Strengthening China Through Science and Education: China's Development Strategy Toward the Twenty-First Century

Issues and Studies

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 122-149

  Cao, Cong ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

China; Education; Public policy; Research and development (R D); Science and technology (S T)

Indexed keywords

EID: 0348237206     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. Song Jian, then China's state councilor and head of the State Science and Technology Commission, is credited with coining the term.
2. "Science Interview: China's Leader Commits to Basic Research, Global Science," Science 288 (June 16, 2000): 1950-53; Editorial, "Science in China," ibid. (June 30, 2000): 2317.
3. "Science Interview: China's Leader Commits to Basic Research, Global Science," Science 288 (June 16, 2000): 1950-53; Editorial, "Science in China," ibid. (June 30, 2000): 2317.
4. The Leading Group for Science and Technology was first set up in 1983 when Zhao Ziyang was premier.
5. See 〈http://www.cas.ac.cn〉 (accessed on June 12, 2002).
6. Funding of RMB2 million (US$240,000) - including money for research, a housing subsidy, and a moderate salary - is significant even by international comparison. For example, the Canadian government established research chairs for "rising stars" or young faculty members at universities, with funding of only US$70,000 a year. See "Massive Hiring Plan Aimed at Brain Gain," Science 286 (October 22, 1999): 652-53.
7. The University of Science and Technology of China (in Hefei, Anhui,) and the Harbin University of Technology were added later.
8. Available at 〈http://peopledaily.com.cn/GB/kejiao/39/2002916/823808.htnl〉 (accessed on September 17, 2002).
9. Ironically, some of the mergers just recombined those schools split under the 1952 reorganization of universities and departments (yuanxi tiaozheng). For a discussion on yuanxi tiaozheng, see Ruth Hayhoe, China's Universities, 1895-1995: A Century of Cultural Conflict (New York: Garland, 1996), 73-90.
10. China is not alone in pursuing merger of universities. For example, there was a proposal to merge Imperial College and University College London to create British's largest research university. See "Looking After Number One," Nature 419 (October 24, 2002): 763.
11. Interviews (China: 1998 and 1999).
12. See, for example, Keji ribao (Science and Technology Daily), August 4, 1998; Zhongguo kexue bao (China Science News) and Dongfang baodao (East China News), November 27, 1998, 1; Qiao bao (China Press) and Zhongguo kexue zhoubao (The China Science Weekly) (New York), August 20, 2000, C2; Beijing chenbao (Beijing Morning News), November 2, 1999; and Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth News), December 15, 2000.
13. See, for example, Keji ribao (Science and Technology Daily), August 4, 1998; Zhongguo kexue bao (China Science News) and Dongfang baodao (East China News), November 27, 1998, 1; Qiao bao (China Press) and Zhongguo kexue zhoubao (The China Science Weekly) (New York), August 20, 2000, C2; Beijing chenbao (Beijing Morning News), November 2, 1999; and Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth News), December 15, 2000.
14. See, for example, Keji ribao (Science and Technology Daily), August 4, 1998; Zhongguo kexue bao (China Science News) and Dongfang baodao (East China News), November 27, 1998, 1; Qiao bao (China Press) and Zhongguo kexue zhoubao (The China Science Weekly) (New York), August 20, 2000, C2; Beijing chenbao (Beijing Morning News), November 2, 1999; and Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth News), December 15, 2000.
15. See, for example, Keji ribao (Science and Technology Daily), August 4, 1998; Zhongguo kexue bao (China Science News) and Dongfang baodao (East China News), November 27, 1998, 1; Qiao bao (China Press) and Zhongguo kexue zhoubao (The China Science Weekly) (New York), August 20, 2000, C2; Beijing chenbao (Beijing Morning News), November 2, 1999; and Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth News), December 15, 2000.
16. See, for example, Keji ribao (Science and Technology Daily), August 4, 1998; Zhongguo kexue bao (China Science News) and Dongfang baodao (East China News), November 27, 1998, 1; Qiao bao (China Press) and Zhongguo kexue zhoubao (The China Science Weekly) (New York), August 20, 2000, C2; Beijing chenbao (Beijing Morning News), November 2, 1999; and Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth News), December 15, 2000.
17. See, for example, Keji ribao (Science and Technology Daily), August 4, 1998; Zhongguo kexue bao (China Science News) and Dongfang baodao (East China News), November 27, 1998, 1; Qiao bao (China Press) and Zhongguo kexue zhoubao (The China Science Weekly) (New York), August 20, 2000, C2; Beijing chenbao (Beijing Morning News), November 2, 1999; and Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth News), December 15, 2000.
18. See, for example, Keji ribao (Science and Technology Daily), August 4, 1998; Zhongguo kexue bao (China Science News) and Dongfang baodao (East China News), November 27, 1998, 1; Qiao bao (China Press) and Zhongguo kexue zhoubao (The China Science Weekly) (New York), August 20, 2000, C2; Beijing chenbao (Beijing Morning News), November 2, 1999; and Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth News), December 15, 2000.
19. While inspecting the Beijing Electron-Positron Collider on October 24, 1988, Deng Xiaoping said that China must develop its own high technology and occupy an important seat in the world's high-tech area. See Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), 273.
20. See 〈http://www.most.gov.cn〉 (accessed on March 20, 2002).
21. For a more detailed introduction of the Fund and its implications for Chinese science, see Cong Cao and Richard P. Suttmeier, "China's New Scientific Elite: Professional Orientations Among Distinguished Young Scientists," The China Quarterly, no. 168 (December 2001): 959-83.
22. There are at least two possible interpretations of the origins of the 863 Program. Given the status of the senior scientists who were the driving force behind China's nuclear and strategic weapons and space (liangdan yixing) programs and their consciousness of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Program gave consideration to the national defense application potential of the selected areas. Ma Junru, the first director of the 863 Program Office, pointed out that the 863 Program is "the liangdan yixing program in the new era." See Li Mingsheng, Zhongguo baliusan (China's 863 Program) (Taiyuan, Shanxi: Shanxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997) and Zhongguo qingnian bao, February 27, 2001. From another perspective, China was just as concerned with Japan's Fifth-Generation Computer Program and Europe's Eureka Program. From this angle, the 863 Program drew inspiration from liangdan yixing, but has been basically focused on the civilian economy. See Evan Feigenbaum, "The Military Transforms China: The Politics of Strategic Technology from the Nuclear to the Information Age" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1997) and "Who's Behind China's High- Technology 'Evolution'? How Bomb Makers Remade Beijing's Priorities, Policies, and Institutions," International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 95-126.
23. There are at least two possible interpretations of the origins of the 863 Program. Given the status of the senior scientists who were the driving force behind China's nuclear and strategic weapons and space (liangdan yixing) programs and their consciousness of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Program gave consideration to the national defense application potential of the selected areas. Ma Junru, the first director of the 863 Program Office, pointed out that the 863 Program is "the liangdan yixing program in the new era." See Li Mingsheng, Zhongguo baliusan (China's 863 Program) (Taiyuan, Shanxi: Shanxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997) and Zhongguo qingnian bao, February 27, 2001. From another perspective, China was just as concerned with Japan's Fifth-Generation Computer Program and Europe's Eureka Program. From this angle, the 863 Program drew inspiration from liangdan yixing, but has been basically focused on the civilian economy. See Evan Feigenbaum, "The Military Transforms China: The Politics of Strategic Technology from the Nuclear to the Information Age" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1997) and "Who's Behind China's High- Technology 'Evolution'? How Bomb Makers Remade Beijing's Priorities, Policies, and Institutions," International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 95-126.
24. There are at least two possible interpretations of the origins of the 863 Program. Given the status of the senior scientists who were the driving force behind China's nuclear and strategic weapons and space (liangdan yixing) programs and their consciousness of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Program gave consideration to the national defense application potential of the selected areas. Ma Junru, the first director of the 863 Program Office, pointed out that the 863 Program is "the liangdan yixing program in the new era." See Li Mingsheng, Zhongguo baliusan (China's 863 Program) (Taiyuan, Shanxi: Shanxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997) and Zhongguo qingnian bao, February 27, 2001. From another perspective, China was just as concerned with Japan's Fifth-Generation Computer Program and Europe's Eureka Program. From this angle, the 863 Program drew inspiration from liangdan yixing, but has been basically focused on the civilian economy. See Evan Feigenbaum, "The Military Transforms China: The Politics of Strategic Technology from the Nuclear to the Information Age" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1997) and "Who's Behind China's High- Technology 'Evolution'? How Bomb Makers Remade Beijing's Priorities, Policies, and Institutions," International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 95-126.
25. There are at least two possible interpretations of the origins of the 863 Program. Given the status of the senior scientists who were the driving force behind China's nuclear and strategic weapons and space (liangdan yixing) programs and their consciousness of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Program gave consideration to the national defense application potential of the selected areas. Ma Junru, the first director of the 863 Program Office, pointed out that the 863 Program is "the liangdan yixing program in the new era." See Li Mingsheng, Zhongguo baliusan (China's 863 Program) (Taiyuan, Shanxi: Shanxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997) and Zhongguo qingnian bao, February 27, 2001. From another perspective, China was just as concerned with Japan's Fifth-Generation Computer Program and Europe's Eureka Program. From this angle, the 863 Program drew inspiration from liangdan yixing, but has been basically focused on the civilian economy. See Evan Feigenbaum, "The Military Transforms China: The Politics of Strategic Technology from the Nuclear to the Information Age" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1997) and "Who's Behind China's High-Technology 'Evolution'? How Bomb Makers Remade Beijing's Priorities, Policies, and Institutions," International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 95-126.
26. The state originally planned to invest RMB10 billion (US$1.2 billion) in fifteen years. See Li, Zhongguo baliusan.
27. According to a World Bank report, however, the number of patents obtained by projects funded by the 863 Program is on the order of 700 over the period 1986-98, approximately half the number obtained by basic research projects supported through the National Natural Science Foundation of China - for which the government spent about one-third as much money over the same twelve years. See Carl Dahlman and Jean-Eric Aubery, China and the Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Institute, 2001), 136 n. 6.
28. Keji ribao, January 15, 2002, 1.
29. However, the increase of GERD/GDP may have resulted from the adjustment of scope ( koujing) in R&D expenditure statistics. See You Guangrong, Zhongguo keji guoqing fenxi baogao (An analytical report on China's national situation in science and technology) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2001), 125.
30. International Institute for Management Development, World Competitiveness Yearbook 2001 (Lausanne, Switzerland: International Institute for Management Development, 2001), Table 4.3.03: Total Expenditure on R&D, p. 494. The data except for that on China were for 1999.
31. For an excellent discussion on the competition for research money in the American scientific community, see Daniel S. Greenberg, Science, Money, and Politics: Political Triumph and Ethical Erosion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
32. State Statistical Bureau and Ministry of Science and Technology, comps., Zhongguo keji tongji nianjian 2001 (China statistical yearbook on science and technology 2001) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2002), 68-69.
33. Ibid., 197-98.
34. National Natural Science Foundation of China, comp., Guojia ziran kexue jijin weiyuanhui nianbao 2000 (Annual Report of the National Natural Science Foundation of China 2000), available at 〈http://www.nsfc.gov.cn〉 (accessed on March 20, 2002).
35. Keji ribao, May 13, 1999, 1.
36. China Daily, June 13, 2002.
37. State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002 (China statistical yearbook 2002) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2002), 674-75.
38. Zhongguo jiaoyu bao (China Educational News), October 11, 2002, 1.
39. Ibid., October 1, 2002, 2.
40. Beijing qingnian ribao (Beijing Youth Daily), February 21, 2002, 6.
41. Available a 〈http://www.cast.org.cn〉 (accessed on March 20, 2002). This was the fourth nationwide survey of this kind, the previous ones being held in 1992, 1994, and 1996.
42. The Task Force on Higher Education and Society, Higher Education in Developing Countries: Peril and Promise (Washington, D.C.: The International Bank on Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2000), 104-7.
43. Keji ribao, January 15, 2002, 1.
44. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 42.
45. Keji ribao, February 22, 2002, 1.
46. Available at 〈http://jks.moftec.gov.cn/article/20021100048906_1.xml〉 (accessed on November 28, 2002).
47. Available at 〈http://www.sts.org.cn/REPORT_3/documents/2001/0102.html〉 (accessed on March 20, 2002).
48. For example, the Science and Engineering Indicator 2000 shows a different trade picture from that in the China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 2000. The latter has not adopted the internationally used categories of aerospace, office and computing machinery, communications equipment, and drugs and medicines. See Science and Engineering Indicators 2000 (Arlington, Va.: National Science Foundation, 2000), Appendix Table 7-4: Global Industry and Trade Data, by Selected Countries and Industries: 1980-97.
49. Available at 〈http://www.sts.org.cn/REPORT_3/documents/2001/0121.htm〉 (accessed on March 20, 2002).
50. Rao Yi, "Zhongguo kexue de fazhan he tiaozhan: yi shengming kexue lunwen zai guoji qikan shang de fabiao weili" (Advances and challenges in Chinese science: Chinese life scientists' articles in international journals), Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century), 2002, no. 2:83-94.
51. Available at 〈http://www.chinainfo.gov.cn〉 (accessed on March 20, 2002).
52. Zou Chenglu, "My Scientific Career (11)," Kexue shibao (Science Times) (Beijing), July 11, 2002.
53. See, for example, "China's Hopes and Hypes," Nature 410 (March 1, 2001): 1; "Biochemist Wages Online War Against Ethical Lapses," Science 293 (August 10, 2001): 1039.
54. See, for example, "China's Hopes and Hypes," Nature 410 (March 1, 2001): 1; "Biochemist Wages Online War Against Ethical Lapses," Science 293 (August 10, 2001): 1039.
55. Xu Guanhua, Minister of Science and Technology, "Speech at the National Working Conference on Science and Technology" (January 9, 2002), available at 〈http://www. most.gov.cn〉 (accessed on March 20, 2002).
56. Assuming that GDP grows at an annual rate of 7 percent according to the xiaokang goal set in the CCP's 16th National Congress, GDP will reach RMB12.6 trillion in 2005, which gives a RMB190 billion GERD, more than double that of RMB89.6 billion in 2000.
57. Zhongguo keji tongji nianjian 2001, 66-67.
58. Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), February 6, 2002.