The Antinomy of Coherence and Determinacy

Iowa Law Review

Volumn 82, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-19

  Edmundson, William A ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347938904     PISSN: 00210552     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (107)

1. 1 Strange 634, 685 (1725).
2. See Ken Kress, Coherence and Formalism, 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 639, 678 (1993) [hereinafter Kress, Coherence and Formalism]. See generally Ken Kress, Coherence, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 533 (D. Patterson ed., 1996).
3. See Ken Kress, Coherence and Formalism, 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 639, 678 (1993) [hereinafter Kress, Coherence and Formalism]. See generally Ken Kress, Coherence, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 533 (D. Patterson ed., 1996).
4. Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 369, 370 (1984).
5. I am using the term "antinomy" to mean a conflict between otherwise well-founded principles. This is a looser sense of the word than Quine's, see W.V. Quine, The Ways of Paradox 5-6 (1966), and perhaps even Kant's, see I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 384-484 (N. Kemp Smith ed., 1929).
6. I am using the term "antinomy" to mean a conflict between otherwise well-founded principles. This is a looser sense of the word than Quine's, see W.V. Quine, The Ways of Paradox 5-6 (1966), and perhaps even Kant's, see I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 384-484 (N. Kemp Smith ed., 1929).
7. Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge 98 (1985).
8. Rolf Sartorius, The Justification of the Judicial Decision, 78 Ethics 184 (1968).
9. Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222 (1931).
10. John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 Cornell L.Q. 17, 25-26 (1924).
11. Felix Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 Yale L.J. 201, 215-20 (1931).
12. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928); see also Oliphant & Hewitt, Introduction to J. Rueff, From the Physical to the Social Sciences: Introduction to a Study of Economic and Ethical Theory x-xxi, xxv-xxvii (H. Green trans., 1929), reprinted in Jurisprudence: Understanding and Shaping Law 435 (W. Reisman & A. Schreiber eds., 1987).
13. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928); see also Oliphant & Hewitt, Introduction to J. Rueff, From the Physical to the Social Sciences: Introduction to a Study of Economic and Ethical Theory x-xxi, xxv-xxvii (H. Green trans., 1929), reprinted in Jurisprudence: Understanding and Shaping Law 435 (W. Reisman & A. Schreiber eds., 1987).
14. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928); see also Oliphant & Hewitt, Introduction to J. Rueff, From the Physical to the Social Sciences: Introduction to a Study of Economic and Ethical Theory x-xxi, xxv-xxvii (H. Green trans., 1929), reprinted in Jurisprudence: Understanding and Shaping Law 435 (W. Reisman & A. Schreiber eds., 1987).
15. Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 205, 212 (1986), reprinted in Philosophy of Law 179 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds., 6th ed. 1995).
16. Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 205, 212 (1986), reprinted in Philosophy of Law 179 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds., 6th ed. 1995).
17. Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 1239-40.
18. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 129 (2d ed. 1994).
19. It is important to bear in mind the formal difference between cluster problems, having the form: If P then R and if Q then not-R and boundary problems, having the form: If P then R and If not-P then not-R. Boundary problems present an indeterminacy problem distinct from that posed by duster problems. In boundary problems the problem is simply the core/penumbra problem, viz., how to classify the activity as P or as not-P. Boundary problems can aggravate duster problems, but in a mature system of law duster problems will exist even if, per impossible, boundary problems were eliminated.
20. Altman, supra note 11, at 208-09.
21. Then-Judge Cardozo is one among many to have noted the "tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limits of its logic." Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 51 (1921).
22. Altman has also pointed out that the existence of rules is not doubted, but presupposed, in Llewellyn's formulation. The difficulty is independent of any having merely to do with skepticism or antirealism about rules, and so no amount of rehabilitation work done on behalf of rules alone is likely to touch this problem. See Altman, supra note 11, at 211.
23. Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 694, 697 (1980), citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 335 U.S. 715 (1961), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
24. Id. at 694.
25. Id. at 697.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 701.
28. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemen Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (1962); Ralph K Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41.
29. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemen Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (1962); Ralph K Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41.
30. See Tushnet, supra note 18, at 698-701.
31. Id. at 694.
32. Oliphant, supra note 10, at 74.
33. See Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 1241-42; see also Oliphant, supra note 10, at 71-75. Narrowing often opens gaps as it reduces overlap, but the Legal Realists did not abhor vacua in the law. Their program (insofar as Llewellyn was willing to avow one) was to expose gaps in the law both to 1) increase the predictive accuracy of "legal science" and 2) compel acknowledgment of, and gain room for the free play of, policy in adjudication.
34. Letter from Prof. Andrew Altman, George Washington University, to Author (April 19, 1991). Altman argues that Hart's criticisms of the Legal Realists' semantic theory "do not touch the realist thesis that there is a pervasive indeterminacy in the legal system owing to the existence of competing rules of law." Altman, supra note 11, at 212.
35. Joseph Raz's beautiful (if opaque) image of a legal system could be added to this list: Institutionalized systems [such as legal systems] consist of norms surrounded by a parameter [sic] of exclusionary reasons excluding the application of all reasons other than the norms of the system and at their core are authoritative applicative determinations excluding all other reasons including other norms of the system. J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 146 (2d ed. 1990). What Raz is suggesting here is, essentially, that partitions exist within any legal system, and that these partitions function to compartmentalize legal reasons in the same way that a Hartian rule of recognition guards the perimeter of law against the encroachment of extralegal reasons.
36. The late John Mackie criticized Ronald Dworkin's theory of law in these terms: Dworkin's theory . . . would tend to make the law not only less certain but also less determinate than it would be on the rival positivist view . . . [because it] introduces a further source of indeterminacy. It is well known that the inference from a precedent to a general rule supposed to be implicit in it is not watertight; but a much larger degree of freedom is introduced if the judge has to frame hypotheses, not merely about rules which apply directly to cases, but also about far more general and abstract principles of justice and their implications. John Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, reprinted in Philosophy of Law 167 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds., 6th ed. 1995). Mackie might have added that determinacy suffers even if the judge is freed only to the lesser extent of being permitted to appeal to rules that do not "directly" apply to the case at hand. As I argue in the text, once the judge is permitted, or required, to canvass the law "as a whole," determinacy is likely to be diminished.
37. Andrew Altman has referred to this as the "truncation thesis," which he attributes to Roberto Unger. Altman's view differs from Unger's in that Altman believes that truncation is not ultimately arbitrary, shaped only by the current state of endless pitched political battles, but determined by the structure of a network of legal norms. See Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique 139-48 (1990).
38. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
39. Id. at 172-73.
40. According to Michael Moore, judges have a general license - wholly apart from any subservience to legislative intent - to overrule or amend legislation that, in light of the event, would have absurd consequences. Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 151, 258-65 (1981).
41. 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966). See Kress, Coherence and Formalism, supra note 2, at 679, for a more extensive discussion of how partitions might expediently be introduced into the law.
42. See also Stephen Perry, Professor Weinrib's Formalism: The Not-So-Empty Sepulchre, 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 597, 607-08 (1993).
43. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
44. Cf. id. at 399.
45. See Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 283, 301 (1989). The adequacy criterion in Kress's present view is not moral relevance, simpliciter, but moral relevance as ascertained with special reference to institutional facts and rule-of-law values.
46. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 176-224 (1986).
47. See Sartorius, supra note 6.
48. See Ernest Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 39 (1995).
49. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
50. Arbitrariness, in the "morally defective" sense, may be held at bay by rationales - along "better decided than decided rightly" lines - for using a random procedure to break an otherwise "Buridan-some" impasse. See Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements 36-122 (1989).
51. Kress, Coherence and Formalism, supra note 2, at 657.
52. Id. at 658.
53. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 93 J. Phil. 307 (1996) (book review).
54. "Modern moral theory has been dominated by a reverence for coherence," according to Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Coherence and Models for Moral Theorizing, 66 Pac. Phil. Q. 170, 170 (1985).
55. David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics 103 (1989).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. David O. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 105, 131-32 (1988).
59. Id.
60. Rolf Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial Legislation, 8 Am. Phil. Q. 151, 158 (1971).
61. Ronald Dworkin's position on the role of coherence in legal reasoning is a matter of (perhaps whimsical) dispute; compare the appendix to Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 273, 315-21 (1992) (coherence unimportant to Dworkin), with Kress, Coherence and Formalism, supra note 2, at 652-54 (coherence important to Dworkin).
62. Ronald Dworkin's position on the role of coherence in legal reasoning is a matter of (perhaps whimsical) dispute; compare the appendix to Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 273, 315-21 (1992) (coherence unimportant to Dworkin), with Kress, Coherence and Formalism, supra note 2, at 652-54 (coherence important to Dworkin).
63. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69).
64. Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government 29 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1988) (italics omitted).
65. Id. at 29 n.e1.
66. The phrase "nomological dangler" can refer to any posited connection between an element otherwise well-connected to a theory and another element having, otherwise, no connection. See Herbert Feigl, The "Mental" and the "Physical," in II Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 370, 382, 428 (H. Feigl, M. Scriven & G. Maxwell eds., 1958); J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism 68, 90, 94 (1963).
67. The phrase "nomological dangler" can refer to any posited connection between an element otherwise well-connected to a theory and another element having, otherwise, no connection. See Herbert Feigl, The "Mental" and the "Physical," in II Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 370, 382, 428 (H. Feigl, M. Scriven & G. Maxwell eds., 1958); J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism 68, 90, 94 (1963).
68. Philip Kitcher, Abusing Science 47 (1982).
69. See W.V. Quine, From Stimulus to Science 49 (1995); W.V. Quine, The Pursuit of Truth 15, 56 (1992); W.V. Quine, Quiddities 148 (1987).
70. See W.V. Quine, From Stimulus to Science 49 (1995); W.V. Quine, The Pursuit of Truth 15, 56 (1992); W.V. Quine, Quiddities 148 (1987).
71. See W.V. Quine, From Stimulus to Science 49 (1995); W.V. Quine, The Pursuit of Truth 15, 56 (1992); W.V. Quine, Quiddities 148 (1987).
72. The ascendancy of physical science as the paradigm of knowledge is so secure that both its critics and its apologists seem prone to pranksterism. Compare Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (1975) (author's astrological chart supplied on dust jacket, in the place usually reserved for institutional affiliation) with Alan Sokal, Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity, 46/47 Social Text (Spring/Summer 1996) (a hoax intended to expose the arrogance of postmodern critics of science).
73. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
74. 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
75. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
76. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
77. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
78. See Cardozo, supra note 16, at 40-41, 76-78; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 58-61 (1988); Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 545-62 (Willam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 8-27 (1949).
79. See Cardozo, supra note 16, at 40-41, 76-78; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 58-61 (1988); Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 545-62 (Willam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 8-27 (1949).
80. See Cardozo, supra note 16, at 40-41, 76-78; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 58-61 (1988); Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 545-62 (Willam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 8-27 (1949).
81. 2 DeGex & Sm. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849).
82. 40 Ch. Div. 345, 349-52 (1888).
83. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 63, at 193, 211.
84. Id. at 220.
85. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
86. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
87. Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Co., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956).
88. Compare Gill v. Hearst Publ'g. Co., 263 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953) (dismissing with leave to amend) with Gill v. Curtis Publ'g. Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952) (denying motion to dismiss).
89. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 407 (1960).
90. Id. at 397.
91. See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 (1964).
92. See Harry Kalven, Privacy in the Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326 (1966).
93. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
94. 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963).
95. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 915.
96. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
97. Id. at 827.
98. Id. at 840.
99. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
100. Id. at 568.
101. See Lucas v. Pollock, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 918, 919 (Cal. App. 1992); Totten v. More Oakland Residential Hous., Inc., 134 Cal. Rptr. 29, 33 & n.3 (Cal. App. 1976).
102. See, e.g., Ornelas v. Randolph, 847 P.2d 560, 562 (Cal. 1993) (holding that under Cal. Civ. Code §846 (1982) "the landowner's duty to the nonpaying, uninvited recreational user is, in essence, that owed a trespasser as it existed prior to Rowland v. Christian.").
103. On tort's tendencies to penetrate the law of contract, see Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974) and P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979); the criminal law, see Randy Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm for Criminal Justice, 87 Ethics 279 (1977); and constitutional law, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
104. On tort's tendencies to penetrate the law of contract, see Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974) and P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979); the criminal law, see Randy Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm for Criminal Justice, 87 Ethics 279 (1977); and constitutional law, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
105. On tort's tendencies to penetrate the law of contract, see Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974) and P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979); the criminal law, see Randy Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm for Criminal Justice, 87 Ethics 279 (1977); and constitutional law, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
106. Simply reimposing the old boundary means cutting loose the overruling precedent, which the Anti-Partitioning Principle is loath to do. A mere overruling is a partitioning in its starkest form: "Apply the P rule to cases decided prior this decision, and the Q rule thereafter," unless the decision at least attempts to justify itself, which typically it will do by appeal to overall coherence and to the merits of the Q rule. An overruling of an overruling, or retrenchment, enhances determinacy by stanching the earlier overruling as a conduit into new territory, but it gives additional offense to coherence by logically isolating the period of interregnum.
107. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 36 (1993).