Other-regarding epistemic virtues

Ratio

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 257-275

  Kawall, Jason ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE AT CHATTANOOGA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0942303057     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9329.00190     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Philippa Foot draws attention to the same basic distinction in 'Virtues and Vices' in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 2-3
2. Some well-known examples include Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985)
3. Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: PrenticeHall, 1989)
4. Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981)
5. and Robert Shope, The Analysis of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983)
6. See, for example, C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)
7. Cf. Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)
8. Roderick Firth, 'Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental' in John Troyer (ed), In Defense of Radical Empiricism: Essays and Lectures by Roderick Firth (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 264-5
9. Reprinted from Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 55 (1981)
10. See also Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 25-28
11. and Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), section 5.4
12. William P. Alston, 'Concepts of Epistemic Justification' in his Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 83-4
13. Reprinted from The Monist, 68 (1985)
14. William P. Alston, 'A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology' in Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer (eds), Knowledge and Scepticism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 17
15. Ernest Sosa, 'Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue' in his Knowledge in Perspective, p. 225
16. Alvin I. Goldman, 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology' in his Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), p. 160
17. James A. Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), p. 20
18. Lorraine Code, Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover, NH: University of New England Press for Brown University Press, 1987), p. 192
19. Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 3
20. See, for example, J. Angelo Corlett, Analyzing Social Knowledge (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996)
21. Alvin I Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)
22. and Frederick Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994)
23. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World, pp. 4-5
24. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Epistemology (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), p. 148
25. and Charles Taliaferro, 'Divine Cognitive Power', International Journal of Philosophy of Religion, 18 (1985), pp. 133-40
26. See Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), ch. 7
27. Jennifer Lackey, 'Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission', The Philosophical Quarterly, 49 (1999), pp. 471-90. Lackey responds to a number of objections which I cannot discuss here. The case of the creationist teacher may lead us to question whether this teacher is being honest with her students, and whether honesty is an other-regarding epistemic virtue. Perhaps we can distinguish between two kinds of honesty. Compare philosophy teachers - we often have to teach things with which we disagree. Honesty here amounts to providing a fair picture of a position, not a strawman, etc. Thus, we might refer to this as pedagogical honesty: presenting all evidence and positions fairly and completely to allow others to assess them. We can then distinguish standard honesty, which requires us to present what we ourselves believe. The creationist teacher is thus being pedagogically honest, even if not standardly honest; and her role as a teacher requires pedagogical honesty
28. I would like to thank an audience at the 2000 Tennessee Philosophical Association Meetings, Renard Enbas, John Hardwig, Jim Montmarquet, Baron Reed, Ernest Sosa, the editor, and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments and suggestions