Review Article: Constitutionalism and Democracy - Political Theory and the American Constitution

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 595-618

  Bellamy, Richard ^a   Castiglione, Dario ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347799654     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123497000288     Document Type: Review

References (132)

1. See S. S. Wohn, 'Collective Identity and Constitutional Power', in The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 8; cf. also the variolas studies in J. Elster and R. Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). On the restriction of scope that constitutionalism imposes on democracy, see A. Weale, 'The Limits of Democracy', in A. Hamlin and P. Pettit, eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); and R. Ruffilli, 'Riforma delle istituzioni e trasformazione della politica', in Istituzioni Società Stato, vol. III, (Bologna: II Mulino, 1991), pp. 707-21.
2. See S. S. Wohn, 'Collective Identity and Constitutional Power', in The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 8; cf. also the variolas studies in J. Elster and R. Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). On the restriction of scope that constitutionalism imposes on democracy, see A. Weale, 'The Limits of Democracy', in A. Hamlin and P. Pettit, eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); and R. Ruffilli, 'Riforma delle istituzioni e trasformazione della politica', in Istituzioni Società Stato, vol. III, (Bologna: II Mulino, 1991), pp. 707-21.
3. See S. S. Wohn, 'Collective Identity and Constitutional Power', in The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 8; cf. also the variolas studies in J. Elster and R. Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). On the restriction of scope that constitutionalism imposes on democracy, see A. Weale, 'The Limits of Democracy', in A. Hamlin and P. Pettit, eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); and R. Ruffilli, 'Riforma delle istituzioni e trasformazione della politica', in Istituzioni Società Stato, vol. III, (Bologna: II Mulino, 1991), pp. 707-21.
4. See S. S. Wohn, 'Collective Identity and Constitutional Power', in The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 8; cf. also the variolas studies in J. Elster and R. Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). On the restriction of scope that constitutionalism imposes on democracy, see A. Weale, 'The Limits of Democracy', in A. Hamlin and P. Pettit, eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); and R. Ruffilli, 'Riforma delle istituzioni e trasformazione della politica', in Istituzioni Società Stato, vol. III, (Bologna: II Mulino, 1991), pp. 707-21.
5. Cf. P. Jones, Rights (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 173-5.
6. Even supporters of constitutionalism against democracy regard too rigid a constitution as problematic; see, for instance, A. de Tocqueville, who argued in favour of easy and methodic change: Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848, quoted in J. Elster, Argomentare e negoziare (Milano: Anabasi, 1993), p. 23, n. 15. This book consists of 'Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies', Storrs Lectures 1991, which have yet to be published in English.
7. Even supporters of constitutionalism against democracy regard too rigid a constitution as problematic; see, for instance, A. de Tocqueville, who argued in favour of easy and methodic change: Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848, quoted in J. Elster, Argomentare e negoziare (Milano: Anabasi, 1993), p. 23, n. 15. This book consists of 'Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies', Storrs Lectures 1991, which have yet to be published in English.
8. Even supporters of constitutionalism against democracy regard too rigid a constitution as problematic; see, for instance, A. de Tocqueville, who argued in favour of easy and methodic change: Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848, quoted in J. Elster, Argomentare e negoziare (Milano: Anabasi, 1993), p. 23, n. 15. This book consists of 'Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies', Storrs Lectures 1991, which have yet to be published in English.
9. Neither we nor the authors discussed regard these two traditions as either historically or substantively exclusive. On the contrary, we concur with those writers who have stressed their complementarity, such as J. Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. Liberalism: A Reconsideration', History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), 349-77; and S. Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 5. It is nevertheless possible to emphasize one more than the other.
10. Neither we nor the authors discussed regard these two traditions as either historically or substantively exclusive. On the contrary, we concur with those writers who have stressed their complementarity, such as J. Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. Liberalism: A Reconsideration', History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), 349-77; and S. Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 5. It is nevertheless possible to emphasize one more than the other.
11. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
12. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
13. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
14. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
15. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
16. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
17. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
18. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
19. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
20. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
21. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
22. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
23. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
24. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
25. Of particular importance for our discussion in this section are Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, especially the essays by Holmes, Ackerman and Sunstein; W. F. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. N. Katz, M. B. Oliviero and S. C. Wheatley, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); N. MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', in R. Bellamy, ed., Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); C. R. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy: A New Legal Order for Eastern Europe - Constitutionalism and Secession', in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London: Routledge, 1994); first published as 'Constitutionalism and Secession' in The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 633-70; S. L. Elkin and K. E. Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), notably the essays by Elkin and Sunstein; J. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51; J. Arthur, Words that Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 2-11; J. Habernas, 'On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), 12-21; Holmes, Passions and Constraint; R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, eds, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995); R. Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Hants.: Avebury, 1996), and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
26. Jon Elster has rightly noted that from a purely technical point of view written constitutions have three main functions: (1) to define and protect rights; (2) to establish a map of political powers; and (3) to fix the procedures for constitutional revision (cf. 'Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction', The University of Chicago Law Review, 58 (1991), 447-82). We, however, wish to focus on the conceptual justifications underlying these functions in so far as they concern the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy.
27. Sunstein, 'Approaching Democracy', pp. 16-18. His examples, drawn from the American experience, are the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Commerce Clause.
28. For a recent and succinct restatement of classical constitutionalism, see L. Ferrajoli, 'Dai diritti del cittadino ai diritti della persona', in D. Zolo, ed., La Cittadinanza: Appartenenza, identità, diritti (Rome: Laterza, 1994), p 284.
29. On the importance of considering the 'social' attacks against personal liberty, cf. E. W. Böckenförde, Recht, Staat, Freiheit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), transl. State, Society and Liberty (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1991), in particular chap. 10.
30. On the importance of considering the 'social' attacks against personal liberty, cf. E. W. Böckenförde, Recht, Staat, Freiheit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), transl. State, Society and Liberty (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1991), in particular chap. 10.
31. C. Pateman, 'Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy', in A. Phillips, ed., Feminism and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
32. Lochner v. New York (1905) was the most famous case of this period, and involved the Supreme Court striking down a maximum-hours law limiting bakers to a sixty-hour week.
33. In addition to the kind of objections we have just made in the main text, the defence of property rights is often flawed because based on a confusion between the 'universal' and the 'singular' aspects of the right itself. The former establish the right to own property in general as part of the autonomy of the individual (but this does not sanction the particular form in which property has to be enjoyed); while the latter establish the particular form that the right to own property can take in a society, so defining the exercise of the right to property of a particular individual or group by excluding others. Cf. Weale, 'Limits', pp. 42-3; and Ferrajoli, 'Dai diritti', pp. 268-72.
34. In addition to the kind of objections we have just made in the main text, the defence of property rights is often flawed because based on a confusion between the 'universal' and the 'singular' aspects of the right itself. The former establish the right to own property in general as part of the autonomy of the individual (but this does not sanction the particular form in which property has to be enjoyed); while the latter establish the particular form that the right to own property can take in a society, so defining the exercise of the right to property of a particular individual or group by excluding others. Cf. Weale, 'Limits', pp. 42-3; and Ferrajoli, 'Dai diritti', pp. 268-72.
35. Cf S. Holmes, 'Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy', in Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, chap. 7.
36. Waldron, 'A Rights-Based Critique', in particular pp. 46-9.
37. Holmes, 'Precommitment', offers a brief history of the doctrine, noting the importance of Paine and Locke and also the standard criticisms of Hume, Madison and others. See too MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', and Arthur, Words that Bind, pp. 20-3, 24-32.
38. Holmes, 'Precommitment', offers a brief history of the doctrine, noting the importance of Paine and Locke and also the standard criticisms of Hume, Madison and others. See too MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', and Arthur, Words that Bind, pp. 20-3, 24-32.
39. Holmes, 'Precommitment', offers a brief history of the doctrine, noting the importance of Paine and Locke and also the standard criticisms of Hume, Madison and others. See too MacCormick, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', and Arthur, Words that Bind, pp. 20-3, 24-32.
40. T. Jefferson, Letter to Samuel Kercheval, 12 July 1816, in M. D. Peterson, ed., The Portable Thomas Jefferson (New York: Viking Press, 1975), p. 560.
41. Cf. S. Holmes, 'Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission', in Elster and Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy.
42. C. R. Sunstein, 'Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue', in Elster and Slagstand, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy, pp. 339-40.
43. The key statement here is fn. 4 of United States v. Carolene Products of 1938. For a clear discussion of the issues, see Arthur, Words that Bind, pp. 48-52. The fullest philosophical defence of the proceduralist argument is J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
44. The key statement here is fn. 4 of United States v. Carolene Products of 1938. For a clear discussion of the issues, see Arthur, Words that Bind, pp. 48-52. The fullest philosophical defence of the proceduralist argument is J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
45. Quoted in Arthur, Words that Bind, p. 50.
46. See, for example, D. J. Amy, Real Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation Elections in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and L. Gauinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1994).
47. See, for example, D. J. Amy, Real Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation Elections in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and L. Gauinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1994).
48. See C. H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1940), chap. 2.
49. For example, B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), chap. 7; Sunstein, Partial Constitution, chap. 1; R. Bellamy, 'The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy' and S. Elkin, 'Madison and After: The American Model of Political Constitution', both in Bellamy and Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation.
50. For example, B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), chap. 7; Sunstein, Partial Constitution, chap. 1; R. Bellamy, 'The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy' and S. Elkin, 'Madison and After: The American Model of Political Constitution', both in Bellamy and Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation.
51. For example, B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), chap. 7; Sunstein, Partial Constitution, chap. 1; R. Bellamy, 'The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy' and S. Elkin, 'Madison and After: The American Model of Political Constitution', both in Bellamy and Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation.
52. For example, B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), chap. 7; Sunstein, Partial Constitution, chap. 1; R. Bellamy, 'The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy' and S. Elkin, 'Madison and After: The American Model of Political Constitution', both in Bellamy and Castiglione, eds, Constitutionalism in Transformation.
53. For example, Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy', pp. 2-5.
54. Waldron, 'A Rights-Based Critique', p. 40.
55. CfJ. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), in particular Lectures 1, 4, 6 and 8. The main ideas were expressed in two earlier articles: 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 223-51; and 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7 (1987), 1-25.
56. CfJ. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), in particular Lectures 1, 4, 6 and 8. The main ideas were expressed in two earlier articles: 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 223-51; and 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7 (1987), 1-25.
57. CfJ. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), in particular Lectures 1, 4, 6 and 8. The main ideas were expressed in two earlier articles: 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 223-51; and 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7 (1987), 1-25.
58. This feature is particularly evident in Lectures 6 and 8 of Rawls, Political Liberalism, for example pp. 231-40 and pp. 340-63, which consist of detailed accounts of the Supreme Court's function and a discussion of certain test cases with regard to free speech and equal opportunities.
59. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 10.
60. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 54-8.
61. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 9-14.
62. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 'Introduction'.
63. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 22-8.
64. Cf. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 234-5.
65. In his review of Political Liberalism, Ackerman emphasizes the danger of relativism implicit in Rawls's new position (cf. B. Ackerman, 'Political Liberalisms', Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994), 364-86). He argues that Rawls's political liberalism is worryingly 'parasitic upon liberal practice' (p. 375), and he tries to suggest that appeals to the 'public political culture' of present democracies should be distinguished from a discourse based on the idea of an 'overlapping consensus' (pp. 376-7). He also argues in favour of a 'constitutive form of public reason' (p. 368), one on which citizens of the liberal state can 'construct a new dimension to their social identity' instead of stripping themselves of their other attachments and obligations in order to enter the public space (pp. 369-71). Michael Sandel (cf. 'Review of Political Liberalism', Harvard Law Review, 107 (1994), 1765-94) suggests that it is possible to interpret Rawls's revised position as 'thoroughly historicist and antiuniversalist' (Sandel quotes here from Richard Rorty), so that in this view 'social policy needs no more authority than successful accommodation amongst individuals' (p. 1175). Sandel, however, opts for a different interpretation (see below pp. 1789-94). See too R. Bellamy and M. Hollis, 'Liberal Justice: Political and Metaphysical', Philosophical Quarterly, 45 (1995), 1-19, at p. 14.
66. In his review of Political Liberalism, Ackerman emphasizes the danger of relativism implicit in Rawls's new position (cf. B. Ackerman, 'Political Liberalisms', Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994), 364-86). He argues that Rawls's political liberalism is worryingly 'parasitic upon liberal practice' (p. 375), and he tries to suggest that appeals to the 'public political culture' of present democracies should be distinguished from a discourse based on the idea of an 'overlapping consensus' (pp. 376-7). He also argues in favour of a 'constitutive form of public reason' (p. 368), one on which citizens of the liberal state can 'construct a new dimension to their social identity' instead of stripping themselves of their other attachments and obligations in order to enter the public space (pp. 369-71). Michael Sandel (cf. 'Review of Political Liberalism', Harvard Law Review, 107 (1994), 1765-94) suggests that it is possible to interpret Rawls's revised position as 'thoroughly historicist and antiuniversalist' (Sandel quotes here from Richard Rorty), so that in this view 'social policy needs no more authority than successful accommodation amongst individuals' (p. 1175). Sandel, however, opts for a different interpretation (see below pp. 1789-94). See too R. Bellamy and M. Hollis, 'Liberal Justice: Political and Metaphysical', Philosophical Quarterly, 45 (1995), 1-19, at p. 14.
67. In his review of Political Liberalism, Ackerman emphasizes the danger of relativism implicit in Rawls's new position (cf. B. Ackerman, 'Political Liberalisms', Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994), 364-86). He argues that Rawls's political liberalism is worryingly 'parasitic upon liberal practice' (p. 375), and he tries to suggest that appeals to the 'public political culture' of present democracies should be distinguished from a discourse based on the idea of an 'overlapping consensus' (pp. 376-7). He also argues in favour of a 'constitutive form of public reason' (p. 368), one on which citizens of the liberal state can 'construct a new dimension to their social identity' instead of stripping themselves of their other attachments and obligations in order to enter the public space (pp. 369-71). Michael Sandel (cf. 'Review of Political Liberalism', Harvard Law Review, 107 (1994), 1765-94) suggests that it is possible to interpret Rawls's revised position as 'thoroughly historicist and antiuniversalist' (Sandel quotes here from Richard Rorty), so that in this view 'social policy needs no more authority than successful accommodation amongst individuals' (p. 1175). Sandel, however, opts for a different interpretation (see below pp. 1789-94). See too R. Bellamy and M. Hollis, 'Liberal Justice: Political and Metaphysical', Philosophical Quarterly, 45 (1995), 1-19, at p. 14.
68. The locus classicus for this argument is probably E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), for example, pp. 33-5.
69. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 19.
70. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 30-1.
71. See especially Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xxv, where he describes 'stability' rather than 'the highest good' as the defining issue of political justice.
72. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 146.
73. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 151, n. 16.
74. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Lecture 8.
75. This criticism is developed more fully in R. Bellamy, 'Pluralism, Liberal Constitutionalism and Democracy: A Critique of John Rawls's (Meta)Political Liberalism', in J. Meadowcroft, ed., The Liberal Political Tradition: Contemporary Reappraisals (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996).
76. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 240. This position is put forward most forcefully by R. Dworkin, 'The Forum of Principle', in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
77. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 240. This position is put forward most forcefully by R. Dworkin, 'The Forum of Principle', in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
78. For a pathbreaking, if occasionally overstated, analysis of this phenomenon amongst British judges, see J. G. A. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Glasgow: Fontana, 1981). Parallel observations so far as American courts are concerned have fuelled the Critical Legal Studies movement; for example, M. Tushnet, Red, White and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).
79. For a pathbreaking, if occasionally overstated, analysis of this phenomenon amongst British judges, see J. G. A. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Glasgow: Fontana, 1981). Parallel observations so far as American courts are concerned have fuelled the Critical Legal Studies movement; for example, M. Tushnet, Red, White and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).
80. Sunstein, Partial Constitution, pp. 145-9.
81. B. Crick, In Defence of Politics (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1962), p. 24; cf. also I. Hampsher-Monk, 'The Individualist Premise and the Practice of Politics', in I. Hampsher-Monk, ed., Defending Politics (London and New York: British Academic Press, St. Martin's Press, 1993).
82. B. Crick, In Defence of Politics (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1962), p. 24; cf. also I. Hampsher-Monk, 'The Individualist Premise and the Practice of Politics', in I. Hampsher-Monk, ed., Defending Politics (London and New York: British Academic Press, St. Martin's Press, 1993).
83. Ackerman, We the People, pp. 3-33.
84. Ackerman, We the People, pp. 181-3; 186-95.
85. Ackerman, We the People, pp. 266-94.
86. Ackerman, We the People, pp. 58-104.
87. Ackerman, We the People, pp. 7-24.
88. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 233.
89. One of the objections advanced against Ackerman's distinction between normal and constitutional politics is that it does not solve the dualism between reason and consent which is at the centre of Ackerman's own analysis, cf. M. and W. A. Galston, 'Reason, Consent, and the US Constitution: Bruce Ackerman's We the People', Ethics, 104 (1994), 446-66. Don Herzog has objected that Ackerman's 'dualism' confuses three different questions: the subject, the manner and the object of political action: 'Democratic Credentials', Ethics, 104 (1994), 467-79.
90. One of the objections advanced against Ackerman's distinction between normal and constitutional politics is that it does not solve the dualism between reason and consent which is at the centre of Ackerman's own analysis, cf. M. and W. A. Galston, 'Reason, Consent, and the US Constitution: Bruce Ackerman's We the People', Ethics, 104 (1994), 446-66. Don Herzog has objected that Ackerman's 'dualism' confuses three different questions: the subject, the manner and the object of political action: 'Democratic Credentials', Ethics, 104 (1994), 467-79.
91. Cf. Holmes, 'Precommitment', pp. 215-21.
92. Jefferson, Letter to James Madison, 6 September 1789, The Portable Thomas Jefferson, pp. 444-51.
93. J. Madison, Letter to T. Jefferson, 4 February 1790, in M. Meyers, ed., The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison (Hanover, Pa.: Brandeis University Press, 1981), pp. 176-9.
94. Ackerman, We the People, pp. 50-6; on Reaganism as an attempt at a counterrevolution against the legacy of the New Deal, cf. Wolin, 'Collective Identity'.
95. Ackerman, We the People, pp. 50-6; on Reaganism as an attempt at a counterrevolution against the legacy of the New Deal, cf. Wolin, 'Collective Identity'.
96. Cf. B. Ackerman, 'Rooted Cosmopolitanism', Ethics, 104 (1994), 516-35.
97. There are two different senses in which one can understand the 'entrenchment' of rights: in the constitutional sense of rights which have special protection against normal procedures of legislation and policy making (this is the meaning that Ackerman gives to all constitutional rights in 'dualist' democracies, where absolute entrenchment can only be conceived as a temporary measure); and in the supra-constitutional sense of irrevocable entrenchment, revocable only by a complete subversion of the constitutional regime.
98. Ackerman, 'Rooted Cosmopolitanism', pp. 533-5; cf. also We the People, pp. 319-22. This conclusion is in line with the standard cosmopolitan view of constitutionalism according to which if certain fundamental rights are established to defend the individual against the majority, there is no particular reason why a 'qualified' majority (in either quantitative or qualitative terms) should be any different from a 'simple' majority (for a statement of this position, cf. Ferrajoli, 'Dai diritti', p. 285). Indeed, in his review of Political Liberalism, Ackerman seems to adopt a much more standardly liberal position, cf. 'Political Liberalisms', pp. 364-86. The kind of distinctions which in this piece Ackerman makes between his and Rawls's liberalism do not reflect the one identified in our article, which is mainly based on Ackerman's position as put forward in We the People.
99. Ackerman, 'Rooted Cosmopolitanism', pp. 533-5; cf. also We the People, pp. 319-22. This conclusion is in line with the standard cosmopolitan view of constitutionalism according to which if certain fundamental rights are
100. Ackerman, 'Rooted Cosmopolitanism', pp. 533-5; cf. also We the People, pp. 319-22. This conclusion is in line with the standard cosmopolitan view of constitutionalism according to which if certain fundamental rights are established to defend the individual against the majority, there is no particular reason why a 'qualified' majority (in either quantitative or qualitative terms) should be any different from a 'simple' majority (for a statement of this position, cf. Ferrajoli, 'Dai diritti', p. 285). Indeed, in his review of Political Liberalism, Ackerman seems to adopt a much more standardly liberal position, cf. 'Political Liberalisms', pp. 364-86. The kind of distinctions which in this piece Ackerman makes between his and Rawls's liberalism do not reflect the one identified in our article, which is mainly based on Ackerman's position as put forward in We the People.
101. Ackerman, 'Rooted Cosmopolitanism', pp. 533-5; cf. also We the People, pp. 319-22. This conclusion is in line with the standard cosmopolitan view of constitutionalism according to which if certain fundamental rights are established to defend the individual against the majority, there is no particular reason why a 'qualified' majority (in either quantitative or qualitative terms) should be any different from a 'simple' majority (for a statement of this position, cf. Ferrajoli, 'Dai diritti', p. 285). Indeed, in his review of Political Liberalism, Ackerman seems to adopt a much more standardly liberal position, cf. 'Political Liberalisms', pp. 364-86. The kind of distinctions which in this piece Ackerman makes between his and Rawls's liberalism do not reflect the one identified in our article, which is mainly based on Ackerman's position as put forward in We the People.
102. Ackerman, 'Rooted Cosmopolitanism', pp. 533-5; cf. also We the People, pp. 319-22. This conclusion is in line with the standard cosmopolitan view of constitutionalism according to which if certain fundamental rights are established to defend the individual against the majority, there is no particular reason why a 'qualified' majority (in either quantitative or qualitative terms) should be any different from a 'simple' majority (for a statement of this position, cf. Ferrajoli, 'Dai diritti', p. 285). Indeed, in his review of Political Liberalism, Ackerman seems to adopt a much more standardly liberal position, cf. 'Political Liberalisms', pp. 364-86. The kind of distinctions which in this piece Ackerman makes between his and Rawls's liberalism do not reflect the one identified in our article, which is mainly based on Ackerman's position as put forward in We the People.
103. In fact, the uniqueness argument is easily refuted by considering the whole debate on the relationship between constituent power and constituted powers in France since the Revolution. See L. Jaume, 'Il potere costituente in Francia dal 1789 a De Gaulle', in P. Pombeni, Potere costituente e riforme costituzionali (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992); and M-J. Redor, De l'État legal a l'État de droit (Paris: Economica, Presses Universitaries d'Aix- Marseille, 1992).
104. In fact, the uniqueness argument is easily refuted by considering the whole debate on the relationship between constituent power and constituted powers in France since the Revolution. See L. Jaume, 'Il potere costituente in Francia dal 1789 a De Gaulle', in P. Pombeni, Potere costituente e riforme costituzionali (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992); and M-J. Redor, De l'État legal a l'État de droit (Paris: Economica, Presses Universitaries d'Aix- Marseille, 1992).
105. B. Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992).
106. Ackerman, We the People, pp. 173-9, 272-7 and 290-4.
107. For an insightful discussion of the motivational problems linked to higher law-making, and of how it may be possible to give a more positive picture of public reason in constitutional moments, cf. R. Goodin, Motivating Political Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 100-23.
108. This account of the role of the democratic process in constructing a common point of view draws on B. Manin, 'On Legitimacy and Deliberation', Political Theory, 15 (1987), 338-68; and D. Miller, 'Citizenship and Pluralism', Political Studies, 43 (1995), 432-50.
109. This account of the role of the democratic process in constructing a common point of view draws on B. Manin, 'On Legitimacy and Deliberation', Political Theory, 15 (1987), 338-68; and D. Miller, 'Citizenship and Pluralism', Political Studies, 43 (1995), 432-50.
110. Ackerman, We the People, pp. 232-43. Ackerman himself emphasizes the conceptual nature of the link between 'private citizenship' and 'dualist' democracy: cf. pp. 297-300.
111. For a similar criticism of Ackerman's conception of private citizenship, wavering between an expressive and instrumental account of it, cf. Galston and Galston, 'Reason, Consent'.
112. For two histories of democratic thought that tend to divide the tradition into economic and deliberative models (or protective and developmental, to use their terms), see C. B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); and D. Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
113. For two histories of democratic thought that tend to divide the tradition into economic and deliberative models (or protective and developmental, to use their terms), see C. B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); and D. Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
114. Cf. Elster, Argomentare e negoziare, in particular chap. 5; cf. also Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 24-34.
115. Cf. Elster, Argomentare e negoziare, in particular chap. 5; cf. also Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 24-34.
116. Cf. A. O. Hirschman, 'Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Society', Political Theory, 22 (1994), 203-18.
117. Elster, Argomentare e negoziare, chap. 4.
118. Our view of deliberative democracy is looser than that employed by J. Habermas and others influenced by his thought, who imbue it with strong metaphysical elements of a Kantian kind. See in this regard Habermas's critique of Rawls - 'Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism', Journal of Philosophy, 92 (1995), 109-31. Our position is closer to the accounts of Manin, 'On Legitimacy and Deliberation', and Miller, 'Citizenship and Pluralism'.
119. Our view of deliberative democracy is looser than that employed by J. Habermas and others influenced by his thought, who imbue it with strong metaphysical elements of a Kantian kind. See in this regard Habermas's critique of Rawls - 'Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism', Journal of Philosophy, 92 (1995), 109-31. Our position is closer to the accounts of Manin, 'On Legitimacy and Deliberation', and Miller, 'Citizenship and Pluralism'.
120. Our view of deliberative democracy is looser than that employed by J. Habermas and others influenced by his thought, who imbue it with strong metaphysical elements of a Kantian kind. See in this regard Habermas's critique of Rawls - 'Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism', Journal of Philosophy, 92 (1995), 109-31. Our position is closer to the accounts of Manin, 'On Legitimacy and Deliberation', and Miller, 'Citizenship and Pluralism'.
121. Elster, Argomentare e negoziare, chap. 6.
122. For a discussion of whether Britain can be classified as either a 'monist' or a 'dualist' democracy in Ackerman's sense, cf. I. Harden, 'The Constitution and Its Discontents', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 489-510 (in particular, pp. 500-5). Worries about 'monist' democracy in Britain are often the compound result of two different issues. One is the absolute sovereignty of parliament, the other is the effect of the electoral system which transforms a relative electoral majority into an absolute parliamentary majority. The latter is not exclusive to 'monist' democracies, as Ferrajoli, for instance, argues in the Italian case ('Dai diritti', p. 285).
123. For a discussion of whether Britain can be classified as either a 'monist' or a 'dualist' democracy in Ackerman's sense, cf. I. Harden, 'The Constitution and Its Discontents', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 489-510 (in particular, pp. 500-5). Worries about 'monist' democracy in Britain are often the compound result of two different issues. One is the absolute sovereignty of parliament, the other is the effect of the electoral system which transforms a relative electoral majority into an absolute parliamentary majority. The latter is not exclusive to 'monist' democracies, as Ferrajoli, for instance, argues in the Italian case ('Dai diritti', p. 285).
124. This republican interpretation has been urged especially by Sunstein in Partial Constitution; 'The Enduring Legacy of Republicanism', in Elkin and Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism; and 'Preferences and Politics', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20 (1991), 3-34. In our view, however, he overemphasizes the need to exclude all forms of economic democracy.
125. This republican interpretation has been urged especially by Sunstein in Partial Constitution; 'The Enduring Legacy of Republicanism', in Elkin and Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism; and 'Preferences and Politics', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20 (1991), 3-34. In our view, however, he overemphasizes the need to exclude all forms of economic democracy.
126. This republican interpretation has been urged especially by Sunstein in Partial Constitution; 'The Enduring Legacy of Republicanism', in Elkin and Soltan, eds, A New Constitutionalism; and 'Preferences and Politics', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20 (1991), 3-34. In our view, however, he overemphasizes the need to exclude all forms of economic democracy.
127. For an understanding of constitutionalism which also emphasizes its more purposive and 'constitutive' function, cf. essays in Elkin and Soltan, eds, New Constitutionalism, in particular S. L. Elkin, 'Constitutionalism: Old and New', pp. 32-3.
128. For an understanding of constitutionalism which also emphasizes its more purposive and 'constitutive' function, cf. essays in Elkin and Soltan, eds, New Constitutionalism, in particular S. L. Elkin, 'Constitutionalism: Old and New', pp. 32-3.
129. See R. Bellamy, 'The Constitution of Europe: Rights or Democracy', in Bellamy, Bufacchi and Castiglione, eds,. Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe, especially pp. 168-73, for a fuller account of these sort of proposals and their relation to the general approach advocated here.
130. G. Zagrebelsky, Il diritto mite. Legge, diritti, giustizia (Torino: Einaudi, 1992), pp. 147-54.
131. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 113 and 197.
132. We have attempted to apply the model of political constitutionalism to current debates in Europe in R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 'The Communitarian Ghost in the Cosmopolitan Machine: Constitutionalism, Democracy and the Reconfiguration of Politics in the New Europe', in Bellamy, ed., Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty.