Zwischen Immobilität und Instabilität: Auswirkungen der Einführung der allgemeinen Volksinitiative und der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz

Swiss Political Science Review

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 1-257

  Moser, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347912049     PISSN: 14247755     EISSN: 16626370     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1662-6370.1996.tb00181.x     Document Type: Article

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