Dynamic programming model estimates of Social Security Disability Insurance application timing

Journal of Applied Econometrics

Volumn 19, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 671-685

  Burkhauser, Richard V ^a   Butler, J S ^b,d   Gumus, Gulcin ^c  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b University of Kentucky   (United States)

^c IZA   (Germany)

^d UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 10244257670     PISSN: 08837252     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/jae.804     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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