Skinner, pettit and livy: The conflict of the orders and the ambiguity of republican liberty

History of Political Thought

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 377-401

  Kapust, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

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EID: 10644290741     PISSN: 0143781X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (139)

1. On the development of republican historiography in the 1960s and 1970s, see, e.g., Joyce Appleby, 'Republicanism and Ideology', in Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 277-90.
2. Though we would do well to remember here, with North, that 'the constitutional arrangements of Republican Rome, fascinating though their details may be, never tell us enough about the political life of Rome at any moment; they are compatible with a wide range of quite different situations in practice; and are therefore best seen as a set of potential rules, which in general evoke respect when they are appealed to'. J.A. North. 'Democratic Politics in Republican Rome', Past and Present, 126 (1990), pp. 3-21, p. 16.
3. Polybius, The Histories, trans. W.R. Paton (Cambridge, 1929), VI.10.7, p. 291.
4. Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago, 1984), IV.9.1294b14-17, pp. 131-2.
5. While Polybius' discussion entails a sort of checks-and-balances approach, with element checking element, Aristotle's relies far more upon citizen perceptions of having a stake in the regime as it stands: the polity 'should be preserved through itself, not from outside - through itself not because those wishing its preservation are a majority, but because none of the parts of the city generally would wish to have another regime'. Ibid., IV.9.1295b35-39, p. 132.
6. 'It should be stressed that the res publica was a direct democracy, not a representative one. Membership of the Senate, it is true, was an indirect result of election to public office. But, while the Senate had important deliberative and even decision-making and administrative functions, it was in no sense a representative body, was not a parliament, and could not legislate. The widespread notion that the Senate was the governing organ of the Roman Republic is not merely misleading, it is straight-forwardly false.' Fergus Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (Ann Arbor. 1998), p. 209.
7. 'Whatever the form and name of government, an oligarchy lurks behind the facade, and Roman history, Republican or Imperial, is the history of the governing class.' Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939), p. 7. Though to be fair, Syme seems to view all government as essentially oligarchic.
8. 'The "power of the people" was . . . realized only through internal dissent within the elite, which as a whole continued to monopolize political initiative' - i.e., Rome was something between aristocracy and democracy. Henrik Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2001), p. 147.
9. Machiavelli's status as a republican or non-republican is an interesting example of this debate. Pocock locates him in the republican tradition, writing that, for Machiavelli, 'The plebeian as Roman citizen is less a man performing a certain role in a decision-making system than a man trained by civic religion and military discipline to devote himself to the patria and carry this spirit over into civic affairs, so that he conforms to the dual model of the Machiavellian innovator displaying virtu and the Aristotelian citizen attentive to the common good. The Roman plebs displayed virtu in demanding their rights, virtue in being satisfied when their demands were granted.' J.G.A. Pocock, The Machia-vellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 203. Rahe, on the other hand, distinguishes Machiavelli from ancient republicanism, such as we see especially in Sparta: Machiavelli 'rejects altogether the notion that the quest for fame points beyond itself to the pursuit of virtue and human excellence or, indeed, to anything higher than fame itself. Put simply, he severs the link between the beautiful or the noble and the good. This fact explains why Machiavelli so often seems to revel in the harsh and brutal dictates of necessity, why he openly encourages men to break the ties that restrain their acquisitive instincts, and why he is so profoundly hostile not just to Christianity but to classical political thought as well.' Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern, Vol. II (Chapel Hill, 1994), pp. 34-5.
10. Machiavelli's status as a republican or non-republican is an interesting example of this debate. Pocock locates him in the republican tradition, writing that, for Machiavelli, 'The plebeian as Roman citizen is less a man performing a certain role in a decision-making system than a man trained by civic religion and military discipline to devote himself to the patria and carry this spirit over into civic affairs, so that he conforms to the dual model of the Machiavellian innovator displaying virtu and the Aristotelian citizen attentive to the common good. The Roman plebs displayed virtu in demanding their rights, virtue in being satisfied when their demands were granted.' J.G.A. Pocock, The Machia-vellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 203. Rahe, on the other hand, distinguishes Machiavelli from ancient republicanism, such as we see especially in Sparta: Machiavelli 'rejects altogether the notion that the quest for fame points beyond itself to the pursuit of virtue and human excellence or, indeed, to anything higher than fame itself. Put simply, he severs the link between the beautiful or the noble and the good. This fact explains why Machiavelli so often seems to revel in the harsh and brutal dictates of necessity, why he openly encourages men to break the ties that restrain their acquisitive instincts, and why he is so profoundly hostile not just to Christianity but to classical political thought as well.' Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern, Vol. II (Chapel Hill, 1994), pp. 34-5.
11. 'Holmes's 'Aristippus in and out of Athens' is an example that stands out in this regard: a key part of his argument is that 'the normative claims of political philosophy . . . can never be understood from behind a self-imposed veil of ignorance, but rather must always be interpreted in light of historical information about the institutional order within which these claims are to be enforced.' He is discussing most particularly Greek political theory, but extends his claims to what he sees as the illicit importation of ancient concepts into modern contexts. For him, the basic principle of Greek - and probably Roman - politics is 'that the polis is prior to the polites', an idea that refers to 'an emphatic subordination of individual rights to civic duties'. Stephen Holmes, 'Aristippus in and out of Athens', The American Political Science Review, 73 (1979), pp. 113-28, p. 118.
12. See note 3 above.
13. Cf. Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 4-11. Cf. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997), pp. 37-8. It should be noted that viewing Hobbes as a liberal is by no means unproblematic - see, for instance, note 17 below, on Shklar's 'Liberalism of Fear'. Even if we take Hobbes to be the originator of the liberal theory of freedom, other aspects of liberalism - for instance, religious toleration - can be seen prior to Hobbes. On this, see, e.g., Beyond the Persecuting Society, ed. John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman (Philadelphia, 1998), pp. 13-25 for a general overview; also, Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (University Park, PA, 1996), pp. 1-42 for a general overview.
14. Cf. Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 4-11. Cf. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997), pp. 37-8. It should be noted that viewing Hobbes as a liberal is by no means unproblematic - see, for instance, note 17 below, on Shklar's 'Liberalism of Fear'. Even if we take Hobbes to be the originator of the liberal theory of freedom, other aspects of liberalism - for instance, religious toleration - can be seen prior to Hobbes. On this, see, e.g., Beyond the Persecuting Society, ed. John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman (Philadelphia, 1998), pp. 13-25 for a general overview; also, Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (University Park, PA, 1996), pp. 1-42 for a general overview.
15. Cf. Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 4-11. Cf. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997), pp. 37-8. It should be noted that viewing Hobbes as a liberal is by no means unproblematic - see, for instance, note 17 below, on Shklar's 'Liberalism of Fear'. Even if we take Hobbes to be the originator of the liberal theory of freedom, other aspects of liberalism - for instance, religious toleration - can be seen prior to Hobbes. On this, see, e.g., Beyond the Persecuting Society, ed. John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman (Philadelphia, 1998), pp. 13-25 for a general overview; also, Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (University Park, PA, 1996), pp. 1-42 for a general overview.
16. Cf. Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 4-11. Cf. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997), pp. 37-8. It should be noted that viewing Hobbes as a liberal is by no means unproblematic - see, for instance, note 17 below, on Shklar's 'Liberalism of Fear'. Even if we take Hobbes to be the originator of the liberal theory of freedom, other aspects of liberalism - for instance, religious toleration - can be seen prior to Hobbes. On this, see, e.g., Beyond the Persecuting Society, ed. John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman (Philadelphia, 1998), pp. 13-25 for a general overview; also, Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (University Park, PA, 1996), pp. 1-42 for a general overview.
17. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. MacPherson (New York and London, 1968), II.21.108, p. 262.
18. Ibid., II.21.109, p. 264.
19. [6 Ibid., II.21.110, p. 266.
20. Though it should be noted that not all liberals find its initial locus to be in Hobbes - thus Shklar: 'The convoluted genealogy of liberalism that insists on seeing its origins in a theory of absolutism is not in itself interesting. More common is a sort of free association of ideas that perceives a danger to traditional revealed religion in toleration and hence assumes that liberalism is of necessity atheistic, agnostic, relativistic, and nihilistic.' Judith Shklar, 'The Liberalism of Fear', in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 21-38, esp. p. 24.
21. Hobbes, Leviathan, II.21.110, p. 266.
22. Cf. Pettit: 'The republican tradition was unified across time, partly by a deference to the same textual authorities, partly by a shared enthusiasm for the ideals and the lessons of republican Rome, partly by an emphasis on the importance of having certain institutions in place: for example, an empire of law . . . a mixed constitution . . . and a regime of civic virtue.' Pettit, Republicanism, p. 20. Cf. Skinner, in discussing Nedham: 'what made the ancient Romans a free people . . . [was the fact that] no laws could be imposed upon them without a consent first had in the people's assemblies'. Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, p. 27.
23. Cf. Pettit: 'The republican tradition was unified across time, partly by a deference to the same textual authorities, partly by a shared enthusiasm for the ideals and the lessons of republican Rome, partly by an emphasis on the importance of having certain institutions in place: for example, an empire of law . . . a mixed constitution . . . and a regime of civic virtue.' Pettit, Republicanism, p. 20. Cf. Skinner, in discussing Nedham: 'what made the ancient Romans a free people . . . [was the fact that] no laws could be imposed upon them without a consent first had in the people's assemblies'. Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, p. 27.
24. Cornell writes that 'in its most basic sense libertas meant the absence of servitude'. T.J. Cornell, 'Rome: The History of an Anachronism', in City States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy, ed. Anthony Molho, Kurt Raaflaub and Julia Emlen (Ann Arbor, 1991), pp. 53-69, p. 65.
25. P.A. Brunt, 'Libertas in the Republic', in P.A. Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic and Other Essays (Cambridge, 1989), p. 281-350, esp. p. 287.
26. One of the most famous examples of the benefits inhering to citizenship is to be seen in Acts, 22: 23-9. Here, Paul, about to be scourged and examined, asks a centurion standing nearby, 'Is it lawful for you to scourge a man who is a Roman citizen, and uncondemned?' Paul, of course, is released soon thereafter.
27. Brunt, 'Libertas in the Republic', p. 287. See, on this note, Thomas R. Martin, Ancient Greece (New Haven, 2000), pp. 75-7 for an introductory discussion of the Spartan system of slavery, including the strong denigration of slaves.
28. Brunt, 'Libertas in the Republic', p. 287. See, on this note, Thomas R. Martin, Ancient Greece (New Haven, 2000), pp. 75-7 for an introductory discussion of the Spartan system of slavery, including the strong denigration of slaves.
29. Aristotle, Politics, I.4.1254a14-15, p. 39.
30. One should note here that slaves were not alone in being viewed as lesser creatures due to their way of living: 'it is impossible to pursue the things of virtue when one lives the life of a vulgar person or a laborer', ibid., III.5.1278a20-21, p. 93; cf. Aristotle, Economics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, 1984), I.2.1343a27-1343b6, p. 2131: 'Agriculture ranks first [among other arts] because of its justice; for it does not take anything away from men, either with their consent, as do retail trading and the mercenary arts, or against their will, as do the warlike arts . . . Agriculture is natural; for by nature all derive their sustenance from their mother, and so men derive it from the earth . . . It also conduces greatly to bravery; for it does not make men's bodies unserviceable, as do the illiberal arts, but it renders them able to lead an open-air life and work hard; furthermore it makes them adventurous against the foe, for husbandmen are the only citizens whose property lies outside the fortifications.' See also Cicero, De Officiis, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, 1997), I.42.151, p. 155: 'Of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a freeman.'
31. One should note here that slaves were not alone in being viewed as lesser creatures due to their way of living: 'it is impossible to pursue the things of virtue when one lives the life of a vulgar person or a laborer', ibid., III.5.1278a20-21, p. 93; cf. Aristotle, Economics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, 1984), I.2.1343a27-1343b6, p. 2131: 'Agriculture ranks first [among other arts] because of its justice; for it does not take anything away from men, either with their consent, as do retail trading and the mercenary arts, or against their will, as do the warlike arts . . . Agriculture is natural; for by nature all derive their sustenance from their mother, and so men derive it from the earth . . . It also conduces greatly to bravery; for it does not make men's bodies unserviceable, as do the illiberal arts, but it renders them able to lead an open-air life and work hard; furthermore it makes them adventurous against the foe, for husbandmen are the only citizens whose property lies outside the fortifications.' See also Cicero, De Officiis, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, 1997), I.42.151, p. 155: 'Of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a freeman.'
32. One should note here that slaves were not alone in being viewed as lesser creatures due to their way of living: 'it is impossible to pursue the things of virtue when one lives the life of a vulgar person or a laborer', ibid., III.5.1278a20-21, p. 93; cf. Aristotle, Economics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, 1984), I.2.1343a27-1343b6, p. 2131: 'Agriculture ranks first [among other arts] because of its justice; for it does not take anything away from men, either with their consent, as do retail trading and the mercenary arts, or against their will, as do the warlike arts . . . Agriculture is natural; for by nature all derive their sustenance from their mother, and so men derive it from the earth . . . It also conduces greatly to bravery; for it does not make men's bodies unserviceable, as do the illiberal arts, but it renders them able to lead an open-air life and work hard; furthermore it makes them adventurous against the foe, for husbandmen are the only citizens whose property lies outside the fortifications.' See also Cicero, De Officiis, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, 1997), I.42.151, p. 155: 'Of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a freeman.'
33. Though one should note that being non-dominated, or independent, required, for Aristotle, being 'relieved of necessary sorts of work'. Aristotle, Politics, III.5.1278a11, p. 93.
34. Cf. Brunt. 'Libertas in the Republic', p. 291: 'Peoples who were subject to the arbitrary will of a single man or a small group of men were held to be deprived of freedom, as their condition was analogous to that of slaves.'
35. Indeed, as Cicero writes in Pro Cluentio, 'we are all slaves of the law so that we might be free' - 'legum idcirco omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus'. Quoted in Chaim Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome (Cambridge, 1950), p. 7.
36. Indeed, as Cicero writes in Pro Cluentio, 'we are all slaves of the law so that we might be free' - 'legum idcirco omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus'. Quoted in Chaim Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome (Cambridge, 1950), p. 7.
37. Cicero, On the Commonwealth, ed. James E.G. Zetzel (Cambridge, 1999), II.43.5, p. 46.
38. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, p. 17.
39. Ibid., p. 18.
40. This contra, for instance, Hobbes and Locke, both of whom hold that there exists a state of nature in which humans are, more or less, absolutely free. Of course Locke writes that 'freedom of men under government, is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man'. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, II.4.22, in Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1988), p. 284.
41. Thus Wirszubski writes that 'slavery at Rome is a legal institution whereby one person is subjected to the mastery (dominum) of another person: slaves are almost entirely rightless and can neither be entitled to possess or do anything, nor to contract liabilities: a slave is always "in potestate" and "alieni iuris". Broadly speaking, therefore, slavery consists in rightlessness and subjection to dominion.' Wirszubski, Libertas, p. 1.
42. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, p. 26.
43. On this, see Andrew Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999), p. 3: 'The authority behind a law was that of the populus Romanus or plebs Romana voting in an assembly.'
44. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, p. 32. Though here we run into some practical difficulties in the Roman context, as we see, for instance, in Kurt A. Raaflaub, 'From Protection and Defense to Offense and Participation: Stages in the Conflict of the Orders', in Social Struggles in Archaic Rome, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub (Berkeley, 1986), pp. 198-243, esp. p. 226: 'the nomination and election of candidates and the procedure in voting and legislation were regulated in a rigid way that left all the initiative and the final decision in the hands of the presiding magistrate. The aristocracy therefore maintained tight control over the assembly; most probably it was also favored by the system of group voting.'
45. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, p. 32. Though here we run into some practical difficulties in the Roman context, as we see, for instance, in Kurt A. Raaflaub, 'From Protection and Defense to Offense and Participation: Stages in the Conflict of the Orders', in Social Struggles in Archaic Rome, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub (Berkeley, 1986), pp. 198-243, esp. p. 226: 'the nomination and election of candidates and the procedure in voting and legislation were regulated in a rigid way that left all the initiative and the final decision in the hands of the presiding magistrate. The aristocracy therefore maintained tight control over the assembly; most probably it was also favored by the system of group voting.'
46. Some argue that free speech had little place in Rome, or at the very least less of a place than we see in Athens - for instance, we see Theseus, in Euripides' Suppliant Women (Euripides IV, ed. David Grene and Richard Lattimore (Chicago, 1958)), II. 436-40, saying, This is the call of freedom: What man has good advice to give the city, and wishes to make it known?'. We see a similar sentiment in Pericles' funeral oration: 'we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here [i.e., at Athens] at all'. Thucydides , History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York, 1972), 11.40, p. 147. All the same, as Brunt, 'Libertas in the Republic', p. 316, writes 'it is untrue that in the Republic freedom of speech was not associated with the Roman conception, or rather with some Roman conceptions, of libertas, nor is it legitimate to argue e silentio that it was properly confined to men of rank. We simply cannot tell that it was not valued by ordinary commoners.' On the importance of speech at Rome, see, for instance, what Cicero has Crassus say of the importance of oratory in a free society in his De Oratore: 'What function again is kingly, so worthy of the free, so generous, as to bring help to the suppliant, to raise up those that are cast down, to bestow security, to set free from peril, to maintain men in their civil rights?' Cicero, De Oratore, trans. E.W. Sutton (Cambridge, 1987), I.7.32, p. 25.
47. Some argue that free speech had little place in Rome, or at the very least less of a place than we see in Athens - for instance, we see Theseus, in Euripides' Suppliant Women (Euripides IV, ed. David Grene and Richard Lattimore (Chicago, 1958)), II. 436-40, saying, This is the call of freedom: What man has good advice to give the city, and wishes to make it known?'. We see a similar sentiment in Pericles' funeral oration: 'we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here [i.e., at Athens] at all'. Thucydides , History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York, 1972), 11.40, p. 147. All the same, as Brunt, 'Libertas in the Republic', p. 316, writes 'it is untrue that in the Republic freedom of speech was not associated with the Roman conception, or rather with some Roman conceptions, of libertas, nor is it legitimate to argue e silentio that it was properly confined to men of rank. We simply cannot tell that it was not valued by ordinary commoners.' On the importance of speech at Rome, see, for instance, what Cicero has Crassus say of the importance of oratory in a free society in his De Oratore: 'What function again is kingly, so worthy of the free, so generous, as to bring help to the suppliant, to raise up those that are cast down, to bestow security, to set free from peril, to maintain men in their civil rights?' Cicero, De Oratore, trans. E.W. Sutton (Cambridge, 1987), I.7.32, p. 25.
48. Some argue that free speech had little place in Rome, or at the very least less of a place than we see in Athens - for instance, we see Theseus, in Euripides' Suppliant Women (Euripides IV, ed. David Grene and Richard Lattimore (Chicago, 1958)), II. 436-40, saying, This is the call of freedom: What man has good advice to give the city, and wishes to make it known?'. We see a similar sentiment in Pericles' funeral oration: 'we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here [i.e., at Athens] at all'. Thucydides , History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York, 1972), 11.40, p. 147. All the same, as Brunt, 'Libertas in the Republic', p. 316, writes 'it is untrue that in the Republic freedom of speech was not associated with the Roman conception, or rather with some Roman conceptions, of libertas, nor is it legitimate to argue e silentio that it was properly confined to men of rank. We simply cannot tell that it was not valued by ordinary commoners.' On the importance of speech at Rome, see, for instance, what Cicero has Crassus say of the importance of oratory in a free society in his De Oratore: 'What function again is kingly, so worthy of the free, so generous, as to bring help to the suppliant, to raise up those that are cast down, to bestow security, to set free from peril, to maintain men in their civil rights?' Cicero, De Oratore, trans. E.W. Sutton (Cambridge, 1987), I.7.32, p. 25.
49. Some argue that free speech had little place in Rome, or at the very least less of a place than we see in Athens - for instance, we see Theseus, in Euripides' Suppliant Women (Euripides IV, ed. David Grene and Richard Lattimore (Chicago, 1958)), II. 436-40, saying, This is the call of freedom: What man has good advice to give the city, and wishes to make it known?'. We see a similar sentiment in Pericles' funeral oration: 'we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here [i.e., at Athens] at all'. Thucydides , History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York, 1972), 11.40, p. 147. All the same, as Brunt, 'Libertas in the Republic', p. 316, writes 'it is untrue that in the Republic freedom of speech was not associated with the Roman conception, or rather with some Roman conceptions, of libertas, nor is it legitimate to argue e silentio that it was properly confined to men of rank. We simply cannot tell that it was not valued by ordinary commoners.' On the importance of speech at Rome, see, for instance, what Cicero has Crassus say of the importance of oratory in a free society in his De Oratore: 'What function again is kingly, so worthy of the free, so generous, as to bring help to the suppliant, to raise up those that are cast down, to bestow security, to set free from peril, to maintain men in their civil rights?' Cicero, De Oratore, trans. E.W. Sutton (Cambridge, 1987), I.7.32, p. 25.
50. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, p. 68.
51. Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Leslie J. Walker (New York, 1983), I.16, p. 154.
52. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, p. 84.
53. Isaiah Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in Liberalism and its Critics, ed. Michael Sandel (New York, 1984), p. 14.
54. Ibid., p. 22.
55. Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Modems, in Constant: The Political Writings, trans. Biancamaria Fontana (New York, 1988), p. 311.
56. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later Political Writings, trans. Victor Gourevitch (New York, 1997), I.7.8, p. 53.
57. Cf. K.R. Bradley, Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire: A Study in Social Control (Oxford, 1987), pp. 28-9, 38-9, for a discussion of the remarkably independent slaves that inhabit Plautus' comedies.
58. Pettit, Republicanism, p. 22.
59. Ibid., p. 35.
60. Aristotle, Politics, III.6.1279a17-19, p. 95. Cf. Cicero, De Qfficiis, I.7.20, p. 23 : part of justice 'is to lead men to use common possessions for the common interests'. Cicero, On the Commonwealth, I.39.52-3, p. 18: 'the commonwealth is the concern of a people, but a people is not any group of men assembled in any way, but an assemblage of some size associated with one another through agreement on law and community of interest.'
61. Aristotle, Politics, III.6.1279a17-19, p. 95. Cf. Cicero, De Qfficiis, I.7.20, p. 23 : part of justice 'is to lead men to use common possessions for the common interests'. Cicero, On the Commonwealth, I.39.52-3, p. 18: 'the commonwealth is the concern of a people, but a people is not any group of men assembled in any way, but an assemblage of some size associated with one another through agreement on law and community of interest.'
62. Aristotle, Politics, III.6.1279a17-19, p. 95. Cf. Cicero, De Qfficiis, I.7.20, p. 23 : part of justice 'is to lead men to use common possessions for the common interests'. Cicero, On the Commonwealth, I.39.52-3, p. 18: 'the commonwealth is the concern of a people, but a people is not any group of men assembled in any way, but an assemblage of some size associated with one another through agreement on law and community of interest.'
63. Aristotle, Politics, III.6.1279a21, p. 73.
64. Aristotle's argument for majoritarianism, or perhaps popular participation, in Politics, III.11.1281a43-b7, is based on his assessment of the decision-making capacities and experience of the collective citizen body: 'The many, of whom none is individually an excellent man, nevertheless can when joined together be better - not as individuals but all together - than those who are best, just as dinners contributed by many can be better than those equipped from a single expenditure. For because they are many, each can have a part of virtue and prudence, and on their joining together, the multitude, with its many feet and hands and having many senses, becomes like a single human being, and so also with respect to character and mind.' Aristotle grants that the wise ought to rule, but seems to doubt the possibility of this occurring.
65. For instance, in On the Commonwealth, I.51.2, Cicero argues for something much like an Aristotelian aristocracy: 'If a free people chooses the men to whom to entrust itself (and it will choose the best people if it wants to be safe), then surely the safety of the citizens is found in the deliberations of the best men.' He is careful to note that the best men are not necessarily the wealthy, but rather the wise: 'wealth, reputation, or resources, if they are empty of prudence and of a method of living and of ruling over others, are filled with disgrace and insolent pride; and there is no uglier form of state than that in which the richest are thought to be the best'. Ibid., I.51.3, p. 23.
66. For instance, in On the Commonwealth, I.51.2, Cicero argues for something much like an Aristotelian aristocracy: 'If a free people chooses the men to whom to entrust itself (and it will choose the best people if it wants to be safe), then surely the safety of the citizens is found in the deliberations of the best men.' He is careful to note that the best men are not necessarily the wealthy, but rather the wise: 'wealth, reputation, or resources, if they are empty of prudence and of a method of living and of ruling over others, are filled with disgrace and insolent pride; and there is no uglier form of state than that in which the richest are thought to be the best'. Ibid., I.51.3, p. 23.
67. Pettit, Republicanism, p. 30.
68. Indeed, one might argue that a prudent prince would rule in much the same way that a republic would conduct itself, with self-interest (i.e. the desire not to be over-thrown) serving to ensure the common good. Thus Machiavelli on the utmost importance of winning over the people: 'Let no one resist my opinion with that trite proverb, that whoever founds on the people founds on mud.' Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey Mansfield (Chicago, 1985), IX, p. 41. The best way to do this is to avoid their hatred - the prince should abstain from 'the property of his citizens and his subjects, and from their women; if he also needs to proceed against someone's life, he must do it when there is suitable justification and manifest cause for it', ibid., XVII, p. 67. This is, of course, strikingly similar to the benefits of liberty as described in Machiavelli, Dis-courses, I.16, p. 154: 'the possibility of enjoying what one has, freely and without incurring suspicion for instance, the assurance that one's wife and children will be respected, the absence of fear for oneself'.
69. Indeed, one might argue that a prudent prince would rule in much the same way that a republic would conduct itself, with self-interest (i.e. the desire not to be over-thrown) serving to ensure the common good. Thus Machiavelli on the utmost importance of winning over the people: 'Let no one resist my opinion with that trite proverb, that whoever founds on the people founds on mud.' Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey Mansfield (Chicago, 1985), IX, p. 41. The best way to do this is to avoid their hatred - the prince should abstain from 'the property of his citizens and his subjects, and from their women; if he also needs to proceed against someone's life, he must do it when there is suitable justification and manifest cause for it', ibid., XVII, p. 67. This is, of course, strikingly similar to the benefits of liberty as described in Machiavelli, Dis-courses, I.16, p. 154: 'the possibility of enjoying what one has, freely and without incurring suspicion for instance, the assurance that one's wife and children will be respected, the absence of fear for oneself'.
70. Indeed, one might argue that a prudent prince would rule in much the same way that a republic would conduct itself, with self-interest (i.e. the desire not to be over-thrown) serving to ensure the common good. Thus Machiavelli on the utmost importance of winning over the people: 'Let no one resist my opinion with that trite proverb, that whoever founds on the people founds on mud.' Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey Mansfield (Chicago, 1985), IX, p. 41. The best way to do this is to avoid their hatred - the prince should abstain from 'the property of his citizens and his subjects, and from their women; if he also needs to proceed against someone's life, he must do it when there is suitable justification and manifest cause for it', ibid., XVII, p. 67. This is, of course, strikingly similar to the benefits of liberty as described in Machiavelli, Dis-courses, I.16, p. 154: 'the possibility of enjoying what one has, freely and without incurring suspicion for instance, the assurance that one's wife and children will be respected, the absence of fear for oneself'.
71. This law 'declared that the decrees of the plebs should stand on an absolute footing of equality . . . with those of the whole community', Theodor Mommsen, History of Rome, trans. William Purdie Dickson (New York, 1911), Vol. I, p. 385.
72. Romulus appointed the first hundred senators to assist him in ruling - 'they received the designation of Fathers from their rank, and their descendants were called patricians', Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, trans. B.O. Foster (Cambridge, 1913), I.8.7, p. 33. Servius, in instituting the census, 'intended that posterity should celebrate himself as the originator of all distinctions among the citizens, and of the orders which clearly differentiate the various grades of rank and fortune', ibid., I.42.4, p. 149.
73. Romulus appointed the first hundred senators to assist him in ruling - 'they received the designation of Fathers from their rank, and their descendants were called patricians', Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, trans. B.O. Foster (Cambridge, 1913), I.8.7, p. 33. Servius, in instituting the census, 'intended that posterity should celebrate himself as the originator of all distinctions among the citizens, and of the orders which clearly differentiate the various grades of rank and fortune', ibid., I.42.4, p. 149.
74. The various conflicts between nobles and plebs 'were the primary cause of Rome's retaining her freedom', Machiavelli, Discourses, I.4, p. 113.
75. Ibid., I.4. p. 113.
76. Cf. Aristotle, Politics, V.8.1308a3-24, p. 162.
77. Raaflaub, 'From Protection and Defense', p. 210. Though Alfoldy also emphasizes issues of political participation, with the plebs mobilizing because of 'economic exploitation and political repression of the mass of the population by the patrician aristocracy', Geza Alfoldy, The Social History of Rome, ed. David Braun and Frank Pollock (Baltimore, 1988), p. 13.
78. Raaflaub, 'From Protection and Defense', p. 210. Though Alfoldy also emphasizes issues of political participation, with the plebs mobilizing because of 'economic exploitation and political repression of the mass of the population by the patrician aristocracy', Geza Alfoldy, The Social History of Rome, ed. David Braun and Frank Pollock (Baltimore, 1988), p. 13.
79. See Lintott, Constitution, pp. 32-4, for a brief, though detailed, discussion.
80. This, of course, followed the rape of the noble-woman Lucretia by Sextus Tarquinius, and her subsequent suicide, after which Brutus, holding the blood-stained knife Lucretia used to end her own life, swears, 'I will suffer neither them [the Tarquinii] nor any other to be king in Rome!', Livy, Ab Urbe, I.59.1, p. 205.
81. Indeed, part of what it meant to be liber was, as Mouritsen, Plebs, p. 11, puts it, the absence of the rule of one man - libertas' 'antithesis was the regnum, the rule of one man'. This because, according to Brunt, '[p]eoples who were subject to the arbitrary will of a single man or a small group of men were held to be deprived of freedom, as their condition was analogous to that of slaves', Brunt, 'Libertas in the Republic', p. 311.
82. Indeed, part of what it meant to be liber was, as Mouritsen, Plebs, p. it, puts it, the absence of the rule of one man - libertas' 'antithesis was the regnum, the rule of one man'. This because, according to Brunt, '[p]eoples who were subject to the arbitrary will of a single man or a small group of men were held to be deprived of freedom, as their condition was analogous to that of slaves', Brunt, 'Libertas in the Republic', p. 311.
83. Livy, Ab Urbe, I.60.3, p. 209.
84. Walter Eder writes that there were three main functions of archaic law codes: 'first, they were designed to stop the unpredictable development of customary law and political behavior, which under the increasing pressure of the discontented were about to change to the detriment of those in power. Second, they were supposed to provide appeal to a defined and published body of law . . . Third, a legal basis for existing property arrangements was thus to be created in order to render ineffective any demand for cancellation of debts or distribution of land.' The last function, of course, looks far less amenable to popular demands than the first two. Walter Eder, 'The Political Significance of the Codification of Law in Archaic Societies: An Unconventional Hypothesis', in Social Struggles in Archaic Rome, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub (Berkeley, 1986), pp. 262-300, esp. pp. 263-4.
85. Livy, Ab Urbe, III.55.7, p. 183.
86. Lintott, Constitution, p. 34. It is also interesting to note that among Sulla's reforms, upon his taking power, was the removal of the right of tribunes to initiate legislation - see Erich S. Gruen, Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley, 1974), pp. 7-10.
87. Lintott, Constitution, p. 34. It is also interesting to note that among Sulla's reforms, upon his taking power, was the removal of the right of tribunes to initiate legislation - see Erich S. Gruen, Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley, 1974), pp. 7-10.
88. Livy, Ab Urbe, III.33.1, p. 109.
89. This agitation stems from the failure to pass the Terentilian law, introduced by the tribune Gaius Terentilius Harsa in 462 BCE. This law would have appointed five men to 'write out the statutes pertaining to the consular power', for, as Livy has Terentilius say, the consuls 'should not make a law of their own whims and caprices', ibid., III.8.5, p. 31.
90. Ibid., III.35.10, p. 117.
91. Ibid., III.36.5, p. 119. All other magistracies had been suspended during the tenure of decemviri. The attitude of the Senate, according to Livy, is less than sympathetic: 'they had no desire to help those who in their greedy rush for liberty had fallen upon servitude', ibid., III.36.3, p. 121.
92. Ibid., III.36.5, p. 119. All other magistracies had been suspended during the tenure of decemviri. The attitude of the Senate, according to Livy, is less than sympathetic: 'they had no desire to help those who in their greedy rush for liberty had fallen upon servitude', ibid., III.36.3, p. 121.
93. Ibid., III.36.7, pp. 119-21.
94. Claudius, according to Livy, had attempted to (quite literally) gain possession of a young plebeian woman through illegal means, having one of his retainers claim her as his slave while her father was away on duty; in the end, her father, Verginius, kills her, to save her freedom and chastity. This, of course, infuriates the plebs, as did the death of Lucretia prior to the expulsion of the kings.
95. Ibid., III.53.9, p. 177.
96. I b i d.
97. Raaflaub, 'From Protection to Offense', p. 218.
98. Ibid., p. 220.
99. Eder, 'Political Significance', p. 279. He also notes that in Rome, codification did not 'fulfill any of the demands our sources connect with these times of trouble and unrest: political rights were not extended to the lower classes, and their economic situation was at best partially improved', ibid., p. 283.
100. Eder, 'Political Significance', p. 279. He also notes that in Rome, codification did not 'fulfill any of the demands our sources connect with these times of trouble and unrest: political rights were not extended to the lower classes, and their economic situation was at best partially improved', ibid., p. 283.
101. One of the other proposals dealt with issues of debt, the other with setting limits on the amount of land that might be held.
102. Livy, Ab Urbe, VI.37.11, p. 327.
103. Ibid., VI.52.12, p. 351.
104. Ibid., II.44.8-9, p. 365.
105. Polybius, Histories, VI.1.3, p. 269.
106. Livy, Ab Urbe, VIII.28.1, pp. 107-9.
107. This is, perhaps, not unsurprising, if Cicero is right in On the Commonwealth, 2.61.1, p. 53, where he argues that at the time of the passage of the Twelve Tables 'the senate still had the highest influence'.
108. See Gary B. Miles, Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome (Ithaca, 1995), p. 8, for a brief discussion and bibliography of such criticism.
109. M.I. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 85-6.
110. Aristotle, Politics, IV.4.1291b9, p. 124.
111. This, in reality, is hardly a reason to expect non-populist policies. First, as Brunt makes quite clear in 'The Fall of the Roman Republic', in P.A. Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic and Other Essays (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 1-92, esp. pp. 23-32, the Roman assemblies were hardly acquiescent, even before the written ballot was introduced. Second, as Millar notes, in normal operations the centuriate assembly was not legislative, but electoral - the tribal assembly was far more prevalent with respect to legislation. See, for instance, Millar, Crowd, p. 204.
112. This, in reality, is hardly a reason to expect non-populist policies. First, as Brunt makes quite clear in 'The Fall of the Roman Republic', in P.A. Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic and Other Essays (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 1-92, esp. pp. 23-32, the Roman assemblies were hardly acquiescent, even before the written ballot was introduced. Second, as Millar notes, in normal operations the centuriate assembly was not legislative, but electoral - the tribal assembly was far more prevalent with respect to legislation. See, for instance, Millar, Crowd, p. 204.
113. Quoted from Kurt A. Raaflaub, 'The Conflict of the Orders in Archaic Rome: A Comprehensive and Comparative Approach', in Social Struggles in Archaic Rome, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub (Berkeley, 1986), p. 23. For a discussion of this point, see Raaflaub, 'From Protection and Defense', pp. 1-51, esp. pp. 22-3.
114. Quoted from Kurt A. Raaflaub, 'The Conflict of the Orders in Archaic Rome: A Comprehensive and Comparative Approach', in Social Struggles in Archaic Rome, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub (Berkeley, 1986), p. 23. For a discussion of this point, see Raaflaub, 'From Protection and Defense', pp. 1-51, esp. pp. 22-3.
115. On Livy's traditionalism, see, for instance, Donald Earl, The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome (London, 1967), pp. 74-9; see also A.J. Woodman, Rhetoric in Classical Historiography (London, 1988), pp. 134-9.
116. On Livy's traditionalism, see, for instance, Donald Earl, The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome (London, 1967), pp. 74-9; see also A.J. Woodman, Rhetoric in Classical Historiography (London, 1988), pp. 134-9.
117. Wirszubski, Libertas, pp. 13-14.
118. Thus the problem with what democrats take to be equality is that they 'suppose that if they are equal in a certain thing, such as freedom, they are equal generally', leading the many to want more than their due, according to Aristotle, Politics, III.9.1279a23, p. 98. Moreover, 'factional conflict is everywhere the result of inequality, at any rate when there is no proportion among those who are unequal; in general it is equality they seek when they engage in factional conflict' - hence democratic regimes breed faction because those at the bottom try to get what is not rightfully theirs because of their false sense of equality. Ibid, V.1.1301b26-29.
119. Thus the problem with what democrats take to be equality is that they 'suppose that if they are equal in a certain thing, such as freedom, they are equal generally', leading the many to want more than their due, according to Aristotle, Politics, III.9.1279a23, p. 98. Moreover, 'factional conflict is everywhere the result of inequality, at any rate when there is no proportion among those who are unequal; in general it is equality they seek when they engage in factional conflict' - hence democratic regimes breed faction because those at the bottom try to get what is not rightfully theirs because of their false sense of equality. Ibid, V.1.1301b26-29.
120. 'If the people involved [in a partnership] are not equal, they will not receive equal shares; indeed, whenever equals receive unequal shares, or unequals equal shares, in a distribution, that is the source of quarrels and accusations.' Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, 1985), V.3.1131a23-24, p. 123.
121. The problem with democracies, for Polybius, as with any unmixed regime, is that its vice leads to its downfall: 'the licence and lawlessness of this form of government produces mob-rule', Polybius, Histories, VI.4.10, p. 275.
122. Cicero has Scipio say that 'each of these types of commonwealth [i.e. unmixed ones - monarchy, aristocracy, democracy] has a path - a sheer and slippery one - to a kindred evil'; the best form of commonwealth 'is blended and mixed from these first three types that I have mentioned', Cicero, On the Commonwealth, I.44.2, I.45.3.
123. 'When it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses. No one, so long as he has it in him to be of service to the state, is kept in political obscurity because of poverty.' Thucydides, Histories, II.37, p. 145.
124. Livy, Ab Urbe. II.32.9-10, p. 325.
125. Ibid., II.32.11, p. 325.
126. See discussion in Moses Finley, The Ancient Economy (Berkeley, 1999), p. 19.
127. Finley defines orders thus: 'a juridically defined group within a population, possessing formalized privileges and disabilities in one or more fields of activity, governmental, military, legal, economic, religious, marital, and standing in a hierarchical relation to other orders', ibid., p. 45.
128. Aristotle, Rhetoric, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, 1984), I.9.1367a32.
129. Livy, Ab Urbe, VI.40.5, p. 337.
130. Wirszubski, Libertas, pp. 34-5.
131. Cf. North, 'Democratic Politics', p. 16: 'There were two "peoples" in Roman politics: the ideal and the actual. The people as a political concept were distinct from the people as physical reality, and the direct nature of participation meant that the two were effectively separated. There was a stark contrast between the extensive powers of the populus Romanus as collective political agent and the restrictive way in which this role was performed in practice.'
132. Cf. David Whitehead, 'Norms of Citizenship in Ancient Greece', in City State in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy, ed. Anthony Molho, Kurt Raaflaub and Julia Emlen (Ann Arbor, 1991), pp. 135-54, p. 144: the Roman civitas, unlike the Greek polis, 'was much less a matter of political rights than of civil ones, among them the ius provocations, the right of appeal against ill treatment by Roman civilian or military officials'. Cf. also Eder, 'Who Rules? Power and Participation in Athens and Rome', in City State in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy, ed. Molho, Raaflaub and Emlen, pp. 169-96, p. 173. Eder, writing on citizenship and enfranchisement, in a similar vein, argues that 'it would be rash to discern democratic traits in the Roman willingness to grant citizenship almost lavishly. The reason for that should be seen in the political insignificance of the individual Roman citizen, because enjoying the same legal status of citizenship did not necessarily mean possessing the same political rights and opportunities.'
133. Cf. David Whitehead, 'Norms of Citizenship in Ancient Greece', in City State in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy, ed. Anthony Molho, Kurt Raaflaub and Julia Emlen (Ann Arbor, 1991), pp. 135-54, p. 144: the Roman civitas, unlike the Greek polis, 'was much less a matter of political rights than of civil ones, among them the ius provocations, the right of appeal against ill treatment by Roman civilian or military officials'. Cf. also Eder, 'Who Rules? Power and Participation in Athens and Rome', in City State in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy, ed. Molho, Raaflaub and Emlen, pp. 169-96, p. 173. Eder, writing on citizenship and enfranchisement, in a similar vein, argues that 'it would be rash to discern democratic traits in the Roman willingness to grant citizenship almost lavishly. The reason for that should be seen in the political insignificance of the individual Roman citizen, because enjoying the same legal status of citizenship did not necessarily mean possessing the same political rights and opportunities.'
134. Cf. Brunt, 'Libertas in the Republic', p. 319: 'No Roman actually said . . . that "freedom consists in a people's being governed by laws made with their own consent", but this principle is implicit in the Roman system, under which the people could not in perpetuity be bound by the laws that it had enacted or the convention it had accepted, but had in general the power to set them aside by new legislation.'
135. Nor can it be doubted that these elections were fiercely contested: thus Paterson writes that even 'in the late Republic, as at every other time, election to high office had to be worked for even by those who started with the greatest natural advantages', Jeremy Paterson, 'Politics in the Late Republic', in Roman Political Life 90 BC-AD 69, ed. T.P. Wiseman (Exeter, 1985), pp. 21-43, esp. pp. 28-9.
136. we see this, for instance, in the sociology of Rome: again, Paterson writes that 'the main role of the senator was taken to be not just as an adviser on the great matters of state but also as a "broker", a man who used his position, office and influences in society to solve problems, right wrongs and obtain privileges for those who requested his help'. Paterson, 'Politics in the Late Republic', p. 31.
137. One should also add that membership in the higher census levels bore costs: one of the most famous is the practice of the liturgy, discussed by Veyne. While philosophical texts 'discuss the virtues of generosity, or beneficia, these texts unconsciously depict for us a society in which voluntary relations of giving and benefaction fill the place held in our society by the market and by regulations (where these are protective and charitable)', Paul Veyne, Bread and Circuses, trans. Brian Pearce (London, 1990), p. 7.
138. The ancestral masks, or imagines, were made of wax and were realistic portraits of office-holding family members of Roman aristocratic families. They were worn by actors to impersonate illustrious ancestors of Rome's leading families at funeral processions leading to the Forum. Moreover, 'the imagines were clearly designed for use by the living members of the family. They had no role to play in cult or commemoration of the dead at the tomb. They represented only family members who had held at least the office of aedile. Their function is, therefore, overtly political.' Harriet I. Flower, Ancestor Mask and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture (Oxford, 1996), p. 2.
139. Machiavelli, Discourses, I.55, p. 245.