The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949

Diplomatic History

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 95-104

  Sheng, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347803748     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00054     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. For examples, see Joseph W. Esherick, ed., Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John Service (New York, 1974); Barbara W. Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives," Foreign Affairs 51 (October 1972): 44-64; and Donald S. Zagoria, "Containment and China," in Caging the Bear, ed. Charles Gati (Indianapolis, 1974), 109-27.
2. For examples, see Joseph W. Esherick, ed., Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John Service (New York, 1974); Barbara W. Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives," Foreign Affairs 51 (October 1972): 44-64; and Donald S. Zagoria, "Containment and China," in Caging the Bear, ed. Charles Gati (Indianapolis, 1974), 109-27.
3. For examples, see Joseph W. Esherick, ed., Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John Service (New York, 1974); Barbara W. Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives," Foreign Affairs 51 (October 1972): 44-64; and Donald S. Zagoria, "Containment and China," in Caging the Bear, ed. Charles Gati (Indianapolis, 1974), 109-27.
4. See Michael M. Sheng, "America's Lost Chance in China? A Reappraisal of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States before 1945," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 29 (January 1993): 135-57; idem, "Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States and the Myth of the 'Lost Chance,' 1948-1950," Modern Asian Studies 28:3 (July 1994): 475-502; and idem, "The United States, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Soviet Union, 1948- 1950: A Reappraisal," Pacific Historical Review 63 (November 1994): 521-36.
5. See Michael M. Sheng, "America's Lost Chance in China? A Reappraisal of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States before 1945," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 29 (January 1993): 135-57; idem, "Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States and the Myth of the 'Lost Chance,' 1948-1950," Modern Asian Studies 28:3 (July 1994): 475-502; and idem, "The United States, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Soviet Union, 1948- 1950: A Reappraisal," Pacific Historical Review 63 (November 1994): 521-36.
6. See Michael M. Sheng, "America's Lost Chance in China? A Reappraisal of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States before 1945," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 29 (January 1993): 135-57; idem, "Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States and the Myth of the 'Lost Chance,' 1948-1950," Modern Asian Studies 28:3 (July 1994): 475-502; and idem, "The United States, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1950: A Reappraisal," Pacific Historical Review 63 (November 1994): 521-36.
7. Stuart R. Schram, ed., Mao's Road to Power, Revolutionary Writings, 1912-1920 (New York, 1992), xvii.
8. Quoted from Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, MA, 1968), 28.
9. Schram, Mao's Road to Power, 250, 399, 505.
10. Some scholars tend to use the scarcity of Soviet aid to the CCP as an explanation for Mao's alleged alienation from Moscow. For instance, see John W. Garver, "The Soviet Union and the Xi'an Incident," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 26 (July 1991): 145-75. For a criticism of this interpretation see Michael Sheng, "Mao, Stalin, and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front: 1935-1937," China Quarterly 129 (March 1992): 149-70.
11. Some scholars tend to use the scarcity of Soviet aid to the CCP as an explanation for Mao's alleged alienation from Moscow. For instance, see John W. Garver, "The Soviet Union and the Xi'an Incident," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 26 (July 1991): 145-75. For a criticism of this interpretation see Michael Sheng, "Mao, Stalin, and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front: 1935-1937," China Quarterly 129 (March 1992): 149-70.
12. For examples, see John W. Garver, "The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party," China Quarterly 113 (March 1988): 29-59;
13. and Harrison E. Salisbury, New Emperors, China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston, 1992), 84.
14. Mao Zedong nianpu [Chronology of Mao], ed. Document Research Office of the CCP Center (Beijing, 1993), 1:311-27, 339-40.
15. Ibid., 377-91, 398, 420.
16. Influenced by the myth of Mao's own making, it has been taken for granted in the West that Mao was removed from military command before January 1935 by the Comintern and its proxies due to his opposition to the "left-deviationist" policy line. See Garver, "The Origins of the Second United Front";
17. and Salisbury, New Emperor, 84.
18. For a more detailed discussion see Sheng, "Mao, Stalin," 150-58; and idem, "Maoist Dualism and Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1935-1949" (Ph.D. diss., York University, 1991), 21-196.
19. For a more detailed discussion see Sheng, "Mao, Stalin," 150-58; and idem, "Maoist Dualism and Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1935-1949" (Ph.D. diss., York University, 1991), 21-196.
20. Huang Qijun, "The Process of Restoring Electronic Communication between the Party and the Comintern in 1935-36," Dangshi Yanjiu 2 (1987): 23. See also Sheng, "Mao, Stalin," 159.
21. Huang Qijun, "The Process of Restoring Electronic Communication between the Party and the Comintern in 1935-36," Dangshi Yanjiu 2 (1987): 23. See also Sheng, "Mao, Stalin," 159.
22. Mao Zedong wenji [The collection of Mao's writings] (Beijing, 1993), 1:363-71. While the Chinese government of the time was resentful of Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia and refused to accept its independence, Mao had good reasons, as we will see, to feel blessed that Soviet control over Outer Mongolia was strengthened in the 1930s.
23. The last two paragraphs are based on Mao's telegraphs and writings in 1935-36, Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collection of Mao's military writings] (Beijing, 1993), 1:398-655. See also Sheng, "Mao, Stalin."
24. The last two paragraphs are based on Mao's telegraphs and writings in 1935-36, Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collection of Mao's military writings] (Beijing, 1993), 1:398-655. See also Sheng, "Mao, Stalin."
25. Zhou Enlai nianpu [Chronology of Zhou] (Beijing, 1989), 509. Some scholars tend to believe that Stalin intended to sacrifice the CCP's armed force for the sake of Soviet interest, and Mao resisted Stalin's attempt. See John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York, 1988), 57-68.
26. Zhou Enlai nianpu [Chronology of Zhou] (Beijing, 1989), 509. Some scholars tend to believe that Stalin intended to sacrifice the CCP's armed force for the sake of Soviet interest, and Mao resisted Stalin's attempt. See John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York, 1988), 57-68.
27. A great number of new documents indicate that Soviet military aid to the CCP in Manchuria was massive, that CCP-USSR cooperation in Manchuria in 1945-46 was extensive, and that Mao's strategic planning was made and changed according to Soviet advice. A detailed discussion on this topic will be presented elsewhere.
28. For a detailed discussion see Sheng, "Mao, Stalin."
29. For a detailed description of the process see Sheng, "Maoist Dualism," 110-14.
30. At the time, as Stalin pointed out, the CCP could not politically afford to take the blame for initiating a civil war; and militarily, the CCP was still much weaker than its enemy. A willful Mao in the post-Stalin era, however, disregarded the facts and contended that Stalin was so conservative in 1945 that he prevented the CCP from making revolution. Mao's contention has been taken for granted by many scholars in the West. For more discussion
31. See Mao tel. to Zhou Enlai, 3 February 1945, Zhonggong zhongyang kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian [Selected documents of the party center on the anti-Japanese united front] (Beijing, 1985), 3:790. See also Sheng, "The United States," 528.
32. See Mao tel. to Zhou Enlai, 3 February 1945, Zhonggong zhongyang kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian [Selected documents of the party center on the anti-Japanese united front] (Beijing, 1985), 3:790. See also Sheng, "The United States," 528.
33. See Bo Yibo, Ruogang zhongda jueze yu shijian de huigu [Recollection of several important policies and events] (Beijing, 1991), 36-37. See also Sheng, "The United States," 528-31.
34. See Bo Yibo, Ruogang zhongda jueze yu shijian de huigu [Recollection of several important policies and events] (Beijing, 1991), 36-37. See also Sheng, "The United States," 528-31.
35. This and the following two paragraphs are based on seven telegrams between Mao and Stalin, available in Chinese Historians 7 (Spring-Fall 1994): 163-72.
36. See Mao tel. to Zhou Enlai, 25 October 1940, Wannan shibian: Zhiliao xuanbian [The New Fourth Army Incident: Collection of materials) (Beijing, 1982), 34-36. See also Sheng, "America's Lost Chance," 143-46.
37. See Mao tel. to Zhou Enlai, 25 October 1940, Wannan shibian: Zhiliao xuanbian [The New Fourth Army Incident: Collection of materials) (Beijing, 1982), 34-36. See also Sheng, "America's Lost Chance," 143-46.
38. See Shi Zhe, Shi Zhe huiyilu [Shi Zhe memoirs] (Beijing, 1991), 394; and Sergei N. Goncharov, "Interview: Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 4 (1991): 47. See also Sheng, "The United States," 525-27; and idem, "Chinese Communist Policy," 486-92.
39. See Shi Zhe, Shi Zhe huiyilu [Shi Zhe memoirs] (Beijing, 1991), 394; and Sergei N. Goncharov, "Interview: Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 4 (1991): 47. See also Sheng, "The United States," 525-27; and idem, "Chinese Communist Policy," 486-92.
40. See Shi Zhe, Shi Zhe huiyilu [Shi Zhe memoirs] (Beijing, 1991), 394; and Sergei N. Goncharov, "Interview: Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 4 (1991): 47. See also Sheng, "The United States," 525-27; and idem, "Chinese Communist Policy," 486-92.
41. See Shi Zhe, Shi Zhe huiyilu [Shi Zhe memoirs] (Beijing, 1991), 394; and Sergei N. Goncharov, "Interview: Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 4 (1991): 47. See also Sheng, "The United States," 525-27; and idem, "Chinese Communist Policy," 486-92.