Administrative reform as credible commitment: The impact of autonomy on revenue authority performance in Latin America

World Development

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 213-232

  Taliercio Jr , Robert R ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

Administrative reform; Autonomy; Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela; Credibility; Latin America; Tax reform

Indexed keywords

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT; PUBLIC SPENDING; TAX REFORM;

LATIN AMERICA;

EID: 0942278105     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2003.08.008     Document Type: Article

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