Optimal Contracting, Accounting Standards, and Market Structures

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 243-276

  Kirschenheiter, Michael ^a  

^a Graduate School of Business ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347712276     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1999.tb00580.x     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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