From reason to self-realisation? Axel Honneth and the 'ethical turn' in critical theory

Critical Horizons

Volumn 5, Issue , 2004, Pages 323-360

  Kompridis, Nikolas ^a  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Axel Honneth; Critique; Reason; Recognition; Self realisation; The good

Indexed keywords

EID: 10844290982     PISSN: 14409917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/1568516042653585     Document Type: Review

References (90)

1. "Philosophy, working together with the reconstructive sciences, can only throw light on the situations in which we find ourselves. It can contribute to our learning to understand the ambivalences that we come up against as just so many appeals to increasing responsibilities within a contracting space of possibility." Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1992, p. 146, translation altered. It is just this resignation to a 'contracting space of possibility' that concerns me.
2. For an exemplary statement of this more pragmatic version of critical theory, see Thomas McCarthy's contribution to David Hoy and Thomas McCarthy, Critical Theory, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1994.
3. Proposals for post-Habermasian models of critical theory by Jay Bernstein, James Bohman, Axel Honneth, Maeve Cooke, and Nikolas Kompridis are advanced in "Critical Theory after Habermas," a special issue of The International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 11, no. 2, 2005, Nikolas Kompridis, Guest Editor.
4. Examples of this turn in recent critical theory are Martin Seel's Versuch über die Form des Glücks, Alessandro Ferrara's Reflective Authenticity, Christoph Menke's, Tragödie im Sittlichkeit, and Axel Honneth's The Struggle for Recognition.
5. Examples of this turn in recent critical theory are Martin Seel's Versuch über die Form des Glücks, Alessandro Ferrara's Reflective Authenticity, Christoph Menke's, Tragödie im Sittlichkeit, and Axel Honneth's The Struggle for Recognition.
6. Examples of this turn in recent critical theory are Martin Seel's Versuch über die Form des Glücks, Alessandro Ferrara's Reflective Authenticity, Christoph Menke's, Tragödie im Sittlichkeit, and Axel Honneth's The Struggle for Recognition.
7. Examples of this turn in recent critical theory are Martin Seel's Versuch über die Form des Glücks, Alessandro Ferrara's Reflective Authenticity, Christoph Menke's, Tragödie im Sittlichkeit, and Axel Honneth's The Struggle for Recognition.
8. I shall be referring to the following texts: Axel Honneth, "The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Situation of Critical Theory Today," in Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, vol. 1, no. 2, October, 1994, p. 264. Axel Honneth, "Pathologies of the Social: The Past and Present of Social Philosophy," in ed. David Rasmussen, Handbook of Critical Theory, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, pp. 369-398. Axel Honneth, Suffering from Indeterminacy, Assen, Van Gorcum, 2000. Axel Honneth, "Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser," in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, London, Verso, 2003.
9. I shall be referring to the following texts: Axel Honneth, "The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Situation of Critical Theory Today," in Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, vol. 1, no. 2, October, 1994, p. 264. Axel Honneth, "Pathologies of the Social: The Past and Present of Social Philosophy," in ed. David Rasmussen, Handbook of Critical Theory, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, pp. 369-398. Axel Honneth, Suffering from Indeterminacy, Assen, Van Gorcum, 2000. Axel Honneth, "Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser," in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, London, Verso, 2003.
10. I shall be referring to the following texts: Axel Honneth, "The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Situation of Critical Theory Today," in Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, vol. 1, no. 2, October, 1994, p. 264. Axel Honneth, "Pathologies of the Social: The Past and Present of Social Philosophy," in ed. David Rasmussen, Handbook of Critical Theory, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, pp. 369-398. Axel Honneth, Suffering from Indeterminacy, Assen, Van Gorcum, 2000. Axel Honneth, "Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser," in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, London, Verso, 2003.
11. I shall be referring to the following texts: Axel Honneth, "The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Situation of Critical Theory Today," in Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, vol. 1, no. 2, October, 1994, p. 264. Axel Honneth, "Pathologies of the Social: The Past and Present of Social Philosophy," in ed. David Rasmussen, Handbook of Critical Theory, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, pp. 369-398. Axel Honneth, Suffering from Indeterminacy, Assen, Van Gorcum, 2000. Axel Honneth, "Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser," in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, London, Verso, 2003.
12. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1987, p. 139.
13. Honneth, "The Social Dynamics of Disrespect," p. 264.
14. Ibid., p. 265.
15. Ibid., p. 258.
16. Ibid., pp. 255, 257.
17. Ibid., p. 256.
18. "The emancipatory process in which Habermas anchors the normative perspective of critical theory is not at all reflected as such an emancipatory process in the moral experiences of the subjects involved; for they experience an impairment of what we can call their moral experiences, that is, their 'moral point of view', not as a restriction of intuitively mastered rules of language, but as a violation of identity claims acquired in socialisation" (Honneth, "The Social Dynamics of Disrespect," p. 261). This claim is obviously contestable in so far as unwarranted restrictions upon the exchange of reasons can be experienced as violations of one's right to speak, one's right to defend and criticise claims. This is a morally unjustifiable exclusion from the public space of reason and justification. However, I am not interested in assessing the accuracy of Honneth's claim here, since the doubts I have about it are not my primary concern in this paper.
19. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutman, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 25. Though Honneth may choose, rightly or wrongly, to disassociate his normative standpoint from the 'politics of recognition', he cannot deny that much of the initial appeal of his theory depends on the light it promises to shed on the very empirical phenomena from which he wishes to disconnect it.
20. Ibid., p. 25.
21. Honneth, "The Social Dynamics of Disrespect," p. 263.
22. Ibid., p. 262.
23. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, p. 246. Fraser regards it as a moral variant of the epistemological 'myth of the given', Redistribution or Recognition, pp. 201-211.
24. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, p. 246. Fraser regards it as a moral variant of the epistemological 'myth of the given', Redistribution or Recognition, pp. 201-211.
25. Honneth, "Pathologies of the Social," p. 394.
26. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, p. 174.
27. It is this preoccupation with the contingent social struggles of the present that Honneth identifies as one of the two telling differences between his normative paradigm and that of Fraser's. See "Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser," in Redistribution or Recognition, pp. 114-134.
28. For Honneth, "it is still a matter of the invariant dependence of humans on the experience of recognition, even though its forms and contours can become differentiated in the course of historical transformations" (Honneth, "Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions," in Inquiry, 45, 2002, p. 515).
29. Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, Social Action and Human Nature, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 166.
30. Honneth, "The Social Dynamics of Disrespect," p. 261.
31. In my view, were Honneth to attempt to reforge those links, he would find that the critical claims of his theory of recognition would have to be weakened for those links to be strengthened.
32. Honneth, "Pathologies of the Social."
33. As Habermas and Horkheimer did before him, Honneth holds the chair in social philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. And as they were before him, Honneth is concerned with preserving social philosophy's identity and the universality of its statements. Thus, Honneth's concern about the state of social philosophy is hardly new. Already in 1931, Horkheimer described the state of social philosophy in a remarkably similar manner. Although Honneth does not refer to it (somewhat curiously), Horkheimer's essay, "Die Gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung," begins just like Honneth's, singling out precisely the lack of firm disciplinary contours not only between branches of philosophy, but between all of the human sciences. For the English translation, see Between Philosophy and Social Science. Selected Early Writings, trans. G. Frederick Hunter, Matthew S. Kramer, and John Torpey, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1993, p. 1. Original in Max Horkheimer, Sozial-philosophische Studien. Aufsätze, Reden, und Vorträge 1930-1972, Herausgegeben von Werner Brede, Frankfurt, Fischer Verlag, 1972, p. 33.
34. As Habermas and Horkheimer did before him, Honneth holds the chair in social philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. And as they were before him, Honneth is concerned with preserving social philosophy's identity and the universality of its statements. Thus, Honneth's concern about the state of social philosophy is hardly new. Already in 1931, Horkheimer described the state of social philosophy in a remarkably similar manner. Although Honneth does not refer to it (somewhat curiously), Horkheimer's essay, "Die Gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung," begins just like Honneth's, singling out precisely the lack of firm disciplinary contours not only between branches of philosophy, but between all of the human sciences. For the English translation, see Between Philosophy and Social Science. Selected Early Writings, trans. G. Frederick Hunter, Matthew S. Kramer, and John Torpey, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1993, p. 1. Original in Max Horkheimer, Sozial-philosophische Studien. Aufsätze, Reden, und Vorträge 1930-1972, Herausgegeben von Werner Brede, Frankfurt, Fischer Verlag, 1972, p. 33.
35. For a more detailed discussion of Honneth's view of social philosophy see Nikolas Kompridis, "The Task of Social Philosophy: A Reply to Axel Honneth," eds. Cheryl Hughes and James Wong, Social Philosophy Today 17, Philosophy Documentation Center, 2002.
36. In addition to the influence of object-relations theory, Honneth's approach also bears the influence of Ernst Tugendhat's paper, "Antike und moderne Ethik" in Tugendhat, Probleme der Ethik, Reclam, Stuttgart, 1984, pp. 33-56. In this paper, which has had a considerable influence on contemporary German philosophy, Tugendhat argues in favour of a "formal concept of psychological health."
37. Honneth is not the first, nor the last, theorist who wants to have his cake and eat it too. Yet, I still find quite perplexing his interest in grounding social criticism in a formal theory of the good. Ostensibly, the theoretical attraction to ideas of the good is their motivating power. But in what can the motivating power of a formal theory of the good consist once it is stripped of any significant content? From Plato to MacIntyre and Taylor, it has been thought that the good has to appear in some appropriate form if it is to move us to act in this way or that. Honneth presents us with a conception of the good that must hide its face, a good that must sneak in its substantive content through the back door. Is all this subterfuge really necessary?
38. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1989, pp. 62-75. See also pp. 495-522.
39. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science," The Monist 60, 1977, pp. 453-472, and Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 1988. And see Charles Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 34-60, and Sources of the Self, pp. 3-110. Also, Nikolas Kompridis, "So We Need Something Else for Reason to Mean," International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, 2000, pp. 271-295.
40. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science," The Monist 60, 1977, pp. 453-472, and Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 1988. And see Charles Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 34-60, and Sources of the Self, pp. 3-110. Also, Nikolas Kompridis, "So We Need Something Else for Reason to Mean," International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, 2000, pp. 271-295.
41. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science," The Monist 60, 1977, pp. 453-472, and Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 1988. And see Charles Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 34-60, and Sources of the Self, pp. 3-110. Also, Nikolas Kompridis, "So We Need Something Else for Reason to Mean," International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, 2000, pp. 271-295.
42. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science," The Monist 60, 1977, pp. 453-472, and Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 1988. And see Charles Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 34-60, and Sources of the Self, pp. 3-110. Also, Nikolas Kompridis, "So We Need Something Else for Reason to Mean," International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, 2000, pp. 271-295.
43. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science," The Monist 60, 1977, pp. 453-472, and Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 1988. And see Charles Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 34-60, and Sources of the Self, pp. 3-110. Also, Nikolas Kompridis, "So We Need Something Else for Reason to Mean," International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, 2000, pp. 271-295.
44. Honneth, "Grounding Recognition," p. 510.
45. Honneth, "Pathologies of the Social," pp. 387-388.
46. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Politics and the Arts. Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre, trans. Allan Bloom, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1968.
47. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 5; also see, pp. 1-23. I have developed the normative implications of this idea in Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 2004.
48. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 5; also see, pp. 1-23. I have developed the normative implications of this idea in Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 2004.
49. Honneth, "Pathologies of the Social," p. 393.
50. For example: Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Gadamer's Truth and Method, Heidegger's Being and Time, Dewey's The Quest for Certainty, Charles Taylor's critique of naturalist epistemology and ontology, and Habermas' critique of the philosophy of consciousness are at once an internal critique of philosophy and a critique of society and culture.
51. For example: Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Gadamer's Truth and Method, Heidegger's Being and Time, Dewey's The Quest for Certainty, Charles Taylor's critique of naturalist epistemology and ontology, and Habermas' critique of the philosophy of consciousness are at once an internal critique of philosophy and a critique of society and culture.
52. For example: Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Gadamer's Truth and Method, Heidegger's Being and Time, Dewey's The Quest for Certainty, Charles Taylor's critique of naturalist epistemology and ontology, and Habermas' critique of the philosophy of consciousness are at once an internal critique of philosophy and a critique of society and culture.
53. For example: Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Gadamer's Truth and Method, Heidegger's Being and Time, Dewey's The Quest for Certainty, Charles Taylor's critique of naturalist epistemology and ontology, and Habermas' critique of the philosophy of consciousness are at once an internal critique of philosophy and a critique of society and culture.
54. Honneth, Suffering from Indeterminacy, p. 43.
55. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, volume 8, in G. Hegel, Werke, eds. E. Moldenhauer and K. Michelet, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1970, p. 84.
56. For this story see Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1986; see also, Frederick Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 117-166. According to Tugendhat, the key move away from Kant's view of autonomy was taken the moment Fichte jointly poses the following questions: "Who am I really?" and "Are the moral norms to which I'm evidently committed really mine?". As Tugendhat explains, "Kant does not yet mean by autonomy a self-determination of the person as a person or of the I as an I, but a self-determination of reason." Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, pp. 133-134. In Heidegger's Being and Time, the question of self-determination is treated initially as the question of the 'who' of everyday Dasein.
57. For this story see Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1986; see also, Frederick Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 117-166. According to Tugendhat, the key move away from Kant's view of autonomy was taken the moment Fichte jointly poses the following questions: "Who am I really?" and "Are the moral norms to which I'm evidently committed really mine?". As Tugendhat explains, "Kant does not yet mean by autonomy a self-determination of the person as a person or of the I as an I, but a self-determination of reason." Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, pp. 133-134. In Heidegger's Being and Time, the question of self-determination is treated initially as the question of the 'who' of everyday Dasein.
58. For this story see Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1986; see also, Frederick Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 117-166. According to Tugendhat, the key move away from Kant's view of autonomy was taken the moment Fichte jointly poses the following questions: "Who am I really?" and "Are the moral norms to which I'm evidently committed really mine?". As Tugendhat explains, "Kant does not yet mean by autonomy a self-determination of the person as a person or of the I as an I, but a self-determination of reason." Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, pp. 133-134. In Heidegger's Being and Time, the question of self-determination is treated initially as the question of the 'who' of everyday Dasein.
59. For this story see Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1986; see also, Frederick Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 117-166. According to Tugendhat, the key move away from Kant's view of autonomy was taken the moment Fichte jointly poses the following questions: "Who am I really?" and "Are the moral norms to which I'm evidently committed really mine?". As Tugendhat explains, "Kant does not yet mean by autonomy a self-determination of the person as a person or of the I as an I, but a self-determination of reason." Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, pp. 133-134. In Heidegger's Being and Time, the question of self-determination is treated initially as the question of the 'who' of everyday Dasein.
60. For a detailed and compelling elaboration of this view, see Robert Pippin, "What is the Question for which Hegel's Theory of Recognition is the Answer?" European Journal of Philosophy, 8:2,2000, pp. 155-172.
61. Also illuminating is Pippin's "You Can't Get There from Here: Transition Problems in Hegel's Phenomenology," in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. Frederick C. Beiser, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 52-85.
62. Here, I'm deliberately following in the tracks of Honneth's Hegel interpretation in Suffering from Indeterminacy, in order to bring out what has been missed or neglected.
63. G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (my emphasis).
64. To reinforce this point it is worth citing the whole Enzyklopädie formulation of freedom, particularly since it follows upon a formulation of the autonomy of thought (that is, of reason), the last part of which I also include: "In der Logik werden die Gedanken so gefaßt, daß sie keinen anderen Inhalt haben als einen dem Denken selbst angehörigen und durch dasselbe hervorgebrachten. So sind die Gedanken reine Gedanken. So ist der Geist rein bei sich selbst und hiermit frei, denn die Freiheit ist eben dies, in seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein, von sich abzuhängen, das Bestimmende seiner selbst zu sein. In allen Trieben fange ich von einem Anderen an, von einem solchen, das für mich eine Äußerliches ist. Hier sprechen wir dann von Abhängigkeit. Freiheit is nur da, wo kein Anderes f̈r mich ist, das ich nicht selbst bin." Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, volume 8, p. 84.
65. Honneth, "Grounding Recognition," p. 516.
66. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, p. 173.
67. According to Honneth, in modern societies practices of recognition have differentiated themselves into three spheres, the sphere of love, law, and achievement, within each of which the respective practices of recognition are ordered by a corresponding and distinct normative principle.
68. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, p. 133.
69. Ibid., p. 174.
70. "What motivates individuals or social groups to call the prevailing social order into question and to engage in practical resistance is the moral conviction that, with respect to their own situations and particularities, the recognition principles considered legitimate are incorrectly or inadequately applied. It follows from this. . . that a moral experience that can be meaningfully described as one of 'disrespect' must be regarded as the motivational basis of all social conflicts' (Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, p. 157, second emphasis my own).
71. See Chapter IV of Heidegger's Being and Time.
72. I begin to offer such an account in "Misrecognizing Recognition: On Recent Misapplications of Hegel's Theory of Recognition" (forthcoming).
73. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, p. 24 (my emphasis).
74. Ibid., p. 52 (my emphasis).
75. Ibid., p. 183.
76. Ibid., p. 157.
77. "On the one hand, there can be an opening up of new personality-interests involving mutual recognition, leading to an increase in socially confirmed individuality; on the other hand, more personas can be integrated into already-existing conditions of recognition, leading to an expansion of the circle of mutually recognizing subjects" (Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, p. 78). Compare Habermas: "Social individualization means, for the individuals, that the self-determination and self-realization that are expected of them presuppose a non-conventional sort of ego-identity. Even this identity formation can, however, only be conceived as socially constituted; it must therefore be stabilized in relationships of reciprocal recognition that are at least anticipated." Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. William Mark Hohengarten, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1992, p. 184.
78. "On the one hand, there can be an opening up of new personality-interests involving mutual recognition, leading to an increase in socially confirmed individuality; on the other hand, more personas can be integrated into already-existing conditions of recognition, leading to an expansion of the circle of mutually recognizing subjects" (Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, p. 78). Compare Habermas: "Social individualization means, for the individuals, that the self-determination and self-realization that are expected of them presuppose a non-conventional sort of ego-identity. Even this identity formation can, however, only be conceived as socially constituted; it must therefore be stabilized in relationships of reciprocal recognition that are at least anticipated." Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. William Mark Hohengarten, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1992, p. 184.
79. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, p. 77.
80. See Habermas' "The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies," in The New Conservatism, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 50.
81. Ibid., p. 263.
82. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, New York, Harper and Row, 1962, p. 63. German original: Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1986.
83. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, New York, Harper and Row, 1962, p. 63. German original: Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1986.
84. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 14.
85. Ibid., p. 53.
86. Ibid., p. 43.
87. Ibid., p. 53.
88. For a fully elaborated statement of this alternative, see, Nikolas Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future, (forthcoming). For related statements see "The Normativity of the New," ed. Nikolas Kompridis, Philosophical Romanticism, London & New York, Routledge, 2005, and "The Transformation of Reason, Normative Change, and Social Criticism," International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. II, no. 2, 2005.
89. For a fully elaborated statement of this alternative, see, Nikolas Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future, (forthcoming). For related statements see "The Normativity of the New," ed. Nikolas Kompridis, Philosophical Romanticism, London & New York, Routledge, 2005, and "The Transformation of Reason, Normative Change, and Social Criticism," International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. II, no. 2, 2005.
90. For a fully elaborated statement of this alternative, see, Nikolas Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future, (forthcoming). For related statements see "The Normativity of the New," ed. Nikolas Kompridis, Philosophical Romanticism, London & New York, Routledge, 2005, and "The Transformation of Reason, Normative Change, and Social Criticism," International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. II, no. 2, 2005.