The rise of the British regulatory state: Transcending the privatization debate

Comparative Politics

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Levi Faur, David ^a   Gilad, Sharon ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 10144235486     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4150126     Document Type: Review

References (91)

1. For Britain, see Keith Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). For cross-national policy styles, see Frans van Waarden, "Persistence of National Policy Styles: A Study of Their Institutional Foundations," in Brigitte Unger and Frans van Waarden, eds., Convergence or Diversity? (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 333-72.
2. For Britain, see Keith Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). For cross-national policy styles, see Frans van Waarden, "Persistence of National Policy Styles: A Study of Their Institutional Foundations," in Brigitte Unger and Frans van Waarden, eds., Convergence or Diversity? (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 333-72.
3. For Britain, see Keith Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). For cross-national policy styles, see Frans van Waarden, "Persistence of National Policy Styles: A Study of Their Institutional Foundations," in Brigitte Unger and Frans van Waarden, eds., Convergence or Diversity? (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 333-72.
4. Giandomenico Majone, "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe," West European Politics, 17 (1994), 77-101 ; Giandomenico Majone, "From the Positive to the Regulatory State," Journal of Public Policy, 17(1997), 139-67.
5. Giandomenico Majone, "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe," West European Politics, 17 (1994), 77-101 ; Giandomenico Majone, "From the Positive to the Regulatory State," Journal of Public Policy, 17(1997), 139-67.
6. Luigi Manzetti, ed., Regulatory Policy in Latin America (Miami: North-South Center Press, 2000); Jordana Jacint and David Levi-Faur, "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Latin America," presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Philadelphia, August 28-31,2003.
7. Luigi Manzetti, ed., Regulatory Policy in Latin America (Miami: North-South Center Press, 2000); Jordana Jacint and David Levi-Faur, "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Latin America," presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Philadelphia, August 28-31,2003.
8. Kanishka Jayasuriya, "Globalization and the Changing Architecture of the State: The Politics of the Regulatory State and the Politics of Negative Co-ordination," Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (2001), 101-23.
9. The term "independent regulatory authority" is problematic. On the relations between independence and autonomy, see Eric Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously," in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Bown, 1987), pp. 353-90. Also Giandomenico Majone, "The Regulatory State and Its Legitimacy Problems," West European Politics, 22 (1999), 1-24; Giandomenico Majone, "Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance," European Union Politics, 2 (2001), 103-22.
10. The term "independent regulatory authority" is problematic. On the relations between independence and autonomy, see Eric Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously," in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Bown, 1987), pp. 353-90. Also Giandomenico Majone, "The Regulatory State and Its Legitimacy Problems," West European Politics, 22 (1999), 1-24; Giandomenico Majone, "Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance," European Union Politics, 2 (2001), 103-22.
11. The term "independent regulatory authority" is problematic. On the relations between independence and autonomy, see Eric Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously," in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Bown, 1987), pp. 353-90. Also Giandomenico Majone, "The Regulatory State and Its Legitimacy Problems," West European Politics, 22 (1999), 1-24; Giandomenico Majone, "Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance," European Union Politics, 2 (2001), 103-22.
12. See also the diffusion of adversarial legalism. R. Daniel Keleman, "The Rise of Adversarial Legalism in the European Union," in David Levi-Faur and Eran Vigoda-Gadot, eds., International Public Policy and Management: Policy Learning beyond Regional, Cultural and Political Boundaries (forthcoming).
13. States are embedded in societies. Therefore, long-term changes will be reflected and manifested in both these imaginary entities. See Joel Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
14. Michael Moran, The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 2. Our reference to the British regulatory state overlooks some of the implications of regional devolution. See Arthur Midwinter and Neil McGarvey, "In Search of the Regulatory State: Evidence from Scotland," Public Administration, 79 (2001), 825-849.
15. Michael Moran, The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 2. Our reference to the British regulatory state overlooks some of the implications of regional devolution. See Arthur Midwinter and Neil McGarvey, "In Search of the Regulatory State: Evidence from Scotland," Public Administration, 79 (2001), 825-849.
16. See Marc Eisner, Regulatory Politics in Transition, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Majone, "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe"; Majone, "The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems"; Neil Gunningham and Peter N. Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Richard V. Ericson and Kevin D. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). The "smart state" refers generally to the Australian School of Regulation around RegNet, the Australian National University, and the works of John Braithwaite.
17. See Marc Eisner, Regulatory Politics in Transition, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Majone, "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe"; Majone, "The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems"; Neil Gunningham and Peter N. Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Richard V. Ericson and Kevin D. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). The "smart state" refers generally to the Australian School of Regulation around RegNet, the Australian National University, and the works of John Braithwaite.
18. See Marc Eisner, Regulatory Politics in Transition, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Majone, "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe"; Majone, "The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems"; Neil Gunningham and Peter N. Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Richard V. Ericson and Kevin D. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). The "smart state" refers generally to the Australian School of Regulation around RegNet, the Australian National University, and the works of John Braithwaite.
19. See Marc Eisner, Regulatory Politics in Transition, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Majone, "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe"; Majone, "The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems"; Neil Gunningham and Peter N. Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Richard V. Ericson and Kevin D. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). The "smart state" refers generally to the Australian School of Regulation around RegNet, the Australian National University, and the works of John Braithwaite.
20. See Marc Eisner, Regulatory Politics in Transition, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Majone, "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe"; Majone, "The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems"; Neil Gunningham and Peter N. Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Richard V. Ericson and Kevin D. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). The "smart state" refers generally to the Australian School of Regulation around RegNet, the Australian National University, and the works of John Braithwaite.
21. Moran, p. 4.
22. ibid., p. 68.
23. ibid., p. 4. The term "club government" is borrowed from David Marquand, The Unprincipled Society (London: Cape, 1988), p. 178. It also echoes the informalities of British governance as noted by H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money (London: Macmillan, 1974).
24. ibid., p. 4. The term "club government" is borrowed from David Marquand, The Unprincipled Society (London: Cape, 1988), p. 178. It also echoes the informalities of British governance as noted by H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money (London: Macmillan, 1974).
25. Moran, pp. 41-42.
26. ibid., p. 31.
27. ibid., p. 42.
28. ibid., p. 9.
29. i b i d.
30. ibid., pp. 20-22.
31. ibid., p. 7.
32. ibid., pp. 20-21.
33. ibid., pp. 6, 8. Moran bases his case on James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
34. Moran, p. 179.
35. Christopher Hood, Colin Scott, Oliver James, George Jones, and Tony Travers, Regulation inside Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police and Sleaze-Busters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 23.
36. ibid., p. 27.
37. i b i d.
38. ibid., pp. 29-31.
39. ibid., p. 42.
40. Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory Agencies (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1986). See also Donald J. Black, The Behavior of Law (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 40.
41. Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory Agencies (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1986). See also Donald J. Black, The Behavior of Law (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 40.
42. Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 4.
43. ibid., p. 14.
44. ibid., p. xii.
45. ibid., p. 11.
46. ibid., p. 68.
47. ibid., pp. 2, 3.
48. This fourth feature rests on Foucault's notion of governmentality and of self-regulation as the internalization of external norms. Consequently, state regulation is only one, though critical, element in multiple circuits of power and public controls. Indeed, it is the simplistic contrast between regulation and self-regulation that impeded understanding of self-regulation as a means of social control.
49. Cf. the three characteristics - (partial) shift in ownership to the private sector, the creation of quasi-independent agencies, and the formalization of relationships within the policy domain - in Martin Loughlin and Colin Scott, "The Regulatory State," in Patrick Dunleavy et al., eds., Developments in British Politics, vol. 5 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 205-19. "We can now build a picture of the regulatory state: it is one which attaches relatively more importance to process of regulation than to other means of policy making. The regulatory state is a rule-making state, with an attachment to the rule of law and, normally, a predilection for judicial or quasi-judicial solutions." F. McGowan and H. Wallace, "Towards a European Regulatory State," Journal of European Public Policy, 3 (1996), 563.
50. Cf. the three characteristics - (partial) shift in ownership to the private sector, the creation of quasi-independent agencies, and the formalization of relationships within the policy domain - in Martin Loughlin and Colin Scott, "The Regulatory State," in Patrick Dunleavy et al., eds., Developments in British Politics, vol. 5 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 205-19. "We can now build a picture of the regulatory state: it is one which attaches relatively more importance to process of regulation than to other means of policy making. The regulatory state is a rule-making state, with an attachment to the rule of law and, normally, a predilection for judicial or quasi-judicial solutions." F. McGowan and H. Wallace, "Towards a European Regulatory State," Journal of European Public Policy, 3 (1996), 563.
51. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1992).
52. Majone, "From the Positive to the Regulatory State," pp. 148-49.
53. Giandomenico Majone, "Public Policy and Administration: Ideas, Interests and Institutions," in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., A New Handbook of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 611.
54. Hood, Scott, James, Jones, and Travers, p. 107.
55. Grabosky and Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle.
56. Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); Peter Michael Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy: A Study of Interpersonal Relations in Two Government Agencies, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
57. Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); Peter Michael Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy: A Study of Interpersonal Relations in Two Government Agencies, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
58. Rainier Kraakman, "Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2 (1986), 53-104.
59. Peter Grabosky, "The System of Corporate Crime Control," in Henry N. Pontell and David Shichor, Contemporary Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 2001), p. 148.
60. Self-regulate or else seems to be state strategy. See Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 15.
61. ibid., pp. 101-32.
62. Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition: The Bureaucratic Politics of Regulatory Justification, Law, justice, and Power (Burlington: Ashgate Dartmouth, 2003), p. 2; also, Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
63. Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition: The Bureaucratic Politics of Regulatory Justification, Law, justice, and Power (Burlington: Ashgate Dartmouth, 2003), p. 2; also, Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
64. Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation.
65. See Colin Scott, "Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State," in Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur, eds., The Politics of Regulation in the Age of Governance (Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar, 2004), pp. 145-74.
66. This multilayered system is not in any form a product of efficient rational design. On the contrary, it is marked by "crisis and chaos." Moran, p. 26.
67. There is no consensus on the definition of trust and the level in which trust operates. For example, Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Blackwell 1988), p. 219, views trust as a subjective expectation that the likelihood that another agent will perform a particular action that is beneficial (or not detrimental) and confidence in his or her knowledge and expertise to perform such action is high enough to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him or her. Susan Shapiro, "The Social Control of Impersonal Trust," American Journal of Sociology, 93 (1987), 634, inquires into impersonal trust, which is relevant when direct contact between principal and agent is unavailable.
68. There is no consensus on the definition of trust and the level in which trust operates. For example, Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Blackwell 1988), p. 219, views trust as a subjective expectation that the likelihood that another agent will perform a particular action that is beneficial (or not detrimental) and confidence in his or her knowledge and expertise to perform such action is high enough to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him or her. Susan Shapiro, "The Social Control of Impersonal Trust," American Journal of Sociology, 93 (1987), 634, inquires into impersonal trust, which is relevant when direct contact between principal and agent is unavailable.
69. "It is mistaken to regard trust as an element in primary group control, since the hallmarks of the simpler systems of primacy group control are surveillance, the absence of privacy, and coercion... .The basic contention is that modern societies and their organizations are increasingly built on complex trust relationships." Albert Reiss, "Selecting Strategies of Social Control over Organizational Life," in K. Hawkins and J. M. Thomas, eds., Enforcing Regulation (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1984), p. 33.
70. Gambetta, p. 219.
71. Hood, Scott, James, Jones, and Travers, p. 202.
72. ibid., p. 103.
73. Behind what looks like rule-bound adversarial relationship may still be found interdependent informal cooperation.
74. Power, p. 14.
75. Moran, p. 155.
76. ibid., p. 116.
77. ibid., p. 26.
78. ibid., p. 162.
79. ibid., p. 183.
80. Hood, Scott, James, Jones, and Travers, p. 33.
81. ibid., p. 34.
82. Power, p. 14.
83. ibid., p. 2.
84. ibid., p. 91.
85. "[T]here are few projects more central to the social sciences than the study of regulation." J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 10.
86. Covadonga Meseguer, "The Diffusion of Privatisation in Industrial and Latin American Countries: What Role for Learning?," paper prepared for the workshop on the Internationalization of Regulatory Reforms: The Interaction of Policy Learning and Policy Emulation in Diffusion Processes, Berkeley, April 24-25, 2003; Nancy Brune and Geoffrey Garrett, "The Diffusion of Privatization in the Developing World," paper prepared for the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 30-September 3, 2000.
87. Covadonga Meseguer, "The Diffusion of Privatisation in Industrial and Latin American Countries: What Role for Learning?," paper prepared for the workshop on the Internationalization of Regulatory Reforms: The Interaction of Policy Learning and Policy Emulation in Diffusion Processes, Berkeley, April 24-25, 2003; Nancy Brune and Geoffrey Garrett, "The Diffusion of Privatization in the Developing World," paper prepared for the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 30-September 3, 2000.
88. David Levi-Faur, "Herding towards a New Convention: On Herds, Shepherds, and Lost Sheep in the Liberalization of the Telecommunications and Electricity Industries," Politics Papers Series, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, W6-2002. Another study of nineteen Latin American countries in twelve different sectors found that, from a meager number of regulatory authorities in 1988 (mostly in the financial sectors), the overall number of regulatory authorities (with varying degrees of autonomy) had grown to 134 by 2002. In the four years from 1993 to 1996, sixty new authorities were established. Jordana and Levi-Faur, eds.
89. The data cover competition, financial services, telecommunications, electricity, environment, food safety and pharmaceutical sectors. The countries are the nineteen studied by Jordana and Levi-Faur, eds., as well as seventeen European countries studied by Fabrizio Gilardi, "Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe" (Ph.D. diss., University of Lausanne, 2004). We are grateful for Fabrizio Gilardi's data.
90. A notable exception is Christopher Polit et al., Performance or Compliance? Performance Audit and Public Management in Five Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). The study covers France, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K. For the audit society in Australia, see Colin Scott, "Speaking Softly without Big Sticks: Metaregulation and Public Sector Audit," Law and Policy, 25 (2003), 203-19.
91. A notable exception is Christopher Polit et al., Performance or Compliance? Performance Audit and Public Management in Five Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). The study covers France, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K. For the audit society in Australia, see Colin Scott, "Speaking Softly without Big Sticks: Metaregulation and Public Sector Audit," Law and Policy, 25 (2003), 203-19.