Why the end of the Cold War doesn't matter: The US war of terror in Colombia

Review of International Studies

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 569-585+464

  Stokes, Doug ^a  

^a ABERYSTWYTH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 10744231488     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210503005692     Document Type: Review

References (101)

1. 1 For a small, but representative sample see Michael Cox, Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller (eds.), America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
2. For a small, but representative sample see Michael Cox, Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller (eds.), America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
3. See for example the self proclaimed dissident IR theorist David Campbell, 'Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics, and the Anarchical World', in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker, Challenging Boundaries (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 7-32.
4. See, for example, Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). There are a much smaller number of mainstream IR theorists and analysts who examine continuities between the Cold War and post-Cold War period. However, they still accept as unproblematic the contestable claim that US foreign policy is essentially benign and was defensively driven during the Cold War. For a selection of IR theorists who outline a number of continuities see Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', in International Security, 18:2 (1993), pp. 44-79; Colin Gray, 'Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future is the Past-with GPS', in Review of International Studies, 25 (Special Issue, 1999), pp. 161-82.
5. See, for example, Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). There are a much smaller number of mainstream IR theorists and analysts who examine continuities between the Cold War and post-Cold War period. However, they still accept as unproblematic the contestable claim that US foreign policy is essentially benign and was defensively driven during the Cold War. For a selection of IR theorists who outline a number of continuities see Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', in International Security, 18:2 (1993), pp. 44-79; Colin Gray, 'Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future is the Past-with GPS', in Review of International Studies, 25 (Special Issue, 1999), pp. 161-82.
6. See, for example, Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). There are a much smaller number of mainstream IR theorists and analysts who examine continuities between the Cold War and post-Cold War period. However, they still accept as unproblematic the contestable claim that US foreign policy is essentially benign and was defensively driven during the Cold War. For a selection of IR theorists who outline a number of continuities see Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', in International Security, 18:2 (1993), pp. 44-79; Colin Gray, 'Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future is the Past-with GPS', in Review of International Studies, 25 (Special Issue, 1999), pp. 161-82.
7. Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues (London: Verso Press, 1993).
8. Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (London: Verso, 1992).
9. See for example, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, 'The Origins of the Cold War', in Foreign Affairs, 46 (1967), pp. 22-52; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969); Hugh Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace: the Struggle for Power in the Postwar World (New York: Praeger, 1960). Although there has emerged a 'post-revisionist' historiography it has been argued convincingly that post-revisionism acts as a form of 'rearguard' neo-orthodoxy masquerading as a synthesis of both the orthodox and revisionist positions. For examples of post-revisionism, see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', in Diplomatic History, 7:3 (1983), pp. 171-204; For an interesting critique of post-revisionism see Bruce Cummings, 'Revising Post-Revisionism or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History', in Diplomatic History, 17:4 ( 1993), pp. 539-69.
10. See for example, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, 'The Origins of the Cold War', in Foreign Affairs, 46 (1967), pp. 22-52; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969); Hugh Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace: the Struggle for Power in the Postwar World (New York: Praeger, 1960). Although there has emerged a 'post-revisionist' historiography it has been argued convincingly that post-revisionism acts as a form of 'rearguard' neo-orthodoxy masquerading as a synthesis of both the orthodox and revisionist positions. For examples of post-revisionism, see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', in Diplomatic History, 7:3 (1983), pp. 171-204; For an interesting critique of post-revisionism see Bruce Cummings, 'Revising Post-Revisionism or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History', in Diplomatic History, 17:4 ( 1993), pp. 539-69.
11. See for example, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, 'The Origins of the Cold War', in Foreign Affairs, 46 (1967), pp. 22-52; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969); Hugh Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace: the Struggle for Power in the Postwar World (New York: Praeger, 1960). Although there has emerged a 'post-revisionist' historiography it has been argued convincingly that post-revisionism acts as a form of 'rearguard' neo-orthodoxy masquerading as a synthesis of both the orthodox and revisionist positions. For examples of post-revisionism, see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', in Diplomatic History, 7:3 (1983), pp. 171-204; For an interesting critique of post-revisionism see Bruce Cummings, 'Revising Post-Revisionism or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History', in Diplomatic History, 17:4 ( 1993), pp. 539-69.
12. See for example, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, 'The Origins of the Cold War', in Foreign Affairs, 46 (1967), pp. 22-52; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969); Hugh Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace: the Struggle for Power in the Postwar World (New York: Praeger, 1960). Although there has emerged a 'post-revisionist' historiography it has been argued convincingly that post-revisionism acts as a form of 'rearguard' neo-orthodoxy masquerading as a synthesis of both the orthodox and revisionist positions. For examples of post-revisionism, see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', in Diplomatic History, 7:3 (1983), pp. 171-204; For an interesting critique of post-revisionism see Bruce Cummings, 'Revising Post-Revisionism or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History', in Diplomatic History, 17:4 ( 1993), pp. 539-69.
13. See for example, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, 'The Origins of the Cold War', in Foreign Affairs, 46 (1967), pp. 22-52; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969); Hugh Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace: the Struggle for Power in the Postwar World (New York: Praeger, 1960). Although there has emerged a 'post-revisionist' historiography it has been argued convincingly that post-revisionism acts as a form of 'rearguard' neo-orthodoxy masquerading as a synthesis of both the orthodox and revisionist positions. For examples of post-revisionism, see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', in Diplomatic History, 7:3 (1983), pp. 171-204; For an interesting critique of post-revisionism see Bruce Cummings, 'Revising Post-Revisionism or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History', in Diplomatic History, 17:4 ( 1993), pp. 539-69.
14. See for example, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, 'The Origins of the Cold War', in Foreign Affairs, 46 (1967), pp. 22-52; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969); Hugh Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace: the Struggle for Power in the Postwar World (New York: Praeger, 1960). Although there has emerged a 'post-revisionist' historiography it has been argued convincingly that post-revisionism acts as a form of 'rearguard' neo-orthodoxy masquerading as a synthesis of both the orthodox and revisionist positions. For examples of post-revisionism, see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', in Diplomatic History, 7:3 (1983), pp. 171-204; For an interesting critique of post-revisionism see Bruce Cummings, 'Revising Post-Revisionism or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History', in Diplomatic History, 17:4 ( 1993), pp. 539-69.
15. George Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954).
16. Lynn Eden, 'The End of US Cold War History? A Review Essay: A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, by Melvyn P. Leffler', in International Security, 18:1 (1993), pp. 174-207.
17. See Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), Containing the Soviet Union: A Critique of US Policy (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defence Publishers, 1987) for a useful overview of containment doctrine.
18. George Kennan, 'Reflections on Containment', in Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), Containing the Soviet Union, p. 16.
19. Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: US Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, and Counter Terrorism, 1940-1990 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992).
20. See Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision - A Memoir (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1989), pp. 214-55.
21. For the classic conservative articulation of this perspective, see Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: American Enterprise Institute, 1982); see also Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984)
22. For the classic conservative articulation of this perspective, see Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: American Enterprise Institute, 1982); see also Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984).
23. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Towards Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1947-1950: The Roaring of the Cataract (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
24. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Towards Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1947-1950: The Roaring of the Cataract (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
25. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Towards Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1947-1950: The Roaring of the Cataract (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
26. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Towards Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1947-1950: The Roaring of the Cataract (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
27. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Towards Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1947-1950: The Roaring of the Cataract (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
28. Samuel Huntington, 'America's Changing Strategic Interests', in Survival, 23:1 (1991), pp. 3-17; Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Rowman & Littlefleld, 2000); John Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape 'The Answer: A Partition Plan for Bosnia", The New Republic, 14 June 1993; Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
29. Samuel Huntington, 'America's Changing Strategic Interests', in Survival, 23:1 (1991), pp. 3-17; Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Rowman & Littlefleld, 2000); John Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape 'The Answer: A Partition Plan for Bosnia", The New Republic, 14 June 1993; Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
30. Samuel Huntington, 'America's Changing Strategic Interests', in Survival, 23:1 (1991), pp. 3-17; Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Rowman & Littlefleld, 2000); John Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape 'The Answer: A Partition Plan for Bosnia", The New Republic, 14 June 1993; Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
31. Samuel Huntington, 'America's Changing Strategic Interests', in Survival, 23:1 (1991), pp. 3-17; Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Rowman & Littlefleld, 2000); John Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape 'The Answer: A Partition Plan for Bosnia", The New Republic, 14 June 1993; Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
32. Samuel Huntington, 'America's Changing Strategic Interests', in Survival, 23:1 (1991), pp. 3-17; Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Rowman & Littlefleld, 2000); John Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape 'The Answer: A Partition Plan for Bosnia", The New Republic, 14 June 1993; Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
33. Robert Skidelsky, The World After Communism: A Polemic For Our Times (London: Macmillan, 1995); John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', in International Security, 15 (1990), pp. 5-56.
34. Robert Skidelsky, The World After Communism: A Polemic For Our Times (London: Macmillan, 1995); John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', in International Security, 15 (1990), pp. 5-56.
35. Francis Fukuyama, The End Of History And The Last Man (London: Penguin Books, 1992).
36. G. John Ikenberry. America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the PostWar Era', in Michael Cox, Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 104.
37. Tony Smith, 'National Security Liberalism and American Foreign Policy', in Cox, Inoguchi, Ikenberry, American Democracy Promotion, pp. 85-102.
38. Chomsky uses the revisionist historian Gabriel Kolko extensively throughout his work. For the classic text see Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Pantheon, 1990). See also Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War.1945-1980 (New York: Wiley, 1980); William Appleman Williams, History as a Way of Learning (New York: Norton, 1988).
39. Chomsky uses the revisionist historian Gabriel Kolko extensively throughout his work. For the classic text see Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Pantheon, 1990). See also Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War.1945-1980 (New York: Wiley, 1980); William Appleman Williams, History as a Way of Learning (New York: Norton, 1988).
40. Chomsky uses the revisionist historian Gabriel Kolko extensively throughout his work. For the classic text see Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Pantheon, 1990). See also Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War.1945-1980 (New York: Wiley, 1980); William Appleman Williams, History as a Way of Learning (New York: Norton, 1988).
41. Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 23.
42. Noam Chomsky, Year 501, pp. 65-98.
43. John Lewis Gaddis quoted in Noam Chomsky, World Orders, Old and New (London: Pluto Press, 1997), p. 34. Gaddis's emphasis.
44. For more on this see Winfred Ruigrock and Rob Van Tulder, The Logic of International Restructuring (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 221; Kenneth Flamm, Targeting the Computer: Government Support and International Competition (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987); Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1992); David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York: Knopf, 1984); Elizabeth Corcoran, 'Computing's Controversial Patron', Science, 2 April 1993, p. 20.
45. For more on this see Winfred Ruigrock and Rob Van Tulder, The Logic of International Restructuring (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 221; Kenneth Flamm, Targeting the Computer: Government Support and International Competition (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987); Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1992); David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York: Knopf, 1984); Elizabeth Corcoran, 'Computing's Controversial Patron', Science, 2 April 1993, p. 20.
46. For more on this see Winfred Ruigrock and Rob Van Tulder, The Logic of International Restructuring (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 221; Kenneth Flamm, Targeting the Computer: Government Support and International Competition (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987); Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1992); David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York: Knopf, 1984); Elizabeth Corcoran, 'Computing's Controversial Patron', Science, 2 April 1993, p. 20.
47. For more on this see Winfred Ruigrock and Rob Van Tulder, The Logic of International Restructuring (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 221; Kenneth Flamm, Targeting the Computer: Government Support and International Competition (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987); Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1992); David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York: Knopf, 1984); Elizabeth Corcoran, 'Computing's Controversial Patron', Science, 2 April 1993, p. 20.
48. For more on this see Winfred Ruigrock and Rob Van Tulder, The Logic of International Restructuring (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 221; Kenneth Flamm, Targeting the Computer: Government Support and International Competition (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987); Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1992); David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York: Knopf, 1984); Elizabeth Corcoran, 'Computing's Controversial Patron', Science, 2 April 1993, p. 20.
49. Duncan Jr. quote taken from Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, Imperial Alibis: Rationalizing US Intervention After the Cold War (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1993), p. 28.
50. Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, p. 49.
51. Chomsky, Rethinking Camelot. Introduction: Contours and Context, 〈http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/rc/rc-intro-s06.html〉
52. George Kennan, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948 (Washington, DC: General Printing Office, 1976), pp. 9-29; See Noam Chomsky, What Uncle Sam Really Wants: The Liberal Extreme. 〈http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/sam/sam-l-2.html〉 for Chomsky's analysis of Kennan's position.
53. George Kennan, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948 (Washington, DC: General Printing Office, 1976), pp. 9-29; See Noam Chomsky, What Uncle Sam Really Wants: The Liberal Extreme. 〈http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/sam/sam-l-2.html〉 for Chomsky's analysis of Kennan's position.
54. Noam Chomsky, World Orders, Old and New (London: Pluto Press, 1997). See also William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Intervention Since World War II (Maine: Common Courage Press, 1986).
55. Noam Chomsky, World Orders, Old and New (London: Pluto Press, 1997). See also William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Intervention Since World War II (Maine: Common Courage Press, 1986).
56. Thomas G, Patterson, Meeting the Communist Threat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
57. Chomsky is careful not to provide a materialist monocausal analysis of US foreign policy (i.e. relating it solely to economic considerations). He also examines ideological factors in US foreign policy but accords them secondary importance and argues that any 'close analysis of policy will generally unearth a structure of rational calculation based on perceived interests at its core but in the complex world of decision-making and political planning, many other elements may also intervene...including the system of self-serving beliefs that is regularly constructed to disguise - to others, and to oneself what is really happening in the world". Noam Chomsky, Turning the Tide: US Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace (Boston: South End Press, 1985), p. 56.
58. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh (eds.), Low Intensity Warfare (New York: Random House, 1988).
59. See Paul Wolf''s Plan Lazo and the Alliance for Progress for an excellent series of recently declassified documents on Plan Lazo and US policy during the Cold War. 〈http://www.icdc.com/̃paulwolf/colombia/planlazo.htm〉
60. Americas Watch, The Central-Americanization of Colombia? Human Rights and the Peace Process (New York: Americas Watch Report, 1986), pp. 141-4.
61. Joseph Biden, Aid to 'Plan Colombia': The Time for US Assistance is Now, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, May 2000.
62. Bill Clinton, Statement by President Bill Clinton (Washington, DC: The White House), 13 July 2000.
63. Rand Beers, US Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Remarks before the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism Subcommittee, Washington, DC, 25 February 2000, 〈http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000225_beers_sfrc.html〉
64. James Milford, DEA Congressional testimony. House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, 16 July 1997, 〈http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct970716.htm〉
65. DEA Congressional Testimony. Statement of Dannie R. Marshall. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 28 February 2001. 〈http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct022801.htm〉
66. Milford, DEA Congressional testimony.
67. Marshal. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control.
68. Washington Post, 10 April 2000.
69. Associated Press, 6 August 1999.
70. Reuters, 6 September 2000.
71. 45 For a more detailed analysis of Plan Colombia see Doug Stokes, 'Better Lead Than Bread? A Critical Analysis of the US's Plan Colombia', in Civil Wars, 4:2 (2001), pp. 59-78.
72. John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Drug Enforcement Administration, 19 March 2002. 〈http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/02031903.htm〉
73. The Washington Times, 19 July 2002.
74. The Center for International Policy, Why We Oppose the Andean Regional Initiative, September 2001. 〈http://www.ciponline.org.nxlkhost.com/colombia/092401.htm〉
75. Human Rights Watch, The Ties that Bind 〈http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/colombia/〉 To date, nobody has refuted or seriously challenged the HRW reports, which are generally regarded as authoritative. Human Rights Watch is the largest human rights monitoring organisation in the United States. For more on human rights in Colombia, see Amnesty International's website 〈http://www.amnesty.org/〉 and the US State Department's human rights documents 〈http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/〉
76. Human Rights Watch, Colombia 2000 〈http://www.hrw.org/hrw/wr2k/americas-03.htm〉
77. US Department of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 25 February 2000.
78. Human Rights Watch, The 'Sixth Division': Military-Paramilitary Ties and US Policy in Colombia. September, 2001. 〈http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/〉
79. Human Rights Watch, The 'Sixth Division'
80. Human Rights Watch / Amerieas Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Colombia's Killer Networks: the Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States (London: Human Rights Watch, 1996), p. 28. In the same report Human Rights Watch have provided the original documents of the order in both Spanish and English. See pp. 105-50.
81. Human Rights Watch, Colombia's Killer Networks, p 29.
82. Ibid., pp. 30-9.
83. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
84. Interestingly, William Robinson argues that whilst post-Cold War US objectives have remained the same as its earlier Cold War objectives (the maintenance of an unequal international system) its tactical considerations have shifted from the maintenance of authoritarian regimes to the promotion of polyarchic democracies throughout Latin America. Robinson defines polyarchy as elite-based democracies where popular participation in the electoral process is confined to leadership choices managed by competing elites. These polyarchic systems continue to maintain highly unequal socioeconomic systems. Polyarchic democracies primarily rely on consensual mechanisms (as opposed to violence). Alongside the promotion of polyarchy, however, resides the credible threat of repression should social forces committed to fundamental change threaten the social order, as is the case in Colombia. That is, polyarchy is the velvet glove of democracy wrapped around the iron fist of repression. Polyarchic democracy promotion thus remains consistent with long-term US foreign policy objectives and tactics. See the excellent William Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US Intervention, and Hegemony (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); William Robinson, 'Promoting Capitalist Polyarchy: The Case of Latin America', in Michael Cox, Takashi Inoguchi, G, John Ikenberry (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora and Richard Wilson (eds.), Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order (London: Pluto Press, 1993).
85. Interestingly, William Robinson argues that whilst post-Cold War US objectives have remained the same as its earlier Cold War objectives (the maintenance of an unequal international system) its tactical considerations have shifted from the maintenance of authoritarian regimes to the promotion of polyarchic democracies throughout Latin America. Robinson defines polyarchy as elite-based democracies where popular participation in the electoral process is confined to leadership choices managed by competing elites. These polyarchic systems continue to maintain highly unequal socioeconomic systems. Polyarchic democracies primarily rely on consensual mechanisms (as opposed to violence). Alongside the promotion of polyarchy, however, resides the credible threat of repression should social forces committed to fundamental change threaten the social order, as is the case in Colombia. That is, polyarchy is the velvet glove of democracy wrapped around the iron fist of repression. Polyarchic democracy promotion thus remains consistent with long-term US foreign policy objectives and tactics. See the excellent William Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US Intervention, and Hegemony (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); William Robinson, 'Promoting Capitalist Polyarchy: The Case of Latin America', in Michael Cox, Takashi Inoguchi, G, John Ikenberry (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora and Richard Wilson (eds.), Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order (London: Pluto Press, 1993).
86. Interestingly, William Robinson argues that whilst post-Cold War US objectives have remained the same as its earlier Cold War objectives (the maintenance of an unequal international system) its tactical considerations have shifted from the maintenance of authoritarian regimes to the promotion of polyarchic democracies throughout Latin America. Robinson defines polyarchy as elite-based democracies where popular participation in the electoral process is confined to leadership choices managed by competing elites. These polyarchic systems continue to maintain highly unequal socioeconomic systems. Polyarchic democracies primarily rely on consensual mechanisms (as opposed to violence). Alongside the promotion of polyarchy, however, resides the credible threat of repression should social forces committed to fundamental change threaten the social order, as is the case in Colombia. That is, polyarchy is the velvet glove of democracy wrapped around the iron fist of repression. Polyarchic democracy promotion thus remains consistent with long-term US foreign policy objectives and tactics. See the excellent William Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US Intervention, and Hegemony (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); William Robinson, 'Promoting Capitalist Polyarchy: The Case of Latin America', in Michael Cox, Takashi Inoguchi, G, John Ikenberry (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora and Richard Wilson (eds.), Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order (London: Pluto Press, 1993).
87. Donald E, Schulz, The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future (Carlisle PA: Strategie Studies Institute, 2000), p. 3.
88. El Tiempo, 10 February 2002. 〈http://www.amazonwatch.org/newsrooin/mediaolips02/col/020210_col_et. html〉
89. Washington Post, 10 April 2000.
90. Christian Science Monitor, 5 March 2002.
91. House Appropriations Committee. Secretary of State Colin Powell before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, 13 February 2002.
92. El Tiempo, 10 February 2002.
93. US Department of the Army, US Army Counterinsurgency Forces. FM31-22, (1963), p.84.
94. US Department of the Army, Psychological Operations. FM33-5 (1962), p. 115.
95. General William P. Yarborough quote from Michael McClintock, The American Connection. State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador (London: Zed Books, 1985), p.23.
96. Department of Defense, US Army School of the Americas, Inteligencia de Combate, p. 168 quoted in Michael McClintock, The United States and Operation Condor: Military Doctrine in an Unconventional War. Paper delivered at Latin American Studies Association, Washington DC, September 2001, p.11.
97. Intelligence Oversight Board, Report on the Guatemala Review. 28 June 1996. 〈http://www.us.net/cip/iob.htm〉
98. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Report 2000, 8 February 2001.
99. State Department, Human Rights Report 2000. Colombia, 26 February 2001.
100. CNN.com. 6 September, 2000. 〈http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/09/06/colombia. paramilitary.reut/〉
101. Christopher Neal, Sustained Growth and Improved Social Safety Nets to Fight Poverty, Says World Bank (Bogata: The World Bank Group, 2002). 〈http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/external/lacAac.nsf/Countries/Colombia/ CC081B1813AF278985256BA300824DE6?OpenDocument〉