Improved dynamically modified confidentiality policies model

Ruan Jian Xue Bao/Journal of Software

Volumn 15, Issue 10, 2004, Pages 1547-1557

  Ji, Qing Guang ^a,b   Qing, Si Han ^a,b   He, Ye Ping ^a,b  

^a INSTITUTE OF SOFTWARE   (China)

^b INSTITUTE OF GEOLOGY AND GEOPHYSICS   (China)

Author keywords

Confidentiality policy; Formal model; IPC objects; Multiple level entity; Sensitivity level range

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTER NETWORKS; CONSTRAINT THEORY; FORMAL LOGIC; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SECURITY OF DATA;

ABLP MODEL; CONFIDENTIALITY POLICY; FORMAL MODELS; IPC OBJECTS; MULTIPLE LEVEL ENTITY; NETWORK SECURITY; SENSITIVITY LEVEL RANGE;

SECURITY SYSTEMS;

EID: 10644289533     PISSN: 10009825     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Ott A. Regel-Basierte zugriffskontrolle nach dem Generalized framework for access controlansatz am beispiel Linux. Diplomarbeit Universitat Hamburg, 1997.
2. Shi WC. Research on and enforcement of methods of secure operating systems development. [Ph.D. Thesis] Beijing: Institute of Software, The Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2001 (in Chinese with English abstract).
3. Mayer FL. An interpretation of refined Bell-LaPadula model for the TMach kernel. In: Proc. of the 4th Aerospace Computer Security Applications Conf. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1988. 368-378.
4. Lunt T, Denning D, Schell R, Heckman M, Shockley W. The Sea View security model. IEEE Trans. on Software Engineering, 1990, 16(6): 593-607.
5. Bell DE, La Padula LJ. Secure computer system: Unified exposition and multics interpretation. Mitre Report, MTR-2997 Rev. 1, 1976.
6. Schell RR, Tao TF, Heckman M. Designing the GEMSOS security kernel for security and performance. In: Proc. of the 8th National Computer Security Conf. 1985. 108-119.
7. Lee TMP. Using mandatory integrity to enforce commercial security. In: Proc. of the IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1988. 140-146.
8. Clark DD, Wilson DR. A comparison of commercial and military security policies. In: Proc. of the 1987 IEEE Symp. on Research in Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1987. 184-238.
9. Rushbyc J. Design and verification of secure systems. ACM Operating System Review, 1981, 15(5): 12-21.
10. Bell DE. Security policy modeling for the next-generation packet switch. In: Proc. of the IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1988. 212-216.
11. Kargar PA, Austel V, Toll D. A new mandatory security policy combining secrecy and integrity. IBM Research Report, RC21717, 2000.
12. Loscocco PA, Smalley SD. Integrating flexible support for security policies into the Linux operating system. Technical Report, NAI Labs, 2001.
13. McLean J. The algebra of security. In: Proc. of the IEEE 1988 Symp. on Research in Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1988. 2-7.
14. Secure Computing Corporation. Assurance in the Fluke microkernel: Formal top-level specification. CDRL A004. Technical Report, Secure Computing Corporation, 1999.
15. Data General. Managing security on DG/UX system, manual 093-701138-04. Westboro: Data General Corporation, MA01580, 1996.
16. Trusted Information System, Inc,. Trusted mach mathematical model. Technical Report, TIS tmach EDOC-0017-96B, Trusted Information System, Inc, 1996.
17. Landwehr CE, Heitmeyer CL, McLean J. A security model for military message systems. ACM Trans. on Computer Systems, 1984, 9(3): 198-222.
18. Thomas T. A mandatory access control mechanism for the UNIX file system. In: Proc. of the 4th Aerospace Computer Security Applications Conf. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1988. 173-177.
19. Stevens WR. UNIX Network Programming. Volume 2: Interprocess Communications. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1999.
20. Sutton S, Hinrichs S, Inskeep T. MISSI B-level windows NT feasibility study. Final Report, MISSI, MISSI Contract MDA904-95-C-4088, 1996.
21. Parenty TJ. The incorporation of multi-level IPC into UNIX. In: Proc. of the IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1989. 94-99.