Sources, Methods, and Competing Perspectives on the End of the Cold War

Diplomatic History

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 283-294

  English, Robert D ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0347875781     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0145-2096.00070     Document Type: Review

References (80)

1. Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? (New York, 1961), 26.
2. A useful interpretive review of many recent works is Melvyn P. Leffler, "Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened," Foreign Affairs 75 (July-August 1996): 120-35.
3. See Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA, 1996); and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, 1994).
4. See Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA, 1996); and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, 1994).
5. For example, on difficulties concerning new documents and interpretations on the origins of the Korean War see Robert C. Tucker's essay in this symposium.
6. For example, the 1962 Cuban and 1979 Afghan ventures were not decided by the full Presidium or Politburo, but by individuals or rump leadership groupings whose motivations - for all the new sources - remain unclear. From Brezhnev's "shadow cabinet" to Gorbachev's "brain trust," many decisions are only recorded in participants' memories, and the Politburo's invariably unanimous "endorsement" was a formal ritual. On Brezhnev's "shadow cabinet" see Vadim Medvedev, V Komande Gorbacheva: Vzgliad iznutri [On Gorbachev's team: A view from within] (Moscow, 1994); Gorbachev's "brain trust" is the term of Pavel Palazchenko, My Years With Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter (University Park, PA, 1997).
7. For example, the 1962 Cuban and 1979 Afghan ventures were not decided by the full Presidium or Politburo, but by individuals or rump leadership groupings whose motivations - for all the new sources - remain unclear. From Brezhnev's "shadow cabinet" to Gorbachev's "brain trust," many decisions are only recorded in participants' memories, and the Politburo's invariably unanimous "endorsement" was a formal ritual. On Brezhnev's "shadow cabinet" see Vadim Medvedev, V Komande Gorbacheva: Vzgliad iznutri [On Gorbachev's team: A view from within] (Moscow, 1994); Gorbachev's "brain trust" is the term of Pavel Palazchenko, My Years With Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter (University Park, PA, 1997).
8. To be absolutely clear, my argument, as illustrated below, is that foreign and domestic woes were a necessary but insufficient condition for adoption of radical new thinking.
9. A leading exponent of this view is Richard Pipes, whose arguments include "Misinterpreting the Cold War: The Hard-Liners Had It Right," Foreign Affairs 74 (January 1995): 154-60.
10. Ibid., 158. See "Rech' tovarishcha A. A. Gromyko na plenume TsK KPSS II Marta 1985 goda" [The speech of comrade A. A. Gromyko at the CC CPSU plenum of II March 1985], Kommunist 5 (1985): 6-7.
11. Ibid., 158. See "Rech' tovarishcha A. A. Gromyko na plenume TsK KPSS II Marta 1985 goda" [The speech of comrade A. A. Gromyko at the CC CPSU plenum of II March 1985], Kommunist 5 (1985): 6-7.
12. See the Politburo resolution of 4 September 1986, in "Ne pozvolim SShA Dostich' Prevoskhodstva" [We won't permit the USA to achieve superiority], Istochnik 2 (1995): 70-72.
13. S. Chugrov, "Kniga Aleksandra Iakovleva i Lilli Marku vo Frantsii" [Alexander Yakovlev and Lilly Marcou's book in France], Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 12 (1991): 139.
14. Ibid. In fact, the reactionary offensive had begun late in Brezhnev's reign and only paused during the seven months of Andropov's active leadership. On some early battles in this struggle see Iakov Etinger, "Ne sleduet uproshchat' slozhnuiu problemu" [Don't oversimplify a complex problem], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 20 March 1993.
15. Ibid. In fact, the reactionary offensive had begun late in Brezhnev's reign and only paused during the seven months of Andropov's active leadership. On some early battles in this struggle see Iakov Etinger, "Ne sleduet uproshchat' slozhnuiu problemu" [Don't oversimplify a complex problem], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 20 March 1993.
16. G. A. Arbatov, Zatianuvsheesia vyzdorovlenie (1953-1985 gg.): Svidetel'stvo sovremennika [A delayed recovery (1953-1985): The testimony of a contemporary] (Moscow, 1991), 337.
17. Izvestiia, 29 April 1990.
18. Ibid., 23 September 1983.
19. Medvedev, V Komande Gorbacheva, 22. Against this backdrop, the 1984 readmission to the Communist Party of Stalin's aged henchman, Vyacheslav Molotov, was also symbolically important.
20. Grishin's bid was seen in his staged, publicized efforts to portray himself as Chernenko's right hand - and obvious successor - as the leader neared death. Yeltsin claims that a list of Grishin's planned Politburo changes was later found; Ligachev disputes this but agrees that a reactionary outcome was indeed narrowly averted. See Boris El'tsin, Ispoved' na zadannuiu temu [Confession on a given theme] (Leningrad, 1990), 101, 109; Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin: The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev (New York, 1993), 32-33, 66-67. On Romanov's moves to dominate the military-industrial complex, "undermine" Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, and build a "springboard" to the top see Roald Z. Sagdeev, The Making of a Soviet Scientist: My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars, ed. Susan Eisenhower (New York, 1994), 259. On Tikhonov's maneuvers and various other "intrigues" see Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy [Life and Reforms] (Moscow, 1995), 1:241-72.
21. Grishin's bid was seen in his staged, publicized efforts to portray himself as Chernenko's right hand - and obvious successor - as the leader neared death. Yeltsin claims that a list of Grishin's planned Politburo changes was later found; Ligachev disputes this but agrees that a reactionary outcome was indeed narrowly averted. See Boris El'tsin, Ispoved' na zadannuiu temu [Confession on a given theme] (Leningrad, 1990), 101, 109; Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin: The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev (New York, 1993), 32-33, 66-67. On Romanov's moves to dominate the military-industrial complex, "undermine" Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, and build a "springboard" to the top see Roald Z. Sagdeev, The Making of a Soviet Scientist: My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars, ed. Susan Eisenhower (New York, 1994), 259. On Tikhonov's maneuvers and various other "intrigues" see Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy [Life and Reforms] (Moscow, 1995), 1:241-72.
22. Grishin's bid was seen in his staged, publicized efforts to portray himself as Chernenko's right hand - and obvious successor - as the leader neared death. Yeltsin claims that a list of Grishin's planned Politburo changes was later found; Ligachev disputes this but agrees that a reactionary outcome was indeed narrowly averted. See Boris El'tsin, Ispoved' na zadannuiu temu [Confession on a given theme] (Leningrad, 1990), 101, 109; Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin: The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev (New York, 1993), 32-33, 66-67. On Romanov's moves to dominate the military-industrial complex, "undermine" Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, and build a "springboard" to the top see Roald Z. Sagdeev, The Making of a Soviet Scientist: My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars, ed. Susan Eisenhower (New York, 1994), 259. On Tikhonov's maneuvers and various other "intrigues" see Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy [Life and Reforms] (Moscow, 1995), 1:241-72.
23. Grishin's bid was seen in his staged, publicized efforts to portray himself as Chernenko's right hand - and obvious successor - as the leader neared death. Yeltsin claims that a list of Grishin's planned Politburo changes was later found; Ligachev disputes this but agrees that a reactionary outcome was indeed narrowly averted. See Boris El'tsin, Ispoved' na zadannuiu temu [Confession on a given theme] (Leningrad, 1990), 101, 109; Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin: The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev (New York, 1993), 32-33, 66-67. On Romanov's moves to dominate the military-industrial complex, "undermine" Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, and build a "springboard" to the top see Roald Z. Sagdeev, The Making of a Soviet Scientist: My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars, ed. Susan Eisenhower (New York, 1994), 259. On Tikhonov's maneuvers and various other "intrigues" see Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy [Life and Reforms] (Moscow, 1995), 1:241-72.
24. Nikolai Ryzhkov, Perestroika: Istoriia predatel'stv [Perestroika: A history of betrayal] (Moscow, 1992), 60.
25. Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin, 74-76.
26. Insightful here is the memoir of former Chernenko aide Vadim Pechenev, Gorbachev: K vershinam vlasti: Iz teoretiko-memuarnykh razmyshlenii [Gorbachev: To the pinnacle of power: Theoretical-memoiristic reflections] (Moscow, 1991), 12-13. Had the Politburo "recommended"' another, it is extremely unlikely that the Central Committee would have done anything but accept that choice too. On the "inner circle" of Politburo members who really decided key issues, as well as on the "traditions" that stifled disagreement once a serious proposal had been made, see Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy 1:248-49.
27. Insightful here is the memoir of former Chernenko aide Vadim Pechenev, Gorbachev: K vershinam vlasti: Iz teoretiko-memuarnykh razmyshlenii [Gorbachev: To the pinnacle of power: Theoretical-memoiristic reflections] (Moscow, 1991), 12-13. Had the Politburo "recommended"' another, it is extremely unlikely that the Central Committee would have done anything but accept that choice too. On the "inner circle" of Politburo members who really decided key issues, as well as on the "traditions" that stifled disagreement once a serious proposal had been made, see Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy 1:248-49.
28. Rvzhkov, Perestroika: Istoriia predatel'stv, 78.
29. Anatoly Dobrynin and Alexander Bessmertnykh interviews with the author, 14 June and 24 December 1993.
30. Pechenev, Gorbachev: K vershinam vlasti, 110. He adds, "our temporary arrangements have a way of becoming permanent." In Gorbachev's account, Ustinov - not Gromyko - was his strongest supporter.
31. Gorgii Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody: Reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pamoshchnika [The price of freedom: Gorbachev's reformation through the eyes of his aide] (Moscow, 1993), 36.
32. Another member of Brezhnev's old guard, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, also could not reach Moscow until after the Politburo's first, probably decisive, post-Chernenko meeting.
33. Pechenev, Gorbachev: K vershinam vlasti, 109. See also former Politburo aide Valerii Legostaev, "Demokrat s radikal'nymi vzgliadami" [A democrat with radical views], Den' 13 (1991): 4. By contrast, as noted above, Gorbachev cites Ustinov as one of his supporters who, had he lived, would surely have backed him in 1985. If so, Ustinov would also surely have regretted it soon thereafter (see below).
34. Pechenev, Gorbachev: K vershinam vlasti, 109. See also former Politburo aide Valerii Legostaev, "Demokrat s radikal'nymi vzgliadami" [A democrat with radical views], Den' 13 (1991): 4. By contrast, as noted above, Gorbachev cites Ustinov as one of his supporters who, had he lived, would surely have backed him in 1985. If so, Ustinov would also surely have regretted it soon thereafter (see below).
35. Ryzhkov, Perestroika: Istoriia predatel'stv, 79.
36. Pechenev, Gorbachev: K vershinam vlasti, 90, 92.
37. Geidar Aliev, interviewed in Andrei Karaulov, Vokrug kremlia [Around the Kremlin] (Moscow, 1990), 267-68.
38. See Pipes, "Misinterpreting the Cold War," 157-58.
39. One of very few analyses to seriously consider the hardline alternatives to Gorbachev's course is George W. Breslauer, "How Do You Sell a Concessionary Foreign Policy?" Post-Soviet Affairs 3 (1994): 279.
40. William E. Colby interview with the author, 17 May 1986. On the foreign policy establishment's immediate skepticism (and confusion) upon Gorbachev's rapid initiatives see S. F. Akhromeev and G. M. Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata: Kriticheskii vzgliad na vneshniuiu politiku SSSR do i fosle 1985 goda [Through the eyes of a marshal and a diplomat: A critical view of Soviet foreign policy before and after 1985] (Moscow, 1992), 65-66, 91.
41. A. S. Cherniaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym Po dnevnikovym zapisiam [Six years with Gorbachev: From private notes] (Moscow, 1993), 110. Some Politburo records of 1985-1988 show a more orthodox Gorbachev arguing for foreign policy changes on grounds of economic necessity. But other sources reveal a truly radical reformer struggling to convince his conservative colleagues to accept initiatives that, importantly, originated within a smaller group of advisers equally motivated by liberal principles of international relations.
42. Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze made no secret of the importance of calm abroad for reform at home, but that is a far cry from the desperation seen by U.S. hardliners. A far more analytically (and empirically) powerful realist argument, but one whose self-conscious emphasis on sources illuminating perceptions of power over evidence on the impact of ideas leads to a similar conclusion on the singular importance of economic crisis, is William C. Wohlforth, " Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 3 (Winter 1994-1995): 91-129.
43. Pipes, "Misinterpreting the Cold War," 158.
44. Stuart Parrott, "Aganbegyan's Press Conference in London," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 486/87, 1 December 1987; Tatyana Zaslavskaya interview with the author, 15 April 1990.
45. E. Primakov, "Uchenyi, rukovoditel',chelovek (K 70-letiiu akademika N. N. Inozemtseva)" [Scholar, leader, man (on the 70th birthday of academician N. N. Inozemtsev)], Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 4 (1991): 106; Sagdeyev, The Making of a Soviet Scientist, 266.
46. E. Primakov, "Uchenyi, rukovoditel',chelovek (K 70-letiiu akademika N. N. Inozemtseva)" [Scholar, leader, man (on the 70th birthday of academician N. N. Inozemtsev)], Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 4 (1991): 106; Sagdeyev, The Making of a Soviet Scientist, 266.
47. Vladimir Tikhonov and Yevgeny Velikhov interviews with the author, 24 May 1990 and 30 December 1993.
48. "Vo mnogom poteriannaia zhizn'" [In many ways a wasted life], Sobesednik 11 (1992); "Vokrug sensatsii i bez nego" [With and without sensation], Moskovskii komsomolets 7 (January 1990).
49. "Vo mnogom poteriannaia zhizn'" [In many ways a wasted life], Sobesednik 11 (1992); "Vokrug sensatsii i bez nego" [With and without sensation], Moskovskii komsomolets 7 (January 1990).
50. Cherniaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym, 15-16, 19-21.
51. Chugrov, "Kniga Aleksandra Iakovleva," 138; Medvedev, V Komande Gorbacheva, 19-20; Oleg Kalugin interview with the author, 14 July 1991. A common view, based on some of his mass-circulation writings of the early to mid-1980s, is that Yakovlev was deeply anti-American. Not only does this ignore other sources, it also conflates anti-Reaganism and anti-Americanism while forgetting the bitter political climate of that time; it was "to deflect attention from his real political agenda, that is radical reform, that he felt obliged to adopt the rhetoric of the most orthodox critics of the U.S." Morton Schwartz, American Political Science Review 86 (June 1992): 590.
52. Chugrov, "Kniga Aleksandra Iakovleva," 138; Medvedev, V Komande Gorbacheva, 19-20; Oleg Kalugin interview with the author, 14 July 1991. A common view, based on some of his mass-circulation writings of the early to mid-1980s, is that Yakovlev was deeply anti-American. Not only does this ignore other sources, it also conflates anti-Reaganism and anti-Americanism while forgetting the bitter political climate of that time; it was "to deflect attention from his real political agenda, that is radical reform, that he felt obliged to adopt the rhetoric of the most orthodox critics of the U.S." Morton Schwartz, American Political Science Review 86 (June 1992): 590.
53. Chugrov, "Kniga Aleksandra Iakovleva," 138; Medvedev, V Komande Gorbacheva, 19-20; Oleg Kalugin interview with the author, 14 July 1991. A common view, based on some of his mass-circulation writings of the early to mid-1980s, is that Yakovlev was deeply anti-American. Not only does this ignore other sources, it also conflates anti-Reaganism and anti-Americanism while forgetting the bitter political climate of that time; it was "to deflect attention from his real political agenda, that is radical reform, that he felt obliged to adopt the rhetoric of the most orthodox critics of the U.S." Morton Schwartz, American Political Science Review 86 (June 1992): 590.
54. Arbatov, Zatianuvsheesia vyzdorovlenie, 338.
55. Vadim Pechenev interview with the author, 30 May 1991. The object of an academic "witch hunt" and banned from publishing or foreign travel, Gorbachev's intervention saved Tsipko's job and halted further attacks: Alexander Tsipko interview with author, 23 May 1990. See also A. S. Tsipko, Nekotorye filosofskie aspekty teorii sotsializma [Some philosophical aspects of socialist theory] (Moscow, 1983).
56. An overview of these changes is Jerry Hough, Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform (New York, 1988).
57. "'500 dnei'i drugie dni moei zhizni" [The "500 days" and other days of my life], Nezavisimaia gazeta, 31 March 1992.
58. Nikolai P. Shmelev, Problemy i perspektivy ekonomicheskikh sviazei Sovietskogo soiuza so stranami zapala [The problems and prospects of economic ties between the Soviet Union and Western countries] (Moscow, 1975), 77. See also idem, Ekonomicheskie sviazi vostok-zapad: Problemy i vozmozhnosti [East-West economic ties: Problems and possibilities] (Moscow, 1976); and idem and V. P. Karavaev, Osobennosti podkhoda evropeiskikh stran SEV k problemam ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii s zapadom [Special aspects of the European CEMA countries' approach to problems of economic relations with the West] (Moscow, 1975).
59. Nikolai P. Shmelev, Problemy i perspektivy ekonomicheskikh sviazei Sovietskogo soiuza so stranami zapala [The problems and prospects of economic ties between the Soviet Union and Western countries] (Moscow, 1975), 77. See also idem, Ekonomicheskie sviazi vostok-zapad: Problemy i vozmozhnosti [East-West economic ties: Problems and possibilities] (Moscow, 1976); and idem and V. P. Karavaev, Osobennosti podkhoda evropeiskikh stran SEV k problemam ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii s zapadom [Special aspects of the European CEMA countries' approach to problems of economic relations with the West] (Moscow, 1975).
60. Nikolai P. Shmelev, Problemy i perspektivy ekonomicheskikh sviazei Sovietskogo soiuza so stranami zapala [The problems and prospects of economic ties between the Soviet Union and Western countries] (Moscow, 1975), 77. See also idem, Ekonomicheskie sviazi vostok-zapad: Problemy i vozmozhnosti [East-West economic ties: Problems and possibilities] (Moscow, 1976); and idem and V. P. Karavaev, Osobennosti podkhoda evropeiskikh stran SEV k problemam ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii s zapadom [Special aspects of the European CEMA countries' approach to problems of economic relations with the West] (Moscow, 1975).
61. A. Nikiforov, Sovremennyi podkhod SShA k problemam razvitiia osvobozhdivshikhsia gosudarstv [The USA's current approach to developmental problems of liberated states] (Moscow, 1980). See also V. L. Sheinis, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia differentsiatsiia razvivaiushikhsia stran: tendentsii i perspektivy [Socioeconomic differentiation of the developing countries: Tendencies and prospects] (Moscow, 1981); E. A. Bragina, Melkoe promyshlennoe proizvodstvo v strategii osvobozhdivshikhsia stran na 80ye gody [Light industrial production in the strategy of liberated countries in the 1980s] (Moscow, 1982).
62. A. Nikiforov, Sovremennyi podkhod SShA k problemam razvitiia osvobozhdivshikhsia gosudarstv [The USA's current approach to developmental problems of liberated states] (Moscow, 1980). See also V. L. Sheinis, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia differentsiatsiia razvivaiushikhsia stran: tendentsii i perspektivy [Socioeconomic differentiation of the developing countries: Tendencies and prospects] (Moscow, 1981); E. A. Bragina, Melkoe promyshlennoe proizvodstvo v strategii osvobozhdivshikhsia stran na 80ye gody [Light industrial production in the strategy of liberated countries in the 1980s] (Moscow, 1982).
63. A. Nikiforov, Sovremennyi podkhod SShA k problemam razvitiia osvobozhdivshikhsia gosudarstv [The USA's current approach to developmental problems of liberated states] (Moscow, 1980). See also V. L. Sheinis, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia differentsiatsiia razvivaiushikhsia stran: tendentsii i perspektivy [Socioeconomic differentiation of the developing countries: Tendencies and prospects] (Moscow, 1981); E. A. Bragina, Melkoe promyshlennoe proizvodstvo v strategii osvobozhdivshikhsia stran na 80ye gody [Light industrial production in the strategy of liberated countries in the 1980s] (Moscow, 1982).
64. A. V. Kozyrev, "Limitation of the Arms Trade," in Problems of Common Security (Moscow, 1984), 140-56.
65. V. P. Lukin, Evoliutsiia politiki SShA v otnoshenii KNR na rubezhe 70kh godov [The evolution of the USA's policy toward the PRC on the eve of the 1970s] (Moscow, 1976).
66. A. G. Arbatov, Novye programmy strategicheskikh vooruzhennykh sil SShA [New U.S. strategic weapons programs] (Moscow, 1977).
67. B. S. Orlov, Sotsial'no-politicheskie korni zapadnogermanskogo neofashizma [The sociopolitical roots of West German neofacism] (Moscow, 1970); Osnovnye cherty zapadnoevropeiskoi politicheskoi integratsii na sovremennom etape [The main contemporary aspects of West European politica integration] (Moscow, 1976).
68. B. S. Orlov, Sotsial'no-politicheskie korni zapadnogermanskogo neofashizma [The sociopolitical roots of West German neofacism] (Moscow, 1970); Osnovnye cherty zapadnoevropeiskoi politicheskoi integratsii na sovremennom etape [The main contemporary aspects of West European politica integration] (Moscow, 1976).
69. See V. I. Dashichev, ed., Problemy vneshnei politiki sotsialisticheskikh stran [Foreign policy problems of the socialist countries] (Moscow, 1980).
70. From an IEMSS memorandum of April 1979, cited in L. G. Beliaeva et al., eds., Istoriia i stalinism [History and Stalinism] (Moscow, 1991), 237-40.
71. "Some Considerations of the Foreign Policy Results of the 19705, 20 January 1980," cited in Moscow News 30 (1989).
72. Nikolai I. Bukharin et al., O prichinakh i sushcbnosti krizisa 1080 g. v PNR [On the causes and nature of the crisis of 1980 in the PPR],June 1981. The implied criticism of Brezhnev's "entourage" and warning of similar crisis in the USSR was clear.
73. Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente (Ithaca, 1984), 26.
74. Essentially agreeing with Gelman, though written in the glasnost era, is Vladimir Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power The Post-Stalin Era (Princeton, 1990), 22.
75. George Breslauer, "Explaining Soviet Policy Changes: Politics, Ideology and Learning," in Soviet Policy in Africa: From the Old to the New Thinking, ed. Breslauer (Berkeley, 1992), 207 . On policy "windows" and "entrepreneurs" see Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," World Politics 45 (1993): 271-300.
76. George Breslauer, "Explaining Soviet Policy Changes: Politics, Ideology and Learning," in Soviet Policy in Africa: From the Old to the New Thinking, ed. Breslauer (Berkeley, 1992), 207 . On policy "windows" and "entrepreneurs" see Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," World Politics 45 (1993): 271-300.
77. Arbatov, Zatianuvsheesia vyzdorovlenie, 49-85.
78. On the historical parallel see Bruce W. Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats (DeKalb, IL, 1982).
79. Adam Michnik, "Tri geneticheskie oshibki" [Three genetic errors], Novoe vremia 1 (1991): 4-7.
80. Expanding on the arguments and evidence cited in this essay, my own contribution to this study is Russia Views the West: Intellectual and Political Origins of Soviet New Thinking (forthcoming, Columbia University Press).