and records useful for servicing veterans inquiries, and records that "derive from a foreign source or involve third agency equity"; see Lawrence McDonald, "OSS Textual Records at the National Archives: An Outline for Researchers," Newsletter, World War Two Studies Association 61 (Spring 1999): 4-10. Why such records must remain classified over fifty years later may be explained by foreign country sensitivities about spies and collaborators, but "third agency equity" (that is, some agency other than CIA) is puzzling. Moreover, discussions within the Nazi War Crimes Commission reveal that the CIA has not declassified estimates of Red Army strength and tactics that frequently were written by accused and even convicted Nazi war criminals. Eduard Mark has, in various articles, begun to make use of OSS records, but primarily to explore the origins of the Cold War; for example, "The OSS in Romania, 1944-1945: An Intelligence Operation of the Early Cold War," Intelligence and National Security 9 (April 1994): 320-44. Jay Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence and Special Operations, 1940-1945 (New York, 1999), studies administrative relationships, but in the process offers a road-map to many of the operational records. On British clandestine activities in the United States see Susan Brewer, To Win the Peace: British Propaganda in the United States during World War II (Ithaca, 1997); Nicholas J. Cull, Selling the War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American "Neutrality" in World War Two (New York, 1995); and the exaggerated, ahistorical picture drawn by Thomas E. Mahl, Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-1944 (Washington, 1998).
51. OSS engaged in both clandestine intelligence collection and special operations (guerrilla, sabotage, and subversion activities). U.S. special operations in the Second World War await their historian, even though all but some eight hundred of eight thousand cubic feet of OSS records are declassified and available in the National Archives. According to an archivist there, the material withheld pertains either to intelligence sources and methods, travel vouchers and records useful for servicing veterans inquiries, and records that "derive from a foreign source or involve third agency equity"; see Lawrence McDonald, "OSS Textual Records at the National Archives: An Outline for Researchers," Newsletter, World War Two Studies Association 61 (Spring 1999): 4-10. Why such records must remain classified over fifty years later may be explained by foreign country sensitivities about spies and collaborators, but "third agency equity" (that is, some agency other than CIA) is puzzling. Moreover, discussions within the Nazi War Crimes Commission reveal that the CIA has not declassified estimates of Red Army strength and tactics that frequently were written by accused and even convicted Nazi war criminals. Eduard Mark has, in various articles, begun to make use of OSS records, but primarily to explore the origins of the Cold War; for example, "The OSS in Romania, 1944-1945: An Intelligence Operation of the Early Cold War," Intelligence and National Security 9 (April 1994): 320-44. Jay Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence and Special Operations, 1940-1945 (New York, 1999), studies administrative relationships, but in the process offers a road-map to many of the operational records. On British clandestine activities in the United States see Susan Brewer, To Win the Peace: British Propaganda in the United States during World War II (Ithaca, 1997); Nicholas J. Cull, Selling the War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American "Neutrality" in World War Two (New York, 1995); and the exaggerated, ahistorical picture drawn by Thomas E. Mahl, Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-1944 (Washington, 1998).
52. OSS engaged in both clandestine intelligence collection and special operations (guerrilla, sabotage, and subversion activities). U.S. special operations in the Second World War await their historian, even though all but some eight hundred of eight thousand cubic feet of OSS records are declassified and available in the National Archives. According to an archivist there, the material withheld pertains either to intelligence sources and methods, travel vouchers and records useful for servicing veterans inquiries, and records that "derive from a foreign source or involve third agency equity"; see Lawrence McDonald, "OSS Textual Records at the National Archives: An Outline for Researchers," Newsletter, World War Two Studies Association 61 (Spring 1999): 4-10. Why such records must remain classified over fifty years later may be explained by foreign country sensitivities about spies and collaborators, but "third agency equity" (that is, some agency other than CIA) is puzzling. Moreover, discussions within the Nazi War Crimes Commission reveal that the CIA has not declassified estimates of Red Army strength and tactics that frequently were written by accused and even convicted Nazi war criminals. Eduard Mark has, in various articles, begun to make use of OSS records, but primarily to explore the origins of the Cold War; for example, "The OSS in Romania, 1944-1945: An Intelligence Operation of the Early Cold War," Intelligence and National Security 9 (April 1994): 320-44. Jay Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence and Special Operations, 1940-1945 (New York, 1999), studies administrative relationships, but in the process offers a road-map to many of the operational records. On British clandestine activities in the United States see Susan Brewer, To Win the Peace: British Propaganda in the United States during World War II (Ithaca, 1997); Nicholas J. Cull, Selling the War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American "Neutrality" in World War Two (New York, 1995); and the exaggerated, ahistorical picture drawn by Thomas E. Mahl, Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-1944 (Washington, 1998).
53. On the dangers of the "stateless" approach see Williamson Murray, "Military Culture Does Matter," Foreign Policy Research Institute WIRE 7 (February 1999). A good example of how to study culture and the military is Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York, 1991).
54. On the dangers of the "stateless" approach see Williamson Murray, "Military Culture Does Matter," Foreign Policy Research Institute WIRE 7 (February 1999). A good example of how to study culture and the military is Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York, 1991).
55. Likewise, Richard Overy, who warns that "material explanations of Soviet victory are never quite convincing," and that understanding the history of World War II in Russia depends on "recognizing that some idea of a Russian 'soul' or 'spirit' mattered too much to be written off as mere sentimentality." Russia's War: Blood Upon the Snow (New York, 1997), 15.
56. The British historian, Callum A. MacDonald, whose untimely death and superb histories prompted the memorial conference for which this paper was originally written, wrote a first-rate example of a campaign history that transcended just guns and bullets; The Lost Battle: Crete, 1941 (New York, 1993). Ambrose's Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945 (New York, 1997), and Spielberg's motion picture production, Saving Private Ryan (1998), evoke the tragedy and inspiration that battle brings for individuals, but they leave to others the study of the broad political, economic, and social nature and effects of war.
57. This despite the efforts of Mark Stoler to connect military events with politics; see his historiographical essay, "A Half Century of Conflict." I have tried, in a very tentative way, to look at the political implications of military history during World War II; see my Forged in War, and "Stalingrad: A Chance for Choices," Journal of Military History 60 (January 1996): 89-114.
58. This despite the efforts of Mark Stoler to connect military events with politics; see his historiographical essay, "A Half Century of Conflict." I have tried, in a very tentative way, to look at the political implications of military history during World War II; see my Forged in War, and "Stalingrad: A Chance for Choices," Journal of Military History 60 (January 1996): 89-114.
59. For speculation about the subtle influence of the Second World War on U.S. policy during the 1999 Balkan crisis see Jacob Weisberg, "Bombs and Blockbusters," New York Times Magazine, Sunday, 11 April 1999.
60. Les Adler and Thomas Paterson in "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s-1950s," American Historical Review 75 (April 1970): 1046-64, suggest a clear psychological connection for Americans between Hitler and Stalin, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. But they are fundamentally concerned with the origins of the Cold War, not a yearning for the "good war."
61. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, 1962); Anders Stephanson, "Fourteen Notes on the Very Concept of the Cold War," posted on the H-DIPLO website in 1998, and published in Rethinking Geopolitics, ed. Georoid O'Tuathail and Simon Dalby (London, 1998), 62-85.
62. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, 1962); Anders Stephanson, "Fourteen Notes on the Very Concept of the Cold War," posted on the H-DIPLO website in 1998, and published in Rethinking Geopolitics, ed. Georoid O'Tuathail and Simon Dalby (London, 1998), 62-85.
63. Charles Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Foreign Policy after World War II," International Organization 31 (Autumn 1977): 607-33. For a sampling of those few who have examined the "external" New Deal, though none comprehensively, see Barry Karl, The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945 (Chicago, 1983);
64. Charles Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Foreign Policy after World War II," International Organization 31 (Autumn 1977): 607-33. For a sampling of those few who have examined the "external" New Deal, though none comprehensively, see Barry Karl, The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945 (Chicago, 1983);
65. Alan Milward, War, Economy, and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987); Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49 (New York, 1996); John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959-67), particularly "A New Deal in International Economics," 3:228-78; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964) and idem, "The Role of the Commerce and Treasury Departments," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and S. Okamoto (New York, 1973), 261-85; Jürg Martin Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941 (London, 1988), 42-65; and W.F. Kimball, Swords Or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany (Philadelphia, 1976). The dissertation is that of Regina Gramer, "Reconstructing Germany, 1938-1949: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cartel Question" (Rutgers University, 1996). See also Robert Vitalis, "The 'New Deal' in Egypt: The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism," Diplomatic History 20 (Spring 1996): 211-39.
66. Alan Milward, War, Economy, and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987); Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49 (New York, 1996); John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959-67), particularly "A New Deal in International Economics," 3:228-78; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964) and idem, "The Role of the Commerce and Treasury Departments," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and S. Okamoto (New York, 1973), 261-85; Jürg Martin Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941 (London, 1988), 42-65; and W.F. Kimball,
67. Alan Milward, War, Economy, and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987); Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49 (New York, 1996); John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959-67), particularly "A New Deal in International Economics," 3:228-78; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964) and idem, "The Role of the Commerce and Treasury Departments," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and S. Okamoto (New York, 1973), 261-85; Jürg Martin Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941 (London, 1988), 42-65; and W.F. Kimball, Swords Or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany (Philadelphia, 1976). The dissertation is that of Regina Gramer, "Reconstructing Germany, 1938-1949: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cartel Question" (Rutgers University, 1996). See also Robert Vitalis, "The 'New Deal' in Egypt: The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism," Diplomatic History 20 (Spring 1996): 211-39.
68. Alan Milward, War, Economy, and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987); Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49 (New York, 1996); John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959-67), particularly "A New Deal in International Economics," 3:228-78; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964) and idem, "The Role of the Commerce and Treasury Departments," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and S. Okamoto (New York, 1973), 261-85; Jürg Martin Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941 (London, 1988), 42-65; and W.F. Kimball, Swords Or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany (Philadelphia, 1976). The dissertation is that of Regina Gramer, "Reconstructing Germany, 1938-1949: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cartel Question" (Rutgers University, 1996). See also Robert Vitalis, "The 'New Deal' in Egypt: The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism," Diplomatic History 20 (Spring 1996): 211-39.
69. Alan Milward, War, Economy, and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987); Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49 (New York, 1996); John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959-67), particularly "A New Deal in International Economics," 3:228-78; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964) and idem, "The Role of the Commerce and Treasury Departments," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and S. Okamoto (New York, 1973), 261-85; Jürg Martin Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941 (London, 1988), 42-65; and W.F. Kimball, Swords Or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany (Philadelphia, 1976). The dissertation is that of Regina Gramer, "Reconstructing Germany, 1938-1949: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cartel Question" (Rutgers University, 1996). See also Robert Vitalis, "The 'New Deal' in Egypt: The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism," Diplomatic History 20 (Spring 1996): 211-39.
70. Alan Milward, War, Economy, and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987); Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49 (New York, 1996); John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959-67), particularly "A New Deal in International Economics," 3:228-78; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964) and idem, "The Role of the Commerce and Treasury Departments," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and S. Okamoto (New York, 1973), 261-85; Jürg Martin Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941 (London, 1988), 42-65; and W.F. Kimball, Swords Or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany (Philadelphia, 1976). The dissertation is that of Regina Gramer, "Reconstructing Germany, 1938-1949: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cartel Question" (Rutgers University, 1996). See also Robert Vitalis, "The 'New Deal' in Egypt: The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism," Diplomatic History 20 (Spring 1996): 211-39.
71. Alan Milward, War, Economy, and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987); Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49 (New York, 1996); John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959-67), particularly "A New Deal in International Economics," 3:228-78; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964) and idem, "The Role of the Commerce and Treasury Departments," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and S. Okamoto (New York, 1973), 261-85; Jürg Martin Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941 (London, 1988), 42-65; and W.F. Kimball, Swords Or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany (Philadelphia, 1976). The dissertation is that of Regina Gramer, "Reconstructing Germany, 1938-1949: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cartel Question" (Rutgers University, 1996). See also Robert Vitalis, "The 'New Deal' in Egypt: The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism," Diplomatic History 20 (Spring 1996): 211-39.
72. Alan Milward, War, Economy, and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987); Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49 (New York, 1996); John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959-67), particularly "A New Deal in International Economics," 3:228-78; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964) and idem, "The Role of the Commerce and Treasury Departments," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and S. Okamoto (New York, 1973), 261-85; Jürg Martin Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941 (London, 1988), 42-65; and W.F. Kimball, Swords Or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany (Philadelphia, 1976). The dissertation is that of Regina Gramer, "Reconstructing Germany, 1938-1949: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cartel Question" (Rutgers University, 1996). See also Robert Vitalis, "The 'New Deal' in Egypt: The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism," Diplomatic History 20 (Spring 1996): 211-39.
73. Alan Milward, War, Economy, and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987); Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49 (New York, 1996); John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959-67), particularly "A New Deal in International Economics," 3:228-78; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964) and idem, "The Role of the Commerce and Treasury Departments," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and S. Okamoto (New York, 1973), 261-85; Jürg Martin Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941 (London, 1988), 42-65; and W.F. Kimball, Swords Or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany (Philadelphia, 1976). The dissertation is that of Regina Gramer, "Reconstructing Germany, 1938-1949: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cartel Question" (Rutgers University, 1996). See also Robert Vitalis, "The 'New Deal' in Egypt: The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism," Diplomatic History 20 (Spring 1996): 211-39.
74. Alan Milward, War, Economy, and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987); Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49 (New York, 1996); John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959-67), particularly "A New Deal in International Economics," 3:228-78; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964) and idem, "The Role of the Commerce and Treasury Departments," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and S. Okamoto (New York, 1973), 261-85; Jürg Martin Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941 (London, 1988), 42-65; and W.F. Kimball, Swords Or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany (Philadelphia, 1976). The dissertation is that of Regina Gramer, "Reconstructing Germany, 1938-1949: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cartel Question" (Rutgers University, 1996). See also Robert Vitalis, "The 'New Deal' in Egypt: The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism," Diplomatic History 20 (Spring 1996): 211-39.
75. Alan Milward, War, Economy, and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley, 1977); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987); Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-49 (New York, 1996); John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston, 1959-67), particularly "A New Deal in International Economics," 3:228-78; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964) and idem, "The Role of the Commerce and Treasury Departments," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and S. Okamoto (New York, 1973), 261-85; Jürg Martin Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941 (London, 1988), 42-65; and W.F. Kimball, Swords Or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany (Philadelphia, 1976). The dissertation is that of Regina Gramer, "Reconstructing Germany, 1938-1949: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cartel Question" (Rutgers University, 1996). See also Robert Vitalis, "The 'New Deal' in Egypt: The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism," Diplomatic History 20 (Spring 1996): 211-39.
76. On Bretton Woods and other economics issues see Georg Schild, Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks (New York, 1995); and Randall B. Woods, A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946 (Chapel Hill, 1990).
77. On Bretton Woods and other economics issues see Georg Schild, Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks (New York, 1995); and Randall B. Woods, A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946 (Chapel Hill, 1990).
78. Spoken to one of Charles de Gaulle's emissaries; as quoted in John L. Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean C. Acheson (New York, 1994), 113.
79. Kimball, Forged in War, 201-2.
80. John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory (London, 1993), 460-61. This is not to single out Charmley; he is only the latest such accuser in what is a very long line.
81. In addition to the "new perfectionists" cited in note 15, see also Alexander Mayer's comments on the H-DIPLO website during 1998.
82. Witness the excellent studies by Charles S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900 (New York, 1974), and three volumes by Bradford Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805 (Philadelphia, 1955), Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961), and The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 (New York, 1968). But see the cautionary argument of Kinley J. Brauer, "The United States and British Imperial Expansion, 1815-60," Diplomatic History 12 (Winter 1988): 19-37; and idem, "The Great American Desert Revisited," Diplomatic History 13 (Summer 1989): 395-417.
83. Witness the excellent studies by Charles S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900 (New York, 1974), and three volumes by Bradford Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805 (Philadelphia, 1955), Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961), and The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 (New York, 1968). But see the cautionary argument of Kinley J. Brauer, "The United States and British Imperial Expansion, 1815-60," Diplomatic History 12 (Winter 1988): 19-37; and idem, "The Great American Desert Revisited," Diplomatic History 13 (Summer 1989): 395-417.
84. Witness the excellent studies by Charles S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900 (New York, 1974), and three volumes by Bradford Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805 (Philadelphia, 1955), Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961), and The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 (New York, 1968). But see the cautionary argument of Kinley J. Brauer, "The United States and British Imperial Expansion, 1815-60," Diplomatic History 12 (Winter 1988): 19-37; and idem, "The Great American Desert Revisited," Diplomatic History 13 (Summer 1989): 395-417.
85. Witness the excellent studies by Charles S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900 (New York, 1974), and three volumes by Bradford Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805 (Philadelphia, 1955), Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961), and The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 (New York, 1968). But see the cautionary argument of Kinley J. Brauer, "The United States and British Imperial Expansion, 1815-60," Diplomatic History 12 (Winter 1988): 19-37; and idem, "The Great American Desert Revisited," Diplomatic History 13 (Summer 1989): 395-417.
86. Witness the excellent studies by Charles S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900 (New York, 1974), and three volumes by Bradford Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805 (Philadelphia, 1955), Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961), and The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 (New York, 1968). But see the cautionary argument of Kinley J. Brauer, "The United States and British Imperial Expansion, 1815-60," Diplomatic History 12 (Winter 1988): 19-37; and idem, "The Great American Desert Revisited," Diplomatic History 13 (Summer 1989): 395-417.
87. Witness the excellent studies by Charles S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900 (New York, 1974), and three volumes by Bradford Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805 (Philadelphia, 1955), Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961), and The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914 (New York, 1968). But see the cautionary argument of Kinley J. Brauer, "The United States and British Imperial Expansion, 1815-60," Diplomatic History 12 (Winter 1988): 19-37; and idem, "The Great American Desert Revisited," Diplomatic History 13 (Summer 1989): 395-417.
88. The vastness of the literature itself on the "special relationship" suggests that it exists. For starters see Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York, 1998). Although Danchev has examined the "special relationship" with penetrating scholarship and a raised eyebrow, he demonstrates that, whatever his doubts, behind every grand generalization lie some devilish details. Some other assessments of the "special relationship," in order of increasing skepticism, are: the essays in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War," International Affairs 62 (Winter 1985-86): 1-20; Alan P. Dobson, "Special in Relationship to What? Anglo-American Relations in the Second World War," in Britain and the Threat to the Stability in Europe, 1918-1945, ed. Peter Catterall and C. J. Morris (London, 1993), 124-41; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1914-1945 (New York, 1978); and John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957 (London, 1995). For a range of views see many of the essays in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945 (New York, 1995). There is, of course, a literature to the contrary. That is particularly true for many of the British memoirs from the Thatcher era, with Geoffrey Howe's Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1995) the obvious exception. Leading Foreign Office personnel during the Thatcher years, including those seconded to the Prime Minister's Office, claim that there was a "special relationship" based on both tradition and the national interest of both nations, although career diplomats who look to Europe frequently try to soften the reality by pointing out that Britain has a "special" relationship with every nation. For some reason, pundits and scholars seem to view British relations with Europe and relations with the United States as inversely proportional, just as the value of gold and the U.S. dollar used to perform. But that latter equation no longer functions, and I wonder if the former has any validity, but that is all part of the debate; interviews with Sir John Coles (London, 6 May 1998), Sir Charles Powell, (London, 18 May 1998), Sir Antony Acland (Eton, 20 May 1998), and Sir Nicholas Henderson (3 June 1998). Likewise the anecdotal look at the relationship by retired American diplomat (and Anglophile), Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London, 1998), and the broad popular survey, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War (New York, 1996), by the British diplomat, Sir Robin Renwick. Then there is there is the clever demi-memoir by British intelligence adviser Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London, 1997), which manages to be remarkably informed and uninformative at the same time. For scholarly accounts see C.J. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship": A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); R. Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942-1949 (Oxford, 1982); A. P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940-1987 (Brighton, 1988);
89. The vastness of the literature itself on the "special relationship" suggests that it exists. For starters see Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York, 1998). Although Danchev has examined the "special relationship" with penetrating scholarship and a raised eyebrow, he demonstrates that, whatever his doubts, behind every grand generalization lie some devilish details. Some other assessments of the "special relationship," in order of increasing skepticism, are: the essays in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War," International Affairs 62 (Winter 1985-86): 1-20; Alan P. Dobson, "Special in Relationship to What? Anglo-American Relations in the Second World War," in Britain and the Threat to the Stability in Europe, 1918-1945, ed. Peter Catterall and C. J. Morris (London, 1993), 124-41; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1914-1945 (New York, 1978); and John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957 (London, 1995). For a range of views see many of the essays in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945 (New York, 1995). There is, of course, a literature to the contrary. That is particularly true for many of the British memoirs from the Thatcher era, with Geoffrey Howe's Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1995) the obvious exception. Leading Foreign Office personnel during the Thatcher years, including those seconded to the Prime Minister's Office, claim that there was a "special relationship" based on both tradition and the national interest of both nations, although career diplomats who look to Europe frequently try to soften the reality by pointing out that Britain has a "special" relationship with every nation. For some reason, pundits and scholars seem to view British relations with Europe and relations with the United States as inversely proportional, just as the value of gold and the U.S. dollar used to perform. But that latter equation no longer functions, and I wonder if the former has any validity, but that is all part of the debate; interviews with Sir John Coles (London, 6 May 1998), Sir Charles Powell, (London, 18 May 1998), Sir Antony Acland (Eton, 20 May 1998), and Sir Nicholas Henderson (3 June 1998). Likewise the anecdotal look at the relationship by retired American diplomat (and Anglophile), Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London, 1998), and the broad popular survey, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War (New York, 1996), by the British diplomat, Sir Robin Renwick. Then there is there is the clever demi-memoir by British intelligence adviser Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London, 1997), which manages to be remarkably informed and uninformative at the same time. For scholarly accounts see C.J. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship": A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); R. Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942-1949 (Oxford, 1982); A. P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940-1987 (Brighton, 1988);
90. The vastness of the literature itself on the "special relationship" suggests that it exists. For starters see Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York, 1998). Although Danchev has examined the "special relationship" with penetrating scholarship and a raised eyebrow, he demonstrates that, whatever his doubts, behind every grand generalization lie some devilish details. Some other assessments of the "special relationship," in order of increasing skepticism, are: the essays in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War," International Affairs 62 (Winter 1985-86): 1-20; Alan P. Dobson, "Special in Relationship to What? Anglo-American Relations in the Second World War," in Britain and the Threat to the Stability in Europe, 1918-1945, ed. Peter Catterall and C. J. Morris (London, 1993), 124-41; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1914-1945 (New York, 1978); and John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957 (London, 1995). For a range of views see many of the essays in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945 (New York, 1995). There is, of course, a literature to the contrary. That is particularly true for many of the British memoirs from the Thatcher era, with Geoffrey Howe's Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1995) the obvious exception. Leading Foreign Office personnel during the Thatcher years, including those seconded to the Prime Minister's Office, claim that there was a "special relationship" based on both tradition and the national interest of both nations, although career diplomats who look to Europe frequently try to soften the reality by pointing out that Britain has a "special" relationship with every nation. For some reason, pundits and scholars seem to view British relations with Europe and relations with the United States as inversely proportional, just as the value of gold and the U.S. dollar used to perform. But that latter equation no longer functions, and I wonder if the former has any validity, but that is all part of the debate; interviews with Sir John Coles (London, 6 May 1998), Sir Charles Powell, (London, 18 May 1998), Sir Antony Acland (Eton, 20 May 1998), and Sir Nicholas Henderson (3 June 1998). Likewise the anecdotal look at the relationship by retired American diplomat (and Anglophile), Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London, 1998), and the broad popular survey, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War (New York, 1996), by the British diplomat, Sir Robin Renwick. Then there is there is the clever demi-memoir by British intelligence adviser Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London, 1997), which manages to be remarkably informed and uninformative at the same time. For scholarly accounts see C.J. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship": A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); R. Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942-1949 (Oxford, 1982); A. P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940-1987 (Brighton, 1988);
91. The vastness of the literature itself on the "special relationship" suggests that it exists. For starters see Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York, 1998). Although Danchev has examined the "special relationship" with penetrating scholarship and a raised eyebrow, he demonstrates that, whatever his doubts, behind every grand generalization lie some devilish details. Some other assessments of the "special relationship," in order of increasing skepticism, are: the essays in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War," International Affairs 62 (Winter 1985-86): 1-20; Alan P. Dobson, "Special in Relationship to What? Anglo-American Relations in the Second World War," in Britain and the Threat to the Stability in Europe, 1918-1945, ed. Peter Catterall and C. J. Morris (London, 1993), 124-41; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1914-1945 (New York, 1978); and John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957 (London, 1995). For a range of views see many of the essays in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945 (New York, 1995). There is, of course, a literature to the contrary. That is particularly true for many of the British memoirs from the Thatcher era, with Geoffrey Howe's Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1995) the obvious exception. Leading Foreign Office personnel during the Thatcher years, including those seconded to the Prime Minister's Office, claim that there was a "special relationship" based on both tradition and the national interest of both nations, although career diplomats who look to Europe frequently try to soften the reality by pointing out that Britain has a "special" relationship with every nation. For some reason, pundits and scholars seem to view British relations with Europe and relations with the United States as inversely proportional, just as the value of gold and the U.S. dollar used to perform. But that latter equation no longer functions, and I wonder if the former has any validity, but that is all part of the debate; interviews with Sir John Coles (London, 6 May 1998), Sir Charles Powell, (London, 18 May 1998), Sir Antony Acland (Eton, 20 May 1998), and Sir Nicholas Henderson (3 June 1998). Likewise the anecdotal look at the relationship by retired American diplomat (and Anglophile), Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London, 1998), and the broad popular survey, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War (New York, 1996), by the British diplomat, Sir Robin Renwick. Then there is there is the clever demi-memoir by British intelligence adviser Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London, 1997), which manages to be remarkably informed and uninformative at the same time. For scholarly accounts see C.J. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship": A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); R. Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942-1949 (Oxford, 1982); A. P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940-1987 (Brighton, 1988);
92. The vastness of the literature itself on the "special relationship" suggests that it exists. For starters see Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York, 1998). Although Danchev has examined the "special relationship" with penetrating scholarship and a raised eyebrow, he demonstrates that, whatever his doubts, behind every grand generalization lie some devilish details. Some other assessments of the "special relationship," in order of increasing skepticism, are: the essays in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War," International Affairs 62 (Winter 1985-86): 1-20; Alan P. Dobson, "Special in Relationship to What? Anglo-American Relations in the Second World War," in Britain and the Threat to the Stability in Europe, 1918-1945, ed. Peter Catterall and C. J. Morris (London, 1993), 124-41; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1914-1945 (New York, 1978); and John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957 (London, 1995). For a range of views see many of the essays in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945 (New York, 1995). There is, of course, a literature to the contrary. That is particularly true for many of the British memoirs from the Thatcher era, with Geoffrey Howe's Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1995) the obvious exception. Leading Foreign Office personnel during the Thatcher years, including those seconded to the Prime Minister's Office, claim that there was a "special relationship" based on both tradition and the national interest of both nations, although career diplomats who look to Europe frequently try to soften the reality by pointing out that Britain has a "special" relationship with every nation. For some reason, pundits and scholars seem to view British relations with Europe and relations with the United States as inversely proportional, just as the value of gold and the U.S. dollar used to perform. But that latter equation no longer functions, and I wonder if the former has any validity, but that is all part of the debate; interviews with Sir John Coles (London, 6 May 1998), Sir Charles Powell, (London, 18 May 1998), Sir Antony Acland (Eton, 20 May 1998), and Sir Nicholas Henderson (3 June 1998). Likewise the anecdotal look at the relationship by retired American diplomat (and Anglophile), Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London, 1998), and the broad popular survey, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War (New York, 1996), by the British diplomat, Sir Robin Renwick. Then there is there is the clever demi-memoir by British intelligence adviser Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London, 1997), which manages to be remarkably informed and uninformative at the same time. For scholarly accounts see C.J. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship": A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); R. Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942-1949 (Oxford, 1982); A. P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940-1987 (Brighton, 1988);
93. The vastness of the literature itself on the "special relationship" suggests that it exists. For starters see Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York, 1998). Although Danchev has examined the "special relationship" with penetrating scholarship and a raised eyebrow, he demonstrates that, whatever his doubts, behind every grand generalization lie some devilish details. Some other assessments of the "special relationship," in order of increasing skepticism, are: the essays in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War," International Affairs 62 (Winter 1985-86): 1-20; Alan P. Dobson, "Special in Relationship to What? Anglo-American Relations in the Second World War," in Britain and the Threat to the Stability in Europe, 1918-1945, ed. Peter Catterall and C. J. Morris (London, 1993), 124-41; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1914-1945 (New York, 1978); and John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957 (London, 1995). For a range of views see many of the essays in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945 (New York, 1995). There is, of course, a literature to the contrary. That is particularly true for many of the British memoirs from the Thatcher era, with Geoffrey Howe's Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1995) the obvious exception. Leading Foreign Office personnel during the Thatcher years, including those seconded to the Prime Minister's Office, claim that there was a "special relationship" based on both tradition and the national interest of both nations, although career diplomats who look to Europe frequently try to soften the reality by pointing out that Britain has a "special" relationship with every nation. For some reason, pundits and scholars seem to view British relations with Europe and relations with the United States as inversely proportional, just as the value of gold and the U.S. dollar used to perform. But that latter equation no longer functions, and I wonder if the former has any validity, but that is all part of the debate; interviews with Sir John Coles (London, 6 May 1998), Sir Charles Powell, (London, 18 May 1998), Sir Antony Acland (Eton, 20 May 1998), and Sir Nicholas Henderson (3 June 1998). Likewise the anecdotal look at the relationship by retired American diplomat (and Anglophile), Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London, 1998), and the broad popular survey, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War (New York, 1996), by the British diplomat, Sir Robin Renwick. Then there is there is the clever demi-memoir by British intelligence adviser Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London, 1997), which manages to be remarkably informed and uninformative at the same time. For scholarly accounts see C.J. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship": A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); R. Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942-1949 (Oxford, 1982); A. P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940-1987 (Brighton, 1988);
94. The vastness of the literature itself on the "special relationship" suggests that it exists. For starters see Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York, 1998). Although Danchev has examined the "special relationship" with penetrating scholarship and a raised eyebrow, he demonstrates that, whatever his doubts, behind every grand generalization lie some devilish details. Some other assessments of the "special relationship," in order of increasing skepticism, are: the essays in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War," International Affairs 62 (Winter 1985-86): 1-20; Alan P. Dobson, "Special in Relationship to What? Anglo-American Relations in the Second World War," in Britain and the Threat to the Stability in Europe, 1918-1945, ed. Peter Catterall and C. J. Morris (London, 1993), 124-41; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1914-1945 (New York, 1978); and John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957 (London, 1995). For a range of views see many of the essays in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945 (New York, 1995). There is, of course, a literature to the contrary. That is particularly true for many of the British memoirs from the Thatcher era, with Geoffrey Howe's Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1995) the obvious exception. Leading Foreign Office personnel during the Thatcher years, including those seconded to the Prime Minister's Office, claim that there was a "special relationship" based on both tradition and the national interest of both nations, although career diplomats who look to Europe frequently try to soften the reality by pointing out that Britain has a "special" relationship with every nation. For some reason, pundits and scholars seem to view British relations with Europe and relations with the United States as inversely proportional, just as the value of gold and the U.S. dollar used to perform. But that latter equation no longer functions, and I wonder if the former has any validity, but that is all part of the debate; interviews with Sir John Coles (London, 6 May 1998), Sir Charles Powell, (London, 18 May 1998), Sir Antony Acland (Eton, 20 May 1998), and Sir Nicholas Henderson (3 June 1998). Likewise the anecdotal look at the relationship by retired American diplomat (and Anglophile), Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London, 1998), and the broad popular survey, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War (New York, 1996), by the British diplomat, Sir Robin Renwick. Then there is there is the clever demi-memoir by British intelligence adviser Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London, 1997), which manages to be remarkably informed and uninformative at the same time. For scholarly accounts see C.J. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship": A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); R. Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942-1949 (Oxford, 1982); A. P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940-1987 (Brighton, 1988);
95. The vastness of the literature itself on the "special relationship" suggests that it exists. For starters see Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York, 1998). Although Danchev has examined the "special relationship" with penetrating scholarship and a raised eyebrow, he demonstrates that, whatever his doubts, behind every grand generalization lie some devilish details. Some other assessments of the "special relationship," in order of increasing skepticism, are: the essays in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War," International Affairs 62 (Winter 1985-86): 1-20; Alan P. Dobson, "Special in Relationship to What? Anglo-American Relations in the Second World War," in Britain and the Threat to the Stability in Europe, 1918-1945, ed. Peter Catterall and C. J. Morris (London, 1993), 124-41; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1914-1945 (New York, 1978); and John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957 (London, 1995). For a range of views see many of the essays in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945 (New York, 1995). There is, of course, a literature to the contrary. That is particularly true for many of the British memoirs from the Thatcher era, with Geoffrey Howe's Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1995) the obvious exception. Leading Foreign Office personnel during the Thatcher years, including those seconded to the Prime Minister's Office, claim that there was a "special relationship" based on both tradition and the national interest of both nations, although career diplomats who look to Europe frequently try to soften the reality by pointing out that Britain has a "special" relationship with every nation. For some reason, pundits and scholars seem to view British relations with Europe and relations with the United States as inversely proportional, just as the value of gold and the U.S. dollar used to perform. But that latter equation no longer functions, and I wonder if the former has any validity, but that is all part of the debate; interviews with Sir John Coles (London, 6 May 1998), Sir Charles Powell, (London, 18 May 1998), Sir Antony Acland (Eton, 20 May 1998), and Sir Nicholas Henderson (3 June 1998). Likewise the anecdotal look at the relationship by retired American diplomat (and Anglophile), Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London, 1998), and the broad popular survey, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War (New York, 1996), by the British diplomat, Sir Robin Renwick. Then there is there is the clever demi-memoir by British intelligence adviser Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London, 1997), which manages to be remarkably informed and uninformative at the same time. For scholarly accounts see C.J. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship": A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); R. Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942-1949 (Oxford, 1982); A. P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940-1987 (Brighton, 1988);
96. The vastness of the literature itself on the "special relationship" suggests that it exists. For starters see Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York, 1998). Although Danchev has examined the "special relationship" with penetrating scholarship and a raised eyebrow, he demonstrates that, whatever his doubts, behind every grand generalization lie some devilish details. Some other assessments of the "special relationship," in order of increasing skepticism, are: the essays in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War," International Affairs 62 (Winter 1985-86): 1-20; Alan P. Dobson, "Special in Relationship to What? Anglo-American Relations in the Second World War," in Britain and the Threat to the Stability in Europe, 1918-1945, ed. Peter Catterall and C. J. Morris (London, 1993), 124-41; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1914-1945 (New York, 1978); and John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957 (London, 1995). For a range of views see many of the essays in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945 (New York, 1995). There is, of course, a literature to the contrary. That is particularly true for many of the British memoirs from the Thatcher era, with Geoffrey Howe's Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1995) the obvious exception. Leading Foreign Office personnel during the Thatcher years, including those seconded to the Prime Minister's Office, claim that there was a "special relationship" based on both tradition and the national interest of both nations, although career diplomats who look to Europe frequently try to soften the reality by pointing out that Britain has a "special" relationship with every nation. For some reason, pundits and scholars seem to view British relations with Europe and relations with the United States as inversely proportional, just as the value of gold and the U.S. dollar used to perform. But that latter equation no longer functions, and I wonder if the former has any validity, but that is all part of the debate; interviews with Sir John Coles (London, 6 May 1998), Sir Charles Powell, (London, 18 May 1998), Sir Antony Acland (Eton, 20 May 1998), and Sir Nicholas Henderson (3 June 1998). Likewise the anecdotal look at the relationship by retired American diplomat (and Anglophile), Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London, 1998), and the broad popular survey, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War (New York, 1996), by the British diplomat, Sir Robin Renwick. Then there is there is the clever demi-memoir by British intelligence adviser Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London, 1997), which manages to be remarkably informed and uninformative at the same time. For scholarly accounts see C.J. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship": A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); R. Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942-1949 (Oxford, 1982); A. P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940-1987 (Brighton, 1988);
97. The vastness of the literature itself on the "special relationship" suggests that it exists. For starters see Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York, 1998). Although Danchev has examined the "special relationship" with penetrating scholarship and a raised eyebrow, he demonstrates that, whatever his doubts, behind every grand generalization lie some devilish details. Some other assessments of the "special relationship," in order of increasing skepticism, are: the essays in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War," International Affairs 62 (Winter 1985-86): 1-20; Alan P. Dobson, "Special in Relationship to What? Anglo-American Relations in the Second World War," in Britain and the Threat to the Stability in Europe, 1918-1945, ed. Peter Catterall and C. J. Morris (London, 1993), 124-41; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1914-1945 (New York, 1978); and John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957 (London, 1995). For a range of views see many of the essays in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945 (New York, 1995). There is, of course, a literature to the contrary. That is particularly true for many of the British memoirs from the Thatcher era, with Geoffrey Howe's Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1995) the obvious exception. Leading Foreign Office personnel during the Thatcher years, including those seconded to the Prime Minister's Office, claim that there was a "special relationship" based on both tradition and the national interest of both nations, although career diplomats who look to Europe frequently try to soften the reality by pointing out that Britain has a "special" relationship with every nation. For some reason, pundits and scholars seem to view British relations with Europe and relations with the United States as inversely proportional, just as the value of gold and the U.S. dollar used to perform. But that latter equation no longer functions, and I wonder if the former has any validity, but that is all part of the debate; interviews with Sir John Coles (London, 6 May 1998), Sir Charles Powell, (London, 18 May 1998), Sir Antony Acland (Eton, 20 May 1998), and Sir Nicholas Henderson (3 June 1998). Likewise the anecdotal look at the relationship by retired American diplomat (and Anglophile), Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London, 1998), and the broad popular survey, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War (New York, 1996), by the British diplomat, Sir Robin Renwick. Then there is there is the clever demi-memoir by British intelligence adviser Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London, 1997), which manages to be remarkably informed and uninformative at the same time. For scholarly accounts see C.J. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship": A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); R. Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942-1949 (Oxford, 1982); A. P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940-1987 (Brighton, 1988);
98. The vastness of the literature itself on the "special relationship" suggests that it exists. For starters see Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations (New York, 1998). Although Danchev has examined the "special relationship" with penetrating scholarship and a raised eyebrow, he demonstrates that, whatever his doubts, behind every grand generalization lie some devilish details. Some other assessments of the "special relationship," in order of increasing skepticism, are: the essays in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986); David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War," International Affairs 62 (Winter 1985-86): 1-20; Alan P. Dobson, "Special in Relationship to What? Anglo-American Relations in the Second World War," in Britain and the Threat to the Stability in Europe, 1918-1945, ed. Peter Catterall and C. J. Morris (London, 1993), 124-41; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1914-1945 (New York, 1978); and John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957 (London, 1995). For a range of views see many of the essays in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945 (New York, 1995). There is, of course, a literature to the contrary. That is particularly true for many of the British memoirs from the Thatcher era, with Geoffrey Howe's Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1995) the obvious exception. Leading Foreign Office personnel during the Thatcher years, including those seconded to the Prime Minister's Office, claim that there was a "special relationship" based on both tradition and the national interest of both nations, although career diplomats who look to Europe frequently try to soften the reality by pointing out that Britain has a "special" relationship with every nation. For some reason, pundits and scholars seem to view British relations with Europe and relations with the United States as inversely proportional, just as the value of gold and the U.S. dollar used to perform. But that latter equation no longer functions, and I wonder if the former has any validity, but that is all part of the debate; interviews with Sir John Coles (London, 6 May 1998), Sir Charles Powell, (London, 18 May 1998), Sir Antony Acland (Eton, 20 May 1998), and Sir Nicholas Henderson (3 June 1998). Likewise the anecdotal look at the relationship by retired American diplomat (and Anglophile), Raymond Seitz, Over Here (London, 1998), and the broad popular survey, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and at War (New York, 1996), by the British diplomat, Sir Robin Renwick. Then there is there is the clever demi-memoir by British intelligence adviser Percy Craddock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London, 1997), which manages to be remarkably informed and uninformative at the same time. For scholarly accounts see C.J. Bartlett, "The Special Relationship": A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); R. Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942-1949 (Oxford, 1982); A. P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940-1987 (Brighton, 1988);
99. Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, exp. ed. (New York, 1969); Woods, A Changing of the Guard, and the various and stimulating works of Correlli Barnett on the decline of British power.
100. Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, exp. ed. (New York, 1969); Woods, A Changing of the Guard, and the various and stimulating works of Correlli Barnett on the decline of British power.
101. U.S. Department of State [Harley A. Notter], Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington, 1950), 92-93, 96-97;
102. and U.S. Department of State, Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A. Notter [microform in Alexander Library, Rutgers University] (Bethesda, 1987), file 548-1 (a summary of contacts with the president); W. F. Kimball, "A Victorian Tory': Churchill, the Americans, and Self-Determination," in More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics, and Culture in Britain, ed. Wm. Roger Louis (New York, 1998), 221-39.
103. On the "ganging up" issue see Warren F. Kimball, ed., Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, 3 vols. (Princeton, 1984), 2: R-418 (11 November 1943); and Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, rev. ed. (New York, 1950), 707-8.
104. On the "ganging up" issue see Warren F. Kimball, ed., Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, 3 vols. (Princeton, 1984), 2: R-418 (11 November 1943); and Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, rev. ed. (New York, 1950), 707-8.
105. Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance, 74. During their Casablanca Conference early in the war, before the Soviet Union demonstrated its military strength, Roosevelt and Churchill succumbed to the temptation to dream of a pax Anglo-Americana. But reality soon set in. See Kimball, "Casablanca: The End of Imperial Romance," in The Juggler, 63-81. 41. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, and Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York, 1978) both provide ample examples of awareness among British leaders of the need to plan for devolution. Paradoxically, the Cold War soon prompted the United States to encourage and subsidize the maintenance of an informal British "empire" in its ex-colonies; see Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 22 (September 1994): 462-511.
106. Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance, 74. During their Casablanca Conference early in the war, before the Soviet Union demonstrated its military strength, Roosevelt and Churchill succumbed to the temptation to dream of a pax Anglo-Americana. But reality soon set in. See Kimball, "Casablanca: The End of Imperial Romance," in The Juggler, 63-81. 41. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, and Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York, 1978) both provide ample examples of awareness among British leaders of the need to plan for devolution. Paradoxically, the Cold War soon prompted the United States to encourage and subsidize the maintenance of an informal British "empire" in its ex-colonies; see Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 22 (September 1994): 462-511.
107. Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance, 74. During their Casablanca Conference early in the war, before the Soviet Union demonstrated its military strength, Roosevelt and Churchill succumbed to the temptation to dream of a pax Anglo-Americana. But reality soon set in. See Kimball, "Casablanca: The End of Imperial Romance," in The Juggler, 63-81. 41. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, and Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York, 1978) both provide ample examples of awareness among British leaders of the need to plan for devolution. Paradoxically, the Cold War soon prompted the United States to encourage and subsidize the maintenance of an informal British "empire" in its ex-colonies; see Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson,
108. Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance, 74. During their Casablanca Conference early in the war, before the Soviet Union demonstrated its military strength, Roosevelt and Churchill succumbed to the temptation to dream of a pax Anglo-Americana. But reality soon set in. See Kimball, "Casablanca: The End of Imperial Romance," in The Juggler, 63-81. 41. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, and Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York, 1978) both provide ample examples of awareness among British leaders of the need to plan for devolution. Paradoxically, the Cold War soon prompted the United States to encourage and subsidize the maintenance of an informal British "empire" in its ex-colonies; see Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 22 (September 1994): 462-511.
109. As quoted in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 7, Road to Victory (Boston, 1986), 1026.
110. Kimball, Forged in War, 293-306.
111. Gilbert, Road to Victory, 978.
112. (J. Buffett) BMI.
113. The comment is that of Lloyd C. Gardner.
114. See Kimball, "'A Victorian Tory.'"
115. Kimball, Forged in War, 209.
116. Lord Gowrie interview, 22 April 1997 (London).