Does inequality lead to greater efficiency in the use of local commons? The role of strategic investments in capacity

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 163-182

  Aggarwal, Rimjhim M ^a   Narayan, Tulika A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS   (United States)

^b ABT ASSOCIATES   (United States)

Author keywords

Access to credit; Capacity; Common pool resources; Equilibrium; Groundwater; India; Inequality; Markov perfect; Strategic investment

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; EXTRACTION; INVESTMENTS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

RESOURCE EXTRACTION;

STRATEGIC PLANNING;

CAPACITY BUILDING; COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE; GROUNDWATER; INVESTMENT;

ASIA; EURASIA; INDIA; SOUTH ASIA;

EID: 0348195943     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0095-0696(03)00034-2     Document Type: Article

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