Farmers' rights: Intellectual property regimes and the struggle over seeds

Politics and Society

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 511-543

  Borowiak, Craig ^a  

^a HAVERFORD COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Development discourse; Farmers' rights; Indigenous knowledge; Intellectual property; TRIPS

Indexed keywords

EID: 10044252183     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329204269979     Document Type: Article

References (127)

1. This "seed war" has most often been framed as a struggle between North and South, as new commercial seeds are generally engineered by agricultural firms located in the industrialized North, even though the germplasm used for such engineering is generally acquired from the developing countries of the South. This by no means implies that farmers in industrialized countries are not also significantly affected by plant variety IPR regimes. In the United States, for example, the issue of seed reuse reached as high as the Supreme Court. In its January 1995 decision on Asgrow Seed Co. v, Winterboer, the court ruled that farmers may sell for reproductive purposes only that amount of seed they have saved for replanting in their own acreage. See the Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 2 (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 170. By late 1998 more than 475 farmers in the United States and Canada were involved in litigation with Monsanto regarding unauthorized seed collection. In May 2004, Canada's supreme court ruled in favor of Monsanto in its lawsuit against a Saskatchewan farmer found with patented crops in his field without authorization. See Colin McClelland, "Canadian Court Broadens Monsanto's Patent Rights," Oregonian, May 22, 2004, A9; Luke Anderson, Genetic Engineering, Food, and Our Environment (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 1999), 47.
2. This "seed war" has most often been framed as a struggle between North and South, as new commercial seeds are generally engineered by agricultural firms located in the industrialized North, even though the germplasm used for such engineering is generally acquired from the developing countries of the South. This by no means implies that farmers in industrialized countries are not also significantly affected by plant variety IPR regimes. In the United States, for example, the issue of seed reuse reached as high as the Supreme Court. In its January 1995 decision on Asgrow Seed Co. v, Winterboer, the court ruled that farmers may sell for reproductive purposes only that amount of seed they have saved for replanting in their own acreage. See the Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 2 (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 170. By late 1998 more than 475 farmers in the United States and Canada were involved in litigation with Monsanto regarding unauthorized seed collection. In May 2004, Canada's supreme court ruled in favor of Monsanto in its lawsuit against a Saskatchewan farmer found with patented crops in his field without authorization. See Colin McClelland, "Canadian Court Broadens Monsanto's Patent Rights," Oregonian, May 22, 2004, A9; Luke Anderson, Genetic Engineering, Food, and Our Environment (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 1999), 47.
3. This "seed war" has most often been framed as a struggle between North and South, as new commercial seeds are generally engineered by agricultural firms located in the industrialized North, even though the germplasm used for such engineering is generally acquired from the developing countries of the South. This by no means implies that farmers in industrialized countries are not also significantly affected by plant variety IPR regimes. In the United States, for example, the issue of seed reuse reached as high as the Supreme Court. In its January 1995 decision on Asgrow Seed Co. v, Winterboer, the court ruled that farmers may sell for reproductive purposes only that amount of seed they have saved for replanting in their own acreage. See the Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 2 (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 170. By late 1998 more than 475 farmers in the United States and Canada were involved in litigation with Monsanto regarding unauthorized seed collection. In May 2004, Canada's supreme court ruled in favor of Monsanto in its lawsuit against a Saskatchewan farmer found with patented crops in his field without authorization. See Colin McClelland, "Canadian Court Broadens Monsanto's Patent Rights," Oregonian, May 22, 2004, A9; Luke Anderson, Genetic Engineering, Food, and Our Environment (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 1999), 47.
4. Related concerns exist over the production of seeds that have been genetically altered either to lose fertility after only one generation ("terminator technology") or to turn on desirable traits only with the application of chemicals sold by the same firm ("traitor technology").
5. For examples of how this history has been used by farmer advocacy groups, see Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), "Frequently Unasked Questions about the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources," RAFI Communique, no. 69 (March/April 2001); Ellen Hickey and Anuradha Mittal, eds., Voices from the South: The Third World Debunks Corporate Myths on Genetically Engineered Crops (Oakland, CA: Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2003), 18, 29, 39, 62; http:// www.foodfirst.org/progs/global/ge/sactoministerial/voices.php (accessed December 22, 2003); and the Via Campesina 1996 Intervention to the FAO/CGRFA, www.ukabc.org/Via_Camp.html (accessed December 20, 2003).
6. For examples of how this history has been used by farmer advocacy groups, see Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), "Frequently Unasked Questions about the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources," RAFI Communique, no. 69 (March/April 2001); Ellen Hickey and Anuradha Mittal, eds., Voices from the South: The Third World Debunks Corporate Myths on Genetically Engineered Crops (Oakland, CA: Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2003), 18, 29, 39, 62; http:// www.foodfirst.org/progs/global/ge/sactoministerial/voices.php (accessed December 22, 2003); and the Via Campesina 1996 Intervention to the FAO/CGRFA, www.ukabc.org/Via_Camp.html (accessed December 20, 2003).
7. For examples of how this history has been used by farmer advocacy groups, see Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), "Frequently Unasked Questions about the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources," RAFI Communique, no. 69 (March/April 2001); Ellen Hickey and Anuradha Mittal, eds., Voices from the South: The Third World Debunks Corporate Myths on Genetically Engineered Crops (Oakland, CA: Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2003), 18, 29, 39, 62; http:// www.foodfirst.org/progs/global/ge/sactoministerial/voices.php (accessed December 22, 2003); and the Via Campesina 1996 Intervention to the FAO/CGRFA, www.ukabc.org/Via_Camp.html (accessed December 20, 2003).
8. The first recorded nonplant patents date in Great Britain, Venice, and the Republic of Florence. The architect Filippo Brunelleschi is the earliest patentee on record, receiving a patent from the state of Florence in 1421. In England, the first patents for invention were granted during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and in France and Germany they were granted around the same period. One scholar has argued that some patenting took place as early as the reign of King Edward III in 1336. See P. J. Frederico, "Origin and Early History of Patents," Journal of the Patent Office Society 11, no. 7 (1929): 293. During these first centuries, patents were more a matter of monopolies of privilege given at the discretion of roy-alty. While England's 1624 Statute of Monopolies is often cited as the first written patent law, others point to the formalization of patent procedures 150 years earlier in Venice. See M. Frumkin, "The Origin of Patents," Journal of the Patent Office Society 27, no. 3 (1945): 143-48; Frank D. Prager, "A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787," Journal of the Patent Office Society 26, no. 11 (1944): 711; Prabuddha Ganguli, Gearing up for Patents: The Indian Scenario (Hyderabad, India: Universities Press, 1998), 12; and Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, "The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Economic History 10, no. 1 (1950): 1-29.
9. The first recorded nonplant patents date in Great Britain, Venice, and the Republic of Florence. The architect Filippo Brunelleschi is the earliest patentee on record, receiving a patent from the state of Florence in 1421. In England, the first patents for invention were granted during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and in France and Germany they were granted around the same period. One scholar has argued that some patenting took place as early as the reign of King Edward III in 1336. See P. J. Frederico, "Origin and Early History of Patents," Journal of the Patent Office Society 11, no. 7 (1929): 293. During these first centuries, patents were more a matter of monopolies of privilege given at the discretion of roy-alty. While England's 1624 Statute of Monopolies is often cited as the first written patent law, others point to the formalization of patent procedures 150 years earlier in Venice. See M. Frumkin, "The Origin of Patents," Journal of the Patent Office Society 27, no. 3 (1945): 143-48; Frank D. Prager, "A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787," Journal of the Patent Office Society 26, no. 11 (1944): 711; Prabuddha Ganguli, Gearing up for Patents: The Indian Scenario (Hyderabad, India: Universities Press, 1998), 12; and Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, "The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Economic History 10, no. 1 (1950): 1-29.
10. The first recorded nonplant patents date in Great Britain, Venice, and the Republic of Florence. The architect Filippo Brunelleschi is the earliest patentee on record, receiving a patent from the state of Florence in 1421. In England, the first patents for invention were granted during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and in France and Germany they were granted around the same period. One scholar has argued that some patenting took place as early as the reign of King Edward III in 1336. See P. J. Frederico, "Origin and Early History of Patents," Journal of the Patent Office Society 11, no. 7 (1929): 293. During these first centuries, patents were more a matter of monopolies of privilege given at the discretion of roy-alty. While England's 1624 Statute of Monopolies is often cited as the first written patent law, others point to the formalization of patent procedures 150 years earlier in Venice. See M. Frumkin, "The Origin of Patents," Journal of the Patent Office Society 27, no. 3 (1945): 143-48; Frank D. Prager, "A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787," Journal of the Patent Office Society 26, no. 11 (1944): 711; Prabuddha Ganguli, Gearing up for Patents: The Indian Scenario (Hyderabad, India: Universities Press, 1998), 12; and Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, "The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Economic History 10, no. 1 (1950): 1-29.
11. The first recorded nonplant patents date in Great Britain, Venice, and the Republic of Florence. The architect Filippo Brunelleschi is the earliest patentee on record, receiving a patent from the state of Florence in 1421. In England, the first patents for invention were granted during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and in France and Germany they were granted around the same period. One scholar has argued that some patenting took place as early as the reign of King Edward III in 1336. See P. J. Frederico, "Origin and Early History of Patents," Journal of the Patent Office Society 11, no. 7 (1929): 293. During these first centuries, patents were more a matter of monopolies of privilege given at the discretion of roy-alty. While England's 1624 Statute of Monopolies is often cited as the first written patent law, others point to the formalization of patent procedures 150 years earlier in Venice. See M. Frumkin, "The Origin of Patents," Journal of the Patent Office Society 27, no. 3 (1945): 143-48; Frank D. Prager, "A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787," Journal of the Patent Office Society 26, no. 11 (1944): 711; Prabuddha Ganguli, Gearing up for Patents: The Indian Scenario (Hyderabad, India: Universities Press, 1998), 12; and Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, "The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Economic History 10, no. 1 (1950): 1-29.
12. The first recorded nonplant patents date in Great Britain, Venice, and the Republic of Florence. The architect Filippo Brunelleschi is the earliest patentee on record, receiving a patent from the state of Florence in 1421. In England, the first patents for invention were granted during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and in France and Germany they were granted around the same period. One scholar has argued that some patenting took place as early as the reign of King Edward III in 1336. See P. J. Frederico, "Origin and Early History of Patents," Journal of the Patent Office Society 11, no. 7 (1929): 293. During these first centuries, patents were more a matter of monopolies of privilege given at the discretion of roy-alty. While England's 1624 Statute of Monopolies is often cited as the first written patent law, others point to the formalization of patent procedures 150 years earlier in Venice. See M. Frumkin, "The Origin of Patents," Journal of the Patent Office Society 27, no. 3 (1945): 143-48; Frank D. Prager, "A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787," Journal of the Patent Office Society 26, no. 11 (1944): 711; Prabuddha Ganguli, Gearing up for Patents: The Indian Scenario (Hyderabad, India: Universities Press, 1998), 12; and Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, "The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Economic History 10, no. 1 (1950): 1-29.
13. Jack Ralph Kloppenburg Jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 72; Anthony J. Stenson and Tim S. Gray, The Politics of Genetic Resource Control (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 9.
14. Jack Ralph Kloppenburg Jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 72; Anthony J. Stenson and Tim S. Gray, The Politics of Genetic Resource Control (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 9.
15. James Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Constitution of the Information Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 98.
16. I do not mean to suggest that "agronomy, community, and nature" are the only or best oppositions to "commerce, science, technology and property." I use them merely as ready-at-hand characteristics of an imagined alternative discourse in which seeds and farmers might be better situated.
17. Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 132.
18. An example of the political pressure to put seeds into the control of seedsmen even before hybrids were introduced can be seen in the words of C. P. Hartley, principal agronomist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1920: "Well-conducted corn breeding requires special methods that farmers generally do not have time to apply. If there is in your locality a corn breeder who demonstrates each year the superiority of his corn, you can afford to pay him well for his superior seed.... The general farmer is a producer rather than a breeder of corn. He profits by the careful work of the corn breeder by adopting the higher yielding strains for his general crop." See Hartley, "Better Seed Corn," in Farmers Bulletin 1175 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1920), 5, cited in Stephen A. Marglin, "Farmers, Seedsmen, and Scientists: Systems of Agriculture and Systems of Knowledge," in Decolonizing Knowledge: From Development to Dialogue, ed. Frederick Apffel-Marglin and Stephen A. Marglin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 205-6.
19. An example of the political pressure to put seeds into the control of seedsmen even before hybrids were introduced can be seen in the words of C. P. Hartley, principal agronomist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1920: "Well-conducted corn breeding requires special methods that farmers generally do not have time to apply. If there is in your locality a corn breeder who demonstrates each year the superiority of his corn, you can afford to pay him well for his superior seed.... The general farmer is a producer rather than a breeder of corn. He profits by the careful work of the corn breeder by adopting the higher yielding strains for his general crop." See Hartley, "Better Seed Corn," in Farmers Bulletin 1175 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1920), 5, cited in Stephen A. Marglin, "Farmers, Seedsmen, and Scientists: Systems of Agriculture and Systems of Knowledge," in Decolonizing Knowledge: From Development to Dialogue, ed. Frederick Apffel-Marglin and Stephen A. Marglin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 205-6.
20. Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 93. Richard Lewontin and Jean-Pierre Berlan make similar arguments about how hybrid corn allowed commercial seedsmen to insert themselves as controlling players in agricultural production. See Lewontin and Berlan, "Technology, Research, and the Penetration of Capital: The Case of U.S. Agriculture," Monthly Review 38 (July-August 1986): 21-35; and Berlan and Lewontin, "The Political Economy of Hybrid Corn," Monthly Review 38 (July-August 1986): 35-48 (case study of capitalism in agricultural production; includes article on explanation of hybrid crops).
21. Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 93. Richard Lewontin and Jean-Pierre Berlan make similar arguments about how hybrid corn allowed commercial seedsmen to insert themselves as controlling players in agricultural production. See Lewontin and Berlan, "Technology, Research, and the Penetration of Capital: The Case of U.S. Agriculture," Monthly Review 38 (July-August 1986): 21-35; and Berlan and Lewontin, "The Political Economy of Hybrid Corn," Monthly Review 38 (July-August 1986): 35-48 (case study of capitalism in agricultural production; includes article on explanation of hybrid crops).
22. Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 93. Richard Lewontin and Jean-Pierre Berlan make similar arguments about how hybrid corn allowed commercial seedsmen to insert themselves as controlling players in agricultural production. See Lewontin and Berlan, "Technology, Research, and the Penetration of Capital: The Case of U.S. Agriculture," Monthly Review 38 (July-August 1986): 21-35; and Berlan and Lewontin, "The Political Economy of Hybrid Corn," Monthly Review 38 (July-August 1986): 35-48 (case study of capitalism in agricultural production; includes article on explanation of hybrid crops).
23. For more on the history and qualities of hybrid corn, see A. Richard Crabb, The Hybrid-Corn Makers: Prophets of Plenty (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1947); D. Duvick, "Genetic Contributions to Yield Gains of U.S. Hybrid Maize, 1930 to 1980," in Genetic Contributions to Yield Gains of Five Major Crop Plants, ed. W. R. Fehr (Crop Science Society of America Special Publication, no. 7) (Madison, WI: American Society of Agronomy, 1984); Kloppenburg, First the Seed; and Marglin, "Farmers, Seedsmen, and Scientists."
24. For more on the history and qualities of hybrid corn, see A. Richard Crabb, The Hybrid-Corn Makers: Prophets of Plenty (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1947); D. Duvick, "Genetic Contributions to Yield Gains of U.S. Hybrid Maize, 1930 to 1980," in Genetic Contributions to Yield Gains of Five Major Crop Plants, ed. W. R. Fehr (Crop Science Society of America Special Publication, no. 7) (Madison, WI: American Society of Agronomy, 1984); Kloppenburg, First the Seed; and Marglin, "Farmers, Seedsmen, and Scientists."
25. For more on the history and qualities of hybrid corn, see A. Richard Crabb, The Hybrid-Corn Makers: Prophets of Plenty (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1947); D. Duvick, "Genetic Contributions to Yield Gains of U.S. Hybrid Maize, 1930 to 1980," in Genetic Contributions to Yield Gains of Five Major Crop Plants, ed. W. R. Fehr (Crop Science Society of America Special Publication, no. 7) (Madison, WI: American Society of Agronomy, 1984); Kloppenburg, First the Seed; and Marglin, "Farmers, Seedsmen, and Scientists."
26. For more on the history and qualities of hybrid corn, see A. Richard Crabb, The Hybrid-Corn Makers: Prophets of Plenty (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1947); D. Duvick, "Genetic Contributions to Yield Gains of U.S. Hybrid Maize, 1930 to 1980," in Genetic Contributions to Yield Gains of Five Major Crop Plants, ed. W. R. Fehr (Crop Science Society of America Special Publication, no. 7) (Madison, WI: American Society of Agronomy, 1984); Kloppenburg, First the Seed; and Marglin, "Farmers, Seedsmen, and Scientists."
27. Edward M. East and Donald Jones, Inbreeding and Outbreeding: Their Genetic and Sociological Significance (Philadelphia: Lippincot, 1919), 224, quoted in Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 99. For more on Jones and East, see S. Becker, Donald F. Jones and Hybrid Corn: Lockwood Lecture April 9, 1976, (Bulletin 763) (New Haven: Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station, 1976).
28. Edward M. East and Donald Jones, Inbreeding and Outbreeding: Their Genetic and Sociological Significance (Philadelphia: Lippincot, 1919), 224, quoted in Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 99. For more on Jones and East, see S. Becker, Donald F. Jones and Hybrid Corn: Lockwood Lecture April 9, 1976, (Bulletin 763) (New Haven: Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station, 1976).
29. Edward M. East and Donald Jones, Inbreeding and Outbreeding: Their Genetic and Sociological Significance (Philadelphia: Lippincot, 1919), 224, quoted in Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 99. For more on Jones and East, see S. Becker, Donald F. Jones and Hybrid Corn: Lockwood Lecture April 9, 1976, (Bulletin 763) (New Haven: Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station, 1976).
30. Today one finds similar statements made about terminator technology. See, for example, USDA, "Why the USDA's Technology Protection System (aka "Terminator") Benefits Agriculture," USDA Agricultural Research Service: News and Information, December 28, 2001, http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/br/tps/ (accessed May 7, 2002). Here the U.S. Department of Agriculture compares terminator technology to hybrid corn and praises them both for their role in promoting development.
31. As a naturally outbreeding species with relatively large, widely separated male and female flower parts, corn is somewhat uniquely suited for commercial hybridization. In contrast, most other major crops are naturally inbreeding and have flowers formed for self-pollination rather than the cross-fertilization necessary for hybridization. See Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 124, 134, 300.
32. Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 132; Stenson and Gray, The Politics of Genetic Resource Control, 10.
33. Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 132; Stenson and Gray, The Politics of Genetic Resource Control, 10.
34. The Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 2, 171.
35. Interestingly, Cary Fowler observes that as recent as the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act even the most outspoken of breeders' rights proponents recognized seed collection and reuse as a "right" of farmers. See Cary Fowler, Unnatural Selection: Technology, Politics, and Plant Evolution (Yverdon, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers S.A., 1994), 115.
36. Philippe Cullet, "Farmers' Rights in Peril," Frontline 17, no. 7 (2000): 71-72. See also Vandana Shiva, Captive Minds, Captive Lives: Essays on Ethical and Ecological Implications of Patents on Life (Dehra Dun, India: Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource Policy, 1995).
37. Philippe Cullet, "Farmers' Rights in Peril," Frontline 17, no. 7 (2000): 71-72. See also Vandana Shiva, Captive Minds, Captive Lives: Essays on Ethical and Ecological Implications of Patents on Life (Dehra Dun, India: Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource Policy, 1995).
38. Gerd Winter, "Patent Law Policy in Biotechnology," Journal of Environmental Law 4, no. 2 (1992): 167-87.
39. Quoted in Shiva, Captive Minds, Captive Lives, 107. Leenders was secretary general of the International Seed Trade Federation (FIS) from 1962 to 1986, and secretary general of the International Association of Plant Breeders for Protection of Plant Varieties (ASSINSE) from 1977 to 1986.
40. Susan Sell and C. May, "Moments in Law: Contestation and Settlement in the History of Intellectual Property," Review of International Political Economy 8, no. 3 (2001): 467-500; Susan Sell, "Intellectual Property Rights" in Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2002), 171-88.
41. Susan Sell and C. May, "Moments in Law: Contestation and Settlement in the History of Intellectual Property," Review of International Political Economy 8, no. 3 (2001): 467-500; Susan Sell, "Intellectual Property Rights" in Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2002), 171-88.
42. Peter Drahos, "Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the GATT," Prometheus 13, no. 1 (1995): 6-19; Peter Drahos, "Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue," in Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development, ed. Peter Drahos and Ruth Mayne (London: Oxfam, 2002).
43. Peter Drahos, "Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the GATT," Prometheus 13, no. 1 (1995): 6-19; Peter Drahos, "Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue," in Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development, ed. Peter Drahos and Ruth Mayne (London: Oxfam, 2002).
44. S. K. Verma, "TRIPS and Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries," European Intellectual Property Review 6 (1995): 281-89. For example, in the Indian pre-TRIPS patent regime, plant varieties were included in a long list of unpatentable items. India offered patents for processes of plant production, but not for the resulting product. So, whereas the processes that produced seeds and pesticides were patentable, the seeds and pesticides themselves were not. This policy enabled the government to promote food security by ensuring that essential items such as high-quality seeds, food, medicines, and so on were not monopoly controlled and were therefore cheap and accessible for farmers and other communities. It also gave recognition to the history among farmers and farming communities of freely sharing agricultural information. The TRIPS agreement, in contrast, obliges India to depart from both of these rationales. See Ganguli, Gearing up for Patents.
45. S. K. Verma, "TRIPS and Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries," European Intellectual Property Review 6 (1995): 281-89. For example, in the Indian pre-TRIPS patent regime, plant varieties were included in a long list of unpatentable items. India offered patents for processes of plant production, but not for the resulting product. So, whereas the processes that produced seeds and pesticides were patentable, the seeds and pesticides themselves were not. This policy enabled the government to promote food security by ensuring that essential items such as high-quality seeds, food, medicines, and so on were not monopoly controlled and were therefore cheap and accessible for farmers and other communities. It also gave recognition to the history among farmers and farming communities of freely sharing agricultural information. The TRIPS agreement, in contrast, obliges India to depart from both of these rationales. See Ganguli, Gearing up for Patents.
46. "Fostering Plant Innovation: ASSINSEL Brief on Review of TRIPS 27.3b," 6, http://www.worldseed.org/pdf/trips273b.pdf (accessed May 20, 2004).
47. Marglin, "Farmers, Seedsmen, and Scientists," 204.
48. Reuters, January 26, 2001. For examples of similar protests in Thailand, India, the Philippines, New Zealand, Indonesia, Bolivia, Zambia, and elsewhere, see Hickey and Mittal, Voices from the South.
49. "Indigenous People's Statement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the WTO Agreement" signed July 25, 1999, at the United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, by more than eighty signatories representing many Indigenous Peoples' organizations, NGOs, and networks, http://www.undp.org/csopp/CSO/NewFiles/ipdocagreeno.html (accessed December 3, 2003).
50. Quoted in Hickey and Mittal, Voices from the South, 62.
51. On the basis of such an interpretation, he argues that farmers will benefit from the agreement, will not lose access to seeds, will not lose their ability to exchange seeds, and will not be made dependent on the plant breeder. See Peter Sutherland, "Seeds of Doubt: Assurance on 'Farmers' Privilege,' "Times of India, March 15, 1994. Similarly, the Indian Commerce Ministry repeatedly claimed that while a patent regime would be against farmers' and the national interest, the effective sui generis option allows the state to protect farmers' rights. See Harcharan Singh Josh, GATT, Dunkel and India (New Delhi, India: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1995), 62; and Shiva, Captive Minds, Captive Lives, 113.
52. On the basis of such an interpretation, he argues that farmers will benefit from the agreement, will not lose access to seeds, will not lose their ability to exchange seeds, and will not be made dependent on the plant breeder. See Peter Sutherland, "Seeds of Doubt: Assurance on 'Farmers' Privilege,' "Times of India, March 15, 1994. Similarly, the Indian Commerce Ministry repeatedly claimed that while a patent regime would be against farmers' and the national interest, the effective sui generis option allows the state to protect farmers' rights. See Harcharan Singh Josh, GATT, Dunkel and India (New Delhi, India: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1995), 62; and Shiva, Captive Minds, Captive Lives, 113.
53. On the basis of such an interpretation, he argues that farmers will benefit from the agreement, will not lose access to seeds, will not lose their ability to exchange seeds, and will not be made dependent on the plant breeder. See Peter Sutherland, "Seeds of Doubt: Assurance on 'Farmers' Privilege,' "Times of India, March 15, 1994. Similarly, the Indian Commerce Ministry repeatedly claimed that while a patent regime would be against farmers' and the national interest, the effective sui generis option allows the state to protect farmers' rights. See Harcharan Singh Josh, GATT, Dunkel and India (New Delhi, India: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1995), 62; and Shiva, Captive Minds, Captive Lives, 113.
54. In addition to TRIPS, the term effective, which is usually combined with adequate, has been inserted by the United States into the Biodiversity Convention (Article 16:2). More significantly, it is the phrase used in the U.S. Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 that, along with the Super 301 section of the Trade Act of 1974, enabled the U.S. government to strong-arm developing countries into bending to its demands (including the demands to make concessions in the GATT negotiations) by denying them most favored nation status and by imposing sanctions and other measures to punish noncooperation. The fact that the sui generis clause is couched in the same language casts doubt on the clause as the solution to autonomy concerns.
55. See the International Seed Federation's "Position Paper on Farm Saved Seed," http://www.worldseed.org/Position_papers/FSSe.htm (accessed May 20, 2004). See also the statement adopted by plant breeders from thirty-one countries representing more than one thousand seed companies at the 1999 Congress of the International Association of Plant Breeders for the Protection of Plant Varieties (ASSINSEL). "Development of New Plant Varieties and Protection of Intellectual Property," http://www.worldseed.org (accessed May 20, 2004). This is discussed in the Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1 (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2000), 93.
56. See the International Seed Federation's "Position Paper on Farm Saved Seed," http://www.worldseed.org/Position_papers/FSSe.htm (accessed May 20, 2004). See also the statement adopted by plant breeders from thirty-one countries representing more than one thousand seed companies at the 1999 Congress of the International Association of Plant Breeders for the Protection of Plant Varieties (ASSINSEL). "Development of New Plant Varieties and Protection of Intellectual Property," http://www.worldseed.org (accessed May 20, 2004). This is discussed in the Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1 (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2000), 93.
57. See the International Seed Federation's "Position Paper on Farm Saved Seed," http://www.worldseed.org/Position_papers/FSSe.htm (accessed May 20, 2004). See also the statement adopted by plant breeders from thirty-one countries representing more than one thousand seed companies at the 1999 Congress of the International Association of Plant Breeders for the Protection of Plant Varieties (ASSINSEL). "Development of New Plant Varieties and Protection of Intellectual Property," http://www.worldseed.org (accessed May 20, 2004). This is discussed in the Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1 (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2000), 93.
58. Sell, "Intellectual Property Rights."
59. The Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1, 54; José Esquinas-Alcázar, "The Realisation of Farmers' Rights," in Agrobiodiversity and Farmers' Rights, ed. M. S. Swaminathan (Delhi, India: Konark Publishers PVT LTD, 1996); Esquinas-Alcázar, "Farmers' Rights," in Agricultural Values of Plant Genetic Resources, ed. R. E. Evenson, D. Gollin, and V. Santaniello (Wallingford, UK: CABI Publishing, 1998).
60. The Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1, 54; José Esquinas-Alcázar, "The Realisation of Farmers' Rights," in Agrobiodiversity and Farmers' Rights, ed. M. S. Swaminathan (Delhi, India: Konark Publishers PVT LTD, 1996); Esquinas-Alcázar, "Farmers' Rights," in Agricultural Values of Plant Genetic Resources, ed. R. E. Evenson, D. Gollin, and V. Santaniello (Wallingford, UK: CABI Publishing, 1998).
61. The Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1, 54; José Esquinas-Alcázar, "The Realisation of Farmers' Rights," in Agrobiodiversity and Farmers' Rights, ed. M. S. Swaminathan (Delhi, India: Konark Publishers PVT LTD, 1996); Esquinas-Alcázar, "Farmers' Rights," in Agricultural Values of Plant Genetic Resources, ed. R. E. Evenson, D. Gollin, and V. Santaniello (Wallingford, UK: CABI Publishing, 1998).
62. Genetic Resources Action International (GRAIN) and Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI)(now ETC Group) have been two of the most influential NGOs at FAO negotiations.
63. See FAO, "Revision of the International Undertaking: Issues for Consideration in Stage II; Access to Plant Genetic Resources, and Farmers' Rights," CPGR-Ex 1/94/5 (Rome, 1994), paragraph 41; Martin A. Girsberger, Biodiversity and the Concept of Farmers' Rights in International Law (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 186-87.
64. See FAO, "Revision of the International Undertaking: Issues for Consideration in Stage II; Access to Plant Genetic Resources, and Farmers' Rights," CPGR-Ex 1/94/5 (Rome, 1994), paragraph 41; Martin A. Girsberger, Biodiversity and the Concept of Farmers' Rights in International Law (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 186-87.
65. These include the UN Conference on Environment and Development's (UNCED) Agenda 21, the Keystone International Dialogue on Plant Genetic Diversity, Resolution 3 of the Nairobi Conference for the Adoption of an Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the FAO's Global Plan of Action. For descriptions of these see Girsberger, Biodiversity and the Concept of Farmers' Rights.
66. Carlos Correa, "Options for the Implementation of Farmers' Rights at the National Level," in Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) Working Paper 8 (South Centre, December 2000), http://www.southcentre.org/publications/farmersrights/toc.htm (accessed December 22, 2003).
67. Esquinas-Alcázar, "The Realization of Farmers' Rights," 3.
68. According to a report by Rabobank International, the current world seed market of around US$30 billion could soon triple to US$90 billion. See GRAIN, "Farmers' Privilege under Attack" (June 2003), http://www.grain.org/publications/bio-ipr-fp-june-2003-en.cfm (accessed December 21, 2003). See also Lather Venkatraman, "Hike Research Spend in Seed Technology: Rabobank Report," Hindu Business Line, March 25, 2002, http://www.blonnet.com/bline/2002/03/25/stories/2002032500240700.htm (accessed April 30, 2004).
69. According to a report by Rabobank International, the current world seed market of around US$30 billion could soon triple to US$90 billion. See GRAIN, "Farmers' Privilege under Attack" (June 2003), http://www.grain.org/publications/bio-ipr-fp-june-2003-en.cfm (accessed December 21, 2003). See also Lather Venkatraman, "Hike Research Spend in Seed Technology: Rabobank Report," Hindu Business Line, March 25, 2002, http://www.blonnet.com/bline/2002/03/25/stories/2002032500240700.htm (accessed April 30, 2004).
70. J. P. Srivastava and S. Jaffee, "Best Practices for Moving Seed Technology: New Approaches to Doing Business," in World Bank Technical Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993).
71. See the FAO's background paper on farmers' rights prepared for the UN Environmental Program (UNEP): UNEP/CBD/IC/2/13, section IV, paragraph 32. See also Esquinas-Alcázar, "Farmers' Rights"; and Esquinas-Alcázar, "The Realization of Farmers' Rights."
72. See the FAO's background paper on farmers' rights prepared for the UN Environmental Program (UNEP): UNEP/CBD/IC/2/13, section IV, paragraph 32. See also Esquinas-Alcázar, "Farmers' Rights"; and Esquinas-Alcázar, "The Realization of Farmers' Rights."
73. For a sampling of efforts at assessing such value, see Evenson, Gollin, and Santaniello, Agricultural Values.
74. Srivastava and Jaffee, "Best Practices," 8. See also Correa, "Options for the Implementation of Farmers' Rights."
75. Srivastava and Jaffee, "Best Practices," 8. See also Correa, "Options for the Implementation of Farmers' Rights."
76. Srivastava and Jaffee give the example of Ethiopia, where only 2 percent of seed by small farmers is commercially supplied. See Srivastava and Jaffee, "Best Practices," 7-8. In India, an estimated 85 percent of seeds are produced by farmers. See Suman Sahai, "India's Plant Variety Protection and Farmers' Rights Legislation" in Global Intellectual Property Rights, 215. Also see Shiva, Captive Minds, Captive Lives, 107; and Correa, "Options for the Implementation of Farmers' Rights," 14. For a different estimate, see Verma, "TRIPS and Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries," 286.
77. Srivastava and Jaffee give the example of Ethiopia, where only 2 percent of seed by small farmers is commercially supplied. See Srivastava and Jaffee, "Best Practices," 7-8. In India, an estimated 85 percent of seeds are produced by farmers. See Suman Sahai, "India's Plant Variety Protection and Farmers' Rights Legislation" in Global Intellectual Property Rights, 215. Also see Shiva, Captive Minds, Captive Lives, 107; and Correa, "Options for the Implementation of Farmers' Rights," 14. For a different estimate, see Verma, "TRIPS and Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries," 286.
78. Srivastava and Jaffee give the example of Ethiopia, where only 2 percent of seed by small farmers is commercially supplied. See Srivastava and Jaffee, "Best Practices," 7-8. In India, an estimated 85 percent of seeds are produced by farmers. See Suman Sahai, "India's Plant Variety Protection and Farmers' Rights Legislation" in Global Intellectual Property Rights, 215. Also see Shiva, Captive Minds, Captive Lives, 107; and Correa, "Options for the Implementation of Farmers' Rights," 14. For a different estimate, see Verma, "TRIPS and Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries," 286.
79. Srivastava and Jaffee give the example of Ethiopia, where only 2 percent of seed by small farmers is commercially supplied. See Srivastava and Jaffee, "Best Practices," 7-8. In India, an estimated 85 percent of seeds are produced by farmers. See Suman Sahai, "India's Plant Variety Protection and Farmers' Rights Legislation" in Global Intellectual Property Rights, 215. Also see Shiva, Captive Minds, Captive Lives, 107; and Correa, "Options for the Implementation of Farmers' Rights," 14. For a different estimate, see Verma, "TRIPS and Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries," 286.
80. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a Human Face (New York: Oxford University Press for the UNDP, 1999): 68.
81. One study describes how modern varieties of seeds are often recommended through extension services, linked to credit facilities, or obliged by processing industries. See Walter Jaffe and Jeroen van Wijk, The Impact of Plant Breeders' Rights in Developing Countries: Debate and Experience in Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Mexico and Uruguay (The Hague: DGIS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 1995).
82. Timothy Byakola, "The Fallacy of Genetic Engineering and Small Farmers in Africa," in Voices from the South, 10.
83. Correa, "Options for the Implementation of Farmers' Rights," 14; and the Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1, 99.
84. Correa, "Options for the Implementation of Farmers' Rights," 14; and the Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1, 99.
85. UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12 (Geneva, 1999). The link with human rights has been facili-tated by recent UN reports that challenge the TRIPS agreement as inconsistent with the international covenant on civil and political rights. See UNDP, Human Development Report 1999; UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, E/CN.4/ Sub.2/2000/7 (Geneva, 2000).
86. UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12 (Geneva, 1999). The link with human rights has been facili-tated by recent UN reports that challenge the TRIPS agreement as inconsistent with the international covenant on civil and political rights. See UNDP, Human Development Report 1999; UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, E/CN.4/ Sub.2/2000/7 (Geneva, 2000).
87. UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12 (Geneva, 1999). The link with human rights has been facili-tated by recent UN reports that challenge the TRIPS agreement as inconsistent with the international covenant on civil and political rights. See UNDP, Human Development Report 1999; UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, E/CN.4/ Sub.2/2000/7 (Geneva, 2000).
88. Stephen Brush, "Whose Knowledge, Whose Genes, Whose Rights?" in Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People and Intellectual Property Rights, ed. Stephen Brush and Doreen Stabinsky (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1996); Stephen Brush, "Indigenous Knowledge of Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights: The Role of Anthropology," American Anthropologist 95, no. 3 (1993): 653-71; Graham Dutfield, "Protecting and Revitalising Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights and Community Knowledge Databases in India," in Intellectual Property Aspects of Ethnobiology, ed. Michael Blakeney (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 103-22; and Tom Greaves, "Introduction" and "IPR, a Current Survey," in Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous Peoples: A Source Book, Tom Greaves (Oklahoma City, OK: SFAA, 1994).
89. Stephen Brush, "Whose Knowledge, Whose Genes, Whose Rights?" in Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People and Intellectual Property Rights, ed. Stephen Brush and Doreen Stabinsky (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1996); Stephen Brush, "Indigenous Knowledge of Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights: The Role of Anthropology," American Anthropologist 95, no. 3 (1993): 653-71; Graham Dutfield, "Protecting and Revitalising Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights and Community Knowledge Databases in India," in Intellectual Property Aspects of Ethnobiology, ed. Michael Blakeney (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 103-22; and Tom Greaves, "Introduction" and "IPR, a Current Survey," in Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous Peoples: A Source Book, Tom Greaves (Oklahoma City, OK: SFAA, 1994).
90. Stephen Brush, "Whose Knowledge, Whose Genes, Whose Rights?" in Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People and Intellectual Property Rights, ed. Stephen Brush and Doreen Stabinsky (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1996); Stephen Brush, "Indigenous Knowledge of Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights: The Role of Anthropology," American Anthropologist 95, no. 3 (1993): 653-71; Graham Dutfield, "Protecting and Revitalising Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights and Community Knowledge Databases in India," in Intellectual Property Aspects of Ethnobiology, ed. Michael Blakeney (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 103-22; and Tom Greaves, "Introduction" and "IPR, a Current Survey," in Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous Peoples: A Source Book, Tom Greaves (Oklahoma City, OK: SFAA, 1994).
91. Stephen Brush, "Whose Knowledge, Whose Genes, Whose Rights?" in Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous People and Intellectual Property Rights, ed. Stephen Brush and Doreen Stabinsky (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1996); Stephen Brush, "Indigenous Knowledge of Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights: The Role of Anthropology," American Anthropologist 95, no. 3 (1993): 653-71; Graham Dutfield, "Protecting and Revitalising Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights and Community Knowledge Databases in India," in Intellectual Property Aspects of Ethnobiology, ed. Michael Blakeney (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 103-22; and Tom Greaves, "Introduction" and "IPR, a Current Survey," in Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous Peoples: A Source Book, Tom Greaves (Oklahoma City, OK: SFAA, 1994).
92. Of the 199 drugs developed from higher plants available on the world market, an estimated 74 percent can be traced to traditional herbal medicine. See Willem Pretorius, "TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level Is the Playing Field?" in Global Intellectual Property Rights, 185; and S. Laird, "Natural Products and the Commercialization of Traditional Knowledge, " in Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous Peoples. One estimate claims the annual world market for medicines derived from medicinal plants discovered from indigenous peoples is US$43 billion, of which less than 0.001 percent of the profils have ever gone to the indigenous peoples who have led researchers to them. See Darrell Posey, "Intellectual Property Rights and Just Compensation for Indigenous Knowledge," Anthropology Today 6, no. 4 (1990): 15.
93. Of the 199 drugs developed from higher plants available on the world market, an estimated 74 percent can be traced to traditional herbal medicine. See Willem Pretorius, "TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level Is the Playing Field?" in Global Intellectual Property Rights, 185; and S. Laird, "Natural Products and the Commercialization of Traditional Knowledge, " in Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous Peoples. One estimate claims the annual world market for medicines derived from medicinal plants discovered from indigenous peoples is US$43 billion, of which less than 0.001 percent of the profils have ever gone to the indigenous peoples who have led researchers to them. See Darrell Posey, "Intellectual Property Rights and Just Compensation for Indigenous Knowledge," Anthropology Today 6, no. 4 (1990): 15.
94. Of the 199 drugs developed from higher plants available on the world market, an estimated 74 percent can be traced to traditional herbal medicine. See Willem Pretorius, "TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level Is the Playing Field?" in Global Intellectual Property Rights, 185; and S. Laird, "Natural Products and the Commercialization of Traditional Knowledge, " in Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous Peoples. One estimate claims the annual world market for medicines derived from medicinal plants discovered from indigenous peoples is US$43 billion, of which less than 0.001 percent of the profils have ever gone to the indigenous peoples who have led researchers to them. See Darrell Posey, "Intellectual Property Rights and Just Compensation for Indigenous Knowledge," Anthropology Today 6, no. 4 (1990): 15.
95. The differences can be seen in the campaigns' respective approaches to TRIPS. Whereas the seed debates often revolve around the patenting of life and Article 27.3 of TRIPS, pharmaceutical debates often revolve around compulsory licensing and Article 31 of TRIPS. For a side-by-side discussion of seed-and drug-related IPR debates, see Drahos and Maynes, Global Intellectual Property Rights.
96. Stephen Brush, "A Non-Market Approach to Protecting Biological Resources," in Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous Peoples, 138.
97. Also see Stenson and Gray, The Politics of Genetic Resource Control.
98. See, for example, the commentary on farmers'rights provided by the International Seed Federation, http://www.worldseed.org/FAQfr.htm (accessed November 15, 2003).
99. Http://www.ukabc.org/Via_Camp.html (accessed April 30, 2004).
100. For a similarly broad definition of farmers' rights, see the "Masipag Statement on Farmers Rights" adopted in the Philippines in August 2002, http://www.peoplesfoodsovereignty.org/new/statements/090502-02.htm (accessed July 21, 2003).
101. For one commentary on the renegotiation of the International Undertaking, see GRAIN, Seedling, June 2000, www.grain.org/publications/negotiations-example-fr.cfm (accessed December 22, 2003).
102. Darrell Posey, Traditional Resource Rights: International Instruments for Protection and Compensation for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, 1996), 104; and Darrell Posey and Graham Dutfield, Beyond Intellectual Property: Toward Traditional Resource Rights for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (Ottawa, Canada: IDRC, 1996).
103. Darrell Posey, Traditional Resource Rights: International Instruments for Protection and Compensation for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, 1996), 104; and Darrell Posey and Graham Dutfield, Beyond Intellectual Property: Toward Traditional Resource Rights for Indigenous
104. There are good examples of such cleavages in the Indian context. It can, for instance, be seen in the comments of the leader of one farming organization. While hundreds of thousands of Indian farmers were protesting the Dunkel Draft of GATT in 1993 and 1994, Sharad Joshi, leader of the Maharashtra farmer organization Shetkari Sangathana is quoted in a national newspaper as saying, "What's wrong with Dunkel? I prefer to pay royalty for good quality seeds than pick up bad subsidized ones." See India Today (North American edition), January 14, 1994, 19, cited in Akhil Gupta, Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 325. In general, Gupta does an excellent job of outlining some of the major divisions within the farming communities of India. See also Tania Roy and Craig Borowiak, "Against Ecofeminism: The Splintered Subject of Agrarian Nationalism in Post-Independent India," Alternatives: Global Local Political 28, no. 1 (2003); and Jim Bentall and Stuart Corbridge, "Urban-Rural Relations, Demand Politics and the 'New Agrarianism' in Northwest India: The Bharatiya Kisan," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 2, no. 1 (1996): 27-48.
105. There are good examples of such cleavages in the Indian context. It can, for instance, be seen in the comments of the leader of one farming organization. While hundreds of thousands of Indian farmers were protesting the Dunkel Draft of GATT in 1993 and 1994, Sharad Joshi, leader of the Maharashtra farmer organization Shetkari Sangathana is quoted in a national newspaper as saying, "What's wrong with Dunkel? I prefer to pay royalty for good quality seeds than pick up bad subsidized ones." See India Today (North American edition), January 14, 1994, 19, cited in Akhil Gupta, Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 325. In general, Gupta does an excellent job of outlining some of the major divisions within the farming communities of India. See also Tania Roy and Craig Borowiak, "Against Ecofeminism: The Splintered Subject of Agrarian Nationalism in Post-Independent India," Alternatives: Global Local Political 28, no. 1 (2003); and Jim Bentall and Stuart Corbridge, "Urban-Rural Relations, Demand Politics and the 'New Agrarianism' in Northwest India: The Bharatiya Kisan," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 2, no. 1 (1996): 27-48.
106. There are good examples of such cleavages in the Indian context. It can, for instance, be seen in the comments of the leader of one farming organization. While hundreds of thousands of Indian farmers were protesting the Dunkel Draft of GATT in 1993 and 1994, Sharad Joshi, leader of the Maharashtra farmer organization Shetkari Sangathana is quoted in a national newspaper as saying, "What's wrong with Dunkel? I prefer to pay royalty for good quality seeds than pick up bad subsidized ones." See India Today (North American edition), January 14, 1994, 19, cited in Akhil Gupta, Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 325. In general, Gupta does an excellent job of outlining some of the major divisions within the farming communities of India. See also Tania Roy and Craig Borowiak, "Against Ecofeminism: The Splintered Subject of Agrarian Nationalism in Post-Independent India," Alternatives: Global Local Political 28, no. 1 (2003); and Jim Bentall and Stuart Corbridge, "Urban-Rural Relations, Demand Politics and the 'New Agrarianism' in Northwest India: The Bharatiya Kisan," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 2, no. 1 (1996): 27-48.
107. There are good examples of such cleavages in the Indian context. It can, for instance, be seen in the comments of the leader of one farming organization. While hundreds of thousands of Indian farmers were protesting the Dunkel Draft of GATT in 1993 and 1994, Sharad Joshi, leader of the Maharashtra farmer organization Shetkari Sangathana is quoted in a national newspaper as saying, "What's wrong with Dunkel? I prefer to pay royalty for good quality seeds than pick up bad subsidized ones." See India Today (North American edition), January 14, 1994, 19, cited in Akhil Gupta, Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 325. In general, Gupta does an excellent job of outlining some of the major divisions within the farming communities of India. See also Tania Roy and Craig Borowiak, "Against Ecofeminism: The Splintered Subject of Agrarian Nationalism in Post-Independent India," Alternatives: Global Local Political 28, no. 1 (2003); and Jim Bentall and Stuart Corbridge, "Urban-Rural Relations, Demand Politics and the 'New Agrarianism' in Northwest India: The Bharatiya Kisan," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 2, no. 1 (1996): 27-48.
108. See, for example, the intense advocacy of farmers' rights by Via Campesina, an Africa-based organization self-described as an "international movement which coordinates peasant organizations of small and middle-scale producers, agricultural workers, rural women, and indigenous communities from Asia, Africa, America, and Europe." This organization has subsequently worked with the farmer advocacy NGO ETC Group (formerly RAFI) to achieve recognition in FAO negotiations. It has been particularly strong advocate of food sovereignty rights. See Hickey and Mittal, Voices from the South; and the Via Campesina Web site, www.viacampesina.org/welcome_english. php3 (accessed December 22, 2003).
109. The Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1, 99; the Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 2, 145, 169-71.
110. The Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 1, 99; the Crucible II Group, Seeding Solutions: Volume 2, 145, 169-71.
111. Correa, "Options for the Implementation of Farmers' Rights,"10.
112. C. S. Srinivasan, "Exploring the Feasibility of Farmers' Rights," Development Policy Review 21, no. 4 (2003): 419-47.
113. Posey, Traditional Resource Rights; Posey and Dutfield, Beyond Intellectual Property.
114. Posey, Traditional Resource Rights; Posey and Dutfield, Beyond Intellectual Property.
115. See Brush, "A Non-Market Approach"; and Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights, Trade and Biodiversity (London: IUCN, Earthscan, 2000).
116. See Brush, "A Non-Market Approach"; and Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights, Trade and Biodiversity (London: IUCN, Earthscan, 2000).
117. Greaves, "IPR, a Current Survey"; Drahos, "Indigenous Knowledge and the Duties of Intellectual Property Owners"; and Kloppenburg and Gonzales, "Between State and Capital."
118. Greaves, "IPR, a Current Survey"; Drahos, "Indigenous Knowledge and the Duties of Intellectual Property Owners"; and Kloppenburg and Gonzales, "Between State and Capital."
119. Greaves, "IPR, a Current Survey"; Drahos, "Indigenous Knowledge and the Duties of Intellectual Property Owners"; and Kloppenburg and Gonzales, "Between State and Capital."
120. Dutfield, "Intellectual Property Rights, Trade and Biodiversity," 103.
121. Paper submitted by Kenya on behalf of the African Group (WT/GC/W/302, dated August 6, 1999). This paper demands formal recognition in TRIPS of sui generis systems that provide for (1) the protection of the innovations of indigenous and local farming communities in developing countries, consistent with the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources; (2) the continuation of the traditional farming practices including the right to save, exchange, and save seeds, and sell their harvest; and (3) the prevention of anticompetitive rights or practices that will threaten food sovereignty of people in developing countries, as is permitted by Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.
122. The CBD identifies biodiversity as national resources subject to claims of national sovereignty. It then calls for benefit sharing when that biodiversity is used by other nations.
123. WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, November 20, 2001, http://www.wto.org/englisewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm (accessed May 8, 2002).
124. Other countries actively legislating farmers' rights include Bangladesh, Brazil, members of the Organization for African Unity, Panama, Peru, and the Philippines. See GRAIN, "Biodiversity Rights Legislation Overview," www.grain.org/brl/fr-brl-en.cfm (accessed November 24, 2003). For more on India's law, see Sahai, "India's Plant Variety Protection and Farmers' Rights Legislation"; and Srinivasan, "Exploring the Feasibility of Farmers' Rights."
125. Other countries actively legislating farmers' rights include Bangladesh, Brazil, members of the Organization for African Unity, Panama, Peru, and the Philippines. See GRAIN, "Biodiversity Rights Legislation Overview," www.grain.org/brl/fr-brl-en.cfm (accessed November 24, 2003). For more on India's law, see Sahai, "India's Plant Variety Protection and Farmers' Rights Legislation"; and Srinivasan, "Exploring the Feasibility of Farmers' Rights."
126. Other countries actively legislating farmers' rights include Bangladesh, Brazil, members of the Organization for African Unity, Panama, Peru, and the Philippines. See GRAIN, "Biodiversity Rights Legislation Overview," www.grain.org/brl/fr-brl-en.cfm (accessed November 24, 2003). For more on India's law, see Sahai, "India's Plant Variety Protection and Farmers' Rights Legislation"; and Srinivasan, "Exploring the Feasibility of Farmers' Rights."
127. International Seed Federation, "Fostering Plant Innovation: ASSINSEL Brief on Review of TRIPS 27.3b," 12, http://www.worldseed.org/pdf/trips273b.pdf (accessed May 20, 2004).