The diversity visa lottery - A cycle of unintended consequences in United States immigration policy

Journal of American Ethnic History

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 3-29

  Law, Anna O ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 10444219946     PISSN: 02785927     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (64)

1. See for example Stephen Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy, 2nd ed. (New York, 1997), pp. 204-211
2. Walter Jacob, "Note: Diversity Visas: Muddled Thinking and Pork Barrel Politics," Georgetown Immigration Law Journal (June 1992) and numerous articles in the print media and ethnic media. Jacob attributes the origin of the diversity lottery idea to the recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy that existed in the mid-1980s.
3. I am very grateful to Cornelius "Dick" Scully for pointing out to me that the roots of the lottery go much further back than the late 1980s.
4. David Reimers, Still the Golden Door-The Third World Comes to America. (New York, 1985), pp. 80-81.
5. David Reimers, "An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act and Third World Immigration to the United States," Journal of American Ethnic History, 3 (Fall 1983): 80, 87, 89.
6. Letter in Q & A form from Norbert A. Schlei, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel to "Fellow Citizens" in response to the public writing in about the immigration act. Also published in the Congressional Record of the 89th Congress, 28 April 1965. "Legislative Background Immigration Law 1965" Box 1. Folder "Road to Final Passage" Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.
7. See also Reimers, "An Unintended Reform." Reimers lays out in detail how the unintended shift in the ethnicity in immigrants came about.
8. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1994 (Washington, D.C., 1996), p. 12.
9. Due to the implementation of the 20,000 per country limit for immigrant admissions, some countries had developed large backlogs in certain family petition categories because there are more people who wish to immigrate per year than there are available visa numbers. For example, U.S. citizens petitioning for their unmarried brothers and sisters in the Philippines or China must wait 18-20 years before their brothers and sisters will have a current visa priority date that would allow them to enter the U.S. and obtain permanent residence (get a greencard). Some argued that these lengthy backlogs undermine the credibility of the system.
10. Dick Scully explained in detail what this connection was. Cornelius "Dick" Scully, telephone conversation with author, 28 June 2001.
11. Cornelius "Dick" Scully, telephone conversation with the author, 28 June 2001 and email communication to the author, 26 July 2001. Mr. Scully (now retired) was a career civil servant at the Department of State between 1968 and 1997. He was for many years, the Director of the Office of Legislation, Regulations and Advisory Assistance, which was the technical section of the visa office at State. While at his position, Mr. Scully was responsible for writing all the regulatory orders to implement all the various lotteries, including the current one. Given the many years he was at the Department of State's visa section, Mr. Scully is truly the institutional memory of the place.
12. Additionally, the process for immigrating under the non-preference quota was quick. One simply wrote a letter to the consular officer stating their desire to immigrate; the officer would send them a biographical information form to fill out. Upon receipt of the form the officer would check whether there were actual numbers available for the non-preference applicant. If there were, which was always the case in Ireland, the applicant was sent information to prepare for a visa interview. If the interview went smoothly, the visa would be issued on the spot and the applicant could travel to the US. (Scully, email communication to author 26 July 01.)
13. Under U.S. immigration law, only close relatives such as spouses, sons and daughters, and brothers/sisters have petitioning rights - not more distant relatives like cousins, aunts, uncles or grandparents.
14. David Reimers "An Unintended Reform," pp. 73-74 and Scully, telephone interview with author 28 June 2001.
15. This umbrella organization was composed of members of all the major Irish American organizations in the U.S. including the Ancient Order of Hibernians, the Knights of Equity, and the Gaelic Athletic Association.
16. Testimony of John P. Collins, House Subcommittee on Immigration, Western Hemisphere Immigration Hearing on H.R. 981 93rd cong., 1st sess., 1973, p. 324.
17. Testimony of John P. Collins. Subcommittee No. I of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, The Effect of the Act of October 5, 1965, on Immigration From Ireland and Northern Europe, 91st cong, 1st session, 1969, p. 15.
18. Arthur "Skip" Endres, phone interview with author, 11 July 2001. Mr. Endres was Chief Counsel to Congressman Peter Rodino (D-NJ) when Rodino was first Chair of the House Immigration Subcommittee and then Chair of the full Judiciary Committee. Rodino and his staff played active leadership roles in the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and the Immigration Act of 1990.
19. Backlogs result when more persons than 20,000 wish to immigrate each year to a particular country. If the 20,000 slots are already used up that year, the persons must wait on a wait list until the year a slot opens up for them.
20. Dick Scully reports that at one point, there were well over 100,000 registrants on the Italian waiting list for brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens. (Scully, email communication to author 26 July 2001.)
21. Scully, email communication to author, 26 July 2002.
22. Testimony of Rev. Joseph A. Cogo, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 1975, p. 313. Reimers notes the Italians were also in favor of the 20,000 per country limit even though it meant an increase in backlogs because the general feeling at the time was that no country should dominate the immigration system and a set per country limit would be the fairest way to ensure that goal. (Reimers, "An Unintended Reform," p. 74.)
23. Scully, email communication to author, 26 July 2001. Scully adds that in the late 1960s the U.S. government took the extraordinary step of instructing the Italian postal service to find the persons whom the visa approval letters had been sent to and get them into the immigration process.
24. Testimony of Rev. Joseph A. Cogo., House Immigration Subcommittee Hearing on H.R. 981, Western Hemisphere Immigration, 1973, p. 320.
25. Scully, email communication to author, 26 July 2001.
26. In the political science literature, policy entrepreneurs are described as "advocates who are willing to invest their resources - time, energy reputation, and money - to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive or solidary benefits." Kingdon further articulates three common qualities of such entrepreneurs. They have some claim to a hearing as a representative of a group or an "authoritative decision-making position; they are known for their political connections and negotiating skills, and they are persistent and tenacious. John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, (New York, 1995), pp. 179-181. One will see that Kingdon's description of policy entrepreneurs quite aptly describes the Members of Congress who negotiated previous and present versions of the diversity lottery.
27. Opening statement of Michael Feighan, Hearings of the U.S. House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 1, The Effect of the Act of October 3, 1965 on the Immigration from Ireland and Northern Europe, 91st cong., 1st sess., 1969, pp. 2-3.
28. Opening remarks of Peter Rodino. The Effect of the Act of October 3, 1965 on the Immigration from Ireland and Northern Europe, 1969, pp. 4-5, 8-9.
29. Celler, and later Rodino, served first as chair of the House Immigration Subcommittee then the House Judiciary committee.
30. Endres, telephone interview with author, 11 July 2001.
31. Testimony of John P. Collins, Hearings of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee, The Effect of the Act of October 3, 1965 on the Immigration from Ireland and Northern Europe. 1969. pp. 11-12.
32. The society is a national organization of American citizens wholly or in part of Germanic origin and who have been actively interested in U.S. immigration issues.
33. Testimony of Edward J. Sussman, U.S. House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, The Effect of the Act of October 3, 1965 on the Immigration from Ireland and Northern Europe. 1969, pp. 26-27.
34. Statement of Philip O'Rourke, U.S. House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 1, The Effect of the Act of October 3, 1965 on the Immigration from Ireland and Northern Europe, 1969, p. 30.
35. Endres, phone interview with author, 11 July 2001.
36. Scully, email communication to author, 26 July 2001. Scully speculated that Eastland bottled up all immigration legislation because he felt he would lose control of an immigration bill if it went to the floor.
37. House Report 100-1038, Immigration Amendments of 1988, Document submitted by Peter Rodino to accompany H.R. 5115.
38. Endres, telephone interview with author, 11 July 2001. Mr. Endres, as Chief counsel of the Judiciary, was present at the meeting between O'Neal and Rodino when this deal transpired.
39. 52 Federal Register 1,449 (1987).
40. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Diversity Lottery Program, 1987: Hearings on S. 161, 101st cong., 1st sess., 1987, p. 4.
41. Endres, telephone interview with author, 11 July 2001. It was clear that the Irish government took a very active interest in this lottery given the depressing economic situation in that country. Endres reports that during the events leading up to the passage of IRCA, he asked Donnelley whether the Irish are interested in the provision and why Rodino had not heard from the Irish consulate. Rodino received a call the following day from the Irish Prime Minister.
42. Testimony of Brian J. Donelley, U.S., House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 7.
43. Walter Jacob, "Note: Diversity Visas," p. 313. Jacob writes that Harris Miller, the chief lobbyist for the Irish Immigration Reform Movement told him that the diversity language was used to gain support from the other interest groups.
44. See the statements of objection to the diversity provision in the testimonies from representatives from the Organization of Chinese Americans, La Raza, Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, and the Japanese American Citizens League among others in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Immigration, Hearings on S 161 - the Diversity Lottery Program, 101st cong., 1st sess., 1987.
45. Scully pointed out that no Administration had ever treated Mexico as anything but a North American country. (Scully, telephone interview with author 28 June 2001) The gerrymandering of Mexico into South/Central America seems to lend credence to the charge that the current lottery is a reaction against Latino migration. With Mexico in another hemisphere, the only three countries left in the Northern Hemisphere are the U.S., Canada and the Bahamas. Under the present diversity lottery rules, each hemisphere has a cap and each country has a cap. Moving Mexico to another Hemisphere would free up more visas for the remaining countries in North America.
46. Joyce Vialet and Larry Eig, Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649) Congressional Research Service report to Congress, 1990 (no. 90-601), pp. 1-2.
47. Asian and Latino interests strenuously fought the proposals that would cut back on family preferences. Both these groups criticized the proposal's definition of "nuclear family" as Eurocentric and culturally insensitive. Asian interest groups also argued that it was too soon to cut back on these preferences especially when their communities had just recently begun to enjoy the benefits of the liberalized immigration laws provided by the 1965 Act after they had been discriminated for so long under the Asia-Pacific Triangle system.
48. U.S. Department of State, Visa Bulletin Number 2a Volume VII, p. 3.
49. Statement of Brian Donnelley, U.S. House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Hearings on S. 161, Diversity Lottery Program, 101st cong., 1st sess., 1987, p. 52.
50. Statement of Brian J. Donnelley, U.S., House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Rep., 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 11. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 granted amnesty to illegal aliens who were residing in the country but most of the illegal Irish missed the cut-off date for eligibility because the economic problems in Ireland that precipitated a large number of illegals coming to the U.S. occurred after the amnesty cut-off date. Since IRCA was intended as a one-time only amnesty opportunity that could not be repeated, the diversity lottery was designed as a "back door amnesty" for the Irish illegals.
51. Statement of Edward Kennedy, U.S., House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 2.
52. Statement of Patrick Moynihan, U.S., House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, pp. 37, 40.
53. Statement of AIfonse D'Amato, U.S., House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary. 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 41.
54. Dick Kirschten, "Opening the Door" National Journal (1990): 2003.
55. Statement of MALDEF. U.S. House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 519.
56. Testimony of Lawrence Fuchs, U.S. House, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 100th cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 180.
57. I have elsewhere written about Fuchs' objection to the provision and the logic inconsistencies of the lottery defenders' arguments. Anna O. Law "Race, Ethnicity and National Origins in Public Policy - When Should it Matter?" Georgetown Immigration Law Journal (1986) vol. 10:71, 75.
58. Lawrence Fuchs, telephone interview with the author, 13 March 1998. Fuchs added that there was no illusion on the part of the sponsors of the bill that the lottery provision could be justified on principle. All the rhetoric about diversity was "just window dressing."
59. Scully's view was that by the time IMMACT '90 passed, the interest groups and the policy community were more generally worn out over the battle and gave up on attacking the lottery. He notes that even the Federation for American Immigration Reform, a restrictionist group, has stopped attacking the diversity lottery (email communication with author 19 July 2001) Between 1996 to the present, the New York Times ran fewer than a dozen stories on the diversity lottery. Most of these stories were about the effects of the lottery on individuals' lives or on neighborhoods and communities. However, I suspect the lottery received far more cover-age in the ethnic media, especially in countries that were meeting with high rates of success with the lottery.
60. John Murray Brown, "Irish economic recovery brings biggest rise in jobs since 1972," Financial Times (London, 25 October 1995).
61. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the immigration and Naturalization Service, 1994 (Washington, D.C.,) (1994 p. 44, 1996, p. 46, 1997, p. 44, 1998, p. 32) INS Statistical Yearbooks for 1999-2000 are not yet available.
62. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1994 (Washington, D.C.,) (1996, pp. 46-47, 1997, p. 44-45, 1998, 32-33) INS Statistical Yearbooks for 1999-2000 are not yet available.
63. Chidi Uzor, "US Embassy Issues 3000 Diversity Visas to Nigerians" This Day, (Lagos, Nigeria) 5 April 2001.
64. It is unclear whether there is a constituency supporting the diversity lottery today and who that constituency may be because there has been no serious policy discussion about the lottery since 1990. However, one might suspect that new interest groups (other than the Irish and Italian ones) would emerge to defend the lottery if the provision was under attack.