Russia's biological weapons threat

Orbis

Volumn 43, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 479-492

  Graeves, Rebecca K ^a,b  

^a AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 10444234411     PISSN: 00304387     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0030-4387(99)80083-0     Document Type: Article

References (81)

1. Ian Hoffman, "Piece Found In Anthrax Mystery: Lab Sheds Light on Russian Leak," Albuquerque Journal, Feb. 3, 1998.
2. Officially, 66 were reported dead, but several subsequent studies place the number much higher, including a 1986 Defense Intelligence Agency report Soviet Biological Warfare Threat (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Department of Defense), which concluded that hundreds may have died within seven to ten days of the outbreak, and a thousand or more may have lost their lives within the next several weeks (pp. 5-6). The Union for Chemical Safety in Russia went so far as to report tens of thousands of deaths due to the outbreak, including those who died at the time of the catastrophe and those who suffered a "delayed death." This number includes not only civilians, but prisoners used for anti-epidemic measures and soldiers stationed nearby, about whom no information is available. According to Aleksandr Yevtushenko and Sergey Avdeyev, "Sverdlovsk was infected with anthrax. Nineteen years ago the Soviet Army used a bacteriological weapons against its own people." See "Further on 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Release," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter, FBIS) SOV-98-159, June 8, 1998, from Komsomolskaya Pravda, Apr. 30, 1998.
3. Officially, 66 were reported dead, but several subsequent studies place the number much higher, including a 1986 Defense Intelligence Agency report Soviet Biological Warfare Threat (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Department of Defense), which concluded that hundreds may have died within seven to ten days of the outbreak, and a thousand or more may have lost their lives within the next several weeks (pp. 5-6). The Union for Chemical Safety in Russia went so far as to report tens of thousands of deaths due to the outbreak, including those who died at the time of the catastrophe and those who suffered a "delayed death." This number includes not only civilians, but prisoners used for anti-epidemic measures and soldiers stationed nearby, about whom no information is available. According to Aleksandr Yevtushenko and Sergey Avdeyev, "Sverdlovsk was infected with anthrax. Nineteen years ago the Soviet Army used a bacteriological weapons against its own people." See "Further on 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Release," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter, FBIS) SOV-98-159, June 8, 1998, from Komsomolskaya Pravda, Apr. 30, 1998.
4. Officially, 66 were reported dead, but several subsequent studies place the number much higher, including a 1986 Defense Intelligence Agency report Soviet Biological Warfare Threat (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Department of Defense), which concluded that hundreds may have died within seven to ten days of the outbreak, and a thousand or more may have lost their lives within the next several weeks (pp. 5-6). The Union for Chemical Safety in Russia went so far as to report tens of thousands of deaths due to the outbreak, including those who died at the time of the catastrophe and those who suffered a "delayed death." This number includes not only civilians, but prisoners used for anti-epidemic measures and soldiers stationed nearby, about whom no information is available. According to Aleksandr Yevtushenko and Sergey Avdeyev, "Sverdlovsk was infected with anthrax. Nineteen years ago the Soviet Army used a bacteriological weapons against its own people." See "Further on 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Release," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter, FBIS) SOV-98-159, June 8, 1998, from Komsomolskaya Pravda, Apr. 30, 1998.
5. Officially, 66 were reported dead, but several subsequent studies place the number much higher, including a 1986 Defense Intelligence Agency report Soviet Biological Warfare Threat (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Department of Defense), which concluded that hundreds may have died within seven to ten days of the outbreak, and a thousand or more may have lost their lives within the next several weeks (pp. 5-6). The Union for Chemical Safety in Russia went so far as to report tens of thousands of deaths due to the outbreak, including those who died at the time of the catastrophe and those who suffered a "delayed death." This number includes not only civilians, but prisoners used for anti-epidemic measures and soldiers stationed nearby, about whom no information is available. According to Aleksandr Yevtushenko and Sergey Avdeyev, "Sverdlovsk was infected with anthrax. Nineteen years ago the Soviet Army used a bacteriological weapons against its own people." See "Further on 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Release," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter, FBIS) SOV-98-159, June 8, 1998, from Komsomolskaya Pravda, Apr. 30, 1998.
6. Yevtushenko and Avdeyev, "Sverdlovsk Anthrax Release."
7. Peter Pringle, "Anthrax Answer Blowing in the Wind," Independent (London), Nov. 18, 1994.
8. DIA, Soviet Biological Warfare Threat, p. 6.
9. Pringle, "Anthrax Answer."
10. DIA, Soviet Biological Warfare Threat, p. 4.
11. Steve Connor, "How the Russians Poisoned Their Own," Independent (London), Mar. 29, 1993.
12. Professor Matthew Meselson, a biological weapons expert at Harvard, visited the Soviet Union in 1986 and spoke to scientists who had studied the outbreak. He apparently was convinced that the Soviet explanation was accurate. In 1988, he asserted that "contrary to the U.S. government version, there was no evidence of inhalatory anthrax." Ibid.
13. Pringle, "Anthrax Answer."
14. It was not until 1991 that some proof was offered. Gen. Andrei Mironyuk, a retired Soviet military officer, confirmed what had been long suspected: the Sverdlovsk outbreak had been caused by an accidental release of anthrax from a secret biological weapons laboratory. Connor, "How the Russians Poisoned Their Own."
15. Professor Meselson was responsible for assembling this team of Western scientists, which visited Sverdlovsk in June 1992 and August 1993. Ibid.
16. Quoted in Pringle, p. 13.
17. Connor, "How the Russians Poisoned Their Own."
18. This study was apparently "removed" at the instruction of then-national security adviser Henry Kissinger so it would not hinder arms control efforts. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "A Biological Weapons Threat Worse Than Saddam," Wall Street Journal, Mar. 10, 1998.
19. Officially called the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and On Their Destruction, the treaty was subsequently signed by 140 nations.
20. BWC, Article IV. Text available from the Henry L. Stimson Center website (http://www.stim-son.org/cwc/bwtext.htm).
21. When the ACDA questioned a National Security Council official about the allegations, he advised they be ignored on the grounds that chemical and biological weapons had no strategic value and therefore did not justify such violations. Douglass, "A Biological Weapons Threat."
22. Notable are Luba Markish, who spoke of tests of BW on guinea pigs in 1976; David Azbel, who confirmed those tests; and Mark Popovskiy, who testified on the objectives of the Soviet BW program in 1980. Ibid.
23. Interview with Matthew Meselson, molecular biologist. Published on the website for "Plague War," Frontline (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/interviews) (hereafter, Frontline).
24. Ibid.
25. Interview with James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, 1989-92, Frontline.
26. ibid.
27. Interview with Ken Alibek, Frontline.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., and Richard Preston, "Annals of Warfare - The Bioweaponeers," New Yorker, Mar. 9, 1998.
31. Ibid., and Richard Preston, "Annals of Warfare - The Bioweaponeers," New Yorker, Mar. 9, 1998.
32. Julie Moffett, "Russia: Biological Weapons Still in Production, Says Expert," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (hereafter, RFE/RL) Research Report, Mar. 2, 1998.
33. Ibid., and Douglass, "A Biological Weapons Threat." 30 Interview with Alibek, Frontline.
34. Ibid., and Douglass, "A Biological Weapons Threat." 30 Interview with Alibek, Frontline.
35. Ibid.
36. Preston, "Annals of Warfare."
37. Moffett, "Biological Weapons Still in Production."
38. Interview with Meselson, Frontline.
39. Interview with Christopher Davis, UK Defense Intelligence Staff, 1987-96, Frontline.
40. Alibek claims that Soviet researchers engineered a germ that combined smallpox and Venezuelan equine encephalitis in 1990-91. He believes that they may be working currently on an Ebola-smallpox chimera. Preston, "Annals of Warfare."
41. Allegations of "selective impact" agents sprang up after the Sverdlovsk incident. Apparently, the 1979 anthrax outbreak affected mainly males in the prime of life (18-55). Not a single child was affected, despite the fact that the accident happened near dozens of schools. Only 22 percent of the victims were women. "Sverdlovsk Was Hit By 'Selective-Impact Biological Weapon,'" FBIS-TAC-98-063, Mar. 4, 1998, from NTV (Moscow), Feb. 25, 1998. Following the accident, doctors were ordered to perform mass inoculations, but only on adults 18 to 60. See Yevtushenko and Avdeyev, "Sverdlovsk was infected with Anthrax." In addition, scientists studying tissue samples of the victims report that they found at least four strains of anthrax, arousing suspicion that the germs were somehow enhanced to make them less responsive to vaccines. David Hoffman, "Russia Challenged To Disclose Status of Biological Weapons," Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1998.
42. Allegations of "selective impact" agents sprang up after the Sverdlovsk incident. Apparently, the 1979 anthrax outbreak affected mainly males in the prime of life (18-55). Not a single child was affected, despite the fact that the accident happened near dozens of schools. Only 22 percent of the victims were women. "Sverdlovsk Was Hit By 'Selective-Impact Biological Weapon,'" FBIS-TAC-98-063, Mar. 4, 1998, from NTV (Moscow), Feb. 25, 1998. Following the accident, doctors were ordered to perform mass inoculations, but only on adults 18 to 60. See Yevtushenko and Avdeyev, "Sverdlovsk was infected with Anthrax." In addition, scientists studying tissue samples of the victims report that they found at least four strains of anthrax, arousing suspicion that the germs were somehow enhanced to make them less responsive to vaccines. David Hoffman, "Russia Challenged To Disclose Status of Biological Weapons," Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1998.
43. Allegations of "selective impact" agents sprang up after the Sverdlovsk incident. Apparently, the 1979 anthrax outbreak affected mainly males in the prime of life (18-55). Not a single child was affected, despite the fact that the accident happened near dozens of schools. Only 22 percent of the victims were women. "Sverdlovsk Was Hit By 'Selective-Impact Biological Weapon,'" FBIS-TAC-98-063, Mar. 4, 1998, from NTV (Moscow), Feb. 25, 1998. Following the accident, doctors were ordered to perform mass inoculations, but only on adults 18 to 60. See Yevtushenko and Avdeyev, "Sverdlovsk was infected with Anthrax." In addition, scientists studying tissue samples of the victims report that they found at least four strains of anthrax, arousing suspicion that the germs were somehow enhanced to make them less responsive to vaccines. David Hoffman, "Russia Challenged To Disclose Status of Biological Weapons," Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1998.
44. Moffett, "Biological Weapons Still in Production."
45. Interview with Frank Malinoski, Clinical Investigator, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, 1987-1992, Frontline.
46. See Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. To Buy Uranium Taken From Bombs Scrapped By Russia; Biological-Arms Data," New York Times, Sept. 1, 1992.
47. Joint Statement on Biological Weapons by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Russian Federation, Sept. 10-11, 1992, Article 4A. Text available from the Stimson Center website (http://www.stimson.org/cwc/trilats.htm).
48. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Russia Agrees to Inspection of Its Biological Research Facilities," Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1992.
49. R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Officials Allege That Russians Are Working on Biological Arms," Washington Post, Apr. 8, 1994.
50. Ibid.
51. Thomas W. Lippman, "Administration Voices Concern On Russian Treaty Compliance: Congress Told Moscow's Chemical, Germ Weapon Plans Are Suspect," Washington Post, Dec. 11, 1994.
52. Ibid. See also "Cheating on Biological Weapons?" editorial, Washington Post, Sept. 1, 1992; interview with William Cohen, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Frontline, and interview with James Woolsey, CIA Director, 1993-95, Frontline.
53. Ibid. See also "Cheating on Biological Weapons?" editorial, Washington Post, Sept. 1, 1992; interview with William Cohen, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Frontline, and interview with James Woolsey, CIA Director, 1993-95, Frontline.
54. Ibid. See also "Cheating on Biological Weapons?" editorial, Washington Post, Sept. 1, 1992; interview with William Cohen, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Frontline, and interview with James Woolsey, CIA Director, 1993-95, Frontline.
55. Interview with Woolsey, Frontline.
56. Quoted in Hoffman, "Russia Challenged To Disclose Status of Biological Weapons."
57. Interview with Alibek, Frontline.
58. Quote by Russian foreign ministry spokesman Gennadiy Tarasov, "Russia Denies Production of Biological Weapons," FBIS-SOV-98-90, Mar. 31, 1998, from Interfax (Moscow), Mar. 31, 1998.
59. "Russia: Moscow Denies Report of Secret Deal With Iraq," RFE/RL Report, Feb. 12, 1998.
60. "Russia Denies Media Claims of Iraqi Biological Weapons Deal," FBIS-UMA-98-043, Feb. 12, 1998, from Interfax, Feb. 12, 1998.
61. James Rubin, "Iraq's Chemical and Biological Arsenal," letter to the editor, Washington Post, Nov. 25, 1998.
62. "Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Rebuts Washington Post Article," FBIS-TAC-98-047, Feb. 16, 1998, from Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Feb. 14, 1998.
63. "Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Rebuts Washington Post Article," FBIS-TAC-98-047, Feb. 16, 1998, from Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Feb. 14, 1998.
64. James Adams, "Russia Helps Iran's Bio-Warfare," Sunday Times (London), Aug. 27, 1995.
65. For an allegation of official Russian involvement in Iraq's BW program, see Arnold Beichman, "A Lethal Soviet Alliance," Washington Times, Oct. 21, 1998.
66. R. Jeffrey Smith, "5 Nations Reach Aims Accord: No Chemical, Biological, Nuclear Gear Would Go To Other Countries," Washington Post, May 30, 1992.
67. Anatoliy Yurkin, "Russian Defense Experts Deny Germ Weapons Program Continues," FBIS-TAC-98-058, Feb. 27, 1998, from ITAR-TASS, Feb. 27, 1998.
68. Quoted in Thomas W. Lippman, "Gore Lauds Russia's Policy Curbing Arms for Iran," Washington Post, Mar. 12, 1998.
69. "U.S. Funding Biological Research in Russia Program Aims to Keep Nation's Scientists From Selling Expertise on World Market," Newsday, Aug. 10, 1997.
70. Thomas Orszag-Land, "How to Keep Soviet Science Out of the Wrong Hands," Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 8, 1995.
71. Ibid., and Adams, "Russia Helps Iran's Bio-Warfare." Analysts believe that Iran continues to offer this arrangement.
72. Ibid., and Adams, "Russia Helps Iran's Bio-Warfare." Analysts believe that Iran continues to offer this arrangement.
73. Quoted in Judith Matloff, "Danger From Russia's Scientists: Selling Weapons Know-How," Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 10, 1998.
74. See K. P. Foley, "Russia: Aid To Former Soviet Weapons Experts Is Working," RFE/RL Research Report, Nov. 21, 1996; and "A Funding Imperative," Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 30, 1998.
75. See K. P. Foley, "Russia: Aid To Former Soviet Weapons Experts Is Working," RFE/RL Research Report, Nov. 21, 1996; and "A Funding Imperative," Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 30, 1998.
76. CISAC was created by NAS in 1980. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the committee was committed to developing improved verification methods for the BWC. Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Blueprint for U.S.-Russian Cooperation, Report to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program of the U.S. Department of Defense. U.S.-Russian Collaborative Program for Research and Monitoring of Pathogens of Global Importance Committee, National Academy of Sciences/Institute of Medicine/National Research Council (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997).
77. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE's Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia's Unemployed Weapons Scientists, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, Feb. 1999).
78. See K. P. Foley, "Russia: U.S. Scientists To Collaborate In Anti-Germ Campaign," RFE/RL Research Report, Nov. 18, 1997; and Controlling Dangerous Pathogens.
79. See K. P. Foley, "Russia: U.S. Scientists To Collaborate In Anti-Germ Campaign," RFE/RL Research Report, Nov. 18, 1997; and Controlling Dangerous Pathogens.
80. If Russia should in the future choose to augment its decaying military power by integrating weapons of mass destruction into its arsenal, Alibek claims that given their current capacity, Russia': facilities could begin producing them in two to three months. Interview with Alibek, Frontline.
81. "Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. . . ." Article VI, BWC.