Atomic secrets and governmental lies: Nuclear science, politics and security in the Pontecorvo case

British Journal for the History of Science

Volumn 36, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 389-415

  Turchetti, Simone ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0742289136     PISSN: 00070874     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007087403005120     Document Type: Review

References (134)

1. For example the recent 'Iraq's WMD. The assessment of the British Government', 24-7, at www.pm.gov.uk, accessed 10 October 2002. This essay was written before the conflict in Iraq, thus it does not take into account later criticism of the assessment of the British government put forward by MPs, media or other academics.
2. The Export Control Bill (2002) gives the government the power to veto the transfer of ideas abroad, license foreign researchers working in Britain and stop the publication of research findings. This was approved following the Scott report on the 1996 Iraq arms scandal that considered British security measures over science too lax. P. Curtis, 'Export Bill changes secure academic freedom', The Guardian, 23 July 2002.
3. 239 can be used (and have been used in the past) as fuels in nuclear reactors or explosives in nuclear weapons. See I. Ursu, Physics and Technology of Nuclear Materials, Oxford, 1985, Chapter 3.
4. 239 can be used (and have been used in the past) as fuels in nuclear reactors or explosives in nuclear weapons. See I. Ursu, Physics and Technology of Nuclear Materials, Oxford, 1985, Chapter 3.
5. For example, Peter Galison argues that in the post-war years 'instruments like [the counters] were among the bonds connecting weapons work with post-war basic research'. P. Galison, Image & Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics, Chicago, 1997, 296.
6. D. MacKenzie and G. Spinardi, 'Tacit knowledge and the uninvention of nuclear weapons', American Journal of Sociology (1995), 101, 44-99.
7. On Klaus Fuchs see R. C. Williams, Klaus Fuchs: Atom Spy, Cambridge, MA, 1987. On the Rosenbergs see M. Garber and R. L. Walkowitz (eds.), Secret Agents: The Rosenberg Case, McCarthysm, and Fifties America, New York, 1995.
8. On Klaus Fuchs see R. C. Williams, Klaus Fuchs: Atom Spy, Cambridge, MA, 1987. On the Rosenbergs see M. Garber and R. L. Walkowitz (eds.), Secret Agents: The Rosenberg Case, McCarthysm, and Fifties America, New York, 1995.
9. These include 1. Pontecorvo's scientific reports in the AB series at the Public Records Office (PRO), London; 2. Diplomatic correspondence on the Pontecorvo Case in the series FO, CAB, at the PRO; 3. B. Pontecorvo and J. Chadwick correspondence in the collections PNVO and CHAD at Churchill College Archive, Cambridge.
10. If Perrin's action was due to a contingent agenda, it was also shaped in the context of a 'culture of secrecy'. As shown by historian David Vincent, this culture was a very important aspect of British policy in the post-war years. D. Vincent, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832-1998, Oxford, 1998, 186-247.
11. These details are in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837 and 'Disappearance of Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo in Finland', FO 371/86437. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) originally retained those files under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act (1958). In March 2002 I asked the FCO Records Manager to review the files to establish whether the secrecy conditions still applied. In May 2002 the papers were released.
12. M. Mafai, Il Lungo Freddo. Storia di Bruno Pontecorvo, lo scienziato che scelse l'URSS, Milan, 1992; S. M. Bilenky, T. D. Blokhintseva, I. G. Pokrovskaya and M. G. Sapozhnikov (eds.), B. Pontecorvo Selected Scientific Works, Bologna, 1997.
13. M. Mafai, Il Lungo Freddo. Storia di Bruno Pontecorvo, lo scienziato che scelse l'URSS, Milan, 1992; S. M. Bilenky, T. D. Blokhintseva, I. G. Pokrovskaya and M. G. Sapozhnikov (eds.), B. Pontecorvo Selected Scientific Works, Bologna, 1997.
14. C. Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, London, 1984; H. Montgomery Hyde, The Atom Bomb Spies, London, 1980; J. Costello, Mask of Treachery, London, 1988.
15. C. Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, London, 1984; H. Montgomery Hyde, The Atom Bomb Spies, London, 1980; J. Costello, Mask of Treachery, London, 1988.
16. C. Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, London, 1984; H. Montgomery Hyde, The Atom Bomb Spies, London, 1980; J. Costello, Mask of Treachery, London, 1988.
17. A similar criticism on consolidated historical accounts and their limits is in L. Scott and S. Smith, 'Lessons of October: historians, political scientists, policy-makers and the Cuban Missile Crisis', International Affairs (1994), 70, 659-84.
18. Cucciolo, meaning 'puppy', was Pontecorvo's nickname among Fermi's group. G. Holton, 'Fermi's group and the recapture of Italy's place in physics', in The Scientific Imagination (ed. G. Holton), New York, 1978, 155-98.
19. On the Fascist racial laws in Italy and their impact on the national academic community see G. Israel and P. Nastasi, Scienza e Razza nell'Italia Fascista, Bologna, 1998. The racial laws allowed Pontecorvo to go back to Italy, but they forced him to renounce further employment in Italian universities. Between 1937 and 1940 Pontecorvo's research was funded through the French National Research Council (CNRS) and the Carnegie Foundation ('University Documents', PNVO 1/2).
20. Pontecorvo was offered a position by the Universities of Michigan, Rochester and California and by General Electric in 1946; by Cornell University in 1947; and by the Universities of Rome, Pisa and Cagliari between 1948 and 1950.
21. For example, in 1940 the recent research conducted by French physicist André Lazard and Pontecorvo on 'atomic phosphorescence' prompted expectations of possible applications in medicine. Interviewed by the French newspaper L'Oeuvre, Pontecorvo claimed that his research would have had a major impact in medicine, as ionizing radiation was going to have beneficial effects on organisms ('Ici, l'on fabrique des atomes!,' L'Oeuvre, 6 April 1939, copy in 'Assorted Papers', PNVO 4/2). In 1949, Pontecorvo's research on mesons had prompted expectation of their possible use as 'atom-busting' rays. Pontecorvo was hopeful that he would be able to set up a 'meson-ray production plant' ('University of British Columbia lecturer probing new atom-busting ray', undated press cutting from a Canadian newspaper in 'Scientific Correspondence', PNVO 4/1/1).
22. E. Segrè, A Mind always in Motion, Berkeley, 1993, 159-60.
23. Using radioactivity in prospecting was a significant innovation. Between 1920 and 1940 this was carried out using electricity, magnetism and seismography in surface and subsurface techniques. Radioactive prospecting derived from the electrical subsurface method consisting of introducing cables in the well and plotting the difference in potential between the surface and the geological strata. A historical study of this method (and others) is in G. C. Bowker, Science on the Run: Information Management and Industrial Geophysics at Schlumberger, 1920-1940, Cambridge, MA, 1994.
24. B. Pontecorvo and G. Swift, 'Geophysical prospecting', P.N. US 2353619, 11 July 1944 (filed 18 September 1941); idem, 'Method of geophysical prospecting', P.N. US 2508772, 23 May 1950 (filed 31 October 1942); idem, 'Well surveying', P.N. US 2398324, 9 April 1946 (filed 10 August 1943). Also on the same issue see idem, 'Neutron well logging: a new geological method based on nuclear physics', Oil and Gas Journal (1941), 40, 32-3.
25. B. Pontecorvo and G. Swift, 'Geophysical prospecting', P.N. US 2353619, 11 July 1944 (filed 18 September 1941); idem, 'Method of geophysical prospecting', P.N. US 2508772, 23 May 1950 (filed 31 October 1942); idem, 'Well surveying', P.N. US 2398324, 9 April 1946 (filed 10 August 1943). Also on the same issue see idem, 'Neutron well logging: a new geological method based on nuclear physics', Oil and Gas Journal (1941), 40, 32-3.
26. B. Pontecorvo and G. Swift, 'Geophysical prospecting', P.N. US 2353619, 11 July 1944 (filed 18 September 1941); idem, 'Method of geophysical prospecting', P.N. US 2508772, 23 May 1950 (filed 31 October 1942); idem, 'Well surveying', P.N. US 2398324, 9 April 1946 (filed 10 August 1943). Also on the same issue see idem, 'Neutron well logging: a new geological method based on nuclear physics', Oil and Gas Journal (1941), 40, 32-3.
27. B. Pontecorvo and G. Swift, 'Geophysical prospecting', P.N. US 2353619, 11 July 1944 (filed 18 September 1941); idem, 'Method of geophysical prospecting', P.N. US 2508772, 23 May 1950 (filed 31 October 1942); idem, 'Well surveying', P.N. US 2398324, 9 April 1946 (filed 10 August 1943). Also on the same issue see idem, 'Neutron well logging: a new geological method based on nuclear physics', Oil and Gas Journal (1941), 40, 32-3.
28. 233, obtained from thorium, proved to be of lower fissile quality and its use in weaponry was ruled out. I. Ursu, op. cit. (3), 123.
29. 233, obtained from thorium, proved to be of lower fissile quality and its use in weaponry was ruled out. I. Ursu, op. cit. (3), 123.
30. The technique consisted of separating Geiger-Müller counters with metallic plates absorbing low-energy particles. The Rossi circuit applied to each counter a valve-condenser-resistor system as switch for the counters. Bruno Rossi, Cosmic Rays, New York, 1964, 46-53.
31. Heterogeneous means using a solid fuel and a liquid moderator. On the Anglo-Canadian project, see M. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945, London, 1964. On its contribution to the post-war Canadian nuclear programme, see R. Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Toronto, 1988; D. G. Hurst, 'Overview of nuclear research and development', in Canada Enters the Nuclear Age (ed. D. G. Hurst), Montreal and Kingston, 1997, 1-32.
32. Heterogeneous means using a solid fuel and a liquid moderator. On the Anglo-Canadian project, see M. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945, London, 1964. On its contribution to the post-war Canadian nuclear programme, see R. Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Toronto, 1988; D. G. Hurst, 'Overview of nuclear research and development', in Canada Enters the Nuclear Age (ed. D. G. Hurst), Montreal and Kingston, 1997, 1-32.
33. Heterogeneous means using a solid fuel and a liquid moderator. On the Anglo-Canadian project, see M. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945, London, 1964. On its contribution to the post-war Canadian nuclear programme, see R. Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Toronto, 1988; D. G. Hurst, 'Overview of nuclear research and development', in Canada Enters the Nuclear Age (ed. D. G. Hurst), Montreal and Kingston, 1997, 1-32.
34. M. Gowing, op. cit. (22), 191. The Czech physicist George Placzek and his French colleague Pierre Auger, both already in the Tube Alloys project, were influential in Pontecorvo's employment. M. Mafai, op. cit. (10), 125.
35. M. Gowing, op. cit. (22), 191. The Czech physicist George Placzek and his French colleague Pierre Auger, both already in the Tube Alloys project, were influential in Pontecorvo's employment. M. Mafai, op. cit. (10), 125.
36. J. Dunworth to H. Skinner, 26 April 1946, in 'Harwell pile discussion group, 1946,' AB 12/19.
37. B. Pontecorvo, 'Some information on physical data obtained on a recent trip to Chicago (Blue Print)', 24 June 1944, AB 2/643. CP-2 stands for Chicago Pile 2. Pontecorvo had visited Chicago already in the summer of 1942, when the project on Fermi's first pile, CP-1, had just started.
38. For example, the experimental study of fission properties of by-products of nuclear reactions. B. Pontecorvo and D. West, 'The fission properties of radium 226 and protactinium 233', 1 December 1945, AB 2/318.
39. B. Pontecorvo, 'Some data useful in shielding problems', 8 August 1944, AB 2/655 and idem, 'The side shield of the polymer plant', 8 August 1944, AB 2/656.
40. B. Pontecorvo, 'Some data useful in shielding problems', 8 August 1944, AB 2/655 and idem, 'The side shield of the polymer plant', 8 August 1944, AB 2/656.
41. B. Pontecorvo, 'Report on trip to Port Radium, September 1944 (secret)', AB 1/648.
42. It was also argued that Wells Surveys produced the most innovative instrumentation. Appendix 1, 'Dr Pontecorvo's notes', 31 October 1944, in F. H. Burstall, H. Carmichael, A. H. Gillieson and J. Hardwick, 'Report on a technical conference on prospecting problems held in Washington, 24-26 January 1946', AB 2/67.
43. B. Pontecorvo, 'Notes on prospecting for radioactive materials', 2 April 1945, AB 2/671.
44. Pontecorvo also possessed safe conducts to travel between different sites of the Manhattan Project in the US and Canada. 'In carrying out his official duties he has occasion to travel from one country to the other on official business and to carry with him confidential documents.' Office of the High Commissioner for the UK to Whom it May Concern, 12.2.1943 in 'Official letters', PNVO 1/5.
45. 'Notes of meeting held on 13 February, 1945 to discuss increments and promotion of U.K. staff' in 'Staff recruiting', AB 6/171.
46. A. Sumner to B. Pontecorvo, 18 December 1945, in 'Scientific correspondence, 1945-1950', PNVO 4/1/1.
47. In August 1945 Chadwick wrote to Cockcroft that 'it would be most indiscreet to allow Pontecorvo to visit Italy in the near future and he cannot be allowed to go until matters are much clearer than they are now. ... It will take three or four months'. J. Chadwick to J. Cockcroft, 20 August 1945, 'Work in North America, Canadian Project', CHAD IV, 28.
48. The discovery of the Canadian spy-ring led to the arrest of physicist Alan Nunn May and further secret investigation of German émigré physicist Klaus Fuchs. On the Gouzenko case see A. Moorehead, The Traitors: The Double Life of Fuchs, Pontecorvo and Nunn May, London, 1952, 5-18; R. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, London, 2001, 103-9.
49. The discovery of the Canadian spy-ring led to the arrest of physicist Alan Nunn May and further secret investigation of German émigré physicist Klaus Fuchs. On the Gouzenko case see A. Moorehead, The Traitors: The Double Life of Fuchs, Pontecorvo and Nunn May, London, 1952, 5-18; R. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, London, 2001, 103-9.
50. The Manhattan project director Leslie Groves was also informed about Pontecorvo's travel to Europe: 'Later on he will be employed by the British Government in the new Establishment. He will probably take steps to acquire British citizenship.' J. Chadwick to L. Groves, 10 April 1946, 'Work in North America, Canadian project', CHAD IV, 28.
51. Minutes of meeting, 'Harwell Pile discussion group, 1946', AB 12/19. The engineer James Kendall, who was responsible for pile design at Harwell visited Canada in the early summer of 1946 and, according to Gowing, returned to Britain 'saying that the help of Bruno Pontecorvo...was worth that of all the others put together'. M. Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, London, 1974, 380.
52. Minutes of meeting, 'Harwell Pile discussion group, 1946', AB 12/19. The engineer James Kendall, who was responsible for pile design at Harwell visited Canada in the early summer of 1946 and, according to Gowing, returned to Britain 'saying that the help of Bruno Pontecorvo...was worth that of all the others put together'. M. Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, London, 1974, 380.
53. G. C. Hanna and D. H. Kirkwood, 'High multiplication proportional counters for energy measurements', Physical Review (1949), 75, 985-6. The proportional counting technique differs from the coincidence counting technique because it is based upon the detection of the initial ionizing event that gives formation to secondary electrons. These in turn affect the gas filling the counter and give rise to a phenomenon called 'gas amplification' in which an 'avalanche' of electrons is produced. In the proportional counter technique, the experimenter focuses on the electric pulse due to the initial avalanche, while in the coincidence counting technique the experimenter focuses on the regular pulses that take place afterwards and are independent from the initial gas amplification. For details see S. Korff, Electron and Nuclear Counters, New York, 1946, 6-14 and B. Rossi and H. H. Staub, Ionisation Chambers and Counters: Experimental Techniques, New York, 1949, 72.
54. G. C. Hanna and D. H. Kirkwood, 'High multiplication proportional counters for energy measurements', Physical Review (1949), 75, 985-6. The proportional counting technique differs from the coincidence counting technique because it is based upon the detection of the initial ionizing event that gives formation to secondary electrons. These in turn affect the gas filling the counter and give rise to a phenomenon called 'gas amplification' in which an 'avalanche' of electrons is produced. In the proportional counter technique, the experimenter focuses on the electric pulse due to the initial avalanche, while in the coincidence counting technique the experimenter focuses on the regular pulses that take place afterwards and are independent from the initial gas amplification. For details see S. Korff, Electron and Nuclear Counters, New York, 1946, 6-14 and B. Rossi and H. H. Staub, Ionisation Chambers and Counters: Experimental Techniques, New York, 1949, 72.
55. G. C. Hanna and D. H. Kirkwood, 'High multiplication proportional counters for energy measurements', Physical Review (1949), 75, 985-6. The proportional counting technique differs from the coincidence counting technique because it is based upon the detection of the initial ionizing event that gives formation to secondary electrons. These in turn affect the gas filling the counter and give rise to a phenomenon called 'gas amplification' in which an 'avalanche' of electrons is produced. In the proportional counter technique, the experimenter focuses on the electric pulse due to the initial avalanche, while in the coincidence counting technique the experimenter focuses on the regular pulses that take place afterwards and are independent from the initial gas amplification. For details see S. Korff, Electron and Nuclear Counters, New York, 1946, 6-14 and B. Rossi and H. H. Staub, Ionisation Chambers and Counters: Experimental Techniques, New York, 1949, 72.
56. But their proportional counters were not sensitive enough to detect neutrinos. In 1956 physicists F. Reines and C. Cowan detected for the first time neutrinos using the Savannah River nuclear pile in the US.
57. Pontecorvo assumed that the meson decay could be interpreted as an inverse β-process involving the production of an electron and two neutrinos. B. Pontecorvo, 'Nuclear capture of mesons and the meson decay', Physical Review (1947), 72, 246-7. To validate this assumption, Pontecorvo and Hincks developed a new coincidence counter arrangement to detect the meson decay. An account of their experimental results was given in B. Pontecorvo and E. P. Hincks, 'On the disintegration products of the 2.2-μsec. meson', Physics Review (1950), 77, 102-20. In this paper evidence in support of the 'electron+ 2 neutrino' process was also provided.
58. Pontecorvo assumed that the meson decay could be interpreted as an inverse β-process involving the production of an electron and two neutrinos. B. Pontecorvo, 'Nuclear capture of mesons and the meson decay', Physical Review (1947), 72, 246-7. To validate this assumption, Pontecorvo and Hincks developed a new coincidence counter arrangement to detect the meson decay. An account of their experimental results was given in B. Pontecorvo and E. P. Hincks, 'On the disintegration products of the 2.2-μsec. meson', Physics Review (1950), 77, 102-20. In this paper evidence in support of the 'electron+ 2 neutrino' process was also provided.
59. H. F. Freundlich, E. P. Hincks and W. J. Ozeroff, 'A pulse analyser for nuclear research', Review of Scientific Instruments (1947), 18, 90-100. The issue of secrecy for this device is analysed in P. Galison, op. cit. (4), 296. Pontecorvo used this pulse analyser and also another one designed by C. H. Westcott and G. C. Hanna. Details were published in 'A pulse amplitude analyser for nuclear research using pre-treated pulses', Review of Scientific Instruments (1949), 20, 181-8.
60. H. F. Freundlich, E. P. Hincks and W. J. Ozeroff, 'A pulse analyser for nuclear research', Review of Scientific Instruments (1947), 18, 90-100. The issue of secrecy for this device is analysed in P. Galison, op. cit. (4), 296. Pontecorvo used this pulse analyser and also another one designed by C. H. Westcott and G. C. Hanna. Details were published in 'A pulse amplitude analyser for nuclear research using pre-treated pulses', Review of Scientific Instruments (1949), 20, 181-8.
61. H. F. Freundlich, E. P. Hincks and W. J. Ozeroff, 'A pulse analyser for nuclear research', Review of Scientific Instruments (1947), 18, 90-100. The issue of secrecy for this device is analysed in P. Galison, op. cit. (4), 296. Pontecorvo used this pulse analyser and also another one designed by C. H. Westcott and G. C. Hanna. Details were published in 'A pulse amplitude analyser for nuclear research using pre-treated pulses', Review of Scientific Instruments (1949), 20, 181-8.
62. In 1943 geologist C. F. Davidson of the Geological Survey and the Museum of London set up a uranium committee on behalf of the Ministry of Supply. Intelligence-gathering provided the committee with an approximate list of uranium deposits worldwide. At the time most of the prospecting work was done with GM counters supplied by the Canadians. On 29 August 1945 a meeting took place in which it was stressed that 'the manufacture of counters in the UK must be regarded as urgent'. 'Uranium intelligence, Section 1', AB 1/507. See also M. Gowing, op. cit. (22), 180-2.
63. E. Franklin, 'GM tubes portable equipment for uranium prospecting, 1948', AB 15/9.
64. C. F. Davidson to J. Hardwick, 14 April 1948, in 'Security, general', AB 6/115.
65. C. F. Davidson to J. Hardwick, 14 April 1948 in 'Security, general', AB 6/115. Original emphasis.
66. 'A comparable situation does, in fact, exist in reverse, in that our Intelligence has information of foreign counter readings which cannot be interpreted in terms of grades of ores because lack of data in the makeup of the counters', R. A. Thomson to C. F. Davidson, 1 June 1948, in 'Security, general', AB 6/115.
67. J. Cockcroft to B. Pontecorvo, 3 February 1947, in 'Scientific correspondence, 1945-1950', PNVO 4/1/1.
68. B. Pontecorvo, 'Equipment required for experimental work, 1948', AB 1/648.
69. A. E. Fry to Dr Watson, 31 December 1946, in 'Scientific correspondence, 1945-1950', PNVO 4/1/1.
70. S. Scherbatskoy to B. Pontecorvo, 14 March 1947, in 'Scientific correspondence, 1945-1950', PNVO 4/1/1.
71. G. Fidecaro, 'Bruno Pontecorvo: from Rome to Dubna', in S. M. Bilenky et al. (eds.), op. cit. (10), 474.
72. 'Scientific Civil Service', Nature (1948), 161, 195.
73. Minutes of meeting, 4 May 1949, 'Power Steering Committee, vol. 2, 1948-49', AB 12/74.
74. 'Power Steering Committee, vol.1, 1947', AB 12/57.
75. Survey of Nuclear Physics Programme with other projects in 'Power Steering Committee, vol. 2, 1948-1949', AB 12/74.
76. B. Pontecorvo, 'Recent developments in proportional counter technique', Helvetica Physica Acta (1950), 23, 97-118.
77. S. Scherbatskoy to B. Pontecorvo, 19 January 1950, in 'Scientific correspondence, 1945-1950', PNVO 4/1/1.
78. S. Scherbatskoy to B. Pontecorvo, 27 June 1949, in 'Scientific correspondence, 1945-1950', PNVO 4/1/1.
79. Vice-Chancellor J. Mountford, Liverpool University, to B. Pontecorvo, 6 June 1950, in 'Scientific correspondence, 1945-1950', PNVO 4/1/1.
80. Skinner wrote to Pontecorvo, 'As I told you some time ago, you are certain to get the offer of a B post at Harwell. ... So I think you have to decide whether you prefer a University post to staying at Harwell.' H. Skinner to B. Pontecorvo, 12 July 1950, in 'Scientific correspondence, 1945-1950', PNVO 4/1/1.
81. One of Pontecorvo's cousins was a prominent member of the Italian Communist Party (PCI).
82. In October Skinner wrote to Bruno's brother, Guido, 'I am afraid I am also beginning to be seriously worried about your brother ... As regards this university, Bruno has not so far seriously let us down[.] ... However, of course the lack of news over the last 5-6 weeks is certainly disconcerting'. H. Skinner to G. Pontecorvo, 10 October 1950, in 'Scientific correspondence, 1945-1950', PNVO 4/1/1.
83. Minutes of meeting, 9 January 1950, in 'Power Steering Committee, vol. 3, 1950', AB 12/105. See also M. Mafai, op. cit. (10), 128.
84. Minutes of meeting, 9 January 1950, in 'Power Steering Committee, vol. 3, 1950', AB 12/105. See also M. Mafai, op. cit. (10), 128.
85. S. H. Paul, Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic Relations, 1941-1952, Columbus, 2000, 103-66. On the impact of the Fuchs case on the negotiation see also R. Aldrich, op. cit. (35), 380-4.
86. S. H. Paul, Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic Relations, 1941-1952, Columbus, 2000, 103-66. On the impact of the Fuchs case on the negotiation see also R. Aldrich, op. cit. (35), 380-4.
87. 'Emergency Top Secret Cypher Telegram' from Cabinet Office to British Joint Services Mission (B.J.S.M.), Washington, 20 October 1950, in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837. Makins was certainly aware of Pontecorvo's role in the British nuclear programme because he was in frequent touch with Cockcroft. The two had played a major role as negotiators within the Combined Policy Committee (CPC), the body behind the UK-US atomic agreements.
88. 'Top Secret Cypher Telegram' from Cabinet Office to B.J.S.M., Washington, 23 October 1950, in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837.
89. 'Application of secrecy rules in atomic energy research, draft', 5 May 1948, in 'Security, general', AB 6/115.
90. Harwell Security Service to the Ministry of Supply, 25 April 1950, ' Secret draft on the Pontecorvo case', in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837.
91. 'Top Secret Cypher Telegram' from B.J.S.M., Washington, to Cabinet Office, 24 October 1950, in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837.
92. Oliver Frank to Roger Makins, 2 November 1950, in CAB 126/307.
93. 'Secret', R. Makins to Mr Perrin, November 1950, in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837
94. 'Secret and Guard', M. Perrin to R. Makins, 9 November 1950, in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837.
95. Perrin's argument was certainly contradicted by the recent pledge in favour of the adoption of heavy water reactors made by Pontecorvo at the PSC meeting of January 1950. See the relevant discussion above in this paper.
96. D. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956, New Haven, 1994, 174-7.
97. M. S. Goodman, 'British intelligence and the Soviet atomic bomb, 1945-1950', in Journal of Strategic Studies (forthcoming). I am grateful to Michael Goodman for providing me with an early version of his paper.
98. D. Holloway, op. cit. (74), 177.
99. Two papers were produced to evaluate nuclear reactors for naval propulsion. The paper PSC 65 is still retained by the UKAEA. PSC 63 is in 'Power Steering Committee, vol. 2, 1948-49', AB 12/74.
100. Mr Kellas, Helsinki, to FO, 24 October 1950, in 'Disappearance of Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo in Finland', FO 371/86439.
101. 'Confidential', FO to Mr Kellas, 20 October 1950, in 'Disappearance of Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo in Finland', FO 371/86439.
102. More generally, restraints on access to information about nuclear science and policy represented a crucial factor in shaping post-war UK defence policy. On this see J. Agar and B. Balmer, 'British scientists and the Cold War: the Defence Research Policy Committee and information networks', Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences (1998), 28, 210 and 248.
103. 'The State Department even removed the passport of an American atomic scientist who was due to go to India from his bedroom earlier this year because they had doubts about his reliability', in 'Top Secret Cypher Telegram' from B.J.S.M., Washington, to Cabinet Office, 21 October 1950, in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837. Historian Jessica Wang claims that in the 1950s the US loyalty-security system put suspected American scientists in a state of 'perpetual jeopardy' in which 'old charges were never settled definitely' and 'once cleared, an individual could confront the same accusation in subsequent loyalty-security investigations'. Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism and the Cold War, Chapel Hill, 1999, 256.
104. 'Top Secret Cypher Telegram' from B.J.S.M., Washington, to Cabinet Office, 21 October 1950, in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837.
105. 'Top Secret Cypher Telegram' from B.J.S.M., Washington, to Cabinet Office, 23 October 1950, in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837.
106. The positive vetting extends the right of security agencies to investigate the private life and political ideas of government personnel. M. J. Mookerjee, 'Science, security and the state', M.Sc. Dissertation (Manchester, 2002), 54. See also D. Vincent, op. cit. (8), 194-203.
107. The positive vetting extends the right of security agencies to investigate the private life and political ideas of government personnel. M. J. Mookerjee, 'Science, security and the state', M.Sc. Dissertation (Manchester, 2002), 54. See also D. Vincent, op. cit. (8), 194-203.
108. In order, 'Atom man flies away' (21 October 1950), 'Atom family in Russia' (22 October 1950), 'Atom man knew atom spy' (24 October 1950), 'Atom house searched' (25 October 1950) and finally ' Atom man not screened' (27 October 1950).
109. According to Pincher, the Canadians relied upon British clearance, but British intelligence did not vet Pontecorvo because 'he was never in Britain before joining the Canadian project'. C. Pincher, 'Atom man not screened' Daily Express, 27 October 1950.
110. R. Aldrich, op. cit. (35), 384.
111. C. Pincher, 'Pontecorvo - full story', Daily Express, 26 February 1951.
112. C. Pincher, op. cit. (88). According to Pincher, 'The report on Pontecorvo was detailed and obviously came from reliable sources but I cannot recall them.' Private communication, 19 November 2002.
113. According to Lord Portal of the Ministry of Supply collaboration with the Americans was 'essential for the proper development of our atomic energy schemes', 17 August 1951, in CAB 130/20 (quoted in M. J. Mookerjee, op. cit. (84), 57).
114. M. J. Mookerjee, op. cit. (84), 62.
115. The 'picture of Pontecorvo as a traitor simply does not fit the facts: it would be as rational to believe that Einstein was a secret baby-killer or that Stalin was, in reality, a fox-hunting gentleman from the shires'. A. Moorehead, op. cit. (35), 171.
116. 'The last two theories seem to come nearest to fitting the facts. In the end one is forced to leave the mystery unsolved and concentrate on other major aspects of the case'. A. Moorehead, op. cit. (35), 198.
117. C. P. Snow, The New Men, London, 1954.
118. John Halperin, C. P. Snow: An Oral Biography, Brighton, 1983, 163.
119. On the other hand, the geneticist J. B. S. Haldane had coined the Scottish nickname 'Crawbrigg' (in English, 'Crow-bridge') for his colleague Guido Pontecorvo, Bruno's brother and geneticist at Glasgow University. B. L. Cohen, 'Guido Pontecorvo ("Ponte"), 1907-1999', Genetics (2000), 154, 497.
120. C. Pincher, op. cit. (11), 151. The same version appeared also in J. Costello, op. cit. (11), 533. Costello claims that Pincher received the information from former MI5 high-ranking officer and author of Spycatcher Peter Wright in an interview given in October 1980. But Pincher claims that 'I cannot remember whether or not Wright and I talked about Pontecorvo but the story which Costello referred to is there in Their Trade is Treachery. So he may have assumed that Wright told me as he knew, by then, that he had been the main source'. Private communication, 19 November 2002.
121. C. Pincher, op. cit. (11), 151. The same version appeared also in J. Costello, op. cit. (11), 533. Costello claims that Pincher received the information from former MI5 high-ranking officer and author of Spycatcher Peter Wright in an interview given in October 1980. But Pincher claims that 'I cannot remember whether or not Wright and I talked about Pontecorvo but the story which Costello referred to is there in Their Trade is Treachery. So he may have assumed that Wright told me as he knew, by then, that he had been the main source'. Private communication, 19 November 2002.
122. H. Montgomery Hyde, op. cit. (11), 130.
123. C. Andrew and O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, London, 1990, 312-13.
124. N. West, A Matter of Trust: MIS, 1945-72, London, 1982, 27.
125. BSC had been prominent also in the handling of the Gouzenko case. It is often believed that BSC was a branch of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, known also as MIS). But BSC was not dependent on MI5 or MI6 and was responsible only to the 'Security Executive', the security sub-committee within the Home Defence Executive (HDE) set up in May 1940 by the Prime Minister W. Churchill to respond to a possible German invasion. N. West, MI5: British Security Service Operations, 1909-1945, London, 1981, 151 and 154.
126. 'Secret draft on the Pontecorvo case' in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837.
127. For this reason the letter containing details on the FBI notes was classified 'Secret and Guard'. Mr Perrin to R. Makins, 9 November 1950, in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837.
128. 'Secret draft on the Pontecorvo case' in 'Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo', FO 371/84837.
129. R. Aldrich, op. cit. (35), 105.
130. See note 35, above. Quote from R. Aldrich, op. cit. (35), 106.
131. See note 35, above. Quote from R. Aldrich, op. cit. (35), 106.
132. Pontecorvo was deprived of his British citizenship according to the British Nationality Act (1948). Via diplomatic means, he communicated to British authorities that he considered it 'necessary to emphasise the fact that I have not shown any elements of disloyalty or unfriendliness towards the British people and that I still entertain the highest feeling for them'. B. Pontecorvo, 'Letter to Comrade Slavin, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs', 20 April 1955, in 'Citizens deprived of citizenship, including Bruno Pontecorvo', FO 3721 7390.
133. Pontecorvo's nuclear research in the USSR is examined by V. P. Dzheporov, 'The genius of Bruno Pontecorvo', in S. M. Bilenky et al., op. cit. (10), 487-93 and by several others in the same collection.
134. S. H. Paul, op. cit. (64), 198.