Injustice, violence and social struggle. The critical potential of axel Honneth's theory of recognition

Critical Horizons

Volumn 5, Issue , 2004, Pages 297-322

  Deranty, Jean Philippe ^a  

^a MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Critical Theory; Critique; Honneth; Marx; Recognition; Social Struggle; Violence

Indexed keywords

EID: 10844284790     PISSN: 14409917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/1568516042653549     Document Type: Review

References (71)

1. Although Habermas seems to think that the recognition paradigm does not represent a shift from his own. See J. Habermas, The Inclusion Of The Other. Studies in Political Theory, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, p. 208.
2. Hegel of course, but also Rousseau, Fichte, the young Marx, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Gadamer, Lévinas, Taylor, Habermas evidently. Husserl is one major figure that seems to be missing from this list.
3. Habermas famously adopts Mead's pragmatic, interactionist theory of social action in the second volume of his Theory Of Communicative Action, but Honneth was also instrumental, with Hans Joas, in the rediscovery of Mead in German social theory. See H. Joas, G.H. Mead. A Contemporary Re-examination Of His Thought, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985.
4. Habermas famously adopts Mead's pragmatic, interactionist theory of social action in the second volume of his Theory Of Communicative Action, but Honneth was also instrumental, with Hans Joas, in the rediscovery of Mead in German social theory. See H. Joas, G.H. Mead. A Contemporary Re-examination Of His Thought, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985.
5. This is developed in chapters 4 and 5 of Honneth's Struggle For Recognition. The Moral Grammar Of Social Conflicts, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995. A concise summary is provided in A. Honneth, "Decentered Autonomy: The Subject After The Fall," in The Fragmented World Of The Social. Essays In Social And Political Philosophy, ed. C. Wright, New York, State University of New York Press, 1995, pp. 266-267.
6. This is developed in chapters 4 and 5 of Honneth's Struggle For Recognition. The Moral Grammar Of Social Conflicts, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995. A concise summary is provided in A. Honneth, "Decentered Autonomy: The Subject After The Fall," in The Fragmented World Of The Social. Essays In Social And Political Philosophy, ed. C. Wright, New York, State University of New York Press, 1995, pp. 266-267.
7. Along with Hans Joas, Honneth was instrumental in the rediscovery of Mead. See their Social Action And Human Nature, trans. R. Meyer, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 59-70.
8. More precisely, he identifies two paths in Habermas and chooses the repressed, fully communicative one over the path later taken by Habermas that consists in a synthesis of action-theoretic and systemic approaches. See A. Honneth, The Critique Of Power. Reflective Stages In A Critical Theory Of Society, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1991, chapters 8 and 9, especially pp. 268-277.
9. Besides the critical study of Habermas in the last three chapters of The Critique Of Power, the two central texts, dating from the early 1990s, where Honneth signals his departure from the pragmatic-linguistic interpretation of communication towards a more fully-fledged, anthropological one are: " Die soziale Dynamik von Mißachtung. Zur Ortbestimmung einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie," in Das Andere Der Gerechtigkeit. Aufsätze zur praktischen Philosophie, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2000, pp. 88-109; "Moral Consciousness And Class Domination. Some Problems In The Analysis Of Hidden Morality," in The Fragmented World, pp. 205-209.
10. Besides the critical study of Habermas in the last three chapters of The Critique Of Power, the two central texts, dating from the early 1990s, where Honneth signals his departure from the pragmatic-linguistic interpretation of communication towards a more fully-fledged, anthropological one are: " Die soziale Dynamik von Mißachtung. Zur Ortbestimmung einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie," in Das Andere Der Gerechtigkeit. Aufsätze zur praktischen Philosophie, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2000, pp. 88-109; "Moral Consciousness And Class Domination. Some Problems In The Analysis Of Hidden Morality," in The Fragmented World, pp. 205-209.
11. Besides the critical study of Habermas in the last three chapters of The Critique Of Power, the two central texts, dating from the early 1990s, where Honneth signals his departure from the pragmatic-linguistic interpretation of communication towards a more fully-fledged, anthropological one are: " Die soziale Dynamik von Mißachtung. Zur Ortbestimmung einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie," in Das Andere Der Gerechtigkeit. Aufsätze zur praktischen Philosophie, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2000, pp. 88-109; "Moral Consciousness And Class Domination. Some Problems In The Analysis Of Hidden Morality," in The Fragmented World, pp. 205-209.
12. As Honneth's early work with Joas suggests, the methodological function of philosophical anthropology seems to be central in Honneth's model. He seems to want to replace the communicative action grounded in universal pragmatics with an anthropologically grounded theory of intersubjectivity. This avoids the idealisation of social interaction that he perceives in Habermas, with its corollary deficit in critical potential. This is confirmed by the latest text published by Honneth in which the epistemology of social recognition is unlocked through recourse to developmental psychology with strong anthropological undertones. See A. Honneth, Unsichtbarkeit. Stationen Einer Theorie der Intersubjektivität, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2003, pp. 10-27.
13. However, the anthropological foundation of recognitive structures is also interpreted historically, so much so that sometimes, in his later texts, Honneth denies the anthropological foundation in favour of the historical one. See A. Honneth, Unsichtbarkeit. Stationen Einer Theorie der Intersubjektivität, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2003, pp. 10-27.
14. Compare with his rejection of the anthropological objection put by Fraser and others, Redistribution Or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, trans. J. Golb, J. Ingrain, and C. Wilke, London/New York, Verso, 2003, pp. 181-182, and note 82.
15. Honneth, The Critique Of Power, chapters 8 and 9. See also "Critical Theory," in The Fragmented World, pp. 86-91.
16. Honneth, The Critique Of Power, chapters 8 and 9. See also "Critical Theory," in The Fragmented World, pp. 86-91.
17. Honneth, "Work and Instrumental Action," in The Fragmented World, pp. 46-49.
18. The model is presented in all its details in chapter 5 of Struggle For Recognition and numerous texts thereafter simply refer back to that book.
19. This summary of the logic of recognition in the early Jena Hegel is also a good description of Honneth's own understanding of it: "Since within the framework of an ethically established relationship of mutual recognition, subjects are always learning something more about their particular identity, and since, in each case, it is a new dimension of their selves that they see confirmed thereby, they must once again leave, by means of conflict, the stage of ethical life they have reached, in order to achieve the recognition of more demanding form of their individuality." Honneth, Struggle For Recognition, p. 17. This is confirmed at the end of the book, with the application to the sociology of social conflicts, p. 162.
20. This is probably the most fundamental inspiration behind Honneth's thought. He has never wavered over it.
21. Horkheimer's famous article "Traditional And Critical Theory," in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. M.J. O'Connell et al., New York, Continuum Publication Corporation, 1982. J. Habermas, "Knowledge And Human Interests: A General Perspective," appendix to Knowledge And Human Interests, trans. J. Shapiro, New York, Beacon, 1971, pp. 301-317. Honneth has proposed several masterful reconstructions of the tradition of Critical Theory. See the first three chapters of The Critique Of Power, the article "Critical Theory" quoted above, and "Pathologien Des Sozialen. Tradition Und Aktualität Der Sozialphilosophie," in Das Andere Der Gerechtigkeit, pp. 47-53.
22. Horkheimer's famous article "Traditional And Critical Theory," in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. M.J. O'Connell et al., New York, Continuum Publication Corporation, 1982. J. Habermas, "Knowledge And Human Interests: A General Perspective," appendix to Knowledge And Human Interests, trans. J. Shapiro, New York, Beacon, 1971, pp. 301-317. Honneth has proposed several masterful reconstructions of the tradition of Critical Theory. See the first three chapters of The Critique Of Power, the article "Critical Theory" quoted above, and "Pathologien Des Sozialen. Tradition Und Aktualität Der Sozialphilosophie," in Das Andere Der Gerechtigkeit, pp. 47-53.
23. Horkheimer's famous article "Traditional And Critical Theory," in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. M.J. O'Connell et al., New York, Continuum Publication Corporation, 1982. J. Habermas, "Knowledge And Human Interests: A General Perspective," appendix to Knowledge And Human Interests, trans. J. Shapiro, New York, Beacon, 1971, pp. 301-317. Honneth has proposed several masterful reconstructions of the tradition of Critical Theory. See the first three chapters of The Critique Of Power, the article "Critical Theory" quoted above, and "Pathologien Des Sozialen. Tradition Und Aktualität Der Sozialphilosophie," in Das Andere Der Gerechtigkeit, pp. 47-53.
24. Horkheimer's famous article "Traditional And Critical Theory," in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. M.J. O'Connell et al., New York, Continuum Publication Corporation, 1982. J. Habermas, "Knowledge And Human Interests: A General Perspective," appendix to Knowledge And Human Interests, trans. J. Shapiro, New York, Beacon, 1971, pp. 301-317. Honneth has proposed several masterful reconstructions of the tradition of Critical Theory. See the first three chapters of The Critique Of Power, the article "Critical Theory" quoted above, and "Pathologien Des Sozialen. Tradition Und Aktualität Der Sozialphilosophie," in Das Andere Der Gerechtigkeit, pp. 47-53.
25. Honneth, "Die Soziale Dynamik Von Mißachtung," p. 96.
26. Despite his unmistakable emphasis on the 'moral' grammar of social conflicts, Honneth's model is constantly read as a model of identity politics in an exclusively cultural sense.
27. The typical rhetorical gesture is to write Taylor "and Honneth," as if the commas, or brackets, were sufficient to justify this alignment. In fact, the political scope and dimensions of Honneth's ethics of recognition are very different from those of Taylor's liberal interpretation of the model, as this article attempts to show.
28. See E. Anghern, ed., Dialektischer Negativismus. Michael Theunissen zum 60. Geburtstag, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1992.
29. Honneth cites two types of historical and sociological studies: seminal works that have established a new perspective in class-studies, that of a 'moral economy' (E.P. Thompson) underlying social movements, and contemporary research whose results confirm empirically or in specific areas the fundamental theses presented in those seminal works. The seminal historical work is E.P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1968. Honneth presents his own model as a theoretical account of Thompson's notion of 'moral economy'. Also seminal is Barrington Moore's Injustice: The Social Bases Of Obedience And Revolt, London, Macmillan, 1978. Richard Sennett's The Hidden Injuries Of Class, New York, Knopf 1972, provides the seminal reference in the sociological literature. The amount of contemporary historical and sociological work used by Honneth to substantiate the theory of recognition is tremendous. Any serious critique of Honneth has to face the task of matching him in the use and knowledge of historical and sociological literature.
30. Honneth cites two types of historical and sociological studies: seminal works that have established a new perspective in class-studies, that of a 'moral economy' (E.P. Thompson) underlying social movements, and contemporary research whose results confirm empirically or in specific areas the fundamental theses presented in those seminal works. The seminal historical work is E.P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1968. Honneth presents his own model as a theoretical account of Thompson's notion of 'moral economy'. Also seminal is Barrington Moore's Injustice: The Social Bases Of Obedience And Revolt, London, Macmillan, 1978. Richard Sennett's The Hidden Injuries Of Class, New York, Knopf 1972, provides the seminal reference in the sociological literature. The amount of contemporary historical and sociological work used by Honneth to substantiate the theory of recognition is tremendous. Any serious critique of Honneth has to face the task of matching him in the use and knowledge of historical and sociological literature.
31. Honneth cites two types of historical and sociological studies: seminal works that have established a new perspective in class-studies, that of a 'moral economy' (E.P. Thompson) underlying social movements, and contemporary research whose results confirm empirically or in specific areas the fundamental theses presented in those seminal works. The seminal historical work is E.P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1968. Honneth presents his own model as a theoretical account of Thompson's notion of 'moral economy'. Also seminal is Barrington Moore's Injustice: The Social Bases Of Obedience And Revolt, London, Macmillan, 1978. Richard Sennett's The Hidden Injuries Of Class, New York, Knopf 1972, provides the seminal reference in the sociological literature. The amount of contemporary historical and sociological work used by Honneth to substantiate the theory of recognition is tremendous. Any serious critique of Honneth has to face the task of matching him in the use and knowledge of historical and sociological literature.
32. The article "Moral consciousness and Class Domination" is the most explicit text in this respect.
33. Not only does the theory of recognition borrow its central concept from real social movements, but conversely it is confirmed empirically a second time when new social movements are interpreted from its perspective. See G. Presbey, "The Struggle For Recognition In The Philosophy Of Axel Honneth, Applied To The Current South African Situation And Its Call For An 'African Renaissance'" in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 537-561; R. Boelens, "Local Rights And Legal Recognition: The Struggle For Indigenous Water Rights And The Cultural Politics Of Participation," Paper presented at the Third World Water Forum, 16-23 March 2003, Kyoto, Japan; P. McInness, "Rights, Recognition And Community Mobilisation To Gain Access To Basic Municipal Services In Soweto," conference proceedings of the 2003 annual conference of the Macquarie University Centre For Research On Social Inclusion, www.crsi.mq.edu.au/research_sit.html.
34. Not only does the theory of recognition borrow its central concept from real social movements, but conversely it is confirmed empirically a second time when new social movements are interpreted from its perspective. See G. Presbey, "The Struggle For Recognition In The Philosophy Of Axel Honneth, Applied To The Current South African Situation And Its Call For An 'African Renaissance'" in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 537-561; R. Boelens, "Local Rights And Legal Recognition: The Struggle For Indigenous Water Rights And The Cultural Politics Of Participation," Paper presented at the Third World Water Forum, 16-23 March 2003, Kyoto, Japan; P. McInness, "Rights, Recognition And Community Mobilisation To Gain Access To Basic Municipal Services In Soweto," conference proceedings of the 2003 annual conference of the Macquarie University Centre For Research On Social Inclusion, www.crsi.mq.edu.au/research_sit.html.
35. Not only does the theory of recognition borrow its central concept from real social movements, but conversely it is confirmed empirically a second time when new social movements are interpreted from its perspective. See G. Presbey, "The Struggle For Recognition In The Philosophy Of Axel Honneth, Applied To The Current South African Situation And Its Call For An 'African Renaissance'" in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 537-561; R. Boelens, "Local Rights And Legal Recognition: The Struggle For Indigenous Water Rights And The Cultural Politics Of Participation," Paper presented at the Third World Water Forum, 16-23 March 2003, Kyoto, Japan; P. McInness, "Rights, Recognition And Community Mobilisation To Gain Access To Basic Municipal Services In Soweto," conference proceedings of the 2003 annual conference of the Macquarie University Centre For Research On Social Inclusion, www.crsi.mq.edu.au/research_sit.html.
36. This important implication of the recognition-paradigm for the position of theory in relationship with its object has been most clearly underlined by Emmanuel Renault in his article "La philosophic critique: porte-parole de la souffrance sociale," in Mouvements, no. 34, 2002.
37. See especially chapter 7 of Struggle For Recognition.
38. This is most explicitly affirmed in "Domination And Moral Struggle: The Philosophical Heritage Of Marxism Revisited" in Honneth, The Fragmented World, pp. 3-14.
39. The texts where this dimension of his thought appears most clearly are: "Moral Consciousness and Class Domination," but also the first chapter of his first reply to Nancy Fraser in Redistribution Or Recognition?
40. Honneth, "Moral Consciousness and Class Domination," p. 210.
41. Honneth, "A Fragmented World: On The Implicit Relevance Of Lukács' Early Work" in The Fragmented World, pp. 50-60. It is worth noting that in the German edition, the article is in first position and clearly gives the whole book its title, suggesting that, even more than a retrieval of Marx, Honneth's is the attempt to fulfil the 'implicit' potential in Lukács.
42. This is in fact the driving concern behind Honneth's constructs: that theory should never be severed from the real social experience, from the depth and multi-dimensionality of social suffering as social.
43. Honneth, "Critical Theory," see above.
44. Ibid., p. 82.
45. Honneth, "Kommunikative Erschließung Der Vergangenheit. Zum Zusammenhang Von Anthropologie Und Geschichtsphilosophie Bei Walter Benjamin" in Die Zerrissene Welt des Sozialen. Sozialphilosophische Aufsätze, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1999 (2nd extended edition).
46. Honneth, Struggle For Recognition, chapter 7.
47. Ibid. See also Unsichtbarkeit, pp. 71-105.
48. Ibid. See also Unsichtbarkeit, pp. 71-105.
49. Honneth, Struggle For Recognition, pp. 157-160. Beyond undeniable differences, Honneth and Jacques Rancière share a common rejection of social philosophies that approach the social 'from above'. See J.-P. Deranty, "Jacques Rancière's Contribution to the Ethics of Recognition, " Political Theory, vol. 31, no. 1, February 2003, pp. 136-156.
50. Honneth, Struggle For Recognition, pp. 157-160. Beyond undeniable differences, Honneth and Jacques Rancière share a common rejection of social philosophies that approach the social 'from above'. See J.-P. Deranty, "Jacques Rancière's Contribution to the Ethics of Recognition, " Political Theory, vol. 31, no. 1, February 2003, pp. 136-156.
51. Unsichtbarkeit, p. 14. R. Ellison, Invisible Man, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1953.
52. Unsichtbarkeit, p. 14. R. Ellison, Invisible Man, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1953.
53. I b i d.
54. Hegel and the Human Spirit. A translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805-6) with commentary by Leo Rauch, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1983, p. 130.
55. See Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §127.
56. "Decentered Autonomy: The Subject After The Fall," in The Fragmented World, p. 271.
57. E. Renault, Mépris Social. Ethique Et Politique De La Reconnaissance, Bègles, Editions du Passant, 2000; "Politique De L'identité. Politique Dans L'identité" in Lignes 6, 2001; "Entre Libéralisme Et Communautarisme: Une Troisième Voie?" in eds., E. Renault and Y. Sintomer, Yves, Où en est la théorie critique? Paris, La découverte, 2003, pp. 251-268; Expérience De L'injustice. Reconnaissance et Clinique De L'injustice, Paris, La découverte, 2004.
58. E. Renault, Mépris Social. Ethique Et Politique De La Reconnaissance, Bègles, Editions du Passant, 2000; "Politique De L'identité. Politique Dans L'identité" in Lignes 6, 2001; "Entre Libéralisme Et Communautarisme: Une Troisième Voie?" in eds., E. Renault and Y. Sintomer, Yves, Où en est la théorie critique? Paris, La découverte, 2003, pp. 251-268; Expérience De L'injustice. Reconnaissance et Clinique De L'injustice, Paris, La découverte, 2004.
59. E. Renault, Mépris Social. Ethique Et Politique De La Reconnaissance, Bègles, Editions du Passant, 2000; "Politique De L'identité. Politique Dans L'identité" in Lignes 6, 2001; "Entre Libéralisme Et Communautarisme: Une Troisième Voie?" in eds., E. Renault and Y. Sintomer, Yves, Où en est la théorie critique? Paris, La découverte, 2003, pp. 251-268; Expérience De L'injustice. Reconnaissance et Clinique De L'injustice, Paris, La découverte, 2004.
60. E. Renault, Mépris Social. Ethique Et Politique De La Reconnaissance, Bègles, Editions du Passant, 2000; "Politique De L'identité. Politique Dans L'identité" in Lignes 6, 2001; "Entre Libéralisme Et Communautarisme: Une Troisième Voie?" in eds., E. Renault and Y. Sintomer, Yves, Où en est la théorie critique? Paris, La découverte, 2003, pp. 251-268; Expérience De L'injustice. Reconnaissance et Clinique De L'injustice, Paris, La découverte, 2004.
61. Renault, L'expérience de l'injustice, Chapter 3: "The institutions of injustice."
62. A. Honneth, Leiden an Unbestimmtheit, Stuttgart, Reclam, 2001.
63. In Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, pp. 254-256. Honneth himself suggests this, but the passing suggestion is not further developed. His latest book confirms that he does not want his theory to take this path.
64. Honneth, The Fragmented World, p. 59.
65. Honneth, Struggle For Recognition, p. 162. The point is repeated p. 164.
66. This shift from an Hegelian alternative in the texts around Struggle For Recognition, towards a more orthodox liberal position is explicitly made in Redistribution or Recognition? See pp. 177-179. In Unsichtbarkeit, the Hegelian inspiration seems to be reneged upon (see the Preface, p. 7), and the important first text of the book, the eponymous "Unsichtbarkeit," strikingly interprets recognition in Kantian terms.
67. This shift from an Hegelian alternative in the texts around Struggle For Recognition, towards a more orthodox liberal position is explicitly made in Redistribution or Recognition? See pp. 177-179. In Unsichtbarkeit, the Hegelian inspiration seems to be reneged upon (see the Preface, p. 7), and the important first text of the book, the eponymous "Unsichtbarkeit," strikingly interprets recognition in Kantian terms.
68. See especially the collection of essays Disintegration. Bruchstücke einer soziologischen Zeitdiagnose, Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1995. See also, "Organisierte Selbstverwirklichung. Paradoxien der Individualisierung," in ed. Axel Honneth, Befreiung aus der Mündigkeit. Paradoxien des gegen wärtigen Kapitalismus, Frankfurt am Main, Campus, 2002, pp. 141-158.
69. See especially the collection of essays Disintegration. Bruchstücke einer soziologischen Zeitdiagnose, Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1995. See also, "Organisierte Selbstverwirklichung. Paradoxien der Individualisierung," in ed. Axel Honneth, Befreiung aus der Mündigkeit. Paradoxien des gegen wärtigen Kapitalismus, Frankfurt am Main, Campus, 2002, pp. 141-158.
70. Again, the later Redistribution or Recognition texts are strikingly less critical of modernity than the earlier texts. See for instance, pp. 182-183.
71. This ideal account of modernity is needed, according to Honneth, in order to anchor and thus justify the normative claims found in recognition. See Struggle for Recognition, chapter 9.