The concept of "Teachability"

Educational Theory

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 75-90

  Tubbs, Nigel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WINCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 10044238339     PISSN: 00132004     EISSN: 17415446     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-5446.2003.00075.x     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Seren Kierkegaard, The Point of View (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 15
2. Elizabeth Ellsworth, Teaching Positions (New York Teachers College Press, 19971, 17
3. See Gert J.J. Biesta, "Say You Want a Revolution ... Suggestions for the Impossible Future of Critical edagogy," Educational Theory 48, no. 4 (1998): 499-510.
4. William V. Spanos, The End of Education (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 19931, 164
5. Nicholas C. Burbules, Dialogue in Teaching (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993), 10, 13.
6. See G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).This book will be cited as PS in the text for all subsequent references.
7. See also G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (London: George Allen and Unwin, 19691.
8. A more detailed examination of the master/slave relation as an exemplar of the teacher/student relation can be found in Nigel Tubbs, Contradiction of Enlightenment: Hegel and the Broken Middle (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1997).
9. Gillian Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology (London: Athlone, 19811, 153.
10. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Penguin, 1990). This book will be cited as PO in the text for all subsequent references.
11. Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 1992). This book will be cited as 1P in the text for all subsequent references.
12. Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith, andPaul Standish, ThinkingAguin: Education After Post-modernism (Westport: Bergin and Gamey, 1998). This book will be cited as TA in the text for all subsequent references.
13. I am trying to emphasize that readings of the master/slave relation as "mutual recognition," such as are found below in Blake et al., are wrong. Mutual recognition is not available to self-consciousness which, politically, is already "independent."
14. This is not the place to argue the case for a hfferent definition of the "philosophy of education." In his recent review of Philosophers on Education (published in Journal of Philosophy of Education 33, no. 3 [1999]: 485-5001, John White asked if there has in fact been a continuous historical project called "the philosophy of education" in the West. The question already separates philosophy of education and history, suppressing the educational journey of misrecognition that constitutes the philosophy of history. For speculative philosophy, the life-and-death struggle describedin this essay is the necessity of phdosophy and education - a necessity made possible in its speculative representation of the master/slave and teacher/ student. This philosophy of education is immanent, and, speculatively speaking, it is history.
15. See Jean-FrangoisL yotard, The Postmodern Condition:A Report on Knowledge (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 1979)
16. Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19961, 7
17. Ibid.
18. Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling/Repetitzon [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983], 120.
19. Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 27
20. Kierkegaard, Fear and Tremblingl Repetition, 55.
21. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Iudgment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 18.
22. Equally intriguing, I would argue, is Blake et al.'s idea that Kant's notion of reflective judgment can replace "autonomy" with "authenticity." They argue that the principle of moral autonomy - "the ability to think for oneself, to be able to think from other people's perspectives and to think consistently" - is, in reflective judgment, a form of intersubjective recognition. When reflective judgment is misrecognized as "intersubjective" (in the same way that re-cognition was in Hegel), however, then reflective judgments are themselves subsumedunder a different kindof judgment altogether. In each of these cases, the difficulty of metaphysics, of spirit, and of nature is repressed. Perhaps reflective judgment can provide a model of teachability, but to argue this requires conjoining a transcendental Hegel with the most speculative reading possible of Kant's third critique, so that reflection as judgment is precisely not reflection merely as illusory being. Such an analysis was recently attempted in Howard Caygill, The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge, 1998).
23. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, 44.
24. Gillian Rose, Love's Work (London: Chatto and Windus, 19951, 118, 117.
25. Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragmentsllohannes Climaczzs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 52.
26. Søren Kierkegaard, Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 23.
27. Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 272
28. Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, 38