The 1996 Mount Everest climbing disaster: The breakdown of learning in teams

Human Relations

Volumn 57, Issue 10, 2004, Pages 1263-1284

  Kayes, D Christopher ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Disaster sense making; Errors and accidents; Organizational and experiential learning; Teams and groups

Indexed keywords

EID: 10044225687     PISSN: 00187267     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0018726704048355     Document Type: Review

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