Transnational Convergence: European Union and American Federalism

Cornell International Law Journal

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 42-108

  Hugg, Patrick R ^a  

^a LOYOLA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0347966469     PISSN: 00108812     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (498)

1. WIM F.V. VANTHOOR, EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION SINCE 1848 xiii (1996) (providing an in-depth historical and economic examination of European monetary union efforts from 1848 to 1995).
2. This historic struggle began, in part, with three treaties signed in the 1950s. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW pt. B2 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992); Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, pt. B10 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992); Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
3. This historic struggle began, in part, with three treaties signed in the 1950s. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW pt. B2 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992); Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, pt. B10 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992); Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
4. This historic struggle began, in part, with three treaties signed in the 1950s. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW pt. B2 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992); Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, pt. B10 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992); Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
5. This historic struggle began, in part, with three treaties signed in the 1950s. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW pt. B2 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992); Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, pt. B10 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992); Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
6. This historic struggle began, in part, with three treaties signed in the 1950s. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW pt. B2 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992); Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, pt. B10 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992); Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
7. Europe has been radically transformed by the evolution toward European integration. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2406 (1990). "The context of European law is being fundamentally transformed . . . embracing the plurality of social, political, economic, and cultural settings . . . becoming more pluralistic and indeed plural . . . appropriate to our time . . . of globalization, post-modernism and fragmentation." Francis Snyder, Editorial, 3 EUR. L.J. 1 (1997). And all this is a part of "the world transformation occurring all around us." Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 774 (1997). The Maastricht Treaty "marks a watershed . . . "; its monetary union provisions "form the culminating point of a long and difficult road towards a monetary order for the Community. " Rene Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE SERIES 10 (1997). Professor Brigid Laffan characterized the unprecedented originality of current European integration as without historical precedent, fluid in structure and substance, hovering between politics and diplomacy, states and markets; "that rarest of all historic phenomena, a studied change of regime. . . . It is the reverse of conquest and quite different from incremental adjustment, which is the political norm, and from revolution, which is the social equivalent of an earthquake." Brigid Laffan, The European Union: A Distinctive Model of Internationalisation?, 1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 2, ¶ 1 (Oct. 10, 1997) 〈http://eiop.or.at/ eiyop/texte/1997018a.html〉 (quoting F. DUCHENE, JEAN MONNET: THE FIRST STATESMAN OF INTERDEPENDENCE 20 (1996)).
8. Europe has been radically transformed by the evolution toward European integration. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2406 (1990). "The context of European law is being fundamentally transformed . . . embracing the plurality of social, political, economic, and cultural settings . . . becoming more pluralistic and indeed plural . . . appropriate to our time . . . of globalization, post-modernism and fragmentation." Francis Snyder, Editorial, 3 EUR. L.J. 1 (1997). And all this is a part of "the world transformation occurring all around us." Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 774 (1997). The Maastricht Treaty "marks a watershed . . . "; its monetary union provisions "form the culminating point of a long and difficult road towards a monetary order for the Community. " Rene Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE SERIES 10 (1997). Professor Brigid Laffan characterized the unprecedented originality of current European integration as without historical precedent, fluid in structure and substance, hovering between politics and diplomacy, states and markets; "that rarest of all historic phenomena, a studied change of regime. . . . It is the reverse of conquest and quite different from incremental adjustment, which is the political norm, and from revolution, which is the social equivalent of an earthquake." Brigid Laffan, The European Union: A Distinctive Model of Internationalisation?, 1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 2, ¶ 1 (Oct. 10, 1997) 〈http://eiop.or.at/ eiyop/texte/1997018a.html〉 (quoting F. DUCHENE, JEAN MONNET: THE FIRST STATESMAN OF INTERDEPENDENCE 20 (1996)).
9. Europe has been radically transformed by the evolution toward European integration. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2406 (1990). "The context of European law is being fundamentally transformed . . . embracing the plurality of social, political, economic, and cultural settings . . . becoming more pluralistic and indeed plural . . . appropriate to our time . . . of globalization, post-modernism and fragmentation." Francis Snyder, Editorial, 3 EUR. L.J. 1 (1997). And all this is a part of "the world transformation occurring all around us." Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 774 (1997). The Maastricht Treaty "marks a watershed . . . "; its monetary union provisions "form the culminating point of a long and difficult road towards a monetary order for the Community. " Rene Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE SERIES 10 (1997). Professor Brigid Laffan characterized the unprecedented originality of current European integration as without historical precedent, fluid in structure and substance, hovering between politics and diplomacy, states and markets; "that rarest of all historic phenomena, a studied change of regime. . . . It is the reverse of conquest and quite different from incremental adjustment, which is the political norm, and from revolution, which is the social equivalent of an earthquake." Brigid Laffan, The European Union: A Distinctive Model of Internationalisation?, 1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 2, ¶ 1 (Oct. 10, 1997) 〈http://eiop.or.at/ eiyop/texte/1997018a.html〉 (quoting F. DUCHENE, JEAN MONNET: THE FIRST STATESMAN OF INTERDEPENDENCE 20 (1996)).
10. Europe has been radically transformed by the evolution toward European integration. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2406 (1990). "The context of European law is being fundamentally transformed . . . embracing the plurality of social, political, economic, and cultural settings . . . becoming more pluralistic and indeed plural . . . appropriate to our time . . . of globalization, post-modernism and fragmentation." Francis Snyder, Editorial, 3 EUR. L.J. 1 (1997). And all this is a part of "the world transformation occurring all around us." Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 774 (1997). The Maastricht Treaty "marks a watershed . . . "; its monetary union provisions "form the culminating point of a long and difficult road towards a monetary order for the Community. " Rene Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE SERIES 10 (1997). Professor Brigid Laffan characterized the unprecedented originality of current European integration as without historical precedent, fluid in structure and substance, hovering between politics and diplomacy, states and markets; "that rarest of all historic phenomena, a studied change of regime. . . . It is the reverse of conquest and quite different from incremental adjustment, which is the political norm, and from revolution, which is the social equivalent of an earthquake." Brigid Laffan, The European Union: A Distinctive Model of Internationalisation?, 1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 2, ¶ 1 (Oct. 10, 1997) 〈http://eiop.or.at/ eiyop/texte/1997018a.html〉 (quoting F. DUCHENE, JEAN MONNET: THE FIRST STATESMAN OF INTERDEPENDENCE 20 (1996)).
11. Europe has been radically transformed by the evolution toward European integration. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2406 (1990). "The context of European law is being fundamentally transformed . . . embracing the plurality of social, political, economic, and cultural settings . . . becoming more pluralistic and indeed plural . . . appropriate to our time . . . of globalization, post-modernism and fragmentation." Francis Snyder, Editorial, 3 EUR. L.J. 1 (1997). And all this is a part of "the world transformation occurring all around us." Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 774 (1997). The Maastricht Treaty "marks a watershed . . . "; its monetary union provisions "form the culminating point of a long and difficult road towards a monetary order for the Community. " Rene Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE SERIES 10 (1997). Professor Brigid Laffan characterized the unprecedented originality of current European integration as without historical precedent, fluid in structure and substance, hovering between politics and diplomacy, states and markets; "that rarest of all historic phenomena, a studied change of regime. . . . It is the reverse of conquest and quite different from incremental adjustment, which is the political norm, and from revolution, which is the social equivalent of an earthquake." Brigid Laffan, The European Union: A Distinctive Model of Internationalisation?, 1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 2, ¶ 1 (Oct. 10, 1997) 〈http://eiop.or.at/ eiyop/texte/1997018a.html〉 (quoting F. DUCHENE, JEAN MONNET: THE FIRST STATESMAN OF INTERDEPENDENCE 20 (1996)).
12. Europe has been radically transformed by the evolution toward European integration. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2406 (1990). "The context of European law is being fundamentally transformed . . . embracing the plurality of social, political, economic, and cultural settings . . . becoming more pluralistic and indeed plural . . . appropriate to our time . . . of globalization, post-modernism and fragmentation." Francis Snyder, Editorial, 3 EUR. L.J. 1 (1997). And all this is a part of "the world transformation occurring all around us." Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 774 (1997). The Maastricht Treaty "marks a watershed . . . "; its monetary union provisions "form the culminating point of a long and difficult road towards a monetary order for the Community. " Rene Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE SERIES 10 (1997). Professor Brigid Laffan characterized the unprecedented originality of current European integration as without historical precedent, fluid in structure and substance, hovering between politics and diplomacy, states and markets; "that rarest of all historic phenomena, a studied change of regime. . . . It is the reverse of conquest and quite different from incremental adjustment, which is the political norm, and from revolution, which is the social equivalent of an earthquake." Brigid Laffan, The European Union: A Distinctive Model of Internationalisation?, 1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 2, ¶ 1 (Oct. 10, 1997) 〈http://eiop.or.at/ eiyop/texte/1997018a.html〉 (quoting F. DUCHENE, JEAN MONNET: THE FIRST STATESMAN OF INTERDEPENDENCE 20 (1996)).
13. Laffan, supra note 3, at 2, ¶ 1 (quoting R. O'Donnell, Economic Union, in UNSETTLED EUROPE: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN A TRANSFORMED WORLD (1997)).
14. Some term this "constitutional revolution"; others characterize it less dramatically as ordinary statutory construction. See H.W.R. Wade, Sovereignty - Revolution or Evolution, 112 LAW Q. REV. 568, 568 (1996). Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl often dramatized the historical significance of the advancing integration in his public speeches. On one occasion, he noted: "[W]e stand at the threshold of the 21st century. . . . More than anything else, the number 2000 signifies hope for a good future. We look back on a century of extreme contrasts - war and new beginning, fratricide and European Union." Helmut Kohl, Address Accepting the "Vision for Europe" Prize, in Press and Information Office of the Federal Government (visited Sept. 17, 1997) 〈http:/ /www.bundesregierung.de/ausland/news/pm/pm97091701.html〉.
15. Some term this "constitutional revolution"; others characterize it less dramatically as ordinary statutory construction. See H.W.R. Wade, Sovereignty - Revolution or Evolution, 112 LAW Q. REV. 568, 568 (1996). Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl often dramatized the historical significance of the advancing integration in his public speeches. On one occasion, he noted: "[W]e stand at the threshold of the 21st century. . . . More than anything else, the number 2000 signifies hope for a good future. We look back on a century of extreme contrasts - war and new beginning, fratricide and European Union." Helmut Kohl, Address Accepting the "Vision for Europe" Prize, in Press and Information Office of the Federal Government (visited Sept. 17, 1997) 〈http:/ /www.bundesregierung.de/ausland/news/pm/pm97091701.html〉.
16. The accession of new members presents issues of national power in the institutions of the Union, such as reweighting the "qualified majority voting" in the Council and limiting the number of Commissioners. The Amsterdam Treaty "has been widely described as disappointing and . . . inconclusive." GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., 1998 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 10 (1998). The very architecture of the Union will continue its evolution as its numbers grow and processes are streamlined to enable effective governance. "The administration was originally designed for a community of six member states; there are now 15, and there could be 25 or more members within 10 years or less." Dick Leonard, Eye on the EU, EUROPE, June 1997, at 4.
17. The accession of new members presents issues of national power in the institutions of the Union, such as reweighting the "qualified majority voting" in the Council and limiting the number of Commissioners. The Amsterdam Treaty "has been widely described as disappointing and . . . inconclusive." GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., 1998 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 10 (1998). The very architecture of the Union will continue its evolution as its numbers grow and processes are streamlined to enable effective governance. "The administration was originally designed for a community of six member states; there are now 15, and there could be 25 or more members within 10 years or less." Dick Leonard, Eye on the EU, EUROPE, June 1997, at 4.
18. The Maastrich Treaty and pertinent Protocol impose fixed economic criteria with timetables on Member States wishing to participate in the single currency. See Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 109, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247, 269-77 (1992) [hereinafter TEU]. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 57 (1997); EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE, ANNUAL REPORT 1996, at 52-55 (1997).
19. The Maastrich Treaty and pertinent Protocol impose fixed economic criteria with timetables on Member States wishing to participate in the single currency. See Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 109, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247, 269-77 (1992) [hereinafter TEU]. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 57 (1997); EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE, ANNUAL REPORT 1996, at 52-55 (1997).
20. The Maastrich Treaty and pertinent Protocol impose fixed economic criteria with timetables on Member States wishing to participate in the single currency. See Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 109, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247, 269-77 (1992) [hereinafter TEU]. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 57 (1997); EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE, ANNUAL REPORT 1996, at 52-55 (1997).
21. The Maastrich Treaty and pertinent Protocol impose fixed economic criteria with timetables on Member States wishing to participate in the single currency. See Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 109, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247, 269-77 (1992) [hereinafter TEU]. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 57 (1997); EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE, ANNUAL REPORT 1996, at 52-55 (1997).
22. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 7.
23. Professor James Nafzinger recently wrote of the rapid globalization: "Forces of both integration and fragmentation have gained momentum, as have the complexities of reconciling competing values. Lawyers face critical issues, for example, at the intersections of environmental management, economics, human rights, and sovereignty." James A.R. Nafzinger, Integrating International and U.S. Law: Environmental and Related Problems, 21 VT. L. REV. 755 (1997). He cautions that "fundamental policy and legal issues can be resolved less by 'formal choice, in which the mind is governed by appeals to consistency, than by life-style choice.'" Id. at 758 (quoting CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN 280 (1993)). See also Joseph H.H. Weiler, Fin-de-siècle Europe: On Ideals and Ideology in Post-Maastrich Europe, in INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 23, 39 (Deirdre Curtin & Tom Heukels eds., 1994) (providing a thoughtful essay about the erosion of foundational ideals in European integration, noting that critical value choices are involved in technocratic regimes).
24. Professor James Nafzinger recently wrote of the rapid globalization: "Forces of both integration and fragmentation have gained momentum, as have the complexities of reconciling competing values. Lawyers face critical issues, for example, at the intersections of environmental management, economics, human rights, and sovereignty." James A.R. Nafzinger, Integrating International and U.S. Law: Environmental and Related Problems, 21 VT. L. REV. 755 (1997). He cautions that "fundamental policy and legal issues can be resolved less by 'formal choice, in which the mind is governed by appeals to consistency, than by life-style choice.'" Id. at 758 (quoting CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN 280 (1993)). See also Joseph H.H. Weiler, Fin-de-siècle Europe: On Ideals and Ideology in Post-Maastrich Europe, in INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 23, 39 (Deirdre Curtin & Tom Heukels eds., 1994) (providing a thoughtful essay about the erosion of foundational ideals in European integration, noting that critical value choices are involved in technocratic regimes).
25. Professor James Nafzinger recently wrote of the rapid globalization: "Forces of both integration and fragmentation have gained momentum, as have the complexities of reconciling competing values. Lawyers face critical issues, for example, at the intersections of environmental management, economics, human rights, and sovereignty." James A.R. Nafzinger, Integrating International and U.S. Law: Environmental and Related Problems, 21 VT. L. REV. 755 (1997). He cautions that "fundamental policy and legal issues can be resolved less by 'formal choice, in which the mind is governed by appeals to consistency, than by life-style choice.'" Id. at 758 (quoting CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN 280 (1993)). See also Joseph H.H. Weiler, Fin-de-siècle Europe: On Ideals and Ideology in Post-Maastrich Europe, in INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 23, 39 (Deirdre Curtin & Tom Heukels eds., 1994) (providing a thoughtful essay about the erosion of foundational ideals in European integration, noting that critical value choices are involved in technocratic regimes).
26. FRANCOIS D. LANFORD, EUROPEAN FORUM - THE 1998-99 RESEARCH PROJECT: RECASTING THE EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE: OPTIONS, CONSTRAINTS, ACTORS 1 (May 1997).
27. See Gary Minda, Democratic Pluralism in the Era of Downsizing, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 179, 180 (1997).
28. Several commentators have concluded that most EU countries will need to undertake large-scale social security reform, focusing largely on public pension and health care systems to achieve the criteria. See, e.g., George Kopits, Are Europe's Social Security Finances Compatible with EMU?: Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment of the International Monetary Fund 22 (1997) (analyzing the social protection provisions and convergence criteria country-by-country). "Throughout Europe, the euro, like globalization, has proved unforgiving of the inefficiencies of what Germans call the Vaterstaat -the consoling Father-State . . . forcing a radical reconsideration of the model of European society. . . . The euro is shaking Europe like a massive electric shock." Roger Cohen, The Cries of Welfare States Under the Knife, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at A1.
29. Several commentators have concluded that most EU countries will need to undertake large-scale social security reform, focusing largely on public pension and health care systems to achieve the criteria. See, e.g., George Kopits, Are Europe's Social Security Finances Compatible with EMU?: Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment of the International Monetary Fund 22 (1997) (analyzing the social protection provisions and convergence criteria country-by-country). "Throughout Europe, the euro, like globalization, has proved unforgiving of the inefficiencies of what Germans call the Vaterstaat - the consoling Father-State . . . forcing a radical reconsideration of the model of European society. . . . The euro is shaking Europe like a massive electric shock." Roger Cohen, The Cries of Welfare States Under the Knife, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at A1.
30. Finance Ministers of the European Union nations met early in 1998 to review the 1997 economic data from the Member States and decide which nations have strong and stable enough economies to participate in the introduction of the single currency. The Council of Heads of State is required by the Maastricht Treaty to confirm which members have fulfilled the necessary conditions. See TEU, supra note 7, art. 109(j)(4).
31. "Social market economy" denotes a market economy in which the harsher side-effects of capitalism are tempered by a generous social safety net. See Alan Cowell, Kohl Offers Plan for Big Cuts In the German Welfare State, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1996, at A1.
32. "[T]he three major European countries have suffered protracted economic weakness that has been accompanied by a dramatic rise in unemployment to postwar record levels." INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 1. See also EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 21-23, 30-34 (citing alarming unemployment and unsatisfactory budget deficits as obstacles to the required economic convergence). For example, in 1997, France and Germany had unemployment rates of 12.6% and 11.6%, respectively. See Cohen, supra note 12, at A12. Italy's unemployment rate is 12%. See Italian Ousted Last Week is Restored as Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1997, at A15. In Germany, "[o]fficial statistics chronicle record unemployment above 4.4 million (more than 11 percent)." Alan Cowell, Kohl Believes Something Will Turn Up: His Ratings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at A14. "The EU spends a staggering $240 billion a year" on unemployment benefits. Bruce Barnard, Jobs, Jobs, Jobs, Europe's Top Priority, EUROPE, Sept. 1996, at 16.
33. "[T]he three major European countries have suffered protracted economic weakness that has been accompanied by a dramatic rise in unemployment to postwar record levels." INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 1. See also EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 21-23, 30-34 (citing alarming unemployment and unsatisfactory budget deficits as obstacles to the required economic convergence). For example, in 1997, France and Germany had unemployment rates of 12.6% and 11.6%, respectively. See Cohen, supra note 12, at A12. Italy's unemployment rate is 12%. See Italian Ousted Last Week is Restored as Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1997, at A15. In Germany, "[o]fficial statistics chronicle record unemployment above 4.4 million (more than 11 percent)." Alan Cowell, Kohl Believes Something Will Turn Up: His Ratings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at A14. "The EU spends a staggering $240 billion a year" on unemployment benefits. Bruce Barnard, Jobs, Jobs, Jobs, Europe's Top Priority, EUROPE, Sept. 1996, at 16.
34. "[T]he three major European countries have suffered protracted economic weakness that has been accompanied by a dramatic rise in unemployment to postwar record levels." INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 1. See also EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 21-23, 30-34 (citing alarming unemployment and unsatisfactory budget deficits as obstacles to the required economic convergence). For example, in 1997, France and Germany had unemployment rates of 12.6% and 11.6%, respectively. See Cohen, supra note 12, at A12. Italy's unemployment rate is 12%. See Italian Ousted Last Week is Restored as Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1997, at A15. In Germany, "[o]fficial statistics chronicle record unemployment above 4.4 million (more than 11 percent)." Alan Cowell, Kohl Believes Something Will Turn Up: His Ratings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at A14. "The EU spends a staggering $240 billion a year" on unemployment benefits. Bruce Barnard, Jobs, Jobs, Jobs, Europe's Top Priority, EUROPE, Sept. 1996, at 16.
35. See Treaty of Amsterdam Articles, Oct. 2, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 56 (1998), at 109. High unemployment reduces tax revenue and increases social assistance outlays. The funding gap is increased further by the demographic trend of growing retirements; this causes governments to work diligently just to slow the increase in the deficits, without reducing them.
36. Even the criteria's staunchest proponents - German bankers and economic advisors - discuss delay. See Europe's Currency, Don't (even mention) Delay, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15-21, 1997, at 51. Some have questioned whether monetary union might run too far ahead of political union. See, e.g., Niels Thygesen, Why Is Economic and Monetary Union an Important Objective for Europe?, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 133 (1994) (discussing the benefits and disadvantages of economic and monetary union); Walter Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992-93, at 117 (arguing that the European Union treaty was premature on conception). See also 30 YEARS OF EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION FROM THE WERNER PLAN TO EMU (Alfred Steinherr ed., 1994) [hereinafter 30 YEARS] (discussing issues related to future progress of European Monetary Union in a series of articles).
37. Even the criteria's staunchest proponents - German bankers and economic advisors - discuss delay. See Europe's Currency, Don't (even mention) Delay, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15-21, 1997, at 51. Some have questioned whether monetary union might run too far ahead of political union. See, e.g., Niels Thygesen, Why Is Economic and Monetary Union an Important Objective for Europe?, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 133 (1994) (discussing the benefits and disadvantages of economic and monetary union); Walter Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992-93, at 117 (arguing that the European Union treaty was premature on conception). See also 30 YEARS OF EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION FROM THE WERNER PLAN TO EMU (Alfred Steinherr ed., 1994) [hereinafter 30 YEARS] (discussing issues related to future progress of European Monetary Union in a series of articles).
38. Even the criteria's staunchest proponents - German bankers and economic advisors - discuss delay. See Europe's Currency, Don't (even mention) Delay, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15-21, 1997, at 51. Some have questioned whether monetary union might run too far ahead of political union. See, e.g., Niels Thygesen, Why Is Economic and Monetary Union an Important Objective for Europe?, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 133 (1994) (discussing the benefits and disadvantages of economic and monetary union); Walter Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992-93, at 117 (arguing that the European Union treaty was premature on conception). See also 30 YEARS OF EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION FROM THE WERNER PLAN TO EMU (Alfred Steinherr ed., 1994) [hereinafter 30 YEARS] (discussing issues related to future progress of European Monetary Union in a series of articles).
39. Even the criteria's staunchest proponents - German bankers and economic advisors - discuss delay. See Europe's Currency, Don't (even mention) Delay, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15-21, 1997, at 51. Some have questioned whether monetary union might run too far ahead of political union. See, e.g., Niels Thygesen, Why Is Economic and Monetary Union an Important Objective for Europe?, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 133 (1994) (discussing the benefits and disadvantages of economic and monetary union); Walter Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992-93, at 117 (arguing that the European Union treaty was premature on conception). See also 30 YEARS OF EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION FROM THE WERNER PLAN TO EMU (Alfred Steinherr ed., 1994) [hereinafter 30 YEARS] (discussing issues related to future progress of European Monetary Union in a series of articles).
40. Kicking and Screaming into 1999 [hereinafter Kicking and Screaming], ECONOMIST, June 7-13, 1997, at 20. Four lawsuits have been filed with the German Constitutional Court to block Germany's participation in the monetary union. The suits allege, among other things, that the "introduction of the euro would infringe the basic German constitutional right of economic stability." Alan Cowell, 4 Quixotes Tilt at German Adoption of the Euro, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at A3.
41. Kicking and Screaming into 1999 [hereinafter Kicking and Screaming], ECONOMIST, June 7-13, 1997, at 20. Four lawsuits have been filed with the German Constitutional Court to block Germany's participation in the monetary union. The suits allege, among other things, that the "introduction of the euro would infringe the basic German constitutional right of economic stability." Alan Cowell, 4 Quixotes Tilt at German Adoption of the Euro, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at A3.
42. See Kicking and Screaming, supra note 18, at 21 (describing the results of an opinion poll showing the majority of respondents in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Britain, and Finland opposed to monetary union). One German poll shows the German population opposed to a single currency by a three to one margin. See Richard Medley, Keeping Monetary Union on Track: Time/or Another 'Kohl Shock', FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 21. On the other hand, "Euroskepticism" is muted in less economically developed Member States, such as Portugal, which receive substantial EU contributions for development. See Samantha McArthur, Portugal's Top Priority: The Euro, EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 8-9. Portugal receives $10 million a day for infrastructure and training. See id. at 9.
43. See Kicking and Screaming, supra note 18, at 21 (describing the results of an opinion poll showing the majority of respondents in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Britain, and Finland opposed to monetary union). One German poll shows the German population opposed to a single currency by a three to one margin. See Richard Medley, Keeping Monetary Union on Track: Time/or Another 'Kohl Shock', FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 21. On the other hand, "Euroskepticism" is muted in less economically developed Member States, such as Portugal, which receive substantial EU contributions for development. See Samantha McArthur, Portugal's Top Priority: The Euro, EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 8-9. Portugal receives $10 million a day for infrastructure and training. See id. at 9.
44. See Kicking and Screaming, supra note 18, at 21 (describing the results of an opinion poll showing the majority of respondents in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Britain, and Finland opposed to monetary union). One German poll shows the German population opposed to a single currency by a three to one margin. See Richard Medley, Keeping Monetary Union on Track: Time/or Another 'Kohl Shock', FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 21. On the other hand, "Euroskepticism" is muted in less economically developed Member States, such as Portugal, which receive substantial EU contributions for development. See Samantha McArthur, Portugal's Top Priority: The Euro, EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 8-9. Portugal receives $10 million a day for infrastructure and training. See id. at 9.
45. See Commission Puts the Brakes on Euro Aspirations of Italy and Greece, EUROWATCH, 1997, at 1. Bringing budget deficits within the required limits proved to be the most difficult of the criteria, with only five Member States satisfying them as of February 1998. See David Cameron, EMU After 1999: The Implications and Dilemmas of the Third Stage, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 425, 428 (1997) (highlighting problems in Ireland, Luxembourg, Denmark, Netherlands, and Finland).
46. See Commission Puts the Brakes on Euro Aspirations of Italy and Greece, EUROWATCH, 1997, at 1. Bringing budget deficits within the required limits proved to be the most difficult of the criteria, with only five Member States satisfying them as of February 1998. See David Cameron, EMU After 1999: The Implications and Dilemmas of the Third Stage, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 425, 428 (1997) (highlighting problems in Ireland, Luxembourg, Denmark, Netherlands, and Finland).
47. See Celestine Bohlen, The Magic Word for Italians: Europe (Pain and All), N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at A8. The popularity in Italy of a single European currency is understandable: "As a country of small and medium-sized manufacturers that send 70% of their exports to European neighbors, it also has strong economic reasons for not wanting to be left outside of the common monetary union." Id.
48. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SOCIAL PROTECTION IN THE MEMBER STATES 13-23 (1997) [hereinafter EC SOCIAL PROTECTION] (summarizing trend and Member States' reforms).
49. The IMF World Economic Outlook states: "[a] wide variety of reforms have been implemented across Europe in recent years, but many have been postponed." INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 12. It cautioned that the current gradual, piece-meal approach inadequately addresses the causes of the economic problems. See id.
50. See European Union/Budget, Money, Banking - Special No. 4453 (visited July 16, 1996) 〈http://www.bundesregierung.de/.bin/lay/ausland/news/specials/special4453. html〉.
51. GEORGE BERMANN ET AL., 1995 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 244 (1995).
52. Denmark opted out of participation in the monetary union when it ratified the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. British leaders have notified the Council that the United Kingdom will exercise its right to do the same, though it may participate later. See Report on the Convergence in the European Union in 1996, European Economy, Supplement A, No. 1, Jan. 1997, at 2. The new Labor Government, however, has endorsed eventual participation if the introduction of the euro is successful. See What They Said, INSIDE EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 3 (quoting Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer). Even though it did not have an official "opt-out" agreement, Sweden has declined to participate in the processes. See PETER B. KENNEN, THE TRANSITION TO EMU: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 8 n.7 (1997). One scholar correctly predicted that the first wave would include 11 Members, excluding only Greece, Britain, Sweden, and Denmark. See Cameron, supra note 20, at 425. See also Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 355 (exempting the UK from movement to the third stage and setting forth related provisions to be annexed to the Treaty Establishing the European Community); Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to Denmark, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 356 (recognizing that Denmark shall have an exemption if necessary).
53. Denmark opted out of participation in the monetary union when it ratified the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. British leaders have notified the Council that the United Kingdom will exercise its right to do the same, though it may participate later. See Report on the Convergence in the European Union in 1996, European Economy, Supplement A, No. 1, Jan. 1997, at 2. The new Labor Government, however, has endorsed eventual participation if the introduction of the euro is successful. See What They Said, INSIDE EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 3 (quoting Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer). Even though it did not have an official "opt-out" agreement, Sweden has declined to participate in the processes. See PETER B. KENNEN, THE TRANSITION TO EMU: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 8 n.7 (1997). One scholar correctly predicted that the first wave would include 11 Members, excluding only Greece, Britain, Sweden, and Denmark. See Cameron, supra note 20, at 425. See also Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 355 (exempting the UK from movement to the third stage and setting forth related provisions to be annexed to the Treaty Establishing the European Community); Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to Denmark, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 356 (recognizing that Denmark shall have an exemption if necessary).
54. Denmark opted out of participation in the monetary union when it ratified the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. British leaders have notified the Council that the United Kingdom will exercise its right to do the same, though it may participate later. See Report on the Convergence in the European Union in 1996, European Economy, Supplement A, No. 1, Jan. 1997, at 2. The new Labor Government, however, has endorsed eventual participation if the introduction of the euro is successful. See What They Said, INSIDE EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 3 (quoting Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer). Even though it did not have an official "opt-out" agreement, Sweden has declined to participate in the processes. See PETER B. KENNEN, THE TRANSITION TO EMU: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 8 n.7 (1997). One scholar correctly predicted that the first wave would include 11 Members, excluding only Greece, Britain, Sweden, and Denmark. See Cameron, supra note 20, at 425. See also Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 355 (exempting the UK from movement to the third stage and setting forth related provisions to be annexed to the Treaty Establishing the European Community); Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to Denmark, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 356 (recognizing that Denmark shall have an exemption if necessary).
55. Denmark opted out of participation in the monetary union when it ratified the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. British leaders have notified the Council that the United Kingdom will exercise its right to do the same, though it may participate later. See Report on the Convergence in the European Union in 1996, European Economy, Supplement A, No. 1, Jan. 1997, at 2. The new Labor Government, however, has endorsed eventual participation if the introduction of the euro is successful. See What They Said, INSIDE EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 3 (quoting Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer). Even though it did not have an official "opt-out" agreement, Sweden has declined to participate in the processes. See PETER B. KENNEN, THE TRANSITION TO EMU: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 8 n.7 (1997). One scholar correctly predicted that the first wave would include 11 Members, excluding only Greece, Britain, Sweden, and Denmark. See Cameron, supra note 20, at 425. See also Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 355 (exempting the UK from movement to the third stage and setting forth related provisions to be annexed to the Treaty Establishing the European Community); Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to Denmark, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 356 (recognizing that Denmark shall have an exemption if necessary).
56. Denmark opted out of participation in the monetary union when it ratified the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. British leaders have notified the Council that the United Kingdom will exercise its right to do the same, though it may participate later. See Report on the Convergence in the European Union in 1996, European Economy, Supplement A, No. 1, Jan. 1997, at 2. The new Labor Government, however, has endorsed eventual participation if the introduction of the euro is successful. See What They Said, INSIDE EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 3 (quoting Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer). Even though it did not have an official "opt-out" agreement, Sweden has declined to participate in the processes. See PETER B. KENNEN, THE TRANSITION TO EMU: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 8 n.7 (1997). One scholar correctly predicted that the first wave would include 11 Members, excluding only Greece, Britain, Sweden, and Denmark. See Cameron, supra note 20, at 425. See also Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 355 (exempting the UK from movement to the third stage and setting forth related provisions to be annexed to the Treaty Establishing the European Community); Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to Denmark, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 356 (recognizing that Denmark shall have an exemption if necessary).
57. "Remaining outside [the] EMU would mean a loss [of] benefits anticipated from a favorable assessment by financial markets, in terms of reduced interest premia and elimination of intra-EU exchange rate risk, and from the ensuing expansion of trade, investment, growth, and of course, employment." Kopits, supra note 12, at 21. France and Germany insist on forming a special council of single currency leaders to provide "indispensable" deeper economic coordination. See France and Germany Act on Single Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at A12.
58. Ester Lawshway, Privatization: Hopes and Headaches, EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 44.
59. Beginning with President Reagan's rollback of federal welfare entitlements in 1981 and culminating in 1996 with President Clinton's "most sweeping changes, unprecedented bipartisan support has produced a fundamental change in government policy, reversing 60 years of policy." Kathleen A. Kost & Frank Munger, Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: 1990's Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Values, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 3, 24-34 (1996) (describing and criticizing the 1996 welfare reform).
60. See Jason DeParle, Half the States Unlikely to Meet Goals on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at A1. President Clinton vetoed the first reform bill, but signed the final effort, having himself campaigned on a promise to "end welfare as we know it." Thomas A. Loftus, Reforming Welfare: Are Effective Property Rights a Key?, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 387, 387 (1996).
61. See Jason DeParle, Half the States Unlikely to Meet Goals on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at A1. President Clinton vetoed the first reform bill, but signed the final effort, having himself campaigned on a promise to "end welfare as we know it." Thomas A. Loftus, Reforming Welfare: Are Effective Property Rights a Key?, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 387, 387 (1996).
62. For example, pursuant to the 1996 welfare reforms, the government terminated disability benefits for 95,000 mentally handicapped and otherwise disabled children. Benefit cuts averaging $436 a month per child are estimated to save $4-5 billion during the period from 1997-2002. See Robert Pear, After a Review, 95,000 Children Will Lose Cash Disability Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1997, at A1.
63. See DeParle, supra note 30, at A22 (describing the channeling of approximately $16 billion to the states).
64. See Kost & Munger, supra note 29, at 88.
65. The U.S. system is unique among industrialized countries because it maintains no uniform, universal pension system, no national health care system, no universal family allowance, and the welfare programs are limited to specifically defined groups, who often receive poverty level financial assistance. The American system includes a complex assortment of Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Food Stamps, and unemployment insurance, which are paid for and administered by federal, state, and local governments. See id. at 12-13.
66. See id. at 10-12, 125. Interestingly, the vocal public protest demanding welfare cuts in the United States contrasts directly with European protests to preserve social spending.
67. Jerry Gray, Congress and White House Finally Agree on Budget, 7 Months Into Fiscal Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at A1.
68. See Jeffrey L. Katz, Provisions: Welfare Overhaul Law, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Sept. 21, 1996, at 2606-2705.
69. See Marianne Means, Clinton Delivers, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 9, 1997, at B7.
70. Roger Cohen, Clinging to Its Past, Europe is Warily Awaiting the Euro, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1997, at A1, A10.
71. Id. EU officials are "unelected, supercilious bureaucrats of Brussels" and Europe is a "black hole of despair," according to one 1997 British election candidate who opposed European integration. He claimed that the EU is a German effort to take over Europe. Id. at A1.
72. Francesco Papadia & Fabrizio Saccomanni, From the Werner Plan to the Maastricht Treaty: Europe's Stubborn Quest for Monetary Union, in 30 YEARS, supra note 17, at 57, 60.
73. Edmund Andrews, Germans Surprise World Economies with a Rate Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1997, at A1 (adopting the frequently used metaphor describing underlying political and economic forces).
74. Commentators see the gap widening between voters and leaders over the single currency, some favoring a softer, "political" euro, others a stronger, "economic" one. See Kicking and Screaming, supra note 18, at 21. Columnist George Will terms European integration "an antidemocratic unity. Europe's political class has arrogantly fostered unification over the heads of increasingly unpersuaded people." George Will, A French Raspberry For the New Europe, WASH. POST, June 4, 1997, at A23.
75. Commentators see the gap widening between voters and leaders over the single currency, some favoring a softer, "political" euro, others a stronger, "economic" one. See Kicking and Screaming, supra note 18, at 21. Columnist George Will terms European integration "an antidemocratic unity. Europe's political class has arrogantly fostered unification over the heads of increasingly unpersuaded people." George Will, A French Raspberry For the New Europe, WASH. POST, June 4, 1997, at A23.
76. See EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at xiv, 2, 17. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 1-16 (providing individual country summaries of economic recovery).
77. See Richard I. Fine & Francois Alland, Current Political and Economic Developments in the European Union, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 3 281, 284 (1996).
78. Martin Walker, INSIDE EUROPE, Oct. 1997, at 2. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 4 ("Already in the seventh year of its expansion, the United States economy has continued to combine solid growth of output and employment with low inflation and a diminishing fiscal imbalance."); Richard W. Stevenson, Federal Deficit at Lowest Point in Two Decades, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at A1 ("[T]he economy drove down the deficit at a stunning rate even before the balanced budget agreement."); Jan M. Rosen, Fed Sees No Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at B2 (stating "the economy is growing enough to keep record numbers of Americans employed but not enough to stir inflation.").
79. Martin Walker, INSIDE EUROPE, Oct. 1997, at 2. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 4 ("Already in the seventh year of its expansion, the United States economy has continued to combine solid growth of output and employment with low inflation and a diminishing fiscal imbalance."); Richard W. Stevenson, Federal Deficit at Lowest Point in Two Decades, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at A1 ("[T]he economy drove down the deficit at a stunning rate even before the balanced budget agreement."); Jan M. Rosen, Fed Sees No Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at B2 (stating "the economy is growing enough to keep record numbers of Americans employed but not enough to stir inflation.").
80. Martin Walker, INSIDE EUROPE, Oct. 1997, at 2. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 4 ("Already in the seventh year of its expansion, the United States economy has continued to combine solid growth of output and employment with low inflation and a diminishing fiscal imbalance."); Richard W. Stevenson, Federal Deficit at Lowest Point in Two Decades, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at A1 ("[T]he economy drove down the deficit at a stunning rate even before the balanced budget agreement."); Jan M. Rosen, Fed Sees No Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at B2 (stating "the economy is growing enough to keep record numbers of Americans employed but not enough to stir inflation.").
81. The separate evolutions may produce functionally similar legal changes. For discussion of parallel or convergent evolution, see RICHARD MILNER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVOLUTION 93 (1990). See also Mauro Cappelletti, Two Main Convergences Between Europe and the United States: Constitutionalism and Federalism, 28 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 521 (1994) (discussing two main legal convergences: [T]he adoption of binding constitutions and Bills of Rights in post-World War II Europe, and the "even more striking convergence . . . in the area of federalism or transnationalism, e.g. Europe becoming a United States of Europe.").
82. The separate evolutions may produce functionally similar legal changes. For discussion of parallel or convergent evolution, see RICHARD MILNER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVOLUTION 93 (1990). See also Mauro Cappelletti, Two Main Convergences Between Europe and the United States: Constitutionalism and Federalism, 28 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 521 (1994) (discussing two main legal convergences: [T]he adoption of binding constitutions and Bills of Rights in post-World War II Europe, and the "even more striking convergence . . . in the area of federalism or transnationalism, e.g. Europe becoming a United States of Europe.").
83. The comparisons are justified on many grounds: "[T]he Gross Domestic Product . . . of the European Union and the United States fairly compare, both approaching $7 trillion of GDP [in 1997]. Globally, however, the European Union holds 24% of the world trade, compared to the United States and Japan with 16% and 12% respectively." Fine & Alland, supra note 45, at 282. For similar comparisons of European Union, United States, and Japanese economic indicators, see International Economic Implications of the Euro, in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 24 (June 1997). In addition, the cultural and political inheritance of the United States from Europe suggests value choice comparisons.
84. See Joyce Mushaben, Restructuring the German Sozialstaat: Internal and External Forces for Change, COLUM. J. EUR. L. 19-24 (forthcoming) (suggesting that German reforms may have radically altered historic paradigms of the social commitment).
85. Weiler, supra note 9, at 30-31 (drawing on Socialism, Fabianism, Communism, and Welfare Statism). Germany introduced the first comprehensive social insurance program in 1883, which became a model for the rest of Europe. See ARTHUR LARSON, 1 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 2-11 (1997) . For a recent informative discussion of the modern European welfare state, see EUROPEAN WELFARE POLICY, SQUARING THE WELFARE CIRCLE (Vic George & Peter Taylor-Goody eds., 1996).
86. Weiler, supra note 9, at 30-31 (drawing on Socialism, Fabianism, Communism, and Welfare Statism). Germany introduced the first comprehensive social insurance program in 1883, which became a model for the rest of Europe. See ARTHUR LARSON, 1 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 2-11 (1997) . For a recent informative discussion of the modern European welfare state, see EUROPEAN WELFARE POLICY, SQUARING THE WELFARE CIRCLE (Vic George & Peter Taylor-Goody eds., 1996).
87. In 1989, the Commission promulgated the Social Charter. See Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, reprinted in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SOCIAL EUROPE 48 (Jan. 1990) (issued by the Commission on Nov. 29, 1989; approved by 11 of the 12 governments at the Strasbourg Council meeting, Dec. 9, 1989) [hereinafter SOCIAL CHARTER], The Commission also announced the Social Action Program Communication from the Commission Concerning its Action Program Relating to the Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers. Together, these declarations set out a comprehensive EU program of worker rights. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., From the Social Charter to the Social Action Program 1995-1997: European Union Employment Law Comes Alive, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 43, 50 (1996).
88. In 1989, the Commission promulgated the Social Charter. See Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, reprinted in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SOCIAL EUROPE 48 (Jan. 1990) (issued by the Commission on Nov. 29, 1989; approved by 11 of the 12 governments at the Strasbourg Council meeting, Dec. 9, 1989) [hereinafter SOCIAL CHARTER], The Commission also announced the Social Action Program Communication from the Commission Concerning its Action Program Relating to the Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers. Together, these declarations set out a comprehensive EU program of worker rights. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., From the Social Charter to the Social Action Program 1995-1997: European Union Employment Law Comes Alive, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 43, 50 (1996).
89. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 771, 773 n.8. Seminal European "constitutional" examples include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
90. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 771, 773 n.8. Seminal European "constitutional" examples include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); and the German Constitution, Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz trans., Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz eds., 1994). Germany instilled the constitutional character of the Sozialstaat in the Weimar Constitution and reformulated it in Articles 20 and 28 of the Basic Law after World War II. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 3. Interestingly, one scholar suggests that "[p]aradoxically," the success of turning the modern nation state internally into a welfare state has accelerated the decline of the nation state. Turning the state into an engine of redistribution impairs its economic vitality, thus causing leaders to seek international economic cooperation as a means of stimulating economic growth. See John O. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903, 910-11 (1996).
91. For detailed reports of national and EU social protection provisions, see generally Dowling, supra note 51; U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 1997 (1997).
92. See Kopits, supra note 12, at 3, 19-23 (Table 1 reflects percentage burden on payroll). "[E]xisting tax and benefit systems owe many of their features to a bygone era and have failed to keep pace with changes in the labor market." ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), THE OECD JOBS STRATEGY 11 (1997).
93. William Pfaff, Why Should a Society's Economic Burdens Be So Lopsided?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 21, 1997, at 8. Experts suggest that opposition groups have won public support and deprived reforms of political support. This public opposition hampered reform and ultimately economic recovery. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 12.
94. See Craig Whitney, French Truckers' Strike Snarls Freight Traffic Across Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1997, at A4 [hereinafter Whitney, French Truckers']; Craig Whitney, The More Things Change, the More France Grumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Whitney, The More Things Change]; Craig Whitney, Chirac Is Expected to Call Parliamentary Elections a Year Early, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1997, at A11 [hereinafter Whitney, Parliamentary Elections]; Craig Whitney, French Strike Slows Travel in Protesting Proposed Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1996, at A8 [hereinafter Whitney, French Strike].
95. See Craig Whitney, French Truckers' Strike Snarls Freight Traffic Across Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1997, at A4 [hereinafter Whitney, French Truckers']; Craig Whitney, The More Things Change, the More France Grumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Whitney, The More Things Change]; Craig Whitney, Chirac Is Expected to Call Parliamentary Elections a Year Early, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1997, at A11 [hereinafter Whitney, Parliamentary Elections]; Craig Whitney, French Strike Slows Travel in Protesting Proposed Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1996, at A8 [hereinafter Whitney, French Strike].
96. See Craig Whitney, French Truckers' Strike Snarls Freight Traffic Across Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1997, at A4 [hereinafter Whitney, French Truckers']; Craig Whitney, The More Things Change, the More France Grumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Whitney, The More Things Change]; Craig Whitney, Chirac Is Expected to Call Parliamentary Elections a Year Early, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1997, at A11 [hereinafter Whitney, Parliamentary Elections]; Craig Whitney, French Strike Slows Travel in Protesting Proposed Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1996, at A8 [hereinafter Whitney, French Strike].
97. See Craig Whitney, French Truckers' Strike Snarls Freight Traffic Across Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1997, at A4 [hereinafter Whitney, French Truckers']; Craig Whitney, The More Things Change, the More France Grumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Whitney, The More Things Change]; Craig Whitney, Chirac Is Expected to Call Parliamentary Elections a Year Early, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1997, at A11 [hereinafter Whitney, Parliamentary Elections]; Craig Whitney, French Strike Slows Travel in Protesting Proposed Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1996, at A8 [hereinafter Whitney, French Strike].
98. The three annual public sector strikes in November 1995, 1996, and 1997 proved especially effective because the public sector is so huge. Railroads, public transit, most air travel, and even banks are in government hands. See Craig R. Whitney, France on Strike: Not for Better Future, but for a Stable Present, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 8, 1997, at 4-5.
99. In the spring of 1997, the rightist government fell "victim to a backlash against the stringent fiscal requirements for the euro." Id. The cohabitation or power sharing between conservative President Jacques Chirac and Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin began on June 5, 1997, with the announcement of plans to stimulate the economy, not to cut the budget. See Craig R. Whitney, An Uneasy First Encounter in France's Political 'Cohabitation,' N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at A5. At the same time, the new Socialist-led government was "also marked by a strong, unequivocal commitment to European integration, including monetary union, but on the condition that it include[d] strong, equally unequivocal support for Keynesian-inspired growth and job creation." Axel Krause, Jospin's Socialist Team, EUROPE, July-Aug. 1997, at 16.
100. In the spring of 1997, the rightist government fell "victim to a backlash against the stringent fiscal requirements for the euro." Id. The cohabitation or power sharing between conservative President Jacques Chirac and Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin began on June 5, 1997, with the announcement of plans to stimulate the economy, not to cut the budget. See Craig R. Whitney, An Uneasy First Encounter in France's Political 'Cohabitation,' N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at A5. At the same time, the new Socialist-led government was "also marked by a strong, unequivocal commitment to European integration, including monetary union, but on the condition that it include[d] strong, equally unequivocal support for Keynesian-inspired growth and job creation." Axel Krause, Jospin's Socialist Team, EUROPE, July-Aug. 1997, at 16.
101. See Bruce Barnard, EU's Amsterdam Summit, EUROPE, July-Aug. 1997, at 2.
102. Celestine Bohlen, Italian Government Falls in Fight Over Euro Austerity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1997, at A10.
103. See id. The Communist Refounding Party subsequently reconsidered their support after enormous public outcry.
104. "The massive May vote to throw out the Conservatives after 18 years in power showed the nation was ready for change . . ." and the economy will remain the key for the Blair government. David Lennon, Tony Blair's Government, EUROPE, Dec. 1997, at 9-10. "Exit polls found that a key reason voters switched to Labor was their concern about the widening gap between rich and poor. . . ." Thomas L. Friedman, All About Maggie, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at A15.
105. "The massive May vote to throw out the Conservatives after 18 years in power showed the nation was ready for change . . ." and the economy will remain the key for the Blair government. David Lennon, Tony Blair's Government, EUROPE, Dec. 1997, at 9-10. "Exit polls found that a key reason voters switched to Labor was their concern about the widening gap between rich and poor. . . ." Thomas L. Friedman, All About Maggie, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at A15.
106. He explained that the two year austerity plan would include tough spending cuts but not cost jobs. The new 1996 budget prescribed $9.6 billion in deficit reductions for the next two years. See Janet McBride, Austrian Budget Targets Spending and Jobs, Reuter European Community Report, Mar. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuec. File.
107. Cohen, supra note 12, at A7. See also A Contrary End to the Year, European Social Policy, Europe Information Service, Jan. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eursoc. File. The government had proposed raising the retirement age for transit and train drivers. See Anne Swardson, Truckers' Strike Takes Its Toll on Europe, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov 27, 1996, at 1-2. At the center of France's restiveness is the Government's commitment to meet a series of stiff budget and public debt targets so that France can qualify to join a single European currency in 1999. That in turn has forced the government to step up a program of privatization of public sector corporations. [M]oves . . . to cut welfare and other benefits are widely unpopular. Alan Riding, French Trucker's Strike Ends With Indirect Defeat for Government, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1996, at 7.
108. Cohen, supra note 12, at A7. See also A Contrary End to the Year, European Social Policy, Europe Information Service, Jan. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eursoc. File. The government had proposed raising the retirement age for transit and train drivers. See Anne Swardson, Truckers' Strike Takes Its Toll on Europe, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov 27, 1996, at 1-2. At the center of France's restiveness is the Government's commitment to meet a series of stiff budget and public debt targets so that France can qualify to join a single European currency in 1999. That in turn has forced the government to step up a program of privatization of public sector corporations. [M]oves . . . to cut welfare and other benefits are widely unpopular. Alan Riding, French Trucker's Strike Ends With Indirect Defeat for Government, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1996, at 7.
109. Cohen, supra note 12, at A7. See also A Contrary End to the Year, European Social Policy, Europe Information Service, Jan. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eursoc. File. The government had proposed raising the retirement age for transit and train drivers. See Anne Swardson, Truckers' Strike Takes Its Toll on Europe, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov 27, 1996, at 1-2. At the center of France's restiveness is the Government's commitment to meet a series of stiff budget and public debt targets so that France can qualify to join a single European currency in 1999. That in turn has forced the government to step up a program of privatization of public sector corporations. [M]oves . . . to cut welfare and other benefits are widely unpopular. Alan Riding, French Trucker's Strike Ends With Indirect Defeat for Government, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1996, at 7.
110. See Riding, supra note 64, at 7.
111. See Swardson, supra note 64, at 1-2.
112. Craig R. Whitney, Chirac's Gamble: Courting the Foes of Social Cuts, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 28, 1997, at 5.
113. See Riding, supra note 64, at 7. See also Barry James, French Trucker Strike Raises Specter of Chaos on Continent, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 3, 1997, at 1.
114. See Whitney, French Truckers', supra note 56, at A4.
115. See id. (noting that adjacent EU countries complained that the halt in transportation seriously stalled the flow of goods and services across Europe).
116. See John-Thor Dahlburg, French Trucks Back on Road, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 8, 1997, at A-22.
117. See Barry James, War and Peace in European Labor, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 3, 1997, at 1.
118. The largest drivers' union signed the deal on Nov. 7, 1997. See Roadblocks Lifted As French Strike Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, at 10.
119. See Alan Cowell, Austerity Plan For Workers is Approved for Germany, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1996, at 33. Another strike the following April by pilots of Air France Europe, protesting future lower salaries for new pilots, grounded all flights to and from Paris for two days. Hospital interns joined the fray and occupied railroad stations and roads, protesting government austerity measures to control health care spending, and bank employees briefly struck to show opposition to new work hour rules allowing banks to open on Saturday. See Whitney, supra note 57, at 4. This entrenched resistance to cutting deficit spending and making operations more efficient has caused concern at many levels. See id. "With government transfer payments amounting to well over 50 percent of national income, at least one person out of two is on the receiving end, directly or indirectly," according to one French economist who favors reducing the government's role in the economy. Id.
120. See Tom Buerkle, EU Says Paris Can Aid GAN, Then Must Sell It; Ruling Sharpens a Dilemma Over Jobs, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 31, 1997, at 11.
121. See France: Politics Meets Mathematics, ECONOMIST, June 14, 1997, at 52. See also France Still Trapped, ECONOMIST, July 5, 1997, at 51 (explaining that Jospin cannot fulfill both campaign promises and still expect to join the single currency.).
122. See France: Politics Meets Mathematics, ECONOMIST, June 14, 1997, at 52. See also France Still Trapped, ECONOMIST, July 5, 1997, at 51 (explaining that Jospin cannot fulfill both campaign promises and still expect to join the single currency.).
123. See Alan Friedman, Germans Growling: Labor Leader Warns of Trouble If Social Spending Cuts Persist, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 26, 1997, at 1.
124. See Cowell, supra note 74, at 33 (noting that Parliament had approved legislation lowering government required sick benefits, and decreasing job security by raising the number of employees needed for a company to qualify for stricter rules on employee dismissals).
125. See id.
126. See Edmund L. Andrews, New Hard Line by Big Companies Threatens German Work Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at A1.
127. Alan Cowell, Students in Germany Protest Cuts in University Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1997, at A8.
128. See id.
129. OECD reports that only a few countries have introduced and sustained policy reforms to significantly improve labor market performance. See OECD, Implementing the OECD Job Strategy - Lessons from Member Countries' Experience at 2, (visited Feb. 20, 1998) 〈http://www.oecd.sge/min/97study.html〉.
130. Note, as well, that 13 of the 15 governments had become left of center by the end of 1998. See Social Butterflies, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 1997, at 38 (arguing that social protection may be back in fashion). A special conference was held in January 1997, under the Dutch Presidency, to examine positive interplay between social policy and economic performance. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on "Social Policy and Economic Performance," at ¶ 2, May 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Eclaw File.
131. Note, as well, that 13 of the 15 governments had become left of center by the end of 1998. See Social Butterflies, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 1997, at 38 (arguing that social protection may be back in fashion). A special conference was held in January 1997, under the Dutch Presidency, to examine positive interplay between social policy and economic performance. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on "Social Policy and Economic Performance," at ¶ 2, May 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Eclaw File.
132. CHRISTOPHER HARDING & ANN SHERLOCK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 543 (1995). Britain's staunch refusal to sign the Social Charter, with the other 11 Member States in October of 1989, hindered progressive integration efforts. Following the May 1, 1997 election, the Blair government announced that it would accept the Social Charter. See Social Butterflies, supra note 84, at 38.
133. See Employment and Social Policy 1 (visited Dec. 1997) 〈http://europa.eu.int/ pol/socio/en/info.ht〉.
134. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 2, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 572 (1992) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Title VIII articulates social policy, education, and related goals corresponding to these aspirations. Mainly, the Member States and the Commission are required to cooperate and coordinate with respect to the Treaty's general objectives. These objectives include social security, collective bargaining, and occupational safety and health, among others. Art. 118 and art. 118(a) call upon the Council, after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, to adopt directives establishing technical rules and minimum requirements in these areas.
135. All of the Member States, except the UK, had adopted the 1989 Social Charter, an aspirational statement of political intent, and the subsequent Protocol on Social Policy which allowed a "two speed" process on social matters without the UK. See HARDING & SHERLOCK, supra note 85, at 550-61. For description of European social policy following Maastricht, see Elaine A. Whiteford, Social Policy after Maastricht, 18 EUR. L. REV. 202 (1993).
136. See also Employment and Social Policy, supra note 86, at 2.
137. See Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, Ch. IV, arts. 117-19, 1997 O.J. (C340) 1, 30. Member States included the Protocol essentially intact. Britain's earlier refusal to accede to the Social Charter forced the other Members to craft a special Social Protocol that would use EU institutions and promote social aims, but without Britain's participation. See generally Doug Henderson, Opening Statement by British Minister to the EU (visited May 5, 1997) 〈http://www.fco.gov.uk/texts/1997/may/05/hendl.txt〉.
138. In November 1997, the UK also signed the Council of Europe's Social Charter, a Treaty among the Strasbourg-based Council's 40-nation organization. See Council of Europe, The United Kingdom Signs the Council of Europe Revised Social Charter and the Convention on the Recognition of Higher Education Qualifications (visited 〈http://www.coe.fr/cp/97/ 649a%2897%29.html〉.
139. The Amsterdam Treaty adds employment provisions to Art. B of the TEU, and amends Articles 2 and 3 of the TEU by including a special title on employment. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 89, arts. 2-3.
140. In June 1997, some 80 European scholars issued the Amsterdam Declaration on Social Quality, emphasizing the importance of social cohesion and solidarity in the advancing economic union. For an informative article summarizing arguments on all sides of the reform debate, including a six Member State survey, see Peter Taylor-Goody, European Welfare Futures, 31 Soc. POL'Y & ADMIN. 1, 5-16 (1997).
141. See TEU, supra note 7. The Member States negotiated the Treaty in December 1991. All Member States approved it in October 1992. See generally Michael Abbey & J. Nicholas Bromfield, A Practitioner's Guide to the Maastricht Treaty, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1329 (1994); HARDING & SHERLOCK, supra note 85, at 4. The Treaty amends and builds upon the Treaty of Rome, which established the fledgling European Economic Community. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 103 (for coordination of economic policies). For history, see generally Papadia & Saccomanni, supra note 41. For two exhaustive accounts of the historical unfolding of EMU, see Smits, supra note 3; KENNETH DYSON, ELUSIVE UNION: THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN EUROPE (1994).
142. See TEU, supra note 7. The Member States negotiated the Treaty in December 1991. All Member States approved it in October 1992. See generally Michael Abbey & J. Nicholas Bromfield, A Practitioner's Guide to the Maastricht Treaty, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1329 (1994); HARDING & SHERLOCK, supra note 85, at 4. The Treaty amends and builds upon the Treaty of Rome, which established the fledgling European Economic Community. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 103 (for coordination of economic policies). For history, see generally Papadia & Saccomanni, supra note 41. For two exhaustive accounts of the historical unfolding of EMU, see Smits, supra note 3; KENNETH DYSON, ELUSIVE UNION: THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN EUROPE (1994).
143. TEU preamble, supra note 7. The 12 nations party to the new TEU sought to build on the successes of the internal market and reach out to expanded areas of cooperation, including economic and monetary cooperation. See id. They planned to expand their role in areas such as education, public health, consumer protection, the environment, roads, and communications. The second and third "pillars" established the goals of forging a common foreign, security, and judicial policy. See id. Ninety pages of the blueprint focused on monetary union. Two Member States, Denmark and the United Kingdom, received derogations from monetary union which allowed them to decide at a later date whether to participate. See Recent Developments in European Community Law - Maastricht Treaty's Opt-Out Provisions for Denmark Keep EC Intact, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 223, 226 (1994).
144. Renaud Dehousse, Community Competences: Are There Limits to Growth?, in EUROPE AFTER MAASTRICHT: AN EVER CLOSER UNION 103, 104 (1994).
145. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, arts. 109(j)(1), (3)-(4).
146. See Francis Snyder, EMU - Metaphor for European Union? Institutions, Rules and Types of Regulations, in EUROPE AFTER MAASTRICHT: AN EVER CLOSER UNION, supra note 94, at 68.
147. Though on the agenda for many years, progress proved difficult. See Smits, supra note 3, at 31-41.
148. The EMU concept comprises an integrated market with a single currency, a common monetary and economic policy, and a supranational central bank for the European nations. See JOHN B. GOODMAN, MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY, THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN WESTERN EUROPE 182 (1992).
149. See Smits, supra note 3, at 12-34.
150. See DYSON, supra note 92, at 65-71.
151. See id. at 72-83. The Bretton Woods international monetary system, established in 1945, created the International Monetary Fund and linked world currencies closely to the U.S. dollar. The system functioned poorly as currencies began to fluctuate beyond acceptable limits. See id. at 40-46. For an additional description of this period, see Brian Kurzmann, Challenges to Monetary Unification in the European Union: Sovereignty Reigning Supreme, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 136, 136-38; GOODMAN, supra note 98, at 186-87.
152. See id. at 72-83. The Bretton Woods international monetary system, established in 1945, created the International Monetary Fund and linked world currencies closely to the U.S. dollar. The system functioned poorly as currencies began to fluctuate beyond acceptable limits. See id. at 40-46. For an additional description of this period, see Brian Kurzmann, Challenges to Monetary Unification in the European Union: Sovereignty Reigning Supreme, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 136, 136-38; GOODMAN, supra note 98, at 186-87.
153. The Werner Group is named after then Luxembourg premier and finance minister Pierre Werner. See generally 30 YEARS, supra note 17, at 10-28 (discussing and printing the text of the Werner Report). For a detailed description of events, see also Smits, supra note 3, at 15.
154. The Report, later adopted as a resolution by the Council, advocated completing the single market, limiting the range of currency fluctuation, coordinating the members' economic policies, and establishing a Community system of cooperation for the central banks and a center for economic policy decision. The Group submitted the Werner Report on October 8, 1970. As adopted by the Council in March 1971, the plan articulated a comprehensive definition of the concept of EMU and the building blocks that would ultimately become the blueprint for the successes of EMU in the 1990s. See Resolution by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of March 22, 1971, 1971 O.J. (C 28) 1, reprinted in EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MONETARAY COMMITTEE, COMPENDIUM OF COMMUNITY MONETARY TEXTS 33-37 (1989). See also Papadia & Saccomanni, supra note 41, at 63; Smits, supra note 3, at 15.
155. See VANTHOOR, supra note 1, at 81-83 (providing a succinct general history of this period). See id. at 75-95.
156. See Resolution of the European Council on the Establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) and Related Matters (Dec. 5, 1978), reprinted in EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MONETARY COMMITTEE, supra note 103, at 45-49. All member countries joined except Britain. See Smits, supra note 3, at 20.
157. European leaders established narrow currency trading bands that allowed fluctuations within limits, generally within plus or minus 2.25%. See Resolution of the European Council on the Establishment of the European Monetary System and Related Matters (Dec. 5, 1978), reprinted in EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MONETARY COMMITTEE, supra note 103, at 45-49.
158. See id.; Smits, supra note 3, at 21-23.
159. GOODMAN, supra note 98, at 187-88.
160. See id. at 194-95. "[T]He success of the EMS - in terms of both reducing exchange rate variability and contributing to the convergence of national economic policies - provided broad support for the notion that a full economic and monetary union was no longer unrealistic." Id. at 202. "Short-term volatility of rates between EC currencies was substantially reduced thanks to a mixture of converging inflation rates, interest rate management which targeted the exchange rate, joint intervention in the foreign markets and capital controls." DYSON, supra note 92, at 7.
161. See OFFICE OF OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 8 (1996).
162. See DYSON, supra note 92, at 8.
163. The Commission, under leadership of Jacques Delors, produced the now famous Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, which articulated a detailed guide for removing barriers in the Community. The European Council adopted the White Paper in Milan in 1985. See HERMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
164. See Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 503, 506 (1986) [hereinafter SEA].
165. Article 1 of the Single European Act terms it "concrete progress towards European unity" and specifically refers to the Council Resolution founding the EMS and other measures implementing monetary cooperation. Id. For a discussion, see Smits, supra note 3, at 27-28.
166. See GOODMAN, supra note 98, at 203; Smits, supra note 3, at 28-29, 38-40.
167. COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, REPORT ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ¶¶ 18-19 (1989) [hereinafter DELORS REPORT].
168. See id. at 18-19; Smits, supra note 3, at 40-41.
169. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 17 (1993) (providing a succinct history of monetary and political union efforts).
170. See VANTHOOR, supra note 1, at 97. In the June 1990 Dublin European Council meeting, the 12 Member States agreed to hold parallel IGCs to work on treaty amendments to establish a political, economic, and monetary union. An IGC is a form of constitutional drafting conference. See id. at 97-98.
171. See Smits, supra note 3, at 29. After the reunification of Germany in October 1990, the Community shared direct borders with the newly democratic Eastern European states. See id. at 29-30.
172. See generally TEU, supra note 7. See also Smits, supra note 3, at 31. The European leaders placed the common policy for foreign affairs, defense, and justice under separate pillars or jurisdictions for cooperation, outside normal Community mechanisms. See VANTHOOR, supra note 1, at 101-04.
173. See DYSON, supra note 92, at 131. Rules binding national budgets necessarily impinged on national sovereignty. A key compromise between France and Germany occurred when Germany wanted tough criteria and France wanted a firm timetable. See id. at 153-57.
174. See id. at 134-58.
175. See TEU, supra note 7, art. 3(a)(1).
176. Id. art. 3(a)(3).
177. Stage 1 began on the basis of decisions taken under the EEC Treaty. See Council Directive 88/361/EEC, art. 6, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5, reprinted in EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MONETARY COMMITTEE, supra note 103, at 107-08.
178. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, arts. 109(e)(1), 109(j)(4). For detailed discussion of the specific policies of the three phases, see Snyder, supra note 96, at 87-95; Smits, supra note 3, at 41-54.
179. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, art. 109(f). The EMI has accomplished a number of objectives in the first three years; it has "virtually finalized the conceptual preparations for the ESCB's future monetary policy." Interview with Alexandre Lamfalussy, Member State Progress Towards Convergence (last visited May 1997) 〈http://europa.eu.int/euro/lamfalussy/lamfal.asp〉.
180. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, art. 109(j). See generally Peter B. Kenen, The Euro: A New Single Currency for Europe?: The Transition to EMU - Issues and Implications (from conference sponsored by the Washington University School of Law and the European Studies Program), Oct. 25, 1997, at 1-21.
181. See BERMANN, supra note 25, at 243.
182. Id. at 244 (discussing the Council's adoption of regulations and decisions about excessive debt, calculation of financial resources, consultation of the EMI, and Commission review of excessive deficit levels).
183. A number of scholars discuss the causes and results of this tumultuous period of economic cooperation (or non-cooperation). See generally Pier Luigi Gilbert, Living Dangerously: The Lira and the Pound in a Floating World, in 30 YEARS, supra note 17, at 105;
184. Patrick Artus & Henri Bourguirat, The Stability of the EMS, in 30 YEARS, supra note 17, at 143;
185. Alberto Giovanni, The Debate in Nominal Convergence Before and After the 1992 Crisis, in 30 YEARS, supra note 17, at 184;
186. Paul De Grauwe & Giseppi Tullio, The Exchange Rate Changes of 1992 and Inflation Convergence in the EMS, in 30 YEARS, supra note 17, at 192.
187. Cameron, supra note 20, at 1.
188. See DIRECTORATE GENERAL XV OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ACCOUNTING FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO 8 (1997).
189. See id. The European Commission (Brussels) and the European Monetary Institute (Frankfurt) issued assessments to the Council of Ministers regarding the progress each Member State has achieved in satisfying the criteria for economic union.
190. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, art. 109(j).
191. See id.
192. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, arts. 109(j)(3)-(4). The euro will become a currency in its own right and the ECB will become operational. See id. In addition, stock markets will use the euro. See id. Banks and other institutions will fashion accounts in both euro and national currencies, in preparation for the transition and the gradual introduction of dual pricing of goods and services. See id. For detailed discussion of ECB role and recommended role, see Christas Hadjiemmanuil, European Monetary Union, The European System of Central Banks, and Banking Supervision: A Neglected Aspect of the Maastricht Treaty, 5 TULANE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 105 (1997).
193. See DIRECTORATE GENERAL XV OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 134, at 8.
194. "The pact consists of two European Council regulations . . . which have the force of law, and a European Council resolution, which gives guidance to the Commission, the Council, and member states in applying the pact." INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 58, 57-60.
195. See id. at 58-59.
196. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, art. 109(J)(1).
197. See id.; Peter B. Kenen, The Transition to EMU, Issues and Implications, 3-4 COLUM. INT'L L.J. 359 (1997); Cameron, supra note 20, at 2.
198. See id.; Peter B. Kenen, The Transition to EMU, Issues and Implications, 3-4 COLUM. INT'L L.J. 359 (1997); Cameron, supra note 20, at 2.
199. For detailed description of the complicated evaluation and decision processes, see Kenen, supra note 143 (including how the Member States measure up in October 1997, suggesting that most will be close to satisfying the criteria.) See also Cameron, supra note 20, at 28-29 (suggesting that eleven States will be chosen). In 1996, only three states were not subject to a Council decision of excessive deficit: Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN ECONOMY 12, 30-31 (Jan. 1997) (presenting analysis of Member States' progress toward convergence).
200. The Treaty refers to the compatibility of each country's laws with the requirements of the Treaty and the numerous other economic conditions which the Commission and the EMI must take into account. This unavoidability leaves some ambiguity in the process. See Kenen, supra note 143, at 12-14.
201. See Medley, supra note 19, at 23.
202. EUROPEAN ECONOMY, supra note 144, at 28.
203. DIRECTORATE GENERAL XV OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 134, at 4. Further, the EMU will increase market transparency by "making prices more easily comparable." Id. Transaction costs are estimated at 0.3-0.4% of the EU's gross domestic product, or ECU 220-25 billion. See ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, supra note 110, at 14. Reducing exchange costs will re-order some business practices and profit centers. For example, the lack of volatility in the foreign exchange market is currently hurting banks who engage heavily in that trade or speculation, "driven by the narrowing of inflation rates around the globe, the end of the cold war and the fast approaching European monetary union." Jonathan Fuerbringer, Calm Seas Roll Currency Markets: Trading Ebbs as Technology Advances, Costing Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996, at D1. "Market volatility could recede even further as the 15 nations of the European Union move toward the creation of a common currency by 1999." Id. at D6.
204. See Fine & Alland, supra note 45, at 284-85.
205. According to European Community goals, the common currency will facilitate genuine price comparisons for goods and services within the union, thus stimulating competition and trade. The coordination by the central bank should promote price stability and lowered public deficits - all resulting in economic growth, additional investment, and savings. See ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, supra note 110, at 13. For further discussion of the benefits of monetary union, see Robert Inman & Daniel Rubinfield, The EMU and Fiscal Policy in the New European Community: An Issue For Economic Federalism, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 147, 148-49 (1994).
206. See id. at 30.
207. Wanda Menke-Glückert, Kohl's Goals, EUROPE, Mar. 1997, at 18.
208. See U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53, at v-xxxv (includes detailed descriptions of most countries' social welfare programs). See also EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 13-23 (alphabetically listing each country's system and providing specific, detailed explanation of benefit reforms).
209. See generally U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53 (describing the descriptions of each country's level of benefits and funding sources). For example, Austrian law requires full salary maternity benefits for eight weeks before and after child birth, paid from a small tax (approximately 3.75%) on wage earners and employers. See id. at 21-22.
210. For a detailed examination of the criteria for all EU countries in 1997, see Kenen, supra note 143, at 8-12. See also European Union/Budget, Money, Banking Special No. 4453 (visited Dec. 10, 1997) 〈imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/weo1097/weocon97. htm〉 (estimating the 1997 budget gap at DM 25 billion); John Schmid, Bonn Takes Aim at Tax Breaks; Industry Objects to Waigel's Latest Budget Proposal, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 21, 1997, at 11. (estimates 1997 DM 27 billion budget gap). Germany maintains an excessive deficit (over 3%) and public debt (over 60% GDP). Kicking and Screaming, supra note 18, at 19.
211. For a detailed examination of the criteria for all EU countries in 1997, see Kenen, supra note 143, at 8-12. See also European Union/Budget, Money, Banking Special No. 4453 (visited Dec. 10, 1997) 〈imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/weo1097/weocon97. htm〉 (estimating the 1997 budget gap at DM 25 billion); John Schmid, Bonn Takes Aim at Tax Breaks; Industry Objects to Waigel's Latest Budget Proposal, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 21, 1997, at 11. (estimates 1997 DM 27 billion budget gap). Germany maintains an excessive deficit (over 3%) and public debt (over 60% GDP). Kicking and Screaming, supra note 18, at 19.
212. See Cowell, supra note 14, at A4. The welfare crisis in Germany is largely the result of two factors unrelated to social welfare, namely the phenomenon of high unemployment and the financing of re-unification. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 4.
213. See INTERNATINAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 3 (setting out four major factors for "exceptional sluggishness").
214. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 7. See also Dowling, supra note 51, at 45 (describing how high employment costs and restrictive employment regulations impose significant production burdens). The OECD and the EMI broadly recommend easing employment protection legislation, reducing taxes on labor costs, tightening retirement and disability schemes, and restricting unemployment insurance systems across Europe to improve employment and related economic problems. See OECD, supra note 83, at 15-21 (illustrating country-by-country recommendations for these reforms); EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 2-3.
215. See Menke-Gluckert, supra note 152, at 18.
216. The federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is the largest recipient in the 1997 budget, exceeding DM 120 billion. This contrasts with a defense budget of DM 46 billion and transport budget of DM 45 billion. See European Union/Budget, Money, Banking Special, supra note 155.
217. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 1. Kohl's Christian Democrats and their junior coalition partner, the Free Democrats, have worked together to enact reforms since 1992. See id. at 19.
218. Cowell, supra note 14, at A1. For a detailed description of Germany's comprehensive social protection program, the current efforts at restricting expenditures and entitlements, and the resulting heavy criticism, see Mushaben, supra note 49, at 19-24. See generally U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53, at xx-xxvi; EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 13-23. The German welfare state is a "Bismarckian"-type, with employment-based financing (as opposed to full general funding by the state). Employers and employees contribute to the general scheme, and the government subsidizes it from general tax revenues. In 1994, the funding was allocated at the following rates: employers paid 36.2%, employees paid 21%, and the central government paid 30%. See Karl Hinrichs, The Impact of German Health Insurance Reforms on Redistribution and the Culture of Solidarity, 20 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 653, 659 (1995).
219. Alan Cowell, Small Business Bears Brunt of German Taxes, INT'L HERALD TRIB. Aug. 2-3, 1997, at 1.
220. Press and Information Office of the German Government, Address Given by Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the General Meeting of the German Magazine Publishers' Association (visited Nov. 19, 1997) 〈http://www.bundesregierung.de:80/pweb7〉.
221. See Dowling, supra note 51, at 45.
222. Joel Janssen, Privatizations, Hopes and Headaches, EUROPE, Nov., 1997, at 43.
223. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 4. See also EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 29.
224. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 4-5.
225. See id. at 5-6. Previous reforms in social welfare produced DM 9 billion in reduced expenditures, but these were not maintained as loopholes emerged and some regulations were relaxed. See id. at 6. Reform of the statutory health care insurance system gained prominence in the 1990s. Hinrichs, supra note 162, at 663. Medical services funding and long-term disability wage replacement represent the second largest component of the German welfare program. See id. at 665. For a description of the 1000 plus insurance funds through which these welfare programs are funded, see id. Reform efforts in 1989 failed to curb rising costs, and renewed efforts began in 1992. In 1993 successful reforms took effect, bringing cost containment and organizational fund reform. See id. at 671. Benefits were frozen at 1991 levels and doctors and pharmacies faced limits on services and prices. Patient co-payments were also increased. Significantly, the funds were cross-subsidized in order to balance risk differentials and contribution levels were harmonized. See id. at 672.
226. See OECD, supra note 83, at 8. The Report praises raising the retirement age, reducing red tape for business start-ups, and exempting small companies from employment protection programs. The Report also criticizes some reforms that affect only marginal sectors, such as the part-time work-force in small firms and businesses who engage in short-term contracts. See id. at 8.
227. See Program for Increased Growth and Employment, at 1 (last visited Jan. 1, 1998) 〈http://bundesregierung.de/ausland/news/reports/growth.html〉.
228. The coalition consists of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP).
229. See Menke-Gluckert, supra note 152, at 18. These measures represent the most recent round of saving packages. The 1994 Sparpaket originally introduced the cuts followed by further packages in 1996 and 1997. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 7.
230. See Press and Information Office of the German Government, Setting the Course for Germany (visited Mar. 12, 1997) 〈http://www.bundesregierung.de:80/pweb7〉.
231. See id. In addition, Kohl praised the privatization of the federal railway and postal service, and Deutsche Telecom's initial public offering of stock.
232. See Program for Increased Growth and Employment, supra note 171, at 5.
233. See id. at 2-3. In view of the dramatic changes taking place in our society today, I feel that a just balance of burdens between young and old in the name of solidarity is absolutely vital. Investors need a reliable signal that pension insurance contributions will be reduced and stabilized so that statutory nonwage labor costs can fall. Id. at 3.
234. Present subsidies of DM 10 billion would be reduced to DM 3.8 billion. See id. at 5.
235. Joyce Mane Mushaben, Restructuring the German Sozialstaat: Internal and External Forces for Change 8 (unpublished paper prepared for the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) (on file with author).
236. Cowell, supra note 14, at 3.
237. See Barnard, supra note 15, at 16.
238. See id. at 17.
239. Europe Information Service, Excessive Charges for SMEs Pose Short-Term Threat to Employment, EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY, Apr. 12, 1996, at 1.
240. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 6.
241. See id. at 6. See also EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 29.
242. Mushaben, supra note 49, at 10. Education or training years earned prior to age 17 will no longer count toward vesting pensions, and a maximum of educational vesting years is set at three. Also, the assessment basis for pensions will not exceed 75% of average remuneration. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 29.
243. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 29; Mushaben, supra note 49, at 6.
244. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 29; Mushaben, supra note 49, at 6. These private health insurance funds were previously available only to those in the higher income brackets.
245. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 7.
246. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 29.
247. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 7.
248. See Program For Increased Growth and Employment, supra note 171, at 1.
249. See Cowell, supra note 163, at 4. One company noted that it would save DM 76 million a year by cutting sick benefits to 80% (approximately $50 million). See id. 194. See Ester Lawshway, Newsmakers, EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 45.
250. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 19.
251. See id. at 20-22. Significant growth in the foreign population of Germany (from 1.2% in 1960 to almost 9% in 1997) also raises numerous questions about commitment to social solidarity. See Alan Cowell, Like It or Not, Germany Becomes a Melting Pot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1997, at 3.
252. EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 13, 14, 46-48.
253. See id. The author wishes to thank Dr. Roland Winkler of the University of Salzburg, as well as Mag. Dagmar Schelle and Mag. Verena Haas, both of Vienna, for assistance with the Austrian budget modifications. For full description of the comprehensive social welfare program in Austria, see U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53, at 21-23, and EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, (alphabetically listing each country's system with specific, detailed explanations of benefits).
254. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 46. The whole pension system continued under reform negotiations in 1997. A compromise bill subsequently passed the Nationalrat (the first house of Parliament) and is awaiting passage in the upper house. The bill, "1. Budgetbegleitgesetz 1997" (first additional law to the 1997 budget), would harmonize the several retirement systems (employees, workers, civil servants, entrepreneurs), including the harmonization and reduction of civil servants benefits.
255. See id. Also, the qualifying time for retirement benefits no longer automatically includes time spent at school or at a university.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 47. Article 23 of the law provided extensive details primarily designed to avoid abuse of the system.
258. See id.
259. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 48.
260. See id. at 47. In December 1997, $1 exchanged for approximately 11 Austrian Schillings. $1 Equals . . ., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1997, at C2 (chart).
261. The parents could share equally, with each taking one year. This enactment applies to parents of babies born after July 1, 1996. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 3, 47.
262. See id. Many young people in Europe remain enrolled in college for longer periods than their U.S. counterparts and can qualify for this family benefit.
263. The rule began on October 1, 1996. See id.
264. The rules took effect on September 1, 1996. See id.
265. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 48 (discussing popularity of program with students who occasionally work).
266. See id.
267. France's Budget: Circle Squared?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 1997, at 53.
268. See id.
269. A "minefield of budget cuts . . . blasted . . . Juppé out of the prime Minister's job. . . ." Marlise Simons, Child Care Sacred as France Cuts Back the Welfare State, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1997, at A8.
270. See France's Budget: Circle Squared?, supra note 212, at 54. Since 1991, France had introduced two new taxes (Contribution Sociale Generalisée and Remboursement de la Dette Sociale) on a broader than payroll basis, including income from business and investment, earmarked to help pay for the family allowance and to service pension funds. See Kopits, supra note 12, at 14, n.11.
271. See Crossed Fingers in France, [hereinafter Crossed Fingers] ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 1997, at 45-46.
272. The 12.8% represents a post 1945 high. See Pas de Blair, ECONOMIST, May 10, 1997, at 46. See also OECD, supra note 83, at 9, for comprehensive French economic data.
273. See Crossed Fingers, supra note 216, at 45-46. The tax burden and public spending reached record highs in the last two years of the center-right coalition. See Pas de Blair, supra note 216, at 46. By 1994, social welfare spending totaled $463 billion, 31.4% of GDP, higher than in Germany or Italy. See Social Protection and Unemployment Benefits, at 1 (last visited Jan. 1, 1998) 〈http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/france/societe/ protsoc.gb.html〉. Fundamental labor market reforms are considered essential to restore economic performance. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 5.
274. See Crossed Fingers, supra note 216, at 45-46. The tax burden and public spending reached record highs in the last two years of the center-right coalition. See Pas de Blair, supra note 216, at 46. By 1994, social welfare spending totaled $463 billion, 31.4% of GDP, higher than in Germany or Italy. See Social Protection and Unemployment Benefits, at 1 (last visited Jan. 1, 1998) 〈http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/france/societe/ protsoc.gb.html〉. Fundamental labor market reforms are considered essential to restore economic performance. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 5.
275. Id. For a description of social protection in France, see EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 13-23 (alphabetically listing each country's system with a detailed explanation of benefits), and U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53, at 130-33.
276. Party loyalty was weak, as many Conservatives in Parliament were unwilling to vote for "harsh reforms and vicious spending cuts." Crossed Fingers, supra note 216, at 45.
277. See Kicking and Screaming, supra note 18, at 19. That governments should limit public expenditure (for vital social purposes) to balance budgets is an alien, incomprehensible concept to some French. See Paul Spicker, Exclusion, 35 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 134, 141 (Mar. 1997).
278. Restrictive measures, including target ceilings on health benefits, were intended to reduce the deficits in the pension and health insurance budgets through the use of computer tracking of patient costs, with penalization of doctors who surpass budget limits. See Whitney, The More Things Change, supra note 56, at 4-5. See also Craig R. Whitney, In France, Socialized Medicine Meets Gallic Version of H.M.O., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at A5.
279. Id.
280. See Crossed Fingers, supra note 216, at 46.
281. See id. In a reversal of roles, the Socialists, who originally favored the single currency, proposed conditions before France should proceed further: no new austerity cuts, establishment of an European "economic government" to counterbalance the ECB, restraint on the valuation of the euro, a solidarity and growth pact, and the inclusion of Italy and Spain in the first wave. See Pas de Blair, supra note 216, at 45. EU legendary leader Jacques Delors, former Commission president and one of the inventors of the single currency, advises the Socialist government on monetary union. See Kicking and Screaming, supra note 18, at 20.
282. All of these promises are to be accomplished without raising the budget deficit or raising taxes. See France Still Trapped, ECONOMIST, July 5, 1997, at 51. See also France: Politics Meets Mathematics, supra note 76, at 52.
283. See Thomas L. Friedman, All About Maggie, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at A15. Consider the contrast between French equality and American liberty. See Roger Cohen, France v. U.S.: Warring Versions of Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1997, at A10. France has vastly better public medicine than America, safer cities, higher minimum wages, less crime and more job security, particularly in its huge public sector. But it also has a 12.6 [%] unemployment rate that is more than double the American [rate], much higher taxes, a long-stagnant economy, crippling social security charges that discourages hiring. . ., and a debilitating anxiety about change that has held back its investment in new technologies. Id.
284. See Thomas L. Friedman, All About Maggie, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at A15. Consider the contrast between French equality and American liberty. See Roger Cohen, France v. U.S.: Warring Versions of Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1997, at A10. France has vastly better public medicine than America, safer cities, higher minimum wages, less crime and more job security, particularly in its huge public sector. But it also has a 12.6 [%] unemployment rate that is more than double the American [rate], much higher taxes, a long-stagnant economy, crippling social security charges that discourages hiring. . ., and a debilitating anxiety about change that has held back its investment in new technologies. Id.
285. See Cohen, supra note 226, at A10.
286. Celestine Bohlen, Seeking Euro Club Inclusion, Italy Still Faces Hazing, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1997, at A12.
287. EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 33. See Craig R. Whitney, French Truckers', supra note 56, at A4. Civil servants of many varieties - from doctors and teachers to social security workers and transit drivers - have conducted strikes or protests. See, e.g., Manifestation de la FSUpour le budget de l'education, LE MONDE, June 4, 1996, at 13; Securite Sociale: plusieurs milliers
288. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
289. See Whitney, French Truckers', supra note 56, at A4.
290. See id. Another estimated 160 barricades blockaded oil refineries and fuel depots, forcing 40% of French gas stations to close or restrict supplies. See Barry James, Trucker Talks Yield Progress; French Strikers Win Many Demands but Stay Out, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 7, 1997, at 1.
291. See James, supra note 232, at 1.
292. John Vincour, French Strike Hardening; International Pressure Grows on Paris to Act, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 5, 1997, at 1. The EU neighbors - Spain, Britain, and Germany - as well as the European Commission, insisted that the French government must "begin making policy in a frame of reference going beyond that eternal push-and-pull of national doctrine and politics." Their irritation arose from "the French government's seeming lack of resolve in maintaining freedom of movement of people and goods across the country, a prime tenet of the European Union." Id. at 1, 10.
293. See id. Trucker union leaders insisted that some of the employer associations had failed to live up to the agreements reached after the 1996 strikes, such as the work hour reductions and bonuses. See Whitney, French Truckers', supra note 56, at A4.
294. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 22, 33-37. Articles 34 and 39 of the constitution were amended and a new article 47-1 was added granting Parliament this power.
295. See France's Budget: Circle Squared?, supra note 212, at 54. The French have, however, raised child-care funding, considering it increasingly important as more mothers work. See Simons, supra note 214, at A1, A8.
296. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 34 (ordinance of January 24, 1996, concerning the repayment of the social debt).
297. See id. at 35 (ordinance of January 24, 1996, relating to urgent measures to reestablish the financial balance of social security).
298. See Lionel Jospin, Equilibriste, ECONOMIST, July 26, 1997, at 41. Health care expenditures are paid for by shifting some costs to the wealthy. See Simons, supra note 214, at A8.
299. OECD, supra note 83, at 8.
300. See id. at 8-10. French officials cite fear of negative public reception to the reforms based on social cohesion as the reason for slow reform. See id. at 10.
301. See Social Protection and Unemployment Benefits 2-3 (last visited Dec. 13, 1997) 〈http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/france/soaete/protsoc.gb.html〉.
302. See U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53, at 133 (containing descriptions of detailed provisions, including child care and school benefits). See also France's Budget: Circle Squared?, supra note 212, at 54.
303. See Craig R. Whitney, France's Premier Says Shaky Finances Put a Brake on Jobs Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1997, at A7.
304. The government pays FFr 671 a month for families with two children, FFr 1531 for three children, and FFr 2392 for four children, with FFr 32,000 if both parents are working. See France's Budget: Circle Squared?, supra note 212, at 54.
305. See id. In addition, a 4% tax will apply to savings income.
306. See Cohen, supra note 12, at A1. For a worker with a gross monthly pay of $1700, the employer must pay $2572 (an additional 51% of wage for social welfare benefits) and the worker takes home only $1324. See id. at A12.
307. See id. The 1997 estimate of the social security deficit was $7 billion. See id.
308. See id.
309. See France's Budget: Circle Squared?, supra note 212, at 54. Defense arms procurement will be cut "by 8.7%, forcing the military to delay some arms purchases and development programmes." Myra MacDonald, France Budget, REUTERS, Sept. 24, 1997.
310. MacDonald, supra note 251.
311. See Social Protection and Unemployment Benefits, supra note 243, at 4.
312. See Whitney, supra note 67, at 5.
313. See id.
314. See Social Protection and Unemployment Benefits, supra note 243, at 4.
315. See id. at 5.
316. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 18.
317. See id.
318. See Edmund L. Andrews, No to Air France, Yes to France Telecom on Privatization, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1997, at 41. The government experienced a $6.4 billion windfall when the state took over France Telecom's pension fund. See France: Politics Meets Mathematics, supra note 76, at 52.
319. See Edmund L. Andrews, No to Air France, Yes to France Telecom on Privatization, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1997, at 41. The government experienced a $6.4 billion windfall when the state took over France Telecom's pension fund. See France: Politics Meets Mathematics, supra note 76, at 52.
320. See Andrews, supra note 260, at 41.
321. Id. The chairman of Air France had "passionately argued that the airline had to become a private company if it was to survive brutal new competition caused by deregu-lation of the European airline industry." Id.
322. See France: Politics Meets Mathematics, supra note 76, at 52.
323. See Craig R. Whitney, Strasbourg Journal: A Past Etched in Stone, a Budget Weak as Water, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1997, at A4.
324. See id.
325. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 5.
326. See Niccolo d'Aquiro, Prodi Makes Progress, EUROPE, July-Aug. 1997, at 8-10, 14. Some predict Italy may succeed in its bid.
327. See A Healthy Regime, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 1997, at S21.
328. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 13.
329. Inflation is at 1.5%, the lowest rate in 29 years, and the GDP public debt ratio is at 3.9%. See d'Aquiro, supra note 267, at 10.
330. See Cohen, supra note 12, at A7.
331. See Celestine Bohlen, An Accord With Communists Ends Latest Italian Political Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1997, at A5.
332. D'Aquiro, supra note 267, at 10. "[T]he outcome [is] unclear as the powerful unions prepare to fight the cuts." Id. For a full description of the organization and extent of social protection in Italy, see EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, and U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53, for alphabetical discussion of EU and other national social security schemes.
333. D'Aquiro, supra note 267, at 8.
334. See Antonio La Pergola, Italy and European Integration: A Lawyer's Perspective, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 259 (1994). La Pergola is a professor at the University of Rome, Member of the Italian Parliament and former President of the Constitutional Court.
335. Id.
336. See Bohlen, supra note 271, at A10.
337. See id.
338. Id.
339. See id. at A5.
340. See John Tagliabue, Dairy Farmers Must Finance Their Subsidy, Italy Insists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1998, at A4. Dairy farmers receive about $484 million a year, out of some $6 billion in subsidies distributed annually by the Italian government to farmers, 90% of which is from EU funds. Agriculture spending accounts for two-thirds of the EU's $98 billion annual budget. See id.
341. See id.
342. See Cohen, supra note 12, at A12.
343. Id.
344. See id.
345. See id.
346. See Kopits, supra note 12, at 6.
347. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 14, 41.
348. See id. at 13, 41.
349. See Kopits, supra note 12, at 6.
350. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 42.
351. See id. The government also imposed a new payroll contribution tax funded entirely by employers to offset social welfare spending. See id. at 41. Of note is that Italy raised its family allowance above its previous low level. See id. at 42.
352. Id.
353. See id.
354. See A Healthy Regime, supra note 267, at S22.
355. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 43.
356. Alberto Tamperi, Recent Trends in Industrial Relations in Italy, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 621 (1997) (describing developments in Italy's new industrial labor environment).
357. See id. at 621-22. The quality goals, however, are being achieved less effectively.
358. See id. at 624-25.
359. Privatization: Hopes and Headaches, EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 44.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. See A Healthy Regime, supra note 267, at S21.
363. Marlise Simons, Dutch Take "Third Way" to Prosperity, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1997, at A6.
364. See id. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7. The Netherlands' economy enjoys a "mature stage of . . . expansion with high levels of resource use." Id. at 5. It is a "promising example" of market reform, "successful in enhancing flexibility of . . . [its] econom[y]." Id. at 12.
365. See Simons, supra note 303, at A6.
366. See id. In 1996, a new structure for employee insurance schemes was implemented, with a central board representing employees and employers to set contribution rates, budgeting, and the administration of funds. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 22. For a full description of social benefit programs, see id. at 44-45. See also U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53, at 255-57.
367. See Simons, supra note 303, at A6.
368. See id.
369. See OECD, supra note 83, at 8.
370. See id. at 7.
371. See Kopits, supra note 12, at 6-7; EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 16-17, 45-46. New laws also impose stricter procedures for qualifying for social benefits, emphasizing the recipient's more active role in seeking employment, and measures safeguarding against fraud and abuse. See id.
372. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 13.
373. See Roger Cohen, Under the Knife, Each Welfare State Has Its Own Pain Threshold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at A7. Britain has a stronger economy, less unemployment, and a history of emphasis on individual initiative.
374. See Warren Hoge, Blair Hoping to Disarm Critics, Creates Agency to Work for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at A6. Wage burdens are also far less with social security taxes adding only 10% to the wage bill in Britain, while 50% is added in France. The OECD reports that the U.K. began widespread structural reform in the 1980s and, after implementing it, now suffers less unemployment. And while the U.K. had a heritage of national industries and troubled labor relations, its efforts focused on privatization and product market reform. Britain scaled back unemployment benefits and employment protection, while public sector employment relations have been made similar to the private system. See OECD, supra note 83, at 7-9.
375. Blair welfare reform measures have "provoked a backlash from his own party and public dismay from protesters as diverse as farmers, butchers, students, consumers, welfare recipients and genteel country people." William D. Montalbano, Blair Beset by the Pesky Realities of Governing, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Dec. 27, 1997, at A16. "Blair has built on inherited Conservative free-market economic strengths. . . ," intends to focus on the "strategy of getting the unemployed off benefits and back to work," and has recently passed $100 million in spending cuts. Id.
376. European Monetary Institute data includes Britain in criteria comparisons. See EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 54-55. The OECD also includes Britain in all general economic analyses. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 54, at 17-45 (providing a detailed analysis of employment and social benefits data).
377. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 3, 5, 12.
378. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Report Says British Warm to Euro Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1997, at D1. The Financial Times cited an unidentified government official who described Cabinet discussions about Britain joining the currency after its 1999 introduction but before the next British general elections in 2003. See id.
379. Hoge, supra note 313, at A6.
380. See David Lennon, Tony Blair's Britain, EUROPE, Dec. 97-Jan. 98, at 10. For a description of British social protection system and reforms, see EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 53-56.
381. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 53-56. These benefits, called the "Lone Parent Premiums" and "One Parent Benefits" began phasing out in April 1997. Id. at 17.
382. See id. The shift in ideology to the center is reminiscent of the current U.S. political analogue.
383. Id. at 16, 53.
384. Social security offices may be sold and leased back to the government, leaving property management to the new landlords, while the delivery of certain benefits may be "contracted out" to private agencies. See id. at 20, 53-56.
385. Montalbano, supra note 314, at A16.
386. See id.
387. See Bruce Barnard, Inside Europe, Dec. 97-Jan. 98, at 1. The United States enjoys low unemployment but little social protection; the Continent suffers chronic unemployment but maintains high social cohesion; the United Kingdom and the Netherlands take a middle approach to acceptable levels of both.
388. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996, PUB. L. NO. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). See Jeffery Katz, For the Record: Overhaul Law, Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep., Sept. 21, 1996, at 2696. The passage of the bill stemmed from the Nov. 8, 1994 elections in which Republicans gained majority control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. They campaigned on a platform called the "Contract With America" and promised, among other things, structural change in U.S. welfare laws. See also Kost & Munger, supra note 29, at 10, 24-26.
389. Alan W. Houseman, Legal Representation and Advocacy Under the PRWORA of 1996, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 732. One scholar's observations concerning economic deregulation applies here: the movement toward greater state autonomy has been associated with deregulation both as a theoretical and as a political matter. In theory, devolution encourages deregulation by giving individual states discretion to relax uniform rules. . . . Not surprisingly, state empowerment has found favor among politicians looking for ways to roll back intrusive federal economic regulation. Helen A. Garten, Devolution and Deregulation: The Paradox of Financial Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 65, 65 (1996).
390. Alan W. Houseman, Legal Representation and Advocacy Under the PRWORA of 1996, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 732. One scholar's observations concerning economic deregulation applies here: the movement toward greater state autonomy has been associated with deregulation both as a theoretical and as a political matter. In theory, devolution encourages deregulation by giving individual states discretion to relax uniform rules. . . . Not surprisingly, state empowerment has found favor among politicians looking for ways to roll back intrusive federal economic regulation. Helen A. Garten, Devolution and Deregulation: The Paradox of Financial Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 65, 65 (1996).
391. See PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996, PUB. L. NO. 140-193, §§ 201-32, 110 Stat. 2105, 2185-98 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382).
392. See id. §§ 601-15 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858).
393. See id. §§ 701-42 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1757).
394. See id. §§ 801-91 (amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014).
395. See id. § 114 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396).
396. Representative Timothy J. Roemer of Indiana urged Clinton to sign the bill and explained that recipients will no longer simply be given something, but will be required to "sign a contract to improve themselves." Barbara Vobejda, America Moves Away from the Welfare State, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug 2, 1996, at 1.
397. Critics claim that $55 billion in welfare cuts to the poorest people in America will result in as many as 2.6 million additional people living below the poverty line by 2002. See Houseman, supra note 328, at 2.
398. See Jason DeParle, Success, and Frustration, as Welfare Rules Change, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1997, at A1 [hereinafter DeParle, Success] ("Two million women and children have left the rolls."). Over 1.4 million families have left welfare since the 1994 case load peak. See id. at A16. State welfare rolls have declined due to the effects of the stricter guidelines - Oregon's by 50% in the first three years.
399. See Jason DeParle, The 'Drawer People': Newest Challenge for Welfare: Helping the Hard-Core Jobless, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1997. at A1 [hereinafter DeParle, The 'Drawer People'].
400. See Robert Pear, Number on Welfare Dips Below 10 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1998, at A12.
401. See Paul Glastris, Was Reagan Right?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 20, 1997, at 30. Some suggest that the new strict supervision has chased away welfare fraud. See id.
402. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2645, 2696.
403. See Jeffrey L. Katz, Changes in New Law Hinge on Budget Deal, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3293, 3311 (1996) (describing food stamp cuts of $23 billion - about 13% - and aid to immigrants in the same amount through the year 2002). "The legislation eliminates eligibility for thousands of food stamp recipients and severely reduces Federal funds available for the Food Stamp Program." Houseman, supra note 328, at 932. Another study estimates Food Stamp reductions at $28 billion, by "almost 20 percent, the equivalent of reducing the average food stamp benefit from its current level of 80 cents per person per meal to 66 cents per person per meal." David Super et al., The New Welfare Law - Summary, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (last visited Aug. 13, 1996) 〈http://www.cbpp.org/WCNSUM.HTM〉.
404. See Jeffrey L. Katz, Changes in New Law Hinge on Budget Deal, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3293, 3311 (1996) (describing food stamp cuts of $23 billion - about 13% - and aid to immigrants in the same amount through the year 2002). "The legislation eliminates eligibility for thousands of food stamp recipients and severely reduces Federal funds available for the Food Stamp Program." Houseman, supra note 328, at 932. Another study estimates Food Stamp reductions at $28 billion, by "almost 20 percent, the equivalent of reducing the average food stamp benefit from its current level of 80 cents per person per meal to 66 cents per person per meal." David Super et al., The New Welfare Law - Summary, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (last visited Aug. 13, 1996) 〈http://www.cbpp.org/WCNSUM.HTM〉.
405. See Houseman, supra note 328, at 932.
406. TANF block grants to the states in the amount of $16.4 billion replaced AFDC. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2696-97. For historical and detailed discussion of the changes in the government programs, see generally Sheila Ards, Contract With America: The Implications to the Children, 2 LOYOLA POVERTY L.J. 89 (1996).
407. The AFDC philosophy of strict entitlements for all needy persons sharply contrasts with the mantra of work and limited benefits.
408. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2697.
409. States must explain the following: how the state plan will require and ensure that parents who receive assistance will engage in work activities within two months of receiving benefits; how it will ensure equitable treatment in determining eligibility and delivery of benefits; how it will prevent and reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and how the state intends to treat families moving into the state differently from other residents. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2696-97.
410. See id. at 2697-98 (rising from 25% in fiscal 1997 to 50% in 2002).
411. See Jason DeParle, What About Mississippi?: Welfare Law Weighs Heavy in Delta, Where Jobs Are Few, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997, at A1. The Delta is "the poorest region in the poorest state. . . ." and its "poverty rate of 41% is nearly three times the national average." Id. at A24.
412. One report shows that families removed from welfare eligibility "for violating the new work rules outnumbered those placed in jobs by a margin of nearly two to one." Id. at A1. And in a state where 80% of those on welfare are black, the racial overtone adds to the misfortune. See id.
413. The work rules require unemployed people to attend job search classes, accept job assignments, and stay with them, or lose assistance eligibility. See id. at A24.
414. For example, Mississippi provides $120 a month for a mother with two children. See id. Mississippi's "Work First" program offered financial incentives to businesses to hire former welfare recipients (the employer pays only the first $1 per hour of minimum wage, with the state paying the remaining $4.15 for the first six months) and it required recipients to attend job-search classes and cuts off benefits to those who did not attend the classes or accept offers on employment. See id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See id. Wisconsin receives $7,200 per family, Mississippi gets about $2,100; the average is $4,100. See id. Oregon receives about $6,600 and adds substantial state contributions. See id.
418. See Jonathan Rabinovitz, Connecticut Welfare Cutoff Falls on Hundreds of Families, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at B1 . Connecticut's program is three-pronged, "combining the 21 month limit with penalties and incentives to move welfare recipients into the labor market." Id. To encourage those who are cut off to get jobs, the program preserves their Medicaid and child care subsidies. Also, extensions are available, depending on the circumstances, when jobs are not found through no fault of the recipient. See id. On the other hand, sanctions are included for failure to make a good-faith effort at finding a job and have not participated in an intensive case-management program. See id.
419. See id.
420. See id.
421. See id. at B5. Reports from Idaho include similar numbers, where its program bars welfare assistance after 24 months and cash assistance has been reduced and limited regardless of the number of children living in a household. See Soup Kitchens Fill After Idaho Welfare Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, at 22. Notably, Idaho has seen a 70% decline in the number of single women with children applying for federal and state cash assistance. See id.
422. See Robert Pear, U.S. Mistakenly Cuts Benefits for Many Disabled Children, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, at A1.
423. See Claudia Schlosberg, States Ignore Due Process Protections - 1.6 million Medicaid Beneficiaries at Risk, National Health Law Program 1 (Feb. 10, 1997).
424. The CBO estimates that approximately 315,000 children who would have been receiving SSI benefits in 2002 will lose eligibility. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2699.
425. See Pear, supra note 358, at A1.
426. See Robert Pear, After a Review, 95,000 Children Will Lose Cash Disability Benefit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1997, at A1. Later figures show that 236,586 children have been reexamined and over 142,000 have been cut off (60%), and over 225,000 new claims have been denied. See Pear, supra note 358, at A1. The American Bar Association and others have objected to the law, which one Senator complains increases suffering for "the most vulnerable of our society." Id.
427. Katz, supra note 327, at 2699. The old standard made children eligible who had "impairments that seriously limited their ability to perform activities normal for their age," while the new law requires the "marked and severe" limitation. Pear, supra note 362, at A1. Other restrictive limitations apply, such as a more restrictive Listing of Impairments, and excluding behavioral functioning. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2699. See also Rita L. DiSimone, Major Welfare Reforms Enacted in 1996, SOCIAL SECURITY BULL., Fall 1996, at 57.
428. See Pear, supra note 362, at A1.
429. See id.
430. See id.
431. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2700, 2702.
432. See id. at 2703.
433. See id.
434. See id. at 2704. Waivers of these rules are possible for jobless areas and those hit hardest by unemployment, and exceptions for the work requirement are made for pregnant women, those caring for incapacitated persons, and others. See id.
435. See Super et al., supra note 340, ¶ 9.
436. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2701.
437. See id. at 2701-02 (allowing exceptions for refugees, veterans, and those who have worked here for ten years).
438. George Soros, Legal Immigrants Deserve a Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997, at A1. One recent report from New York illustrates the impact on immigrants, citing the denial of food stamps to more than 50,000 legal immigrants between the ages of 18 and 59 in just four months. See Rachel L. Swarns, Denied Food Stamps, Many Legal Immigrants Scrape for Meals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1997, at B1. "The law, which was intended to move foreigners off public assistance and into jobs, has pushed an estimated 770,000 immigrants off the food stamp rolls across the nation, Federal officials say." Id.
439. George Soros, Legal Immigrants Deserve a Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997, at A1. One recent report from New York illustrates the impact on immigrants, citing the denial of food stamps to more than 50,000 legal immigrants between the ages of 18 and 59 in just four months. See Rachel L. Swarns, Denied Food Stamps, Many Legal Immigrants Scrape for Meals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1997, at B1. "The law, which was intended to move foreigners off public assistance and into jobs, has pushed an estimated 770,000 immigrants off the food stamp rolls across the nation, Federal officials say." Id.
440. See Soros, supra note 374, at A1.
441. "States may choose to deny most legal immigrants . . . benefits from the welfare, Medicaid, and social services block grants." Katz, supra note 340, at 2702.
442. See Robert Pear, Judge Rules States Can't Cut Welfare for New Residents, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1997, at A1, A20.
443. Thirteen other states have taken similar action. See id.
444. See id.
445. The federal and state governments share funding to provide a comprehensive range of services to those who satisfy certain requirements demonstrating financial need. In 1965, federal law established this program with federal guidelines, but each state may design its own program within those guidelines.
446. See DiSimone, supra note 363, at 60.
447. See Katz, supra note 340, at 2698 (explaining that the Medicaid coverage would continue for the children of such a disqualified person).
448. See DiSimone, supra note 363, at 61.
449. See id. States may not deny emergency medical care to either legal or illegal aliens, and other exceptions exist. 5ee id.
450. See id.
451. See Peter T. Kilborn, In Budget Bill, President Wins Welfare Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1997, at A1.
452. See id. at A12.
453. See DeParle, supra note 30, at A1.
454. See id. This problem is primarily political. See id. at A14. Interestingly, almost half of the two parent families affected by this law are refugees in California. See id.
455. See id.
456. See Kost & Munger, supra note 29, at 35 (citing Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Background Material and Data on Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means 409,454 (Comm. Print 1994)).
457. See Super et al., supra note 340, at 2. Senator Patrick Moynahan has stated that, "You won't know what you've done until the five year cut off begins." DeParle, Success, supra note 336, at A17.
458. See Kost & Munger, supra note 29, at 57.
459. See id.
460. See CONG. Q. ALMANAC 100 (1993) (for 1992 figure);
461. See CONG. Q. ALMANAC 100 (1993) (for 1992 figure); CONG. Q. ALMANAC 2-18 (1996) (for estimated 1997 figure). Federal social services expenditures rose from $12.2 billion in 1992 to an estimated $16.2 billion in 1997. See id.
462. See CONG. Q., May 10, 1997, at 1081.
463. Id.
464. See id. at 1082 (providing detailed numerical reductions in specific line items, such as army divisions, ships, jet fighters, ballistic missiles, etc.). "Under pressure from Congress to reduce the Pentagon's bureaucracy before ordering more cuts in troops or weapons, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen plans to trim thousands of civilian jobs at the Pentagon and transfer thousands more military personnel out of their headquarters and into the field." Steven Lee Myers, Pentagon to Trim Thousands of Jobs Held by Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at A1.
465. "A sweeping plan to reorganize the Pentagon's bureaucracy, to streamline operations and to otherwise save money. . . ." has been adopted. Id. Plans to hold two more rounds of base closings have been revived in the hopes of saving $6 billion. See id. The United States reduced the number of troops from 2.1 million (at the end of the cold war) down to 1.4 million in 1997. See id. 399. "Perhaps the simplest of all surprises is that welfare really changed. Unlike previous welfare laws, this one was not a paper reform confined to a White House lawn." DeParle, The 'Drawer People,' supra note 336, at A16.
466. See id. at A1.
467. Weiler, supra note 3, at 2409.
468. The speed of continuing European integration was throttled back. Of particular note is the slowing of the rate of accessions.
469. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (U.S. economic summary).
470. See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d ed. 1985) (distinguishing civil and common law methodology).
471. Another interesting characteristic of European government has been the tradition of leadership by an elite group. For example in France, the same elite school educated two of the last three Presidents and six of the last eight Prime Ministers. See The Ever Surprising Lionel Jospin, ECONOMIST, June 7, 1997 at 50. Presidents of the United States rarely attend the same school. Instead, U.S. political leaders receive their wisdom from public opinion polls. U.S. News reports House Majority Leader Army commenting: "I think the president gets up in the morning, he reads the polls, and he says, 'Ah, now I've read my biography for the day.'"
472. Ronald Brownstein, Clintonism, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 26, 1998, at 23. In one voter survey, 58% agreed that the president "is driven by polls and the politics of the moment." Id.
473. See Paul Spicker, Exclusion and Citizenship in France (paper on file with author). The European concept of social solidarity presents a different philosophical basis for social protection: an overarching concept of social cohesion in which people are "linked to one another through a complex network of interrelated obligations - both reciprocal and collective." Id. at 13-15.
474. In the United States, only 10% of private-sector workers are union members. See Minda, supra note 11, at 180.
475. The Treaty would add some enforcement procedures to counter "serious and persistent" Member State breaches of the constitutional principles democracy, human rights, and rule of law. The Council would be granted authority to legislate in areas previously included in the third pillar (freedom, security, and justice, including the Schengen Convention border harmonization), and would allow jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in these matters. New Community activity is required by the Treaty in the employment area, as discussed above, and social issues competences were expanded. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 10-11.
476. Hinrichs, supra note 162, at 657.
477. For twenty-six centuries, in Europe, we have developed a theory of society. . . . made not in a linear way from ancient Greece onward, but in an accretive way, forming and reforming itself in a dialectical relation to social reality. . . . The idea of democracy. . .producing dramatic social effects within national societies: action and reaction, dissent and revolution, social progress and social conflict. Philip Allott, The European Community is Not the True European Community, 100 YALE L.J. 2485, 2490 (1991).
478. See Kost & Munger, supra note 29, at 3-4.
479. Loftus, supra note 30, at 388.
480. Constitutive charters so provide. See, e.g., U.S. CONST, amend. X ("powers not delegated. . . are reserved, to the States. . . ."); TEU, supra note 7, art. 2 (sets forth permissible goals of Community activity); id. arts. 3 & 3a (list permissible activities in pursuit of those goals); id. art.3b (restricts Community action "within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty," and "[i]n areas which do not fall within the exclusive competence" of the Community, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity).
481. EC Treaty, supra note 87, art. 3b, as amended by the TEU. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 46. Monetary union policy matters should generally be within the "exclusive competence" of Community organs, so subsidiarity principles do not apply to them. Smits, supra note 3, at 11-12. See also Nicolas Bernard, The Future of European Economic Law in the Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 633 (1996) (explaining that subsidiarity can help the Union answer the calls for more decentralized decision-making, without fragmenting the Community legal order, as is threatened by the variable geometry of opt-outs and derogations.).
482. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 47.
483. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
484. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 2.
485. See id.
486. See Hinrichs, supra note 162, at 682-83.
487. See DeParle, supra note 30, at A1 (stating that many states project they will not meet the goals of the 1995 welfare law within the specified time limit).
488. See Craig R. Whitney, Deft French Premier Unscathed by Jobless Rate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1997, at 8. See also Simons, supra note 214, at A6.
489. Tony Judt, The Social Question Redivivus, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 108.
490. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 14.
491. Europe's "defense industries are reeling from budget cuts." Joseph Fitchett, Bonn Set to Clear Funds For the Eurofighter 2000, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 8, 1997, at 1.
492. "[I]ncreasing interconnectness and interdependence [are] driven by capital flows, technology, investment patterns, growing linkages between societies and more rapid dissemination of ideas. The acceleration of internationalism in the 1990s has profound implications for political and economic order at the international, regional and national levels." Laffan, supra note 3, at 1.
493. DICTIONNAIRE (Paul Robert ed., Societe du Nouveau Lettre, 1973).
494. See Laffan, supra note 3, at 11.
495. According to a report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the 1997 surging economy in the United States "[h]as produced vast benefits for the nation's wealthiest people, while doing little to improve the incomes of poor and lower middle income people." Richard Perez-Pena, New York's Income Gap Largest in Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1997, at A14.
496. See Loftus, supra note 30, at 388.
497. See Weiler, supra note 3, at 2478-83 (emphasizing concepts of ethos, community and democracy); Allott, supra note 411, at 2500 (calling for "a new vision of the highest values of European society . . . .").
498. The Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, exemplifies the many interdisciplinary research centers in Europe that promote and coordinate in-depth study of European integration and developing public policy, and organize conferences and other fora for cooperation among academics and policy makers. The Robert Schuman Centre (last modified Sept. 15, 1997) 〈http://www.iue.it/ RSC/Welcome.html〉.