Economic Development and Community Activism

Urban Lawyer

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 401-405

  Poindexter, Georgette C ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0348237051     PISSN: 00420905     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. I do not mean to imply that decisions are never made on the citizen level. However, often by the time firsthand citizen involvement takes place, either the decision is one that only affects a specific neighborhood, or the decision is one of such fundamental nature that sheer notoriety sparks individual interest and is often the subject of a ballot referendum.
2. For example, the Los Angeles ordinance requires a minimum of $8.76/hour (or $7.51 if health insurance is provided). Baltimore was the first city to enact such a standard in 1994. Fifty other cities and counties are reported to be considering such bills, including San Francisco.
3. San Antonio Master Plan 〈http://www.ci.sat.tx.us/planning/masterplan/textonly/ goals/economicdevelopment〉.
4. In 1997, the average hourly earnings for a maid in a San Antonio hotel was $6.12/hour, or less than $13,000 a year. A baggage porter fared a bit better averaging $6.27/hour, or approximately $13,000 a year. The average hourly rate in the retail industry in San Antonio was $7.89/hour for salespersons and $6.60/hour for cashiers which comes to $16,400 and $13,700, respectively, per year. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, METROPOLITAN AREA OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES, SAN ANTONIO MSA (1997).
5. Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS).
6. Membership in COPS is even more restrictive than most community-based organizations. Individuals cannot join COPS. Only specified institutional members (such as churches and schools) may join, and only members of these institutions may participate in COPS' agenda.
7. According to the interest group theory of legislation, market forces provide strong incentives for politicians to enact laws that serve private rather than public interests. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 (1986).
8. SEE STEVEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 10 (1982). See also Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32 (1998) (stating that the theories of modern regulation are an outgrowth of the traditional pluralistic theory of politics).
9. SEE STEVEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 10 (1982). See also Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32 (1998) (stating that the theories of modern regulation are an outgrowth of the traditional pluralistic theory of politics).
10. Another term for interest group theory. See Macey, supra note 7.
11. DANIEL A FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 15 (1991).
12. Macey, supra note 7, at 227.
13. Contrast this situation with a truly public good like clean air. All citizens benefit equally regardless of their contributions to the legislative effort. Although there may be some multiplier benefits to a higher salary (such as increased buying power of those employed at higher wages), the principal benefit still directly flows to discreet employment sectors.
14. These include: evaluation requirements, business quality standards, and compliance/sanction provisions (commonly known as "clawbacks"). See Jennifer Gilbert, Selling the City Without Selling Out: New Legislation on Development Incentives Emphasizes Accountability, 27 URB. LAW. 427, 432 (1995); Scott J. Ziance, Making Economic Development Incentives More Efficient, 30 URB. LAW. 33, 40 (1998).
15. These include: evaluation requirements, business quality standards, and compliance/sanction provisions (commonly known as "clawbacks"). See Jennifer Gilbert, Selling the City Without Selling Out: New Legislation on Development Incentives Emphasizes Accountability, 27 URB. LAW. 427, 432 (1995); Scott J. Ziance, Making Economic Development Incentives More Efficient, 30 URB. LAW. 33, 40 (1998).