Blackwomen, sexual myth, and jurisprudence

Temple Law Review

Volumn 69, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 1343-1387

  Tarpley, Joan R ^a,b,c  

^a MERCER UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DILLARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 10844282029     PISSN: 08998086     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (286)

1. Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1765 (1990) [hereinafter Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified].
2. Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1765 (1990) [hereinafter Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified].
3. Jim DeSimone, Manager's Policy Reversed at Wendy's: Braids Allowed, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), Sept. 4, 1995, at A14.
4. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.REV. 1709, 1719 n.34 (1993). In this Article, I endorse Harris's justification for using the appellation "Blackwomen": My use of the term "Blackwomen" is an effort to use language that more clearly re-flects the unity of identity as "Black" and "woman," with neither aspect primary or subordinate to the other. It is an attempt to realize in practice what has been identified in theory - that, as Kimberle Crenshaw notes, Blackwomen exist "at the crossroads of gender and race hierarchies." Indeed, this essay projects a powerful and complex vision of blackwomen that forms the foundation of my construction of this term: The particular experience of black women in the dominant cultural ideology of American society can be conceptualized as intersectional. Intersectionality captures the way in which the particular location of black women in dominant American social relations is unique and in some senses unassimilable into the discursive paradigms of gender and race domination. Id. (quoting Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, ENGENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402, 403, 404 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992)).
5. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.REV. 1709, 1719 n.34 (1993). In this Article, I endorse Harris's justification for using the appellation "Blackwomen": My use of the term "Blackwomen" is an effort to use language that more clearly re-flects the unity of identity as "Black" and "woman," with neither aspect primary or subordinate to the other. It is an attempt to realize in practice what has been identified in theory - that, as Kimberle Crenshaw notes, Blackwomen exist "at the crossroads of gender and race hierarchies." Indeed, this essay projects a powerful and complex vision of blackwomen that forms the foundation of my construction of this term: The particular experience of black women in the dominant cultural ideology of American society can be conceptualized as intersectional. Intersectionality captures the way in which the particular location of black women in dominant American social relations is unique and in some senses unassimilable into the discursive paradigms of gender and race domination. Id. (quoting Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, ENGENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402, 403, 404 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992)).
6. Blackwomen and their attempts to have a voluntary ethnic identity of hairstyle in an Anglophile, Eurocentric, assimilationist culture is addressed later in Part II of this Article. Part II contains a discussion of Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), a case where the court ruled that an employer's prohibition of braids did not discriminate against Blackwomen. Part II then discusses Paulette Caldwell's treatment of the court's ruling and the implication of Blackwomen's sexual personae in hair and hairstyles - the importance of hair to a Blackwoman's identity. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365.
7. J.C.J. METFORD, DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN LORE AND LEGEND 138 (1983).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. PATRICIA H. COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 67 (1990).
11. Id. at 70-78 (discussing stereotyped roles for Blackwomen).
12. Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 570.
13. Id. at 569.
14. Id. at 569-70.
15. See generally Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1991) (describing "subject" as writer of opinions and maker of decisions).
16. After reading an earlier draft of this Article, one of my white female colleagues, who is also my friend, asked me: "Why aren't we one word?" Good question. While writing this Article, I almost used "Whitewomen" as well, but I thought better of the idea because I believe that combining "white" and "woman" is best done by a white female scholar who chooses to see her world within a combined perspective and discusses her reasons for her perspective.
17. See generally Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference/Deviance Divide, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (1992) [hereinafter Austin, Difference/Deviance]. Austin highlights a case, Clark v. American Broad. Co., Inc., 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983), where an ABC-TV film crew indiscriminately filmed Blackwomen walking down a street frequented by prostitutes. The plaintiff, an attractive Blackwoman, was filmed during the announcer's statement that "the street prostitutes were often black." Id. at 880. Plaintiff, who was not a prostitute, sued ABC for defamation. On appeal from a summary judgment in favor of ABC, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff had shown a jury issue. The case ended with a stipulation and an Order of Dismissal. Id. at 879-80 n.3.
18. See generally Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference/Deviance Divide, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (1992) [hereinafter Austin, Difference/Deviance]. Austin highlights a case, Clark v. American Broad. Co., Inc., 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983), where an ABC-TV film crew indiscriminately filmed Blackwomen walking down a street frequented by prostitutes. The plaintiff, an attractive Blackwoman, was filmed during the announcer's statement that "the street prostitutes were often black." Id. at 880. Plaintiff, who was not a prostitute, sued ABC for defamation. On appeal from a summary judgment in favor of ABC, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff had shown a jury issue. The case ended with a stipulation and an Order of Dismissal. Id. at 879-80 n.3.
19. See generally Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference/Deviance Divide, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (1992) [hereinafter Austin, Difference/Deviance]. Austin highlights a case, Clark v. American Broad. Co., Inc., 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983), where an ABC-TV film crew indiscriminately filmed Blackwomen walking down a street frequented by prostitutes. The plaintiff, an attractive Blackwoman, was filmed during the announcer's statement that "the street prostitutes were often black." Id. at 880. Plaintiff, who was not a prostitute, sued ABC for defamation. On appeal from a summary judgment in favor of ABC, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff had shown a jury issue. The case ended with a stipulation and an Order of Dismissal. Id. at 879-80 n.3.
20. See generally Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference/Deviance Divide, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (1992) [hereinafter Austin, Difference/Deviance]. Austin highlights a case, Clark v. American Broad. Co., Inc., 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983), where an ABC-TV film crew indiscriminately filmed Blackwomen walking down a street frequented by prostitutes. The plaintiff, an attractive Blackwoman, was filmed during the announcer's statement that "the street prostitutes were often black." Id. at 880. Plaintiff, who was not a prostitute, sued ABC for defamation. On appeal from a summary judgment in favor of ABC, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff had shown a jury issue. The case ended with a stipulation and an Order of Dismissal. Id. at 879-80 n.3.
21. Evelyn Higginbotham refers to the Blackwoman's assimilationist leanings as "The Politics of Respectability." She writes: "While adherence to respectability enabled black women to counter racist images and structures, their discursive contestation was not directed solely at white Americans. . . . Their assimilationist leanings led to their insistence upon black's conformity to the dominant society's norms of manners and morals." EVELYN B. HIGGINBOTHAM, RIGHTEOUS DISCONTENT 187 (1993).
22. BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 55 (1981).
23. See generally Impact of Welfare Reform on Children and Their Families: Hearings on S. 541-43 Before the Subcomm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1995).
24. The Women's Committee of One Hundred solicited money for an ad that ran on August 8,1995 in the New York Times. The ad was headlined: "Why Every Woman in America Should Beware of Welfare Cuts." The ad had a section entitled "What myths underlie the attack on welfare?" and another section entitled "10 facts most Americans don't know about welfare." N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1995, at B7.
25. Often cited for accuracy are the data published by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. In a summary of a proposal entitled Making Welfare Work: The Principles for Constructive Welfare Reform, the Joint Center publication states: Myth - Most families on welfare are black. Fact - Of the 4.9 million families on AFDC, 39% are white, 37% are black, and 17% are Hispanic. The proportion of the AFDC population that is black has been dropping since 1973. Myth - The typical AFDC family has four or more children. Fact - The typical AFDC family is comprised of a mother and two children. The birthrate among AFDC families is slightly lower than the birthrate for the general population. Id.
26. HOOKS, supra note 17, at 52.
27. Id. at 65-66.
28. Steven L. Winter, Forward: On Building Houses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1601 (1991).
29. In a symposium on Critical Race Theory, Professor Angela Harris thoroughly and elegantly discusses competing schools of thought. Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994). She argues that these schools create a tension with which legal scholars working in the areas must contend. She summarizes the elements of the theories and then calls for a jurisprudence of reconstruction. Harris credits Mari Matsuda with having coined this phrase. Id. at 765. Jurisprudence of Reconstruction is the "attempt to reconstruct political modernism itself in light of the difference 'race' makes." Id. at 760. In stating that race critics, or "crits," hold the "dual commitment to anti-racist critique and to maintaining the distinctive cultures formed in part by concepts of 'race,'" Harris calls the dual commitment of Critical Race Theory the "politics of difference." Id. In her article, she describes "traditional civil rights scholarship," Critical Race Theory ("CRT"), Critical Legal Studies ("CLS"), Critical Race Feminism ("CRF"), "outsider jurisprudence," modernism, postmodernism, modernist and postmodernist narratives, and legal storytelling. Id. She speaks of resistance culture, multiple consciousness as jurisprudential method, and Post-structuralism and the concept of discourse. Id. Further explanation of these concepts is beyond the scope of this Article. I list Harris's enumeration here to direct any reader to this article who would like a deeper, more extensive explanation of the terms than what I elucidate later in my own Article.
30. In a symposium on Critical Race Theory, Professor Angela Harris thoroughly and elegantly discusses competing schools of thought. Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994). She argues that these schools create a tension with which legal scholars working in the areas must contend. She summarizes the elements of the theories and then calls for a jurisprudence of reconstruction. Harris credits Mari Matsuda with having coined this phrase. Id. at 765. Jurisprudence of Reconstruction is the "attempt to reconstruct political modernism itself in light of the difference 'race' makes." Id. at 760. In stating that race critics, or "crits," hold the "dual commitment to anti-racist critique and to maintaining the distinctive cultures formed in part by concepts of 'race,'" Harris calls the dual commitment of Critical Race Theory the "politics of difference." Id. In her article, she describes "traditional civil rights scholarship," Critical Race Theory ("CRT"), Critical Legal Studies ("CLS"), Critical Race Feminism ("CRF"), "outsider jurisprudence," modernism, postmodernism, modernist and postmodernist narratives, and legal storytelling. Id. She speaks of resistance culture, multiple consciousness as jurisprudential method, and Post-structuralism and the concept of discourse. Id. Further explanation of these concepts is beyond the scope of this Article. I list Harris's enumeration here to direct any reader to this article who would like a deeper, more extensive explanation of the terms than what I elucidate later in my own Article.
31. Harris, supra note 24, at 761.
32. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
33. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
34. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
35. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
36. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
37. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
38. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
39. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
40. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
41. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
42. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
43. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
44. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
45. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
46. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
47. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
48. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
49. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
50. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
51. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
52. Kimberlé Crenshaw has been a major contributor to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It]. Crenshaw was featured in A Manifesto of Sorts for a Black Feminist Movement. Kristl B. Zook, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 12, 1995 at 86 Crenshaw is featured among the group called "The Progressive Bridge," a group that comes by their recognition entitlement for reasons other than the death of a famous husband who worked in the civil rights movement. Id. The bridge group is featured as having spawned "The New Guard," an even younger group of Blackwomen who reject "the notion of a single black identity" and confront "the issues of both race and sex." Id. Angela Harris and Mari Matsuda have also made major contributions to Critical Race Feminism. E.g., Harris, supra note 24; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Critical Legal Studies]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Racist Speech]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda, Multiple Consciousness]. Other scholars who also deny the existence of a unified definition of "woman" or "woman's experience" include Patricia Cain, Martha Minow, and Drucilla Cornell. E.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE DOUBLY-PRIZED WORLD: MYTH, ALLEGORY AND THE FEMININE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 847 (1990); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1990). Critics of CRF believe that the politics of difference harms the feminist project and ought not be espoused. Proponents of this position include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman. E.g., Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991).
53. See Schlag, supra note 13; Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991).
54. See generally Winter, supra note 23; Steven L. Winter, Beyond Critique: Law, Culture and the Politics of Form: An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991) [hereinafter Winter, Beyond Critique]; Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990) [hereinafter Winter, Bull Durham].
55. See generally Winter, supra note 23; Steven L. Winter, Beyond Critique: Law, Culture and the Politics of Form: An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991) [hereinafter Winter, Beyond Critique]; Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990) [hereinafter Winter, Bull Durham].
56. See generally Winter, supra note 23; Steven L. Winter, Beyond Critique: Law, Culture and the Politics of Form: An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991) [hereinafter Winter, Beyond Critique]; Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990) [hereinafter Winter, Bull Durham].
57. See generally Winter, supra note 23; Steven L. Winter, Beyond Critique: Law, Culture and the Politics of Form: An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991) [hereinafter Winter, Beyond Critique]; Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990) [hereinafter Winter, Bull Durham].
58. Schlag, supra note 13, at 1628-29.
59. "[N]ormative precommitment" is a term used by Steven Winter. See Winter, supra note 23, at 1610.
60. Schlag, supra note 13, at 1730.
61. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
62. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
63. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
64. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
65. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
66. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
67. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
68. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
69. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
70. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
71. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
72. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
73. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
74. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
75. Substantial contributors in the area of narrative and storytelling include Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Richard Delgado. E.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (Bell's masterful piece of the Ten Chronicles) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) (discussing civil rights through narrative storytelling) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Chronicles]; Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Year of Transition]; Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Inward Turn]; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing: Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Delgado urges other scholars to use narrative in legal discourse and has discussed what makes for "good" narrative. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411-13 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, A Plea for Narrative]
76. Delgado, A Plea for Narrative, supra note 32, at 2411-13.
77. ROLLO MAY, THE CRY FOR MYTH 20 (1991).
78. See infra Part II for my argument that the "jezebel" myth and jurisprudence are symbiotic and the study of their relationship is not a study in the science of law. It is rather a study of theory embedded in practice.
79. FRIEDREICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 20 (Helen Zimmerman trans., 1989) (1886).
80. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1497 (1993) [here-inafter WEBSTER'S THIRD].
81. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1497 (1993) [here-inafter WEBSTER'S THIRD].
82. See generally CAROL S. PEARSON, THE HERO WITHIN (1991).
83. J.C. SMITH & DAVID N. WEISSTUB, THE WESTERN IDEA OF LAW 119-20 (1983).
84. Id. at 119.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 120. Smith and Weisstub argue that: Myth, through its offspring, law, is the most powerful statement of values to which any society commits itself. Law, furthermore, is the most conservative statement of these values, bearing an intimate relationship to the existing power structure. In all cultures the resolution of conflict and law, as the embodiment of systematic principles around which authority is organized, may be seen as the rationalizing process according to which obedience and respect for hierarchy are developed. Myth, in functional terms, is a pragmatic reaction to the resolution of problems which affect the individual in the social environment; it legitimates institutions and their rituals. An unsympathetic analysis of this process interprets myth as a device of propaganda and social control. Id.
87. Winter, supra note 23, at 1619.
88. Schlag, supra note 13, at 1628.
89. Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (1994) (citations omitted).
90. HOOKS, supra note 17, at 33.
91. Id.
92. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 877 (1988) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S II].
93. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 877 (1988) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S II].
94. WEBSTER'S THIRD, supra note 37, at 1686.
95. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domination, in DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 126, 126-213 (1993).
96. Austin, Difference/Deviance, supra note 15, at 887.
97. Id.
98. This woman is my imaginative construct. See generally DEBORAH G. WHITE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN (1987). See particularly the chapter on Jezebel and Mammy. Id. at 27-61. See also George (a Slave) v. Mississippi, 37 Miss. 316 (1859) (stating that "[masters and slaves cannot be governed by the same common system of laws: so different are their positions, rights, and du-ties;" holding that there is no legal remedy available for rape of female slave child).
99. This woman is my imaginative construct. See generally DEBORAH G. WHITE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN (1987). See particularly the chapter on Jezebel and Mammy. Id. at 27-61. See also George (a Slave) v. Mississippi, 37 Miss. 316 (1859) (stating that "[masters and slaves cannot be governed by the same common system of laws: so different are their positions, rights, and du-ties;" holding that there is no legal remedy available for rape of female slave child).
100. See generally MELTON A. MCLAURIN, CELIA, A SLAVE (1991).
101. I use white women myths for the benefit of Eurocentrics who can easily recall them. It is noteworthy of the Blackwoman's "no-self that no myths of romance or power exist in the mass consciousness about them.
102. WHITE, supra note 53, at 27-61; see also MCLAURIN, supra note 54. Celia's story is that of a slave purchased at 15 who was continuously sexually used and raped by her owner. She bore two children fathered by him before, at the age of 19, she killed him when he attempted to rape her again. She was not allowed to argue self-defense or a "she feared for her life" defense because "a slave could not testify against a white person, even one deceased." MCLAURIN, supra note 54, at 106. Having exhausted all appeals, Celia was executed for having murdered her attacker for no good reason. Id. at 133. "The moral issues in the case of Celia, a Slave were judged irrelevant." Id. at 134.
103. HOOKS, supra note 17, at 15. In a retrospective examination of the black female slave experience, sexism looms as large as racism as an oppressive force in the lives of black women. Institutionalized sexism - that is, patriarchy - formed the base of the American social structure along with racial imperialism. Sexism was an integral part of the social and political order white colonizers brought with them from their European homelands, and it was to have a grave impact on the fate of enslaved black women. Id.
104. Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 7 (1993).
105. See generally Caldwell, supra note 4 (discussing intersection between race and gender); Crenshaw, Demarginalizing, supra note 26 (discussing Black Feminist criticism); Harris, Race and Essentialism supra note 26 (discussing work by feminist legal theorists); Roberts, supra note 58.
106. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing, supra note 26, at 403. The particular experience of black women in the dominant cultural ideology of American society can be conceptualized as intersectional. Intersectionality captures the way in which the particular location of black women in dominant American social relations is unique and in some senses unassimilable into the discursive paradigms of gender and race domination. One commonly noted aspect of this location is that black women are in a sense doubly burdened, subject in some ways to the dominating practices of both a sexual hierarchy and a racial one. In addition to this added dimension, intersectionality also refers to the ways that black women's marginalization within dominant discourses of resistance limits the means available to relate and conceptualize our experiences as black women. Id. at 404.
107. HOOKS, supra note 17, at 38-39.
108. HARRIET A. JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL 12 (L. Maria Child ed., AMS Press 1973) (1861).
109. See, e.g., HOOKS, supra note 17, at 36-37 (citing Once a Slave): [A] white mistress returned home unexpectedly from an outing, opened the doors of her dressing room, and discovered her husband raping a thirteen year old slave girl. She responded by beating the girl and locking her in a smokehouse. The girl was whipped daily for several weeks. When older slaves pleaded on the child's behalf and dared to suggest that the white master was to blame, the mistress simply replied, "She'll know better in the future. After I've done with her, she'll never do the like again through ignorance." Id.
110. Kennedy, supra note 50.
111. Id. at 152-53.
112. HOOKS, supra note 17, at 124. There is an extensive Blackwomen's literature regarding white women's racism. Audre Lorde, for example, criticized feminist theologian Mary Daly's use of exclusively white goddess imagery and Eurocentric women's spirituality in her MetaEthics of Radical Feminism. For example, in "An Open Letter to Mary Daly," Lorde charged that [w]hat [Daly] excluded from Gyn/Ecology dismissed my heritage and the heritage of all other noneuropean women, and denied the real connections that exists between all of us . . . . So the question arises in my mind, Mary, do you ever really read the work of Black women? Did you ever read my words or did you merely finger through them for quotations which you thought might valuably support an already conceived idea concerning some old and distorted connection between us? This is not a rhetorical question. Audre Lorde, An Open Letter to Mary Daly, in AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 68 (1984). See also MCLAURIN, supra note 54, at 32. "[W]hile slavery had its white female southern critics, white women were on the whole supportive of the institution . . . ." Id. McLaurin cites Elizabeth Fox-Genovese's Within the Plantation Household, especially chapters 5 & 7, as his reference source. See id. at 150 (citing ELIZBETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH (1988)).
113. See also NELL I. PAINTER, STANDING AT ARMAGEDDON 247-48 (1987) [hereinafter PAINTER, STANDING]. Because so many black women were poor, black women's organizations, such as the National Association of Colored Women, the National Federation of Colored Women's Clubs, and the Northeastern Federation of Colored Women's Clubs worked for suffrage along with white women, even though the white suffragists betrayed a good deal of racial prejudice. Id.
114. See also NELL I. PAINTER, STANDING AT ARMAGEDDON 247-48 (1987) [hereinafter PAINTER, STANDING]. Because so many black women were poor, black women's organizations, such as the National Association of Colored Women, the National Federation of Colored Women's Clubs, and the Northeastern Federation of Colored Women's Clubs worked for suffrage along with white women, even though the white suffragists betrayed a good deal of racial prejudice. Id.
115. Nell I. Painter, Thinking About the Languages of Money and Race: A Response to Michael O'Malley, "Specie and Species", 99 AM. HIST. REV. Apr. 1994, at 396(a).
116. Id. at 398.
117. Id.
118. Harris, supra note at 3, at 1730.
119. I use Eurocentrism to mean the regard of a European-white male value system as the standard for measurement; Afrocentrism is to regard that which is based in an African culture as the standard for measurement.
120. See Roberts, supra note 58, at 6. "There are two very different struggles involved here. One is the war against racism in white people, and the other is the need for Black women to confront and wade through the racist constructs underlying our deprivation of each other. And these battles are not at all the same." Id.
121. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 32, at 215-35. These pages in Bell's book include the myths, "The Chronicle of the Slave Scrolls" and "The Right to Decolonize Black Minds."
122. Id.
123. LORRAINE HANSBERRY, To BE YOUNG, GIFTED AND BLACK 77 (1970)
124. Id. See also HOOKS, supra note 17, at 58-59 (quoting LORRAINE HANSBERRY, To BE YOUNG, GIFTED AND BLACK (1970)).
125. Barbara Y. Welke, "All the Women are White; All the Blacks are Men," or Are They: Law and Segregation on Common Carriers, 1855 to 1914. ABF WORKING PAPER No. 9215, at 2.
126. Id. at 3.
127. See Harris, supra note 24.
128. Welke, supra note 78, at 10.
129. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). This was one of the five cases consolidated under the heading of the The Civil Rights Cases, United States v. Robinson v. Memphis & Charleston R.R Co., 109 U.S. 3 (1883), which challenged the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Amendment of 1875. This Amendment provided that all persons were entitled to equal access to public buildings and transportation, regardless of race. See U.S. CONST, amend. XIII. The following discussion in the text focuses on the Robinson facts specifically.
130. Welke, supra note 78, at 57.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 56.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
138. Id. at 5.
139. Id. at 24-25 (finding that conductor's refusal of access had "nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude" because public carriers are only bound to furnish proper accommodations "to all unobjectionable persons").
140. 7 F. 51 (W.D. Tenn. 1881).
141. Id. at 57-58.
142. Id. at 58.
143. Id.; see also Welke, supra note 78, at 59.
144. Brown, 7 F. at 60.
145. Id. at 58.
146. Id.
147. The Civil Right Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1883).
148. Brown, 7 F. at 62.
149. The strength of the race-based presumption of looseness and immorality, "a fast woman," also appears in Green v. City of Bridgeton, 10 F. Cas. 1090 (S.D. Ga. 1879) (No. 5,754). In Green, the Blackwoman passenger on a steamboat dressed nicely and wore jewelry. The captain testified that the plaintiff "was a very nicely dressed woman judging from her appearance I should say that she was a fast woman." Welke, supra note 78, at 56. The agent and general manager testified: "I mean that she was flashily dressed." Id. at 57. "The quantity of jewelry worn by a person where the jewelry is of the class that this was determines my mind to a large extent as to the morality of the woman. I cannot give the size of the jewelry but the impression on my mind was that it was large and flashy." Id.
150. Id. Blackwoman journalist Ida B. Wells was among the Blackwomen who sued a rail-road company for not allowing her to sit in the ladies' car. Although Wells was awarded $500 at trial, on appeal, the railroad company prevailed. Chesapeake, Ohio & Southwestern R.R. Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613, 615 (1887); see also IDA B. WELLS, CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA B. WELLS 18-19 (Alfreda M. Duster ed., 1970); Amii L. Barnard, The Application of Critical Race Feminism to the Anti-Lynching Movement: Black Women's Fight Against Race and Gender Ideology, 1892-1920, 3 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 14 (1993) (recounting Wells's lawsuit against railroad company); Patricia H. Minter, The Failure of Freedom: Class, Gender, and the Evolution of Segregated Transit Law in the Nineteenth-Century South, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 1004-06 (1995) (discussing details of Wells's lawsuit against railroad company).
151. Id. Blackwoman journalist Ida B. Wells was among the Blackwomen who sued a rail-road company for not allowing her to sit in the ladies' car. Although Wells was awarded $500 at trial, on appeal, the railroad company prevailed. Chesapeake, Ohio & Southwestern R.R. Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613, 615 (1887); see also IDA B. WELLS, CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA B. WELLS 18-19 (Alfreda M. Duster ed., 1970); Amii L. Barnard, The Application of Critical Race Feminism to the Anti-Lynching Movement: Black Women's Fight Against Race and Gender Ideology, 1892-1920, 3 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 14 (1993) (recounting Wells's lawsuit against railroad company); Patricia H. Minter, The Failure of Freedom: Class, Gender, and the Evolution of Segregated Transit Law in the Nineteenth-Century South, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 1004-06 (1995) (discussing details of Wells's lawsuit against railroad company).
152. Id. Blackwoman journalist Ida B. Wells was among the Blackwomen who sued a rail-road company for not allowing her to sit in the ladies' car. Although Wells was awarded $500 at trial, on appeal, the railroad company prevailed. Chesapeake, Ohio & Southwestern R.R. Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613, 615 (1887); see also IDA B. WELLS, CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA B. WELLS 18-19 (Alfreda M. Duster ed., 1970); Amii L. Barnard, The Application of Critical Race Feminism to the Anti-Lynching Movement: Black Women's Fight Against Race and Gender Ideology, 1892-1920, 3 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 14 (1993) (recounting Wells's lawsuit against railroad company); Patricia H. Minter, The Failure of Freedom: Class, Gender, and the Evolution of Segregated Transit Law in the Nineteenth-Century South, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 1004-06 (1995) (discussing details of Wells's lawsuit against railroad company).
153. Harris, supra note 3, at 1731.
154. In a chapter from Righteous Discontent, entitled "Contested Discourses," Evelyn Higginbotham presents a 1904 portrayal of the white woman's belief about Blackwomen, as quoted from a contemporary newspaper Negro women evidence more nearly the popular idea of total depravity than the men do. . . . When a man's mother, wife and daughters are all immoral women, there is no room in his fallen nature for the aspiration of honor and virtue. . . . I cannot imagine such a creation as a virtuous black woman. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 16, at 190.
155. Schlag, supra note 13, at 1737.
156. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL TWENTIETH CENTURY UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 993 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL].
157. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL TWENTIETH CENTURY UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 993 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL].
158. Id.
159. M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 4 (6th ed. 1994).
160. Indeed the question is asked, "But what are 'human rights'?. . . Jurisprudence does not provide answers to these questions but it does offer pointers, clues, insights: it teaches . . . the rudiments of moral arguments." Id. at 4-5.
161. Schlag, supra note 13, at 1658 (quoting Felix Frankfurter).
162. Id.
163. See generally id. (noting that character of "subject" is missing from most legal thought and interpretations of law).
164. Id. at 1628-29.
165. See, e.g., People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (Cal. 1992) (discussing policy behind permitting judge to prohibit future pregnancies as condition for probation).
166. Id. at 270 (noting imposition of judge's personal values in sentencing decision).
167. Schlag, supra note 13, at 1658.
168. Id. at 1638-39.
169. Winter, supra note 23, at 1601.
170. Id.
171. Schlag, supra note 13, at 1644.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1629.
174. Id. at 1640.
175. ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS: THE MCNAIR LECTURES 117 (Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1969) (1924).
176. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 170-71 (1994).
177. Schlag, supra note 13, at 1640.
178. Note, Dethroning the Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of Reform, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2013, 2013 (1994).
179. Id. at 2016.
180. ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 5 (1976). Roscoe Pound offers the following characteristics of social theory jurisprudence: Sociological jurists regard the working of the law . . . rather than the abstract content of the authoritative precepts. But recent writers on sociology of law are also using the term for all social control. . . . They regard [law] as a social institution which may be improved by intelligent effort. . . . Sociological jurists lay stress upon the social purposes which the law . . . subserves rather than upon sanctions. [They] look on legal institutions and doctrines and precepts functionally. They regard the form of legal precepts as a matter of means only. ROSCOE POUND, 1 JURISPRUDENCE 291-93 (1959).
181. ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 5 (1976). Roscoe Pound offers the
182. The miscegenation codes were prohibitions that some state legislatures enacted to make it criminal behavior for white persons to marry, commit adultery, or fornicate with any person outside their own race. Miscegenation codes were enacted in many states in the wake of slavery's abolition. The codes were intended to deter interracial sexual relations. The codes themselves, as well as the court decisions upholding them, managed to control this type of interaction by branding post-slavery interracial relationships as morally repugnant. For example, the Alabama miscegenation code was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882). Pace was later denounced in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding Virginia's miscegenation statute in violation of Fourteenth Amendment).
183. See generally Loving, 388 U.S. at 6-8 (analyzing attempts to create a legitimate role for Blackwomen).
184. In Loving, the body politic's cry for white racial purity is loud and clear. The trial judge relied upon the authority of "Almighty God" for his opinion that mixing of the races was illegal. Id. at 3. In Loving, a Black woman and a white man married in Washington, D.C., where there was no ban on interracial marriage and moved back to Virginia where there was such a ban. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court had based a decision prior to Loving on reasoning that the state legislature had intended to prevent "the corruption of blood," and a "mongrel breed of citizens." Id. at 7 (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)). Cf. Story v. State, 59 So. 480, 482 (Ala. 1912) (discussing separation of races in context of natural law). The social status, as respects the white race and the negro race, in this state is universally known. The general relation of the races, each toward the other, is kind and cordial to a most marked and gratifying degree; and the impulse the dominant race manifests toward the inferior race is that of a commendable guardianship and abundant generosity, inspired by motives not only of fundamental justice but of sentiment engendered by the earlier legal dependence and subjection of the slave to the master. While this honorable condition is obvious and prevails, yet the social relation and practices of the races have, in the interest of our civilization as well as in expression of the natural pride of the dominant Anglo-Saxon race and of its preservation from the degeneration social equality, between the races, would inevitably bring, imperatively necessitated and created immutable rules of social conduct and social restraint, that the just ends indicated might be attained and permanently maintained. Since the fundamental, initial suggestion of the social separation of the races is conceived in nature and is nurtured by a social pride and self-respect that only ignorance or unholy purpose can question or assail, it was and is the natural result that laws should be enacted primitive of the social purpose of the dominant race. Story, 59 So. at 482.
185. CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEXUAL PERSONAE: ART AND DECADENCE FROM NEFERTITI TO EMILY DICKINSON 2 (1990).
186. Meyer, supra note 45, at 1152.
187. HOOKS, supra note 17, at 33.
188. Meyer, supra note 45, at 1152.
189. Id.
190. MERLIN STONE, WHEN GOD WAS A WOMAN (1976). Stone asks, "What had life been like for women who lived in a society that venerated a wise and valiant female Creator? Why had the members of the later male religions fought so aggressively to suppress that earlier worship - even the very memory of it?" Id. at xiii.
191. Winter, supra note 23, at 1609.
192. COLLINS, supra at 8, at 78.
193. Dees v. Metts, 17 So.2d 137, 143 (Ala. 1944) (denouncing interracial relationship of decedent in probate matter).
194. People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 267 (Cal. 1992) (holding that condition of probation prohibiting pregnancy is unlawful).
195. Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (considering possible racial discrimination in context of hair style prohibitions imposed by employer).
196. 17 So. 2d 137 (Ala. 1944).
197. Id. at 138.
198. Id.
199. See supra note 131, for a discussion of miscegenation codes.
200. The decision speaks of Watts' having been rude to his mother and brother whenever they attempted to dissuade him from associating with Parker. Id. at 141.
201. Id. at 140-41.
202. Id. at 139 (quoting Story v. State, 59 So. 480, 482 (Ala. 1912)).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 142.
206. Id. at 144.
207. Id.
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 139.
210. Id. at 145.
211. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (Cal. 1992).
212. Id. at 267.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1444 (1991).
216. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 5 (1883).
217. Roberts, supra note 58, at 11.
218. Id.
219. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (Cal. 1992).
220. Id. at 270.
221. Id. at 269.
222. Id. at 270.
223. 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
224. Id. at 292.
225. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269.
226. Id. at 267.
227. Id. at 270.
228. Some examples of "buzz" words are: "welfare reform" equals "get Blackwomen off of welfare;" "welfare queen" equals "black women"; "quotas" equals "too many Blacks."
229. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
230. Caldwell, supra note 4, at 366.
231. Id. at 367.
232. RALPH WILEY, WHY BLACK PEOPLE TEND TO SHOUT (1991).
233. Id. at 8-13.
234. Id. at 13. See also NOLIWE M. ROOKS, HAIR RAISING: BEALTTY, CULTURE AND AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN (1996).
235. Id. at 13. See also NOLIWE M. ROOKS, HAIR RAISING: BEALTTY, CULTURE AND AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN (1996).
236. TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE (1970).
237. See Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
238. DeSimone, supra note 2, at A14.
239. Caldwell, supra note 4, at 383.
240. Id. at 375-76.
241. Id. at 370. Caldwell continues by arguing that the failure of well-meaning political activists, policy-makers, and legal theorists to consider the implications of a race-sex intersection arises from a failure to grapple with the complex of myths, negative images, and stereotypes regarding black womanhood. Id. at 376. Upon reading this latter argument, I find myself saying: "Ah-hah!" My perspective is simply that myth is the foundation and the perpetuating force that supplies the negative images and stereotypes.
242. See 10 (Warner Bros. 1979); see also Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
243. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 233.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Another important way of understanding the manner in which the lash of "jezebel" scars Blackwomen is to analyze Caldwell's article as mental balm for the author's own acknowledged pain in grappling with illegitimate hair. A scar it is, but it is one that has taken on positive psyche value for the bearer. Caldwell's reader's cannot deny the culture's delegitimation of the Blackwoman's identity image. Nor can we feel the passion with which the article is written and deny that "jezebel" has wounded a psyche. A subsection of her article, entitled Healing the Shame, graphically portrays the wound of its author. See Caldwell, supra note 4, at 395-96. However, Caldwell's intellectual prowess allows her to work through a doctrinal analysis of Rogers and the other cases she discusses to turn the scar into what Alice Walker refers to as "warrior marks." See ALICE WALKER, WARRIOR MARKS (1993). bell hooks also notes the depth of her pain at the hands of what I am calling the "jezebel whip;" she, too, seems to be able to turn her scars into "warrior marks" through her careful examination of the scars themselves: Let me begin by saying that I came to this theory because I was hurting - the pain within me was so intense that I could not go on living. I came to theory desperate, wanting to comprehend-to grasp what was happening around and within me. Most importantly, I wanted to make the hurt go away. I saw in theory then a location for healing, bell hooks, Theory as Liberatory Practice, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1 (1991).
248. Another important way of understanding the manner in which the lash of "jezebel" scars Blackwomen is to analyze Caldwell's article as mental balm for the author's own acknowledged pain in grappling with illegitimate hair. A scar it is, but it is one that has taken on positive psyche value for the bearer. Caldwell's reader's cannot deny the culture's delegitimation of the Blackwoman's identity image. Nor can we feel the passion with which the article is written and deny that "jezebel" has wounded a psyche. A subsection of her article, entitled Healing the Shame, graphically portrays the wound of its author. See Caldwell, supra note 4, at 395-96. However, Caldwell's intellectual prowess allows her to work through a doctrinal analysis of Rogers and the other cases she discusses to turn the scar into what Alice Walker refers to as "warrior marks." See ALICE WALKER, WARRIOR MARKS (1993). bell hooks also notes the depth of her pain at the hands of what I am calling the "jezebel whip;" she, too, seems to be able to turn her scars into "warrior marks" through her careful examination of the scars themselves: Let me begin by saying that I came to this theory because I was hurting - the pain within me was so intense that I could not go on living. I came to theory desperate, wanting to comprehend-to grasp what was happening around and within me. Most importantly, I wanted to make the hurt go away. I saw in theory then a location for healing, bell hooks, Theory as Liberatory Practice, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1 (1991).
249. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 233.
250. Id.
251. Cain, supra note 26, at 806.
252. MAYA ANGELOU, And Still I Rise, in AND STILL I RISE 41, 41-42 (1978).
253. See supra text accompanying note 37.
254. WEBSTER'S II, supra note 48, at 782.
255. SMITH & WEISSTUB, supra note 39, at 120.
256. Id.
257. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 16, at 187.
258. LORDE, supra note 66, at 53.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 55.
261. Id. at 54.
262. Id. at 56.
263. Id. at 57.
264. ELIZABETH A. PETERSON, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN: A STUDY OF WILL AND SUCCESS (1992).
265. Id. at 1.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. 840 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1988).
269. Austin, supra note 10, at 549.
270. Id. at 551.
271. Id. at 550.
272. Id. at 549.
273. Id. at 552-53.
274. Id. at 553.
275. Id. at 553-54 (footnotes omitted).
276. Id. at 549.
277. Id.
278. Caldwell, supra note 4.
279. Austin, supra note 10.
280. Austin, Difference/Deviance, supra note 15, at 887.
281. See generally Joan R. Tarpley, Grounded Feminist Theory: And I Sprang Full Grown from My Father's Head or Was It Really from My Mother's?, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 589-92 (1993).
282. Id. at 592.
283. Id. at 589.
284. PETERSON, supra note 211, at 1.
285. See Winter, supra note 23, at 1606 (refuting idea that culture and self-identity are distinctly autonomous principles).
286. See generally Schlag, supra note 13 (discussing need to focus on subject when analyzing legal problems).