Preference reversal in ellsberg problems

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 88, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 187-207

  Maher, Patrick ^a   Kashima, Yoshihisa ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b LA TROBE UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0348204973     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004276408704     Document Type: Article

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