The Doctrine of Political Accountability and Supreme Court Jurisdiction: Applying a New External Constraint to Congress's Exceptions Clause Power

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 106, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 197-228

  Handman, Christopher T ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0347768932     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/797270     Document Type: Article

References (192)

1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295-96 (1920).
2. J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 586 (1972) (book review).
3. The history of Roosevelt's plan and its eventual failure are well documented in Michael Comiskey, Can a President Pack - or Draft - the Supreme Court? FDR and the Court in the Great Depression and World War II, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1043 (1994). See generally 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.7 (2d ed. 1992) (chronicling history of court packing plan).
4. During the early 1980s, there were numerous proposals that would have removed controversial issues from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Many of these bills attempted to deny the lower federal courts jurisdiction to issue restraining orders, injunctions, and declaratory judgments over state abortion laws. See, e.g., H.R. 3225, 97th Cong. § 4 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981); S. 158, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981). Congress also attempted to withdraw the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over abortion issues. See, e.g., H.R. 867, 97th Cong. § 1 (1981). School prayer proved equally prone to congressional attempts at jurisdiction stripping. Several bills sought to deny to all federal courts - including the Supreme Court - the jurisdiction to hear cases contesting state laws that authorized public school prayer. See, e.g., H.R. 2347, 97th Cong. §§ 2-3 (1981); S. 481, 97th Cong. §§ 2-3 (1981); H.R. 865, 97th Cong. §§ 2-3 (1981); H.R. 72, 97th Cong. §§ 1-2 (1981).
5. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
6. See. e.g., R.W. Apple, Jr., Voters May Feel Powerless, But They're Not Frightened, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, at 1 (characterizing 1994 general election in which Republicans gained majority in both House and Senate as "Republican revolution"); David S. Broder, Looking for Leadership, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1995, at A1 (same).
7. See. e.g., R.W. Apple, Jr., Voters May Feel Powerless, But They're Not Frightened, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, at 1 (characterizing 1994 general election in which Republicans gained majority in both House and Senate as "Republican revolution"); David S. Broder, Looking for Leadership, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1995, at A1 (same).
8. Judge Hufstedler has commented that "congressional reaction to issues of federal jurisdiction has always been fitful and . . . the fits are usually induced by strong pressures imposed by particular events or by powerful constituencies that seek to influence results in particular causes that concern them." Shirley M. Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 842-43 (1972).
9. See § 106(b)(1)-(2), 110 Stat. at 1220-21.
10. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides in pertinent part: In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
11. § 106(b)(3)(E), 110 Stat. at 1221.
12. See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2338-39 (1996). As discussed in Section II.B, infra, the Court found that the Act did not reach the Court's original jurisdiction to grant habeas petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2441 (1994). See Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2339. By finding that the Act did not entirely repeal the Court's "authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus, there can be no plausible argument that the Act has deprived this Court of appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III, § 2." Id.
13. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming constitutional right to abortion).
14. See Alissa J. Rubin, As Congress Takes up Social Issues, Whose Values Will Prevail, WASH. POST, May 7, 1995, at C3 (citing 1992 Washington Post poll indicating 80% of Americans favor parental notification and 1992 Gallup poll indicating 75% support 24-hour waiting period); Robin Toner, Success Spoils Unity of Abortion Rights Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at A18 (noting majority support for abortion, but overwhelming support for some regulation short of absolute ban).
15. See Alissa J. Rubin, As Congress Takes up Social Issues, Whose Values Will Prevail, WASH. POST, May 7, 1995, at C3 (citing 1992 Washington Post poll indicating 80% of Americans favor parental notification and 1992 Gallup poll indicating 75% support 24-hour waiting period); Robin Toner, Success Spoils Unity of Abortion Rights Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at A18 (noting majority support for abortion, but overwhelming support for some regulation short of absolute ban).
16. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
17. See Kenneth J. Cooper, House Approves Amendment on Flag Desecration; Measure Would Override High Court Rulings, Let States and Congress Outlaw the Act, WASH. POST, June 29, 1995, at A7 (documenting successful 312-120 House vote);
18. Helen Dewar, Senate Falls Short on Flag Amendment; Desecration Ban Was Measure's Aim, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1995, at A1 (noting Senate's 63-36 defeat of amendment, three votes short of requisite two-thirds majority).
19. Senator Jesse Helms claims constitutional support for his proposals to withdraw jurisdiction from the Supreme Court: "In anticipation of judicial usurpations of power, the framers of our Constitution wisely gave the Congress the authority, by a simple majority of both Houses, to check the Supreme Court by means of regulation of its appellate jurisdiction." 125 CONG. REC. 7579 (1979).
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
21. See infra Part III (discussing various theories concerning jurisdiction stripping legislation).
22. But see Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 242 (1985). Amar emphasizes that the word "all" is selectively used in Article III to define those cases to which the judicial power "shall extend." Where the Constitution extends jurisdiction to "all cases," Amar reads this as an immutable grant of jurisdiction; where the "all" has been omitted, he is willing to concede that the Congress may restrict federal court jurisdiction. For further discussion of Amar's theory, as well as its critics, see infra note 51.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See supra note 4.
25. D. Bruce LaPierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process - The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 646 (1985).
26. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), the Marshall Court affirmed the Supreme Court's authority to review and invalidate unconstitutional state laws. In turn, this ruling prompted radical states' rights advocates to attempt to repeal section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (1861), which provided the basis for the Court's review of state laws.
27. See supra note 4.
28. See Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44 (1869) (repealing Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1868)).
29. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (upholding Congress's revocation of Court's authority to hear habeas corpus case). The McCardle decision and its significance are discussed infra Section II.A.
30. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) [hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Russom, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Forewood: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
31. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) [hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Russom, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Forewood: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
32. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) [hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Russom, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Forewood: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
33. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) [hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Russom, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Forewood: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
34. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) [hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Russom, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Forewood: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
35. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) [hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Russom, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Forewood: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
36. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) [hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Russom, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Forewood: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
37. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) [hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Russom, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Forewood: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
38. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) [hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Russom, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Forewood: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
39. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) [hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Russom, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Forewood: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
40. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) [hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Russom, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Forewood: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
41. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) [hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Russom, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Forewood: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
42. See McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506.
43. William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 236 (1973).
44. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (1868).
45. It should be noted that before the argument on the merits of McCardle's habeas petition, the Court held a preliminary argument to address whether the new 1867 habeas law provided the Court with jurisdiction to hear McCardle's appeal. See Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867). The Court established that the case was properly before it and asked the parties to brief and argue the merits.
46. Indicative of the political context in which the McCardle case was decided, the year-long delay in reargument stemmed from Chief Justice Chase's duty to preside over the impeachment proceedings of President Andrew Johnson. Moreover, Johnson had unsuccessfully vetoed Congress's repeal of the Court's 1867 habeas jurisdiction. For an excellent presentation of the political and legal background to the McCardle case, see Van Alstyne, supra note 29.
47. McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 513 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
48. Id. at 514.
49. See supra note 32 for factors contributing to this political context.
50. See Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209 (1868).
51. See H.R. 379, 40th Cong. (1868).
52. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1861).
53. McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515.
54. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 106 (1868).
55. See Van Alstyne, supra note 29, at 248.
56. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
57. See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
58. Id. at 2337.
59. § 106(b)(3)(E), 110 Stat. at 1221.
60. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 106 (1868).
61. Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2339. Section 2241 is the modern version of section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
62. Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2339.
63. Id. at 2342 (Stevens, Souter, Breyer, JJ., concurring).
64. For an excellent collection of essays from scholars on both sides of the issue, see Symposium, Congressional Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 893 (1982) (containing essays from Paul M. Bator, Charles E. Rice, Martin H. Redish, Leonard G. Ratner, Dr. James McClellan, and Kenneth R. Kay).
65. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 19; Amar, supra note 27; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Eisenberg, supra note 27; Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints, supra note 27. To be sure, theories outside of the established schools of thought exist which turn on subtle linguistic interpretations of Article III. First, several commentators argue that the Exceptions Clause only modifies the word "Fact," instead of "appellate jurisdiction" as is generally accepted. See. e.g., RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); Irving Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REV. 3 (1973). This theory's paucity of historical support, coupled with its odd grammatical interpretation, has made it the target of substantial criticism. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 27, at 901; Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under an Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 913-15 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, Congressional Power]. A second theory also requires a novel linguistical approach to Article III. Professor Amar argues that the word "all" delineates the power Congress possesses to restrict federal court jurisdiction. See Amar, supra note 19, at 238-54. Among the classes of cases and controversies enumerated in Article III, Amar notes that only three classes of cases are preceded by "all." In those cases preceded by "all" including "cases arising under federal law," Amar would prohibit Congress from removing federal court jurisdiction. Like Burger's theory, Amar's theory has not been immune from criticism. See, e.g., William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control Over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 89 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633 (1990) [hereinafter Redish, Common Sense].
66. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 19; Amar, supra note 27; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Eisenberg, supra note 27; Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints, supra note 27. To be sure, theories outside of the established schools of thought exist which turn on subtle linguistic interpretations of Article III. First, several commentators argue that the Exceptions Clause only modifies the word "Fact," instead of "appellate jurisdiction" as is generally accepted. See. e.g., RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); Irving Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REV. 3 (1973). This theory's paucity of historical support, coupled with its odd grammatical interpretation, has made it the target of substantial criticism. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 27, at 901; Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under an Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 913-15 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, Congressional Power]. A second theory also requires a novel linguistical approach to Article III. Professor Amar argues that the word "all" delineates the power Congress possesses to restrict federal court jurisdiction. See Amar, supra note 19, at 238-54. Among the classes of cases and controversies enumerated in Article III, Amar notes that only three classes of cases are preceded by "all." In those cases preceded by "all" including "cases arising under federal law," Amar would prohibit Congress from removing federal court jurisdiction. Like Burger's theory, Amar's theory has not been immune from criticism. See, e.g., William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control Over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 89 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633 (1990) [hereinafter Redish, Common Sense].
67. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 19; Amar, supra note 27; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Eisenberg, supra note 27; Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints, supra note 27. To be sure, theories outside of the established schools of thought exist which turn on subtle linguistic interpretations of Article III. First, several commentators argue that the Exceptions Clause only modifies the word "Fact," instead of "appellate jurisdiction" as is generally accepted. See. e.g., RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); Irving Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REV. 3 (1973). This theory's paucity of historical support, coupled with its odd grammatical interpretation, has made it the target of substantial criticism. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 27, at 901; Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under an Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 913-15 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, Congressional Power]. A second theory also requires a novel linguistical approach to Article III. Professor Amar argues that the word "all" delineates the power Congress possesses to restrict federal court jurisdiction. See Amar, supra note 19, at 238-54. Among the classes of cases and controversies enumerated in Article III, Amar notes that only three classes of cases are preceded by "all." In those cases preceded by "all" including "cases arising under federal law," Amar would prohibit Congress from removing federal court jurisdiction. Like Burger's theory, Amar's theory has not been immune from criticism. See, e.g., William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control Over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 89 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633 (1990) [hereinafter Redish, Common Sense].
68. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 19; Amar, supra note 27; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Eisenberg, supra note 27; Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints, supra note 27. To be sure, theories outside of the established schools of thought exist which turn on subtle linguistic interpretations of Article III. First, several commentators argue that the Exceptions Clause only modifies the word "Fact," instead of "appellate jurisdiction" as is generally accepted. See. e.g., RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); Irving Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REV. 3 (1973). This theory's paucity of historical support, coupled with its odd grammatical interpretation, has made it the target of substantial criticism. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 27, at 901; Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under an Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 913-15 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, Congressional Power]. A second theory also requires a novel linguistical approach to Article III. Professor Amar argues that the word "all" delineates the power Congress possesses to restrict federal court jurisdiction. See Amar, supra note 19, at 238-54. Among the classes of cases and controversies enumerated in Article III, Amar notes that only three classes of cases are preceded by "all." In those cases preceded by "all" including "cases arising under federal law," Amar would prohibit Congress from removing federal court jurisdiction. Like Burger's theory, Amar's theory has not been immune from criticism. See, e.g., William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control Over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 89 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633 (1990) [hereinafter Redish, Common Sense].
69. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 19; Amar, supra note 27; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Eisenberg, supra note 27; Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints, supra note 27. To be sure, theories outside of the established schools of thought exist which turn on subtle linguistic interpretations of Article III. First, several commentators argue that the Exceptions Clause only modifies the word "Fact," instead of "appellate jurisdiction" as is generally accepted. See. e.g., RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); Irving Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REV. 3 (1973). This theory's paucity of historical support, coupled with its odd grammatical interpretation, has made it the target of substantial criticism. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 27, at 901; Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under an Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 913-15 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, Congressional Power]. A second theory also requires a novel linguistical approach to Article III. Professor Amar argues that the word "all" delineates the power Congress possesses to restrict federal court jurisdiction. See Amar, supra note 19, at 238-54. Among the classes of cases and controversies enumerated in Article III, Amar notes that only three classes of cases are preceded by "all." In those cases preceded by "all" including "cases arising under federal law," Amar would prohibit Congress from removing federal court jurisdiction. Like Burger's theory, Amar's theory has not been immune from criticism. See, e.g., William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control Over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 89 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633 (1990) [hereinafter Redish, Common Sense].
70. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 19; Amar, supra note 27; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Eisenberg, supra note 27; Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints, supra note 27. To be sure, theories outside of the established schools of thought exist which turn on subtle linguistic interpretations of Article III. First, several commentators argue that the Exceptions Clause only modifies the word "Fact," instead of "appellate jurisdiction" as is generally accepted. See. e.g., RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); Irving Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REV. 3 (1973). This theory's paucity of historical support, coupled with its odd grammatical interpretation, has made it the target of substantial criticism. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 27, at 901; Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under an Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 913-15 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, Congressional Power]. A second theory also requires a novel linguistical approach to Article III. Professor Amar argues that the word "all" delineates the power Congress possesses to restrict federal court jurisdiction. See Amar, supra note 19, at 238-54. Among the classes of cases and controversies enumerated in Article III, Amar notes that only three classes of cases are preceded by "all." In those cases preceded by "all" including "cases arising under federal law," Amar would prohibit Congress from removing federal court jurisdiction. Like Burger's theory, Amar's theory has not been immune from criticism. See, e.g., William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control Over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 89 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633 (1990) [hereinafter Redish, Common Sense].
71. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 27; Redish, supra note 27.
72. Hart, supra note 27, at 1365. Later in his constructed dialogue, Hart concedes that applying an essential functions calculus to jurisdiction stripping bills might be imprecise. Nevertheless, he concludes with the rhetorical question: "[W]hatever the difficulties of the test, they are less, are they not, than the difficulties of reading the Constitution as authorizing its own destruction?" Id.
73. See Ratner, Congressional Power, supra note 27.
74. Id. at 161. Twenty-two years later, Professor Ratner elaborated on the destructive effect that plenary congressional power would precipitate: Such legislation would distort the nature of the federal union by permitting each state to decide for itself the scope of its authority under the Constitution. It would reduce the supreme law of the land to a hodgepodge of sometimes inconsistent decisions by fifty state supreme courts and/or twelve federal courts of appeals. It would thereby fragment and vitiate constitutional protections. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints, supra note 27, at 935.
75. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 27, at 1038-39. (noting that the jurisdiction stripping would undermine constitutional structure and spirit, but that literal language of Constitution sanctions such practices).
76. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
77. See, e.g., Ratner, Congressional Power, supra note 27, at 161-65; Sager, supra note 27, at 45-55.
78. Two historical events during the Convention have provided the most salient bases for supporting the essential functions thesis. First, South Carolina's John Rutledge, perhaps the Convention's strongest Antifederalist, argued against the constitutional creation of lower federal courts but conceded that "the State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts [sic]." 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (1911) (emphasis added). Second, the Exceptions Clause was adopted only after the Convention had rejected a provision that purportedly would have given Congress even greater power over the Court's appellate jurisdiction: "In all the other cases before mentioned the Judicial power shall be exercised in such manner as the Legislature shall direct." 2 id. at 431. As Professor Sager asserts, the defeat of this provision, coupled with the subsequent adoption of the Exceptions Clause, undermines the notion that "the framers were consciously adopting a provision that could completely unravel one of the most basic aspects of the constitutional scheme to which they had committed themselves." Sager, supra note 27, at 51.
79. Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 51, at 911.
80. Gunther, supra note 27, at 908.
81. Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 51, at 911; see also Gunther, supra note 27, at 906.
82. Gunther, supra note 27, at 906.
83. See supra Section II.A.
84. See. e.g., Bator, supra note 27, at 1040 (arguing that McCardle vindicates plenary view of Exceptions Clause); Gunther, supra note 27, at 904-05 (same); Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 51, at 904 (same).
85. Sager, supra note 27, at 78 n.187.
86. Constitutional Restraints upon the Judiciary: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 99 (1981) [hereinafter Constitutional Restraints] (statement of William Van Alstyne).
87. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 27.
89. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that limitations on powers narrowly delegated to Congress "can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void").
90. Some examples of lesser checks are confirmation of presidential nominees, impeachment, and reducing or augmenting the size of the Court.
91. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
92. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (incorporating equal protection guarantees into Fifth Amendment).
93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
94. See, e.g., Constitutional Restraints, supra note 67, at 45 (statement of Paul M. Bator); id. at 129-32 (statement of William Van Alstyne); Bator, supra note 27, at 1034; Gunther, supra note 27, at 916; Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 51, at 915-23; Van Alstyne, supra note 29, at 263.
95. Constitutional Restraints, supra note 67, at 44-45 (statement of Paul M. Bator).
96. Id. at 132 (statement of William Van Alstyne).
97. Id. at 99.
98. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
99. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that principles of equal protection are incorporated in Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
100. Constitutional Restraints, supra note 67, at 34 (statement of Paul M. Bator).
101. See H.R. 867, 97th Cong. § 1 (1981).
102. Admittedly, the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers "no delegated to the United State by the Constitution" to the separate states embodies classical principles of federalism. Particularly in the arena of abstention doctrine, however, the Court's invocation of powerful notions such as "Our Federalism" rests upon foundations broader than just the Tenth Amendment: [O]ne familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism." . . . It should never be forgotten that this slogan, "Our Federalism," born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971). Thus, judicial conceptions of constitutional structure, design, and Founding intent, in addition to the Tenth Amendment, inform our understanding of federalism.
103. See infra Part IV.
104. The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62, 190-91 (1982) [hereinafter 1981 Term].
105. Id. at 191.
106. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 63 n.7 (1990); see also LaPierre, supra note 22, at 640 (defining political accountability as "the 'answerability' of representatives to the represented").
107. 1981 Term, supra note 86, at 191.
108. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Decisions Affecting Human Life and Health, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1976, at 231; LaPierre, supra note 22; Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988).
109. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Decisions Affecting Human Life and Health, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1976, at 231; LaPierre, supra note 22; Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988).
110. See infra text accompanying notes 107-15.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 158-62.
112. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (raising question, without deciding, "whether prejudice against discrete and insular may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry").
113. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
114. See LaPierre, supra note 22, at 642.
115. See Krent, supra note 88, at 65 n.11.
116. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 70, at 325 (James Madison) ("In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good . . . ."); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 70, at 77 (James Madison) ("Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.").
117. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983).
118. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 88, at 65 n.11.
119. See supra note 4.
120. Wright, supra note 2, at 584-85.
121. Id. at 585.
122. LaPierre, supra note 22, at 642-43.
123. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
124. 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
125. Interestingly, less than two months after Cannon, the Court initiated its steady retreat from broadly inferring private rights of action in federal laws in Touche Ross & Co., v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). Justice Rehnquist silently rejected the Cannon reasoning by noting that the Court's task "is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action asserted." Id. at 568.
126. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
127. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994).
128. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 681-82.
129. 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
130. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78).
132. See id. at 731, 740-42.
133. Id. at 743.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
136. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994).
137. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 675 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1994).
143. Id. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)(i).
144. See New York, 505 U.S. at 149 ("This case implicates one of our Nation's newest problems of public policy and perhaps our oldest question of constitutional law.").
145. Id. at 168.
146. Id. at 169.
147. Id. at 168.
148. See 1981 Term, supra note 86.
149. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
150. 1981 Term, supra note 86, at 191.
151. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), the Supreme Court affirmed Congress's power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Bitzer Court reasoned that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity in order to enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 452.
152. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); see also Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintainance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
153. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
154. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994).
155. Id. § 688 (a).
156. Welch, 483 U.S. at 476 (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246).
157. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
158. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (emphasis added).
159. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 242.
162. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 477 (1987) (quoting Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 198-99 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
163. Wright, supra note 2, at 586.
164. See supra Section IV.A.
165. See supra notes 4-5 (enumerating congressional bills proposing withdrawal of Court's jurisdiction over abortion and school prayer).
166. See S. 481, 97th Cong. (1981).
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Some might argue that jurisdiction-stripping bills do not oppose particular constitutional rights; rather, they reflect disagreement with the Supreme Court that the right in question is actually protected by the Constitution. However, since 1803 it has been stated that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); accord Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . ."). The Exceptions Clause does not dismantle this fundamental principle of constitutional law. It merely permits Congress to legislate in direct contravention of established constitutional rights without review from the federal judiciary.
169. For an interesting discussion of whether state courts would remain bound by the precedent of the Supreme Court, see Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 51, at 925-26.
170. See. e.g., H.R. 867, 97th Cong. (1981).
171. See infra Subsection IV.C.3.
172. Professor Sager coined this phrase in Sager, supra note 27, at 41.
173. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 477 (1987) (quoting Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)).
174. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 478 (affirming that Supreme Court "consistently has required an unequivocal expression that Congress intended to override Eleventh Amendment immunity").
175. See, e.g., id. at 477-78; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
176. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 477; Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
177. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) ("[W]hile Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the state to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, . . . Congress . . . [cannot] compel the states to do so."); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
178. See. e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959) ("[I]n the absence of explicit authorization from either the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination.").
179. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
180. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
181. Insofar as liberty interests protected by the Constitution are designed to be immune from popular vote and whim, it seems almost comical to discuss requiring a majority before Congress may subordinate constitutional freedoms. Yet that is clearly what the Exceptions Clause contemplates. Nonetheless, the Exceptions Clause should not be read to go any further. Courts must insist that Congress assemble a true consensus before it invokes its power under the Exceptions Clause.
182. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
183. Of course, the most constitutionally sound manner by which to commission the states to legislate without fear of federal court review is to amend the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
184. See supra note 4; see also supra text accompanying note 148 (quoting relevant portion of bill stripping Court of jurisdiction over school prayer).
185. See Krent, supra note 88, at 63 n.8; LaPierre, supra note 22, at 657; Merritt, supra note 90, at 25.
186. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); LaPierre, supra note 22, at 653.
187. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 70, at 323-25 (James Madison).
188. Id. at 324.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 325.
191. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
192. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 296 (emphasis added).