Provincial Power and Provincial Economic Resources in the PRC

Issues and Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 1-18

  Bo, Zhiyue ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

CCindex; Economic reforms; Elite provinces; Provincial economic resources; Provincial power

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347808601     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. For a detailed description of central-provincial fiscal relations in the 1980s, see Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System," The China Quarterly, no. 125 (March 1991): 1-32. For an evaluation of this system, see Christine P.W. Wong, "Central Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China," ibid., no. 128 December 1991): 691-715. For discussions of the consequences of fiscal decentralization on central-local relations, see Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, "Central-Local Fiscal Politics in China," in Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity, ed. Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 91-112; Dali Yang, "Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local Relations," in China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism, ed. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1994), 59-98; and Jae Ho Chung, "Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal," The China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995): 485-508. Some authors stretched the concept of decentralization into the political arena. See, for instance, Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, "Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China," World Politics 48, no. 1 (October 1995): 50-81.
2. For a detailed description of central-provincial fiscal relations in the 1980s, see Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System," The China Quarterly, no. 125 (March 1991): 1-32. For an evaluation of this system, see Christine P.W. Wong, "Central Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China," ibid., no. 128 December 1991): 691-715. For discussions of the consequences of fiscal decentralization on central-local relations, see Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, "Central-Local Fiscal Politics in China," in Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity, ed. Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 91-112; Dali Yang, "Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local Relations," in China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism, ed. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1994), 59-98; and Jae Ho Chung, "Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal," The China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995): 485-508. Some authors stretched the concept of decentralization into the political arena. See, for instance, Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, "Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China," World Politics 48, no. 1 (October 1995): 50-81.
3. For a detailed description of central-provincial fiscal relations in the 1980s, see Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System," The China Quarterly, no. 125 (March 1991): 1-32. For an evaluation of this system, see Christine P.W. Wong, "Central Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China," ibid., no. 128 December 1991): 691-715. For discussions of the consequences of fiscal decentralization on central-local relations, see Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, "Central-Local Fiscal Politics in China," in Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity, ed. Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 91-112; Dali Yang, "Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local Relations," in China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism, ed. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1994), 59-98; and Jae Ho Chung, "Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal," The China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995): 485-508. Some authors stretched the concept of decentralization into the political arena. See, for instance, Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, "Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China," World Politics 48, no. 1 (October 1995): 50-81.
4. For a detailed description of central-provincial fiscal relations in the 1980s, see Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System," The China Quarterly, no. 125 (March 1991): 1-32. For an evaluation of this system, see Christine P.W. Wong, "Central Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China," ibid., no. 128 December 1991): 691-715. For discussions of the consequences of fiscal decentralization on central-local relations, see Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, "Central-Local Fiscal Politics in China," in Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity, ed. Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 91-112; Dali Yang, "Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local Relations," in China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism, ed. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1994), 59-98; and Jae Ho Chung, "Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal," The China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995): 485-508. Some authors stretched the concept of decentralization into the political arena. See, for instance, Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, "Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China," World Politics 48, no. 1 (October 1995): 50-81.
5. For a detailed description of central-provincial fiscal relations in the 1980s, see Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System," The China Quarterly, no. 125 (March 1991): 1-32. For an evaluation of this system, see Christine P.W. Wong, "Central Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China," ibid., no. 128 December 1991): 691-715. For discussions of the consequences of fiscal decentralization on central-local relations, see Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, "Central-Local Fiscal Politics in China," in Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity, ed. Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 91-112; Dali Yang, "Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local Relations," in China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism, ed. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1994), 59-98; and Jae Ho Chung, "Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal," The China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995): 485-508. Some authors stretched the concept of decentralization into the political arena. See, for instance, Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, "Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China," World Politics 48, no. 1 (October 1995): 50-81.
6. For a detailed description of central-provincial fiscal relations in the 1980s, see Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System," The China Quarterly, no. 125 (March 1991): 1-32. For an evaluation of this system, see Christine P.W. Wong, "Central Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China," ibid., no. 128 December 1991): 691-715. For discussions of the consequences of fiscal decentralization on central-local relations, see Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, "Central-Local Fiscal Politics in China," in Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity, ed. Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 91-112; Dali Yang, "Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local Relations," in China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism, ed. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1994), 59-98; and Jae Ho Chung, "Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal," The China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995): 485-508. Some authors stretched the concept of decentralization into the political arena. See, for instance, Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, "Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China," World Politics 48, no. 1 (October 1995): 50-81.
7. For a detailed description of central-provincial fiscal relations in the 1980s, see Michel Oksenberg and James Tong, "The Evolution of Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971-1984: The Formal System," The China Quarterly, no. 125 (March 1991): 1-32. For an evaluation of this system, see Christine P.W. Wong, "Central Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China," ibid., no. 128 December 1991): 691-715. For discussions of the consequences of fiscal decentralization on central-local relations, see Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Wang Shaoguang, "Central-Local Fiscal Politics in China," in Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity, ed. Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 91-112; Dali Yang, "Reform and the Restructuring of Central-Local Relations," in China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism, ed. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1994), 59-98; and Jae Ho Chung, "Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People's Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal," The China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995): 485-508. Some authors stretched the concept of decentralization into the political arena. See, for instance, Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, "Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China," World Politics 48, no. 1 (October 1995): 50-81.
8. For a bibliography of resources for Chinese provinces in general, see Zhiyue Bo, "Chinese Provincia Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1995), 246-52. For sources regarding the study of Zhejiang and Shanxi provinces, see Keith Forster, "Bibliography of Sources for the Study of Zhejiang Province," and David S.G. Goodman, "Bibliography of Sources for the Study of Shanxi Province," both in Provincial China, no. 4 (October 1997): 56-73.
9. For a bibliography of resources for Chinese provinces in general, see Zhiyue Bo, "Chinese Provincia Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1995), 246-52. For sources regarding the study of Zhejiang and Shanxi provinces, see Keith Forster, "Bibliography of Sources for the Study of Zhejiang Province," and David S.G. Goodman, "Bibliography of Sources for the Study of Shanxi Province," both in Provincial China, no. 4 (October 1997): 56-73.
10. For a bibliography of resources for Chinese provinces in general, see Zhiyue Bo, "Chinese Provincia Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1995), 246-52. For sources regarding the study of Zhejiang and Shanxi provinces, see Keith Forster, "Bibliography of Sources for the Study of Zhejiang Province," and David S.G. Goodman, "Bibliography of Sources for the Study of Shanxi Province," both in Provincial China, no. 4 (October 1997): 56-73.
11. For case studies of provincial variations, see David S.G. Goodman Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Ezra F. Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Goodman and Segal, China Deconstructs; Gang Tian, Shanghai's Role in the Economic Development of China: Reform of Foreign Trade and Investment (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996); and David S.G. Goodman, ed., China's Provinces in Reform: Class, Community and Political Culture (London: Routledge, 1997).
12. For case studies of provincial variations, see David S.G. Goodman Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Ezra F. Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Goodman and Segal, China Deconstructs; Gang Tian, Shanghai's Role in the Economic Development of China: Reform of Foreign Trade and Investment (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996); and David S.G. Goodman, ed., China's Provinces in Reform: Class, Community and Political Culture (London: Routledge, 1997).
13. For case studies of provincial variations, see David S.G. Goodman Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Ezra F. Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Goodman and Segal, China Deconstructs; Gang Tian, Shanghai's Role in the Economic Development of China: Reform of Foreign Trade and Investment (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996); and David S.G. Goodman, ed., China's Provinces in Reform: Class, Community and Political Culture (London: Routledge, 1997).
14. For case studies of provincial variations, see David S.G. Goodman Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Ezra F. Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Goodman and Segal, China Deconstructs; Gang Tian, Shanghai's Role in the Economic Development of China: Reform of Foreign Trade and Investment (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996); and David S.G. Goodman, ed., China's Provinces in Reform: Class, Community and Political Culture (London: Routledge, 1997).
15. For case studies of provincial variations, see David S.G. Goodman Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China: Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Ezra F. Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Goodman and Segal, China Deconstructs; Gang Tian, Shanghai's Role in the Economic Development of China: Reform of Foreign Trade and Investment (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996); and David S.G. Goodman, ed., China's Provinces in Reform: Class, Community and Political Culture (London: Routledge, 1997).
16. According to the CCP Constitution, the party's national congress is the decision-making organ which elects the members and alternate members of the Central Committee. The Central Committee in turn selects members of the Politburo, which in turn determines who will be the chairman and vice-chairmen and members of the standing committee. In practice, however, delegates to the party's national congress wield much less power than members and alternate members of the Central Committee, who in turn have less say in national politics than members and alternate members of the Politburo, who in turn have less power than members of the standing committee, who are simply subordinates of the paramount leader who is the ultimate source of power in the system.
17. This hypothesis is inferred from Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. Here she portrays provincial leaders as a vital part of the selectorate, i.e., the Central Committee, which eventually determines the fate of central leaders.
18. The statistics are available from the author, or can be obtained from Appendix 1: "Provincial Central Committee Representation (1969-97)."
19. For a discussion of Maoist efforts to redress the industrial imbalance between coastal and interior regions from the 1950s through the 1970s, see Dali Yang, "Patterns of China's Regional Development Strategy," The China Quarterly, no. 122 (June 1990): 230-57.
20. See Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. In chap. 9 "Playing to the Provinces," she depicts provincial leaders as a group of powerful leaders confronting the central leaders in defense of their local interests. This image is, however, supported by a few anecdotes. For an earlier presentation of a similar view, see Parris H. Chang, Power and Policy in China, second and enlarged edition (University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978). For a counterargument, see David S.G. Goodman, "Provincial Party First Secretaries in National Politics: A Categorical or a Political Group?" in Groups and Politics in the People's Repbulic of China, ed David S.G. Goodman (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1984), 68-82.
21. See Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. In chap. 9 "Playing to the Provinces," she depicts provincial leaders as a group of powerful leaders confronting the central leaders in defense of their local interests. This image is, however, supported by a few anecdotes. For an earlier presentation of a similar view, see Parris H. Chang, Power and Policy in China, second and enlarged edition (University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978). For a counterargument, see David S.G. Goodman, "Provincial Party First Secretaries in National Politics: A Categorical or a Political Group?" in Groups and Politics in the People's Repbulic of China, ed David S.G. Goodman (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1984), 68-82.
22. See Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. In chap. 9 "Playing to the Provinces," she depicts provincial leaders as a group of powerful leaders confronting the central leaders in defense of their local interests. This image is, however, supported by a few anecdotes. For an earlier presentation of a similar view, see Parris H. Chang, Power and Policy in China, second and enlarged edition (University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978). For a counterargument, see David S.G. Goodman, "Provincial Party First Secretaries in National Politics: A Categorical or a Political Group?" in Groups and Politics in the People's Repbulic of China, ed David S.G. Goodman (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1984), 68-82.
23. Wu's transfer was in fact a promotion because Shandong was an elite province while Jiangxi was not. His promotion was reportedly due to his ability to speak the Beijing language well with a local (Jiangxi) accent while he was party secretary of Jiangxi province. He acquired a Shandong accent after his appointment as party secretary of Shandong province. See China News Analysis, no. 1584 (May 1, 1997): 6.
24. Xie is now a vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the largest united front organization in China.
25. Since alternate Politburo members and above are concurrently full members of the Central Committee, they receive additional points to their full membership points; we can avoid double counting in this way.
26. In 1965, Mao Zedong complained that in Beijing he had no room to put a needle or a drop of water; he thus started the Cultural Revolution from Shanghai. Thirty years later, Jiang Zemin launched a direct attack on the apparatus of the Beijing government.
27. This measure is approximately equivalent to the United Nations' Net Material Product (NMP).
28. Provincial income has been replaced by provincial gross domestic product (GDP) in the China Statistical Yearbook since 1993. See China Statistical Yearbook 1993 and beyond.
29. This will be only an approximate figure, as real revenue contributions are different from budgetary surpluses, but have a positive linear relationship.
30. The year 1997 is missing due to lack of data.