Mail-order gun kits and fingerprint-resistant pistols: Why Washington courts should impose a duty on gun manufacturers to market firearms responsibly

Washington Law Review

Volumn 75, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 941-972

  Edwards, Amy ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0347740444     PISSN: 00430617     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (273)

1. See Handgun Control, Private Sales at Gun Shows: Your Friendly Neighborhood Unregulated Arms Bazaar (visited Jan. 1, 2000) 〈http://www.handguncontrol.org/gunshws.htm〉.
2. See Suspect in L.A. Shootings Surrenders in Las Vegas, Seattle Times, Aug. 11, 1999, at A1.
3. See id.
4. See Mike Carter & Keiko Morris, Furrow's Gun Originally a Police Weapon, Seattle Times, Aug. 13, 1999, at A13.
5. See id.
6. See Steve Miletich et al., Gunman Kills 2, Wounds 2 in Seattle, Seattle Times, Nov. 3, 1999, at A1.
7. See Washington State Department of Health (WSDH), Center for Health Statistics, Death Certificates (Oct. 1999) (CD-ROM).
8. See id., Office of Hospital and Patient Data, Comprehensive Hospital Abstract Reporting System.
9. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, at 207, 209 (1997).
10. See Washington Ceasefire, Financial Costs of Firearms (visited Oct. 24, 1999) 〈http://www.waceasefire.org/waresfinfacts.htm〉.
11. See infra Parts II.A and II.B.1.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. Before a gun manufacturer is held liable, plaintiffs would also need to show breach of duty, causation, and injury. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, § 115 at 270-71 (2000).
14. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc., No. CV 95-3323 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 14, 1995); Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
15. See infra Part II.B.2.
16. Because courts typically determine whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff and the jury determines breach and causation, imposing a duty significantly increases the likelihood that a case will go to trial. See Dobbs, supra note 13, § 115 at 270-71.
17. See Edward Walsh & David A. Vise, U.S., Gunmaker Strike a Deal, Washington Post, Mar. 18, 2000, at A1.
18. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
19. See Dobbs, supra note 13, § 114, at 269; Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Ave. Assoc., 116 Wash. 2d 217, 220, 802 P.2d 1360, 1362 (1991).
20. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Wash. 2d 409, 413, 693 P.2d 697, 700 (1985) (quoting William Prosser, Torts § 53 at 331 (3d ed. 1964)) (internal quotations omitted).
21. See Dobbs, supra note 13, § 115, at 270.
22. See id.
23. See Hutchins, 116 Wash. 2d at 223, 802 P.2d at 1364.
24. See Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 479, 824 P.2d 483, 485 (1992).
25. Webstad v. Stortini, 83 Wash. App. 857, 873, 924 P.2d 940, 949 (1996) (quoting Keates v. City of Vancouver, 73 Wash. App. 257, 265, 869 P.2d 88, 93 (1994)) (internal quotation omitted).
26. See id. at 872, 924 P.2d at 948 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 53, at 359 (5th ed. 1984)).
27. See Hutchins, 116 Wash. 2d at 227, 802 P.2d at 1365-66.
28. See id. at 228, 802 P.2d at 1366.
29. See id. at 227-28, 802 P.2d at 1366.
30. See id. at 228-29, 802 P.2d at 1366 (citing Peterson v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 428, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (1983)).
31. Id. at 229, 802 P.2d at 1366.
32. See id.
33. Webstad v. Stortini, 83 Wash. App. 857, 874, 924 P.2d 940, 949-50 (1996).
34. 83 Wash. App. 857, 924 P.2d 940 (1996).
35. See id. at 864, 924 P.2d at 944-45. The court treated the suicide as an act committed by a third party. See id. at 866, 924 P.2d at 945.
36. See id. at 860, 924 P.2d at 942.
37. See id. at 876, 924 P.2d at 950.
38. See id.
39. 116 Wash. 2d 217, 802 P.2d 1360 (1991).
40. See id. at 230, 802 P.2d at 1367.
41. See id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B)(1965).
42. Id.
43. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B cmt. e, subsec. H (1965).
44. See id., at illus. 15.
45. "Chattel" is defined as "an article of personal property." Black's Law Dictionary 236 (6th ed. 1990)
46. See generally, Bernethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 929, 653 P.2d 280 (1982); Jones v. Harris, 122 Wash. 69, 210 P. 22 (1922); Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 P. 6 (1922).
47. See Bernethy, 97 Wash. 2d at 934, 653 P.2d at 283; Mitchell, 119 Wash, at 555, 206 P. at 8.
48. 97 Wash. 2d 929, 653 P.2d 280 (1982).
49. See id. at 930, 653 P.2d at 281.
50. See id. at 931, 653 P.2d at 281.
51. Bernethy, 97 Wash. 2d at 933, 653 P.2d at 283 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965)) (internal quotations omitted).
52. Id. at 932-33, 653 P.2d at 282 (quoting statute codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.080 (1981)) (internal quotations omitted).
53. See. e.g., Webstad v. Stortini, 83 Wash. App. 857, 873, 924 P.2d 940, 949 (1996); Lauritzen v. Lauritzen, 74 Wash. App. 432, 442, 874 P.2d 861, 867 (1994).
54. Lauritzen, 74 Wash. App. at 442, 874 P.2d at 867.
55. 74 Wash. App. 432, 874 P.2d 861 (1994).
56. See id. at 442-43, 874 P.2d at 867.
57. See Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 269, 748 P.2d 661, 662 (1988).
58. 50 Wash. App. 267, 748 P.2d 661 (1988).
59. See id. at 269, 748 P.2d at 662. The term "Saturday night special" refers to handguns that are small, easily concealable, cheaply made, and inexpensive. See Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1153-54 (Md. 1985).
60. See Knott at 269, 748 P.2d at 662.
61. See id. at 272, 275, 748 P.2d at 663, 665.
62. See id. at 273, 748 P.2d at 664.
63. See id. at 272, 748 P.2d at 663. Subsequent to Knott, section 7.72.030 was amended to exclude firearms from the general provision holding manufacturers liable where they manufacture products that are not reasonably safe as designed. Product Liability Act, Ch. 94, § 1, 1988 Wash. Laws 316-17. The statute now states that firearms "shall not be deemed defective in design on the basis that the benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk of injury posed by its potential to cause serious injury or death when discharged." Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.030(1)(a) (1998).
64. Knott, 50 Wash. App. at 273, 748 P.2d at 663-64 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.030(1)(a) as codified in 1987) (internal quotations omitted).
65. See id. at 273, 748 P.2d at 664.
66. See id. at 275, 748 P.2d at 665.
67. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
68. Id. at 1159.
69. Id. at 1158.
70. 107 Wash. 2d 127, 727 P.2d 655 (1986).
71. See Knott, 50 Wash. App. at 275-76, 748 P.2d at 665 (citing Baughn, 107 Wash. 2d at 147, 727 P.2d at 667).
72. See id. at 276, 748 P.2d at 665.
73. See id. at 273-74, 748 P.2d at 664.
74. See id. at 273, 748 P.2d at 664.
75. Id. (construing statute codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.290 (1987)). As amended in 1994, section 9.41.290 states: The state of Washington hereby fully occupies and preempts the entire field of firearms regulation within the boundaries of the state, including the registration, licensing, possession, purchase, sale, acquisition, transfer, discharge, and transportation of firearms . . . . Cities, towns, and counties or other municipalities may enact only those laws and ordinances relating to firearms that are specifically authorized by state law . . . and are consistent with this chapter. Ch. 7, § 428, 1994 Wash. Laws 2242. In the three other cases that have applied section 9.41.290, the courts addressed whether it preempted a rule or local ordinance. See Cherry v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 116 Wash. 2d 794, 801, 803, 808 P.2d 746, 749-50 (1991); Seattle v. Ballsmider, 71 Wash. App. 159, 164, 856 P.2d 1113, 1116 (1993); State v. Rabon, 45 Wash. App. 832, 835, 727 P.2d 995, 997 (1986).
76. See Knott, 50 Wash. App. at 274, 748 P.2d at 664 (citing Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)).
77. See infra Parts II.A and II.B.1.
78. See infra Part II.B.2.
79. See infra Parts II.A and II.B.1.
80. See infra Part II.A.
81. See infra Part II.B.1.
82. See infra Part II.B.2.
83. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
84. See Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 836 (10th Cir. 1998); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp. 762 F.2d 1250, 1275 (5th Cir. 1985); Casillas v. Auto-Ordinance Corp., No. C 95-3601 FMS, 1996 WL 276830, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 1996); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 761 (D.C. 1989); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Addison v. Williams, 546 So.2d 220 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
85. See Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 532 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1297-98; King v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Fomi v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (N. Y. App. Div. 1996).
86. See Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1198; King, 451 N.W.2d at 875; Forai, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
87. See Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1268-69; Caveny, 665 F. Supp. at 532-33.
88. See Casillas v. Auto-Ordinance Corp., No. C 95-3601 FMS, 1999 WL 276830, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 1996); Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 760; Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1297; Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
89. See Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 761; see also Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 836 (10th Cir. 1998); Casillas, 1996 WL 276830, at *4; Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1297.
90. See Copier, 138 F.3d at 836; Casillas, 1999 WL 276830, at *4; Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1297.
91. See Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 760; Resteiner, 566 N.W.2d at 56.
92. See Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 760; Resteiner, 566 N.W.2d at 56.
93. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc., No. CV 95-3323 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 14, 1995); Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
94. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
97. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 824; Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163; Halberstam, No. CV 95-3323, Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Second Am. Compl., at 15-16 [hereinafter Pls.' Second Mem.].
98. See Casillas v. Auto-Ordinance Corp., No. C 95-3601 FMS, 1996 WL 276830, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 1996); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.N.M. 1987); First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Ark. 1995); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 759 (D.C. 1989); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
99. See Casillas, 1996 WL 276830, at *2 (asserting that defendant should be liable for manufacturing and selling weapons associated with criminal activity); First Commercial Trust, 900 S.W.2d at 203; Resteiner, 566 N.W.2d at 55.
100. See Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1295; Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Forni, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
101. 900 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1995).
102. Id. at 203.
103. 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
104. See id. at 1295.
105. See id.
106. See Casillas v. Auto-Ordinance Corp., No. C 95-3601 FMS, 1996 WL 276830, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 1996); First Commercial Trust, 900 S.W.2d at 205; Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 762 (D.C. 1989).
107. See Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1295; see also Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
108. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc., No. CV 95-3323 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 14, 1995); Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
109. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 824-25; Halberstam, No. CV 95-3323, Mem. of Devorah and David Halberstam and Nachum Sosonkin in Opp'n to the Mots, to Dismiss by S.W. Daniel et al., at 5 [hereinafter Pls.' First Mem.]; Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152, 185.
110. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
111. See id. at 825.
112. No. CV 95-3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
113. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
114. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
115. See id. at 185.
116. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 825, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
117. See id. at 808.
118. See id. at 808-10.
119. See id. at 808.
120. See id. at 824.
121. See id. at 819.
122. See id. at 820.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 821-22.
125. See id. at 821.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 822.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 823.
131. See id. at 824.
132. See id. at 820.
133. See id. at 825-26.
134. See id. at 826.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 826.
137. Id. at 825.
138. See id. at 824.
139. See id. at 825.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 824.
142. See id. at 825.
143. See id. at 826.
144. Id. at 827 (internal citations omitted).
145. See Id.
146. See id.
147. No. CV 95-3323 (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 14, 1995). Because the court did not issue any written opinions, the information in this section comes from court documents and briefs, and Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 681 (1998).
148. See Lytton, supra note 147, at 688.
149. See id. at 682, 687.
150. See Halberstam, No. CV 95-3323 Civil Docket at 6, 12, and 23.
151. See Lytton, supra note 147, at 686.
152. See No. CV 95-3323, Pls.' Second Am. Compl. at 11-13.
153. See Pls.' Second Mem., supra note 97, at 37 n.24.
154. See Lytton, supra note 147, at 688 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390)(1965).
155. Lytton, supra note 147, at 688-89 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B (1965)) (internal quotations omitted).
156. No. CV 95-3323, Pls.' Second Am. Compl. at exh. C, exh. I.
157. See id. at 11-13, exh. C.
158. See No. CV 95-3323, Def.'s Mot to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) [hereinafter Def.'s First Mot. to Dismiss] at 21; Pls.' First Mem. at 8.
159. See Pls.' First Mem., supra note 109, at 37.
160. See id. at 5.
161. Id. at 36-37 (citing Carrini v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 550 N.Y.S.2d 710 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)).
162. See Halberstam, No. CV 95-3323, Civil Docket at 6, 12, and 23.
163. See Lytton, supra note 147, at 697-98.
164. See Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
165. The TEC-DC9 is a modification of the TEC-9 which may have been intended to "evade a ban on the TEC-9" in Washington, D.C. Id. at 152 n.3. Hereinafter, both the TEC-9 and the TEC-DC9 will be referred to as TEC-DC9.
166. See id. at 152.
167. See id. at 152-53.
168. See id. at 152.
169. See id. at 154.
170. See id. at 155.
171. See id. Assault weapons like the TEC-DC9 accounted for 10% of the guns traced to crimes in 1988-89, but represented merely 0.5% of the privately owned firearms in the United States during the same time. See id.
172. See id. at 156-57.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 154, 156-57.
175. See id. at 152.
176. See id. at 163.
177. Id. at 152.
178. See id. at 163.
179. See id. at 163-64.
180. See id. at 164.
181. See id. at 164-65.
182. See id. at 164.
183. See id. at 165; supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
184. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165 (referencing factors articulated in Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)).
185. See id. at 165-66.
186. See id. at 166.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 169-170.
189. See id. at 171. To support its conclusion that the TEC-DC9 had little legitimate civilian use, the court referred to the fact that both the California Legislature and U.S. Congress banned the TEC-DC9. The California Assault Weapons Control Act states that the TEC-DC9 has "such a high rate of fire and capacity for firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is substantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure human beings." Cal. Penal Code § 12275.5 (West 1989). Similarly, in passing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress considered evidence that assault rifles such as the TEC-DC9 were "the weapons of choice among drug dealers, criminal gangs, hate groups, and mentally deranged persons bent on mass murder." H.R. No. 103-489, 2d. Sess., at 13 (1994).
190. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
191. See id. at 172. In comparison, the court cited Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 81-82 (Cal. 1997), where the court refused to impose a duty on a garbage truck operator to guard against frightening horses because it would unreasonably burden those who operate garbage trucks, which are a socially useful machine. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170.
192. See id. at 172.
193. See id. at 169.
194. See id. at 157.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 158.
198. Cal. Penal Code § 12275 (West 1989).
199. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 175-76.
203. Id. at 175 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.4(a)) (internal quotations omitted).
204. See id. at 176.
205. See id. The original bill would have precluded negligence actions as well as product-liability actions; however, it was amended to remove the negligence language. See id. (discussing Sen. Judiciary Comm. Rep. on Assem. Bill. 75 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.)).
206. See id.
207. See id. at 178.
208. See id. at 179.
209. See id. at 178.
210. 83 Wash. App. 857, 859-60, 924 P.2d 940, 942 (1996); see supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
211. See 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 163-165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
212. See Pls.' First Mem., supra note 109, at 5, 36-37.
213. See 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
214. See 116 Wash. 2d 217, 230, 802 P.2d 1360, 1367 (1991).
215. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B (1965).
216. See supra note 39-44 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
218. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.080 (1998) (referencing Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.040 (1998)).
219. See Bernathy v. Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 929, 930, 653 P.2d 280, 281 (1982).
220. See Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc., No. CV 95-3323 (E.D.N.V. filed Aug. 14, 1995), Pls.' Second Am. Compl., at 11-13 exh. C.
221. See id. at 3.
222. See Lytton, supra note 147, at 692.
223. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000); Lytton, supra note 147, at 684, 690.
224. See supra Part II.B.1.
225. See supra notes 137, 189-91 and accompanying text.
226. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171-72.
227. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
228. See supra notes 176 & 189 and accompanying text.
229. See id. at 171.
230. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155.
231. See Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 277, 748 P.2d 661, 666 (1988).
232. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
233. See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.030(1)(a) (1998).
234. See Merrill. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 175-76.
235. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
237. See Knott v. Liberty Jeweliy & Loan, Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 273-74, 748 P.2d 661, 664 (1988).
238. See supra note 75.
239. 71 Wash. App. 159, 856 P.2d 1113 (1993).
240. See id. at 161-62, 856 P.2d at 1116.
241. 116 Wash. 2d 794, 808 P.2d 746 (1991).
242. See id. at 803, 808 P.2d at 749.
243. See Washington Uniform Firearms Act, Ch. 232, § 12, 1983 Wash. Laws 1200.
244. See Senate Judiciary Comm., Section Analysis of Substitute Senate Bill No. 3782, 1983 Legis. Sess. (Wash.); Final Legislative Bill Report on Substitute Senate Bill 3782 (1983) (noting local jurisdictions may only have laws consistent with state laws); see also 1985 Wash. Laws ch. 428 § 85 (amending Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.290) Final Legislative Report on Substitute Senate Bill No. 3450.
245. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
246. See Knott v. Liberty Jewelry and Loan, Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 274-75, 748 P.2d 661, 664-65 (1988).
247. See infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
248. See Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 178-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), review granted, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
249. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
250. See Webstad v. Stortini, 83 Wash. App. 857, 872, 924 P.2d 940, 948 (1996) (citing Strode v. Gleason, 9 Wash. App. 13, 17, 510 P.2d 250, 252 (1973)).
251. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
252. See Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms, Commerce in Firearms in the United States, at 23 (Feb. 2000) thereinafter Commerce in Firearms].
253. See id.
254. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
255. See Commerce in Firearms, supra note 252, at 8.
256. See Tom Diaz, Making a Killing: The Business of Guns in America 7 (1999).
257. See id. at 85.
258. See supra note 10.
259. See Susan Headden, Guns, Money and Medicine, U.S. News and World Report, July 1, 1996, at 30.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See City of Chicago v. Beretta, No. 98 CH 015596 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Apr. 6, 1999), First Am. Compl., at 61 (quoting Robert Hass, former senior vice-president for Smith & Wesson).
263. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 830 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). The Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute is a trade association to which most of the U.S. handgun manufacturers belong. See id.
264. See id. The pamphlet discusses membership support for adopting measures designed to prevent criminals from obtaining guns including imposing penalties against dealers who sell to unqualified persons or straw purchasers. See id.
265. See Fox Butterfield, Gun Flow to Criminals Laid to Tiny Fraction of Dealers, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1999, at A14.
266. See Steve Berry, Assault Rifle Used in Shooting Traced to Gun Maker in Maine, Seattle Times, Aug. 12, 1999, at A22.
267. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
268. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
269. See Chitra Ragavan, The U.S. Targets Gun Makers, U.S. News and World Rep., Dec. 20, 1999, at 26.
270. See Walsh & Vice, supra note 17, at A1. Smith & Wesson recently decided to adopt a number of measures designed to decrease gun fatalities including only supplying its handguns to licensed dealers who agree to a more stringent screening process of prospective buyers. See id. Smith & Wesson also agreed to refrain from advertising guns as "fingerprint proof." See Susan Milligan, New Safety Precautions Taken by Top Gun Maker, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 18, 2000, at A1.
271. See City of Chicago v. Bereite, No. 98 CH 015596 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Apr. 6, 1999), First Am. Compl., at 61 (quoting Robert Hass, former senior vice-president for Smith & Wesson).
272. See Office of U.S. Senator Charles Schumer, Schumer Study Reveals First Ever Evidence of Massive Gun Trafficking (Dec. 20, 1999) (press release).
273. See id.