Supervisor heterogeneity: An analysis of UK microdata

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 49, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 407-417

  Brown, Sarah ^a   Sessions, John G ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER   (United Kingdom)

^b BRUNEL UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EMPLOYMENT; FIRM SIZE; WAGE;

EURASIA; EUROPE; UNITED KINGDOM; WESTERN EUROPE;

EID: 0348172387     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9485.00239     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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