The hidden first amendment values of privacy

Washington Law Review

Volumn 71, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 683-743

  Scott, Sean M ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0347878320     PISSN: 00430617     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (389)

1. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971) (citations omitted).
2. The Powell Decision, N. Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1995, at B13;
3. Excerpts from Colin L. Powell's News Conference, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1995, at A14.
4. Eleanor Clift et al., Why the General's Wife Is a Reluctant Warrior, Newsweek, Nov. 6, 1995, at 39, 39;
5. Dick Polman & Steve Goldstein, Powell Looks More Like a Candidate, Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 22, 1995, at A1.
6. See Excerpts from Colin L. Powell's News Conference, supra note 2, at A14.
7. A.M. Rosenthal, Two Enemies of the Press, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1995, at A25.
8. U.S. Const., amend. I.
9. The private facts tort has been identified by Prosser as one of four torts that come under the invasion of privacy umbrella. Prosser's four distinct torts are: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing facts about the plaintiff [the private facts tort]; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name or likeness. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960).
10. Some legal commentators contest the validity and need for the private facts tort. They would eliminate the need to balance by eliminating the private facts tort altogether. See Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandels Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326 (1966);
11. Don R. Pember, Privacy and the Press: The Law, The Mass Media, and the First Amendment 238 (1972);
12. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 393 (1978);
13. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291, 300-01 (1983). Some courts have agreed with the commentators and eliminated the tort or have severely limited the recovery to which a plaintiff may be entitled. See Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 712 P.2d 803 (Or. 1986); Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988); Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349 (N.Y. 1985). As there remain at least 35 other jurisdictions that recognize the tort, the effort to figure out the appropriate balance between the tort and the First Amendment remains a valid enterprise.
14. See Libel Defense Resource Center, LDRC 50-State Survey, 1994-95 (Henry R. Kaufman ed., 1994).
15. For a detailed history of the development of the law of privacy see Pember, supra note 8.
16. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
17. These values include truth, autonomy and self-governance.
18. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Afro-Am. Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 253 P.2d 441, 443 (Cal. 1953).
19. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 (1964).
20. That the private facts tort promotes the same values as does the First Amendment is the focus of the discussion in part III of this Article, infra.
21. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
22. Id. at 195 (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 29 (2d ed., Chicago: Callaghan, 1888).
23. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421, 437 n.48 (1980).
24. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 213.
25. Id. at 216.
26. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 117, at 850 (5th ed. 1984).
27. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
28. 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927).
29. The First Restatement of Torts, section 867, provided that, "A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other."
30. Restatement (First) of Torts § 867 (1934).
31. The Second Restatement of Torts, section 652D provides that, "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the mater publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public."
32. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
33. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20.201 (1995); N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1995); Okla. Stat. tit. 21 §§ 839.1-839.3 (West 1996); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-401 to 76-9-406 (1995); Va. Code §§ 2.1-377 to 2.1-386 (Michie 1995); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.50 (West 1995).
34. Alaska Const. art. I, § 22; Ariz. Const, art. II, § 8; Cal. Const. art. I, § 1; Fla. Const. art. I, § 23; Haw. Const. art. I, § 7; Ill. Const. art I, § 6; La. Const. art. 1, § 5; S.C. Const. art. I, § 10; Wash. Const. art. I, § 7.
35. Libel Defense Resource Center, supra note 8 (citing and discussing each state's law).
36. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D (1977); see also Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Morgan v. Celender, 780 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Pa. 1992); Times Mirror v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
37. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D cmt. a (1977).
38. The issue has arisen as to whether facts are no longer private when the plaintiff has disclosed the information to a limited number of people, such as family members or close friends. Generally, courts have found that the information remains private when such a limited disclosure is made. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Times Mirror, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 561; Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985); Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Y.G., 795 S.W.2d 488; Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988); But see Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S 1088 (1987).
39. Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 253 P.2d 441, 443 (Cal. 1953); Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 543 P.2d. 988, 993 (Kan. 1975); Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 368 P.2d 147 (N.M. 1962).
40. Smith v. NBC, 292 P.2d 600 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Reece v. Grissom, 267 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
41. Cox Communications, Inc. v. Lowe, 328 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 982 (1985); Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), cert. denied, 508 A.2d 488 (Md.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984 (1986). But see Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
42. Hendry v. Conner, 226 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1975). See generally David A. Elder, The Law of Privacy § 3:3 (1991).
43. Gill, 253 P.2d at 444; Floyd v. Park Cities People, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
44. Penwell v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
45. Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904 (D.C.N.J. 1986).
46. Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976). See generally Elder, supra note 33, § 3:4.
47. Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Hawkins v. Multimedia, Inc., 344 S.E.2d 145 (S.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1012 (1986).
48. Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64 Iowa L. Rev. 185, 193 (1979); see Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327, 328-29 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964); Davis v. Gen. Fin. & Thrift Corp., 57 S.E.2d 225 (Ga. Ct. App. 1950); Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Div., 472 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Meetze v. Associated Press, 95 S.E.2d 606, 610 (S.C. 1956); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944); This element does not require that the information publicized reach the level of repulsiveness or horror: Even people who have nothing rationally to be ashamed of can be mortified by the publication of intimate details of their life. Most people in no wise deformed or disfigured would nevertheless be deeply upset if nude photographs of themselves were published in a newspaper or book. They feel the same way about photographs of their sexual activities, however, "normal," or about a narrative of those activities, or about having their medical records publicized. Although it is well known that every human being defecates, no adult human being in our society wants a newspaper to show a picture of him defecating. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993).
49. Prosser, supra note 7, at 397; see also Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953); Davis, 57 S.E.2d at 227.
50. The Missouri Court of Appeals stated: This complex, important case . . . requires us to decide the precise issue of resolving the delicate balance between a married couple's right to their privacy . . . and the freedom of the electronic news media to report and make public the events surrounding the modern medical "miracle" of the extraordinary process in vitro fertilization. The issue is certainly not easily resolved for the cherished freedoms embodied in the American ideal of privacy of the individual and the freedom of the news media necessarily conflict. Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); see also David O'Brien, Privacy, Law and Public Policy 144 (1979).
51. Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 272-73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[W]e are satisfied that this provision [newsworthiness] is one of constitutional dimension delimiting the scope of the tort and that the extent of the privilege thus is controlled by federal rather than state law."), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Wasser v. San Diego Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (Ct. App. 1987).
52. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). In addition to the four cases discussed, another case is worth mentioning here. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the plaintiff claimed invasion of privacy based on the false light tort. The tort of invasion of privacy through the disclosure of private facts was not at issue; however, the Court indicated in a footnote that there might be tort liability for unwarranted publicity of the truth. In note 7 of its opinion, the Court stated that "[r]evelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notion of decency." Id. at 383 n.7 (quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
53. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
54. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103-04.
55. 420 U.S. 469.
56. Id. at 472.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 474.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 496.
61. Id. at 497. For a critique of this decision see Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205, 1264-68 (1976).
62. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
63. Id. at 310.
64. Id. at 309.
65. Id. at 311.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 311-12.
68. Id. at 311.
69. Id. (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471 (1975)).
70. Id.
71. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
72. Id. at 99.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 105-06.
75. Id. at 100.
76. Id. at 103.
77. Id. at 104.
78. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
79. Id. at 541.
80. Id. at 527.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Fla Stat. ch. 794.03 (1987).
85. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 528.
86. Id. at 541.
87. Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1195 (1990);
88. Jacqueline R. Rolfs, Note, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Beginning of the End for the Tort of Public Disclosure, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1107;
89. Lorelei Van Wey, Note, Private Facts Tort: The End is Here, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 299 (1991).
90. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
91. See id. at 532.
92. The statute under which the plaintiff in Florida Star brought suit has been held unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court. State v. Globe Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994).
93. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1231-32 (7th Cir. 1993). The Haynes court stated: We do not think the Court was being coy in Cox or Florida Star in declining to declare the tort of publicizing intensely personal facts totally defunct. (Indeed, the author of Cox dissented in Florida Star.) The publication of facts in a public record or other official document, such as the police report in the Florida Star, is not to be equated to publishing a photo of a couple making love or of a person undergoing some intimate medical procedure; we even doubt that it would make a difference in such a case if the photograph had been printed in a government document . . . . Id. at 1332; see also Heath v. Playboy Enter. Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D. Fla. 1990); cf. Doe v. Board, of Regents, 452 S.E.2d 776, 781 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Near East Side Community Org. v. Hair, 555 N.E.2d 1324, 1335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Anonsen v. Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2135 (1994).
94. Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232; Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), appeal denied, 527 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1994); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Anonsen, 857 S.W.2d 700.
95. Morgan v. Celender, 780 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Pa. 1992); Heath, 732 F. Supp. 1145; Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655 (Ga. 1993); Doe v. Star Telegram, Inc., 864 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 915 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995); cf. Cape Publications, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374 (FIa. 1989), appeal dismissed, 493 U.S. 929 (1989).
96. 436 S.E.2d 655.
97. Id. at 657.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 864 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 915 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995).
104. Id. at 791.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 792-93.
109. Id. at 792.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 793 (Hicks, J., concurring). It is not clear from the concurrence whether consideration would have been given to the issues of whether the information was lawfully obtained and whether the restriction served a compelling state interest. The concurring judge does state, "While I concur with the majority as to the result, I would offer a different analysis." Id. The concurrence then goes on to suggest that there was an issue of fact as to whether the information disclosed was a matter of legitimate public concern. Id.
112. See Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655, 656 (Ga. 1993); In re Minor, 595 N.E.2d 1052, 1058 (Ill. 1992).
113. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993). The court stated: Yet despite the limited scope of the holdings of Cox and Florida Star, the implications of those decisions for the branch of the right of privacy that limits the publication of private facts are profound, even for a case such as this in which, unlike Melvin v. Reid, the primary source of the allegedly humiliating personal facts is not a public record. Id.
114. Rolfs, supra note 78, at 1115-17.
115. The factors are those identified by the Court in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.: (1) whether the information publicized was lawfully obtained; (2) whether the information concerns a matter of public significance; and (3) whether the imposition of liablity serves a compelling state interest 443 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1979).
116. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
117. It is too early yet to determine whether this will be the case. There is not enough case law to discern a trend.
118. For a detailed analysis and critique of the lawfully obtained doctrine, see Edelman, supra note 78.
119. See Rolfs, supra note 78.
120. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15.
121. Id. at 214.
122. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. c (1977).
123. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1129; Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. c (1977); Woito & McNulty, supra note 39, at 194.
124. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
125. Courts often acknowledge this deference to the press. In Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 1970), the court stated that the definition of newsworthiness is "necessarily circular because an action for invasion of privacy arises only after some publication has made the plaintiff a subject of public concern." Id. at 94. Similarly, the court in Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 712 P.2d 803, 809 (Or. 1986), stated that "one reader's or viewer's 'news' is another's tedium or trivia." Id.; see also Heath v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("[W]hat is newsworthy is primarily a function of the publisher, not the courts.").
126. See Woito & McNulty, supra note 39, at 195.
127. See Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958).
128. Kelly v. Post Publishing Co., 98 N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1951); Woito & McNulty, supra note 39, at 195.
129. Woito & McNulty, supra note 39, at 197. See Kalven, supra note 8; Peter N. Swan, Publicity Invasion of Privacy: Constitutional and Doctrinal Difficulties with a Developing Tort, 58 Or. L. Rev. 483, 502 (1980); Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 343.
130. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Damages and the Privacy Tort: Sketching a "Legal Profile," 64 Iowa L. Rev. 1111, 1133-34 (1979); Hill, supra note 52, at 1255. As one court has stated: [T]he interest of the public in the free dissemination of the truth and unimpeded access to news is so broad, so difficult to define and so dangerous to circumscribe that courts have been reluctant to make such factually accurate public disclosures tortious, except where the lack of any meritorious pubic interest in the disclosure is very clear and its offensiveness to ordinary sensibilities is equally clear. Jenkins, 251 F.2d at 450. There are a few cases in which the court has held that the published matter was not of legitimate public interest. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285 (Ct. App. 1931); Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Buller v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 684 S.W.2d 473,482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Barrows v. Rozansky, 489 N.Y.S.2d 481 (App. Div. 1985).
131. The terms "newsworthiness" and "matters of legitimate public concern" are often used interchangeably by courts and commentators. See Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980); Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 527 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1994); Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 714 (N.C. 1988); Anonsen v. Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2135 (1994). These terms have become all but indistinguishable and will be used interchangeably in this article.
132. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. d (1977).
133. McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 929 (1989); Grossman v. Smart, 807 F. Supp. 1404, 1412 (C.D. Ill. 1992); White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 707 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1989), affd, 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Cape Publications, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 493 U.S. 929 (1989); Howard, 283 N.W.2d 289. But cf. Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 884 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Mason v. Williams Discount Ctr., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (distinguishing between proving that matter is not one of public concern and newsworthiness privilege and finding that privilege is affirmative defense and plaintiff does not have to show privilege in order to state claim.).
134. 283 N.W.2d 289.
135. Id. at 300.
136. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
137. Id.; see Swan, supra note 118, at 505.
138. If the plaintiff is seeking to enjoin the dissemination of allegedly obscene speech then it has the burden of proving that it is unprotected. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
139. Some courts have found that in matters involving First Amendment rights, summary judgment is a favored remedy "because unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights and because speedy resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable." Wasser v. San Diego Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (Ct. App. 1987); Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 676 (Ct. App. 1986); Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993); Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 527 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1994); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Doe v. Star Telegram, Inc., 864 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 915 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995).
140. This is not a change from existing law. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
141. The author recognizes that the value of newsworthiness as a balancing mechanism has been extensively questioned. See Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 553-554 (1970); Kalven, supra note 8; Zimmerman, supra note 8. However, it seems to be the test used by lower courts to resolve the conflict between the private facts tort and the First Amendment. Thus, as courts do not seem ready yet to abandon the doctrine, it seems useful to try to make the doctrine more responsive to the concerns expressed in this article. Also, the advantage of using newsworthiness is that it allows for a case-by-case determination of the issues rather than a blanket rule. This will allow for a careful balancing of the interests presented in each case, which is a way to ensure that the freedom of the press is not unnecessarily chilled.
142. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 43 (Cal. 1971); Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989).
143. The second factor would not be adopted because courts have given it very little weight. See Kapellas, 459 P.2d 912; Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
144. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 43; Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 922; Times Mirror, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556.
145. This nexus would be required regardless of plaintiffs status as a public or private figure. See Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762. Contra Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980).
146. This is consistent with the approach adopted by the court in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
147. The Court in Florida Star evidenced a serious concern about the creation of categorical prohibitions on the publication of truthful information: "We have previously noted the impermissibility of categorical prohibitions upon media access where important First Amendment interests are at stake. More individualized adjudication is no less indispensable where the State, seeking to safeguard the anonymity of crime victims, sets its face against publication of their names." Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,539-40 (1989) (citation omitted).
148. Keeton, supra note 20, § 117, at 862.
149. Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981); Campbell, 614 F.2d at 397; Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762; Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980); see also Barrows v. Rozansky, 489 N.Y.S.2d 481, 485 (App. Div. 1985) ("[T]o be privileged such use must be legitimately related to the informational value of the publication and may not be a mere disguised commercialization of a person's personality."); Delan v. CBS, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 608, 613 (App. Div. 1983) ("Of course, there must have existed a legitimate connection between the use of plaintiff s name and picture and the matter of public interest sought to be portrayed.").
150. 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981).
151. Id. at 308.
152. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
153. Id. at 773.
154. Id. at 772.
155. Id. at 773.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See David A. Logan, Tort Law and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 493, 559 (1990).
161. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. Under Daily Mail, the state has the burden of establishing that the imposition of sanctions is necessary to serve a compelling interest Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. 443 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1979).
165. 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989).
166. Id. at 564.
167. Id. at 558.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 560; see also Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S. W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
172. This article does not address the issue of whether the question of newsworthiness should be one of law or fact. Shifting the burden of newsworthiness to the defendant should not have an impact on this issue.
173. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989) (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975)).
174. This article will not discuss the effect of the lawfully obtained doctrine on the First Amendment. The Supreme Court already has imposed this burden on the defendant. Thus, the proposed reformulation does not alter the existing balance.
175. The theories discussed here are clearly associated with freedom of speech. The issue arises whether these theories are equally applicable when discussing freedom of the press. Is the freedom of the press somehow distinct from the freedom of speech? If so, are there separate theories which justify the free press guarantee? Scholars have long wrestled with these issues. See David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 77 (1975);
176. Melville B. Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 Hasting L.J. 639 (1975);
177. Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press, " 26 Hasting L.J. 631 ( 1975);
178. William W. Van Alstyne, Interpretations of the First Amendment (1984). The U.S. Supreme Court has resisted creating doctrinal differences between the press and other speakers. Thus, it generally has endeavored to neither advantage nor disadvantage the press vis-à-vis other speakers.
179. See Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla And Nimmer on Freedom of Speech: A Treatise on the First Amendment § 13.01[3] (1994). The exception to this general rule is the concept of "reporter's privilege." This privilege does not relate to the thesis of this article and thus, is irrelevant to the discussion. Generally, First Amendment theories and case law subsume the protection of press under the protection of speech. See Van Alstyne, supra, at 50-51. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart has argued that the press has a special institutional role to play: that it operates as a check on the three branches of government. Stewart, supra, at 634. Under this theory the protection extended the institutionalized press is designed to check the abuse of official power. Others have argued that the role played by the press is as agent for the public; that it is a conduit of information to the people. For an extensive discussion of this theory, its strengths and weaknesses, see Van Alstyne, supra, at 50-67.
180. See also James J. Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 Hasting L.J. 777, 793 (1975). Assuming, arguendo, the validity of the concept of press as either a checking agent or as a conduit of information, it does not render the three theories discussed in this article inapplicable. Indeed the concept ties in well with both the marketplace and the self-governance theories of the First Amendment. See Nimmer, supra, at 653. In discussing the three theories of the First Amendment, then, the discussion includes both the guarantees of free speech and free press.
181. It is helpful to keep in mind that although the First Amendment safeguards the right to disseminate information, this right does not always take precedence over the right to privacy. The interests must be balanced against one another, with the outcome dependent upon the specific facts of individual cases. Chafee discusses the need for this kind of careful analysis of interests: [T]here are individual interests and social interests, which must be balanced against each other, if they conflict, in order to determine which interest shall be sacrificed under the circumstances and which shall be protected and become the foundation of a legal right. It must never be forgotten that the balancing cannot be properly done unless all the interests involved are adequately ascertained . . . . Zechariah Chafee Jr., Free Speech in the United States 32 (1942) (citation omitted).
182. See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 15 (1982).
183. Two philosophers are closely associated with this principle of freedom of expression: John Milton and John Stuart Mill. Milton argued persuasively for this principle of free expression: [T]hough all the winde[s] of doctrin[e] were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licen[s]ing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Fals[e]hood grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the worsfe], in a free and open encounter? John Milton, Areopagilica, A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of England 35 (England, Percy Lund, Humphries & Co., Ltd. 1927) (1644). Mill, in On Liberty, echoes the defense raised by Milton. Mill argues in his essay: [T]he opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty . . . . There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.
184. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 24, 27-28 (Gateway ed., Henry Regnery Co. 1955) (1859).
185. For the Holmesian view, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Brandeis expressed his view in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Frankfurter's view is articulated in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 546-53 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); and Hand expressed his view in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
186. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes's articulation of the search for truth theory of the First Amendment is but one of many. Professor Frederick Schauer has extrapolated three common characteristics shared by the various articulations of this theory. First, this theory views freedom of speech as a means, a process for ascertaining truth, rather than an end. Schauer, supra note 166, at 16. Second, the marketplace theory assumes that truth will prevail in the competition between it and falsehood. Id. Third, the theory is skeptical about accepted beliefs and widely acknowledged truth. Id.
187. Gavison states: [I]t can be argued that respect for privacy will help a society attract talented individuals to public life. Persons interested in government service must consider the loss of virtually all claims and expectations of privacy in calculating the costs of running for public office. Respect for privacy might reduce those costs. Gavison, supra note 17, at 456.
188. On this point, Professor Robert Bellah argues that: [T]here is also reason to consider whether the treatment of public figures by the media does not have a "chilling effect" on the decision of individuals to enter the public sphere because they fear what the relentless scrutiny may do to them. To the extent that such fear deters able people from public service, this is a cost that a democratic society can ill afford. Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 743, 746 (1986);
189. see also Richard Davis, Supreme Court Nominations and the News Media, 57 Alb. L. Rev. 1061 (1994);
190. Thomas S. Axworthy, Politics and Privacy, Maclean's, May 18, 1987, at 34;
191. Paul Johnson, A World Without Leaders, Commentary, July 1994, at 19;
192. Al Kamen, For Two. Much Adieu About Something, Wash. Post, May 26, 1993, at A17;
193. Steve Kukolla, Jefferson for President: Blue Ribbon Panelists Look for an Alternative, Indianapolis Bus. J., May 4, 1992, at 1;
194. George Skelton, Running From. Not for, Office, L.A. Times, July 23, 1990, Metro Desk, at Al;
195. Alexander B. Trowbridge, Attracting the Best to Washington, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar./Apr. 1985, at 174.
196. The blacklisting of members of the entertainment industry in the 1950s provides an example of what can happen if people are deprived of privacy concerning political beliefs. Due to the close scrutiny given individuals, and the invasions of privacy, the political activities of writers, directors and actors were seriously curtailed.
197. Lee Bollinger, Images of a Free Press 24-27 (1991).
198. Id. at 2 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
199. Id. at 1.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 20.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 24.
205. Id. at 26.
206. In later sections of his book Bollinger discusses why the Court may have been reluctant to limit the autonomy of the press and suggests that the press may not be as autonomous as the central image implies. Id. at 62-84.
207. Id. at 34-35.
208. Id. at 35.
209. Id. at 26.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 36.
212. See id. at 25, 35-36.
213. Family or Country?, The New Republic, Nov. 27, 1995, at 7, 7.
214. Free expression is said to contribute to the proper functioning of a democracy in a number of ways: (1) It controls abuses of power by government officials. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 521. (2) It facilitates majority rule. Smolla, supra note 164, § 2.04[2][b]. (3) It allows citizens to participate in decision-making.
215. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 601-04 (1982). (4) It allows citizens access to information necessary to formulate opinions and make decisions.
216. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 3-89 (1960). (5) It protects the right of the minority to dissent from majority decisions, thus creating the appearance of fairness and encouraging stability. See Emerson, supra note 130; Smolla, supra note 164, § 2.04[2][e].
217. Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109, 1109 (1993).
218. Meiklejohn, supra note 190, at 24; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245. For a brief summary of those espousing a self-governance theory of free expression prior to Meiklejohn, see Chafee, supra note 165;
219. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405 (1986);
220. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1992).
221. Meiklejohn, supra note 190, at 24. His metaphor has been the subject of criticism. See Post, supra note 191.
222. Meiklejohn, supra note 190, at 18-19. Meiklejohn is clearly not the originator of the idea of the people as sovereign theory; this theory was articulated early in this nation's history by James Madison who stated that "In the United States . . . [t]he People, not the Government, possess the absolute sovereignty." James Madison, Report on the Resolutions (House of Delegates, Session of 1799-1800), in 6 The Writings of James Madison 386 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
223. Meiklejohn, supra note 190, at 26; Schauer, supra note 166, at 38.
224. Schauer, supra note 166, at 38.
225. Id. at 38-39.
226. Other scholars have written supporting this narrow interpretation of the First Amendment. See Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 299(1978);
227. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971).
228. See Sunstein, supra note 192, at 301.
229. Fiss, supra note 192, at 1411.
230. Sunstein, supra note 192, at 263.
231. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 518 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965).
232. 376 U.S. 254.
233. Id. at 280, 283.
234. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
235. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
236. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369).
237. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
238. Id. at 758-59.
239. Id. at 761.
240. Id. at 758-59 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
241. Id. at 759.
242. While it has recognized the primacy of political speech, the Supreme Court has not gone so far as to hold that the First Amendment protects only political speech. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
243. Emerson, supra note 130, at 546.
244. Bloustein, supra note 13, at 1003.
245. See S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in Groups, Leadership and Men 177, 181 (Harold Guetzkow ed., 1951);
246. see also Knud S. Larsen, The Asch Conformity Experiment: Replication and Transhistorical Comparisons, 5 J. Soc. Behav. & Personality 163 (1990);
247. Serge Moscovici, Social Influence and Conformity, in 2 Handbook of Soc. Psychol. 347 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1985);
248. Nigel Nicholson et al., Conformity in the Asch Situation: A Comparison Between Contemporary British and U.S. University Students, 24 British J. Soc. Psychol. 59 (1985).
249. See Emerson, supra note 130, at 546.
250. See Gavison, supra note 17, at 455-56.
251. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964 (1977);
252. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 875 (1994); Post, supra note 191; Redish, supra note 190;
253. David A. Strauss, Persuasion. Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 334 (1991).
254. Schauer, supra note 166, at 47.
255. Id. at 48.
256. For a fuller exposition of this theory, see Redish, supra 190.
257. Id. at 593.
258. See Emerson, supra note 130, at 546.
259. Schauer, supra note 166, at 49-50.
260. See Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 54, 80 (1989).
261. See Smolla, supra note 164, § 2.03[2][c].
262. See Solum, supra note 226, at 80.
263. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 n.2 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978); id. at 783, 804-06; (White, J., dissenting); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,418 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
264. 416 U.S. 396.
265. Id. at 427-28 (citation omitted) (Marshall, J., concurring).
266. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
267. Id. at 624.
268. Id. at 642.
269. Schauer, supra note 166, at 67-72 (making arguments from diversity and dignity as justifying freedom of speech and acknowledging that autonomy agreement is one that is most persuasive).
270. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204 (1971).
271. But see T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 519, 530-37 (1979).
272. For an alternative articulation of the theory, see C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964 (1978).
273. Fallon, supra note 219, at 877.
274. Id. at 878.
275. Schauer, supra note 166, at 69.
276. Fallon, supra note 219, at 875.
277. Schauer, supra note 166, at 69.
278. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943).
279. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
280. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
281. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
282. Id. at 234-35.
283. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
284. Id. at 763.
285. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
286. Bloustein, supra note 13, at 979.
287. Robert S. Gerstein, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the Protection of Private Life, 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 385, 422 (1982).
288. See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 188 Cal. Reptr. 762, 768-70 (Ct. App. 1983).
289. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d. 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762.
290. Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70.
291. See Lyrissa Barnett-Lidsky, Defamation. Reputation and the Myth of
292. These four categories are: (1) speech about public figures on matters of public concern; (2) speech involving public figures and matters not of legitimate public concern; (3) speech involving private persons and matters of public concern; and (4) speech involving private persons and matters not of legitimate public concern.
293. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
294. New York Times applied only to public officials. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. However, the Court extended the rule to all public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
295. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
296. While in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court moved away from considering the public nature of the speech, its subsequent decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), indicates that a different test is applicable when the speech involves matters not of public concern.
297. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
298. Id. at 343-47.
299. Id. at 347.
300. Id. at 350-51.
301. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985).
302. This last development has led to the issue of whether newsworthiness remains a viable defense at all. The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Cox and Florida Star can be construed as a rejection of the newsworthiness test in favor of the lawfully obtained doctrine. However, state and lower federal courts are construing these cases narrowly and have not yet abandoned the newsworthiness test. The curtain has not yet fallen on the newsworthiness defense to privacy actions.
303. Several articles have been written that address this precise topic. For a more extensive discussion of this issue see Elbridge L. Adams, The Right of Privacy, and its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 Am. L. Rev. 37 (1905);
304. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied To Privacy, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 935 (1968); Woito, supra note 37, at 203-217.
305. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Leading Cases, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 120, 217 (1985).
306. See Restatement (First) of Torts § 867 (1934);
307. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D.
308. See Woito & McNulty, supra note 39, at 210.
309. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 126 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1954), rev 'd, 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969); Smith v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 292 P.2d 600 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956). But see Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
310. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971); Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 912; Wasser v. San Diego Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772 (Ct. App. 1987).
311. Nimmer, supra note 267, at 961; Woito & McNulty, supra note 39, at 212.
312. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967).
313. This argument is reviewed in detail by Woito & McNulty, supra note 39, at 213-17, and by Nimmer, supra note 267, at 962. For an opposing argument see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill. Butts and Walker, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267.
314. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
315. Id. at 377.
316. Id. at 379.
317. Id. at 378.
318. Id. at 377.
319. Id. at 387-88. The law of defamation has evolved since Time, Inc. v. Hill was decided. Specifically, the Supreme Court has decided Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that private figures need only show that defendant was negligent as to truth or falsity of information published), and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (holding that when speech concerns private person on matter not of public concern presumed and punitive damages may be awarded without showing of actual malice). Prior to Gertz, it was unclear whether private figures had to show actual malice or simple negligence. The question arises whether a private individual bringing a false-light privacy cause of action must still prove actual malice or whether the lesser standards adopted in Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet apply. Courts take differing approaches to this question. For decisions applying the lesser standards see Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 883 (1984); Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985); Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co, 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); Fils-Aime v. Enlightenment Press, Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 947 (App. Term. 1986). For decisions finding that actual malice should be the standard see Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc., 721 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1986); Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201 (Ill. 1992); Van Duyn v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 1005 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d 922 (Ill.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989); Colbert v. World Publishing Co., 747 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1987).
320. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Elder, supra note 33, § 4:12, at 330 nn.28 & 29 (1991). The Second Restatement of Torts has incorporated the actual malice standard into its definition of the false light tort. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
321. Section 652E of the Second Restatement of Torts defines the false light tort: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E ( 1977).
322. The comment to this section states that "it is essential to the rule stated in this section that the matter published concerning the plaintiff is not true." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt. a (1977). Section 558 of the Second Restatement of Torts sets forth the elements of a cause of action for defamation: To create liability for defamation there must be: (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.
323. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977).
324. The U.S. Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill, seemed to limit its application of the defamation standards to the false light tort: ". . . revelations were so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of decency." Time, 385 U.S. at 383 n.7 (quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
325. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) ("'[T]He interest protected' in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light 'is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation.'") (citation omitted).
326. An argument has been made that the defamation privileges should not apply to the private facts tort because they should not have been applied to false light privacy either. This argument rejects the position that the interests protected by defamation and false light privacy are the same. The argument holds that application of malice to the false light fort at all was wrong because it was premised on the illusion that the torts of defamation and false light are similar. For a full explication of this argument see Nimmer, supra note 267, at 962-67.
327. Time, 385 U.S. at 383 n.7 (quoting Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809).
328. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
329. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 524, 532.
330. Id. at 524.
331. See Libel Defense Resource Center, supra note 8.
332. See discussion supra part II.B.1 and notes accompanying text.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
334. See Wasser v. San Diego Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (Ct. App. 1987); Harris v. Easton Publishing Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). See generally Elder, supra note 33, § 3:3, at 157 n. 77.
335. Elder, supra note 33, § 3:3, at 154.
336. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
337. See Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930); Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (relief granted for unauthorized publication of x-rays of woman's pelvic region); Feeney v. Young, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (App. Div. 1920); Griffin v. Medical Soc'y, 11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) (unauthorized photograph of a plaintiffs deformed nose published in medical journal); Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (C.P. 1940) (unauthorized use of photographs of patient's facial disfigurement). For a case involving the privacy of medical procedures that predates the Warren and Brandeis article, see De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881) (court recognized privacy when man intruded on woman giving birth).
338. 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
339. Id. at 295.
340. The court was mindful of the potential abuse of its rights by the press: [F]reedom of the press was not created merely for the benefit of the press, but because it is essential to the preservation of free government and progress of civilization . . . Therefore, the press, like individual citizens, must not abuse its constitutional rights or overlook its obligations to others. Id.
341. See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). Some have questioned the reasoning and logic of the decision and consider it poor precedent. See Pember, supra note 9, at 132-34.
342. 492 A.2d 580.
343. Id. at 584.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 590.
347. Id. at 587.
348. 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
349. Id. at 488.
350. Id. at 492.
351. Id. at 500.
352. Binder v. Superior Court, 242 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Ct. App. 1987); Wood v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. Rptr. 811, 819-20 (Ct. App. 1985); Jones v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 154-55 (Ct. App. 1981) (constitutionalized right to privacy protects details of citizen's medical history); Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 60-61 (Ct. App. 1979).
353. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
354. Id. at 61.
355. Excerpts From Colin L. Powell's News Conference, supra note 2, at A14.
356. The disclosure of some confidential medical information will not satisfy this element of the tort; for instance if one were to disclose the information shared with an internist concerning the symptoms associated with sinusitis, headache, stuffy nose, or earache, it is doubtful that such disclosure would be offensive.
357. Gallon v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 322 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
358. Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
359. Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1990).
360. Boyles v. Kerr, 806 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
361. Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Hillman v. Columbia County, 474 N.W.2d 913 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1991).
362. Courts have recognized and acknowledged that stigma attaches to one who is identified as mentally ill. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26(1979)); In re Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1979). In Roulet, the court noted: In the ideal society, the mentally ill would be the subjects of understanding and compassion rather than ignorance and aversion. But that enlightened view, unfortunately, does not yet prevail. The stigma borne by the mentally ill has frequently been identified in the literature: "a former mental patient may suffer from the social opprobrium which attaches to treatment for mental illness and which have more severe consequences than do the formally imposed disabilities. Many people have an 'irrational fear of the mentally ill.' The former mentally ill person is likely to be treated with distrust and even loathing; he may be socially ostracized . . . . The legal and social consequences of commitment constitute the stigma of mental illness, a stigma that could be as socially debilitating as that of a criminal conviction. Id. (citations omitted).
363. 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 1984).
364. Id. at 667.
365. Id. at 666.
366. Id. at 670.
367. Id.
368. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
369. Id.
370. Rosenthal, supra note 5.
371. Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr, at 773.
372. 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
373. Id. at 295.
374. 215 So. 2d 673 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
375. Id. at 675; see also Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1931); Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Hall v. Post, 355 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988); Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 Rutgers L.J. 41, 58-61 (1974);
376. James R. Beattie, Jr., Note, Privacy in the First Amendment: Private Facts and the Zone of Deliberation, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 899, 913 (1991). But see Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232-33 (7th Cir. 1993); Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1989) (use of rape victim's name necessary to establish credibility of accused claim of innocence), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Pasadena Star-News v. Superior Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Ct. App. 1988); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963); Macon Tele. Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655 (Ga. 1993); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 302-03 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980).
377. See Excerpts From Colin L. Powell's News Conference, supra note 2.
378. See Farnsworth v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546-47 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming district court order denying defendant access to names and addresses of participants in medical study on Toxic Shock Syndrome).
379. Schauer, supra note 166, at 25-30.
380. Id. at 25-26.
381. Id. at 26.
382. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
383. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
384. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
385. 491 U.S. 524.
386. Florida Star v. B J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989).
387. Id. at 528.
388. Id. at 541.
389. Id. at 538. The Court suggested that the police department should tighten its internal policies to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of the names of rape victims. Id.